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CHAPTER - 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE THESIS
In this chapter, I shall briefly outline what my 
thesis is about, why my research problem needed to be 
researched, and how I went about researching it. I also 
will present a summary of my research findings and 
implications for theory and practice together with the 
contents of the chapters of the thesis.
What The Thesis is About
This research addresses the complexities of strategy 
formulation, controllership functions and control systems 
in a Middle Eastern investment house - Mosnic - which has 
decentralized the management of its investment portfolios 
to a number of discretionary agents.
The thesis examined the process of strategy 
formulation and setting of investment goals in fast-moving 
and unpredictable financial markets. This involved the 
issue of selecting a portfolio of discretionary agents. 
This also emerged to be one of the most significant and 
difficult aspects of running the corporate control system 
in Mosnic.
The problem inherent in selecting the agents was due 
to two main reasons, namely 1- the difficulty in obtaining 
comparable data on the quality of performance of all the 
portfolio managers and 2- the subjectivity involved in
-2-
evaluating the means and methods (i.e. strategy, struc­
ture, and processes) of the intended portfolio managers.
The research also investigated the problem of 
managing different strategic decision levels which emerged 
from the involvement of the discretionary portfolio 
managers in the strategy formulation process. In such a 
process, portfolio managers advocated their rational 
economic and security analysis to justify their own sub­
strategies and models. However, while such an analysis 
was important, it remained the responsibility of the 
controllership function to interpret the objectives of the 
stakeholders to the portfolio of agents so that they could 
accommodate it in their analysis. Thus, considerable 
similarities were shown with regard to investment houses 
to Quinn*s (1988) conclusion related to large diversified 
manufacturing companies of the nature of strategy, al­
though there are some points of differences which will be 
discussed in Chapter 8. Hence, this thesis also attempts 
to enhance our understanding of how security analysis for 
resource allocation takes place in real life.
The thesis also examined the design and implementation 
of post-investment controls to deal with the monitoring 
and evaluation of the performance of different discretion­
ary portfolio managers. One of the major complexities 
which emanated from such a process was how to accommodate 
the strategies, structures, and processes of the different 
agents within Mosnic*s Corporate post-investment control 
system. Another dilemma which developed was how to hold
-3-
the discretionary agents accountable for their performance 
while taking into consideration the involvement of Mosnic 
in the investment decision making process.
The thesis also discussed the role of the Corporate 
Controller and how it was influenced by the upheavals in 
the international, political and economic scene. It also 
highlighted the mixture of both the advisory and function­
al nature of that role. This threw light on the complexity 
of Mosnicfs control system and its Controller's role.
Another theme which was considered in this research 
is how the controllership function in investment houses 
was affected by the requirement of the Owners of the 
organization who adhere to their religious beliefs in 
their business dealings and transactions. This tended to 
trigger the need for different controls role to cope with 
the accountability of non-Muslim agents who work for 
Muslim principals.
Why Was the Research Needed?
Funds expatriated from the Middle East (and other 
parts of the world) to the global financial markets for 
discretionary investment amount to hundreds of billions of 
U.S. dollars. The Middle Eastern discretionary portfolios 
invested in the global markets are held by individual 
owners, offshore incorporations, public institutions, 
local financial institutions and different investment 
funds.
-4-
However, there is insufficient understanding of the 
detailed processes by which these discretionary funds are 
managed. Indeed, the strategy formulation process of such 
expatriated financial assets and their returns cannot be 
adequately explained from the available academic strategy 
and finance literature. Also, the corporate control 
problems resulting from the process of decentralizing the 
management of funds to external portfolio managers has not 
been examined in the finance, accounting, strategic 
control, agency, or professional literature. One of the 
major themes emerging from this research is the lack of 
appreciation in the finance literature of the inter­
disciplinary nature of the investment decision-making 
process although academics (e.g. Tomkins 1991) have 
recently started to draw attention to this important 
issue.
Perhaps one of the main reasons which contribute to 
the lack of research in the problems tackled in this 
thesis is that it requires access to sensitive information 
which investment houses would not usually be willing to 
grant.
How Was The Research Conducted?
In early 1987 I was made aware of the opportunity to 
read part time for a research degree at the University of 
Bath. This was when it was proposed to me and a former 
colleague of mine at Arthur Young International (AYI) the 
notion of doing research about our own organizations. I
was thrilled with the idea, but also thought of the demand 
which the research would put on my time as a Corporate 
Controller of Mosnic where at that time I had completed 
one year.
Prior to joining Mosnic, I was a senior audit manager 
with AYI having worked with them for nearly ten years. My 
journey of experience with AYI provided me with a wealth 
of technical knowledge of accounting and auditing 
practices, particularly as I had to deal with different 
types of large and small organizations.
However, whereas the nature of my work with AYI was 
mainly geared towards the technical aspects of control 
systems, in Mosnic I found that I had to deal more with 
the behavioural and organizational aspects of control 
systems. Nevertheless, my experience in AYI seemed to 
have influenced the way I approached my job in Mosnic. I 
was more concerned with establishing control procedures as 
explained in Chapter 3.
However, I gradually started to realize that the role 
of controller in investment houses was broader than I had 
envisaged initially because it dealt with risk management 
where the owners* objectives were continuously shifting in 
response to volatile financial markets. This meant that I 
had to learn how to cope with the interaction between the 
owners of Mosnic and their portfolio managers. On the 
other hand, I hardly had any knowledge of concepts like 
strategy formulation and strategic control nor was I able
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to explain the complexities of the strategy and control 
processes in Mosnic.
It was with this state of mind that I started my
research degree at Bath University. At the beginning, I 
wrestled to understand the academic language of my 
research supervisors. My concept of academic research at 
that time was very vague. I thought that, given my
knowledge of investment houses and my experience at AYI
together with the data I had at my finger tips, I could 
easily meet the requirements of a doctorate. Such beliefs 
proved to be very naive as I started to struggle to 
fulfill the demands of my supervisors who initially 
advised me to pile up my data in the form of rich 
descriptive cases. This came to be known between me and 
my supervisors as the "pile it high syndrome". This 
process continued for sometime until I was able to shape 
the data in the form required. While I was going through 
this painful process, I was asked by my supervisors to 
start acquainting myself with the research methodology 
literature. In fact, the supervisors also helped by giving 
me and my research colleague who was also working for a 
Ph.D., some seminars on this literature. It was only then 
that I began to appreciate that the nature of my research 
is what Glaser and Strauss (1979) call grounded theory and 
that I was using the case study research method.
Fig. 1.1 attempts to depict the above process. It 
reflects my position at the start of the research and the 
stage of the research in which I was exposed to the rele­
vant academic literature while documenting my practice. 
Initially I was confined to my observation of practice and 
then gradually started to learn about the research 
methodology literature. As time passed by, I expanded the 
observation of my practice, but also was led by my 
supervisors to appreciate the need to consult the relevant 
literature as my research problem became clearer. The 
former process involved building a conceptual framework 
(see Fig. 4.1) from the analysis of the initial case 
study. This was later developed into a detailed 
conceptual framework (see Fig. 7.6) from the analysis of 
five case studies (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) on the interaction 
between Mosnic and some of its portfolio managers.
However, by the time I finished my field work and 
developed my theory, I was widening my survey of the 
literature in order to relate the relevant areas to my 
research problem. This painful process, which required 
from me considerable time and effort, continued until the 
end of the research as explained in more depth in Chapter 
8.
The above process meant that it would be more 
appropriate to place the literature review towards the end 
of the thesis after I had presented to the reader my field 
research and the conceptual frameworks I had developed. 
However, this approach also meant that I needed to discuss 
certain concepts, e.g. (the use of return on investment 
(ROI) in evaluating the performance of portfolio mangers; 
the relevance of the Modern Portfolio Theory and the risk
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adjusted rate of return in managing the risk to which 
investment houses are exposed) which emerged while I was 
developing my theory, in isolation from what is advocated 
in the literature. In Chapters 8 and 9 the relevant liter­
ature is reviewed and such concepts are examined accord­
ingly. Thus, the reader is requested throughout the thesis 
until chapters 8 and 9 to be patient when he/she comes 
across a discussion of such concepts. They will be 
discussed later on and related to their use in current 
academic literature.
The reader will realize from my above description of 
the way I conducted my research that I have used the case 
study method as my sole research vehicle. This was 
necessary because in order to get detailed understanding 
of the research problem's processes, I needed to present a 
thick description of what actually occurred in Mosnic and 
its relationships with discretionary agents. This was 
essential because the academic and professional literature 
has not described the process by which investment houses 
actually develop their strategies and control the port­
folio managers to whom they decentralize the management of 
their discretionary funds. Indeed, given such a gap in the 
literature, the only way I could have developed my 
research was by writing the lengthy case studies which I 
present in Chapters 3, 5 and 6.
In this respect two points need to be spelled out. 
First, the case study of Mosnic was written in a chronolo­
gical order to give the reader a flavour of the sequence
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of developments which took place in this organization and 
a description of the process of the changes which were 
introduced to cope with these developments. Second, addi­
tional case studies were presented to enhance our under­
standing of the broad working hypotheses which were 
generated from the case of Mosnic. Indeed, the notion of 
developing additional case studies to provide further 
information on issues raised in an initial case study 
should be of interest to those attempting to highlight the 
advantages of case studies for accounting research (e.g. 
Scapens 1990) as well as to those who are calling for more 
field research in accounting (e.g. Tomkins and Groves 
1983; Kaplan 1984; Bruns and Kaplan 1987).
It is worthy noting that throughout the whole research 
process I had lengthy interactions with my supervisors who 
also visited the Middle East a number of times as part of 
the research process. These visits were shared by myself 
and my research colleague who was completing a different 
thesis. The very lengthy discussions with my supervisors 
were tape recorded. This helped me to capture the 
"nuggets” of the debates which sometimes ended up in my 
drafts and chapters being either completely or partially 
torn apart.
Contents of the Thesis
Chapter 2, which presents the methodology pursued in 
this research, elaborates on the advantages and 
limitations of practitioner research. The Chapter also
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reviews the use-fulness of case studies as a research 
vehicle in addressing problems (similar to the one of this 
thesis) which require in-depth information. The
qualitative nature of the research methodology adopted in 
the thesis was dictated by the need for detailed 
documentation on the intricacies of the control processes 
in investment houses like Mosnic.
The case of Mosnic is presented in Chapter 3. The 
reader is informed about the developments which took place 
in Mosnic*s control system and controllership function in 
dealing with discretionary portfolio managers. The Chapter 
also reveals the goals and strategy of Mosnic as well as 
the requirement of its owners to have their resources 
invested in accordance with their religious precepts. The 
uncertainties of the international financial markets in 
which Mosnic's funds are invested and the developments in 
the telecommunication technology which helped the company 
to cope with the changes in these markets are also 
illustrated in the Chapter.
The case of Mosnic is analyzed in Chapter 4. Several 
working hypotheses were generated to reflect the major 
factors (environment, goals, strategy) which affected the 
control systems and the controllership function in the 
company. A conceptual framework was developed to summarize 
these relationships as well as to enable the reader to have 
an initial overview of the research problem. The limita­
tions of the conceptual framework are also highlighted.
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However, the initial case study does not cast light 
on the processes of selecting and de-selecting Mosnic*s 
portfolio managers nor does it show how they affect the 
company*s control system and controllership function. The 
three case studies presented in Chapter 5 demonstrate the 
problems which Mosnic encountered in developing its pre­
investment control processes to deal with three of its 
portfolio managers and how these controls were affected by 
the latter's attributes.
The two case studies presented in Chapter 6 describe 
how the post-investment control processes in Mosnic were 
affected by several attributes of two portfolio managers. 
These case studies were intended to enable the reader to 
appreciate how the development of the control systems to 
monitor and evaluate portfolio managers are a result of 
the interaction between the owners of Mosnic and their 
agents.
The five case studies also project the importance of 
the role of the Corporate Controller both in coordinating 
the processes involved in the pre-and post-investment 
controls and as a gatekeeper in the owners-agents 
interaction process.
The relationships emerging from the analysis of the 
five case studies are produced in Chapter 7. It is sugges­
ted that the strategy, structure and process of the port­
folio managers themselves influence the design of control 
systems and controllership function of their parent
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investment houses like Mosnic. The initial conceptual 
framework, which was developed in Chapter 4, was then 
adjusted to take on board these relationships to produce 
the theory contributed by this thesis.
In Chapter 8, an attempt was made to highlight the 
similarities and differences between the theory developed 
in this thesis and what is advocated in the literature on 
strategy formulation, strategic and operational control. 
In Chapter 9, the thesis addresses the implications for 
the literature on finance theory and agency theory. One of 
the significant themes which emerged from the latter exer­
cise was that the finance theorists could significantly 
advance their resource allocation theories if they would 
draw from the management control literature to appreciate 
and consider the complexities involved in the investment 
decision making process.
The professional literature, which is available on 
the subject of this thesis, is also reviewed in Chapter 9. 
This is followed by an examination of the implications of 
the findings emerging from the case of Mosnic for 
practice. Implications for practice, suggestions for 
future research and concluding remarks are presented in 
chapter 10.
Implications and Findings
The findings emerging from this research indicate 
that there is a legitimate place for practitioner research 
in accounting and finance. However, although this type of
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research is important,in comparison with more conventional 
styles (e.g. quantitative research conducted by academics 
and graduate students), it should not be viewed as a 
replacement for them.
The research also provides very interesting insights 
on the strategy formulation and control processes in 
investment houses specialized in marketable securities. 
These insights are consistent with more recent thinking on 
the incremental nature of corporate strategy formulation 
and control. The thesis also projects a different, more 
informal role for the Corporate Controller in these 
processes.
A complete theory covering the management of 
investment houses specialized in marketable securities 
needs to cover a number of different areas. At the moment, 
we have techniques reasonably well-developed by the Modern 
Portfolio Theory and also some recent work has been 
carried out on the Agency Theory. However, this study 
reveals the strategic and controllership aspects required 
for the development of a complete theory on this type of 
organization.
-is-
CHAPTER - 2 
THE APPROACH TO THIS THESIS
Objectives and Outline
The research methodology of this thesis builds on the 
use of the case study method and the concept of
practitioner research. However, as there is still
insufficient work of this nature in accounting and 
finance, and particularly in finance, it will be useful to 
reconsider the advantages and limitations of (1) the case 
study as a research method; and (2) practitioner research.
The Case Study Method: Advantages and Limitations
The Need for the Case Study Method.
A range of different authors (Hopwood 1983; Tomkins 
and Groves 1983; Kaplan 1984, 1986; Bruns and Kaplan 1987) 
have argued for the need for more case study research in 
accounting and finance. However, this is now well 
established and well known. Just Scapens (1990) and Yin 
(1984) will be used to illustrate the argument for the use 
of the case study method.
Scapens (1990) examines different uses which can be 
made of case studies in management accounting. He argues
that accounting researchers in the U.K. have grown more
interested in management accounting as practiced. He 
adds:
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"This interest was initially prompted by a 
perceived gap between the theory and practice 
of management accounting and especially the 
generally held belief that the conventional 
wisdom of management accounting is not widely 
used in practice." (P.259)
Yin (1984) explains why investigators continue to use 
case study methods by stating that:
"One explanation is that some people just do 
not know any better and are not trained to use 
alternative methods." (P.10)
He further argues that:
" case studies continue to be used
extensively in social science research.... The 
method is also a frequent mode of thesis and 
dissertation research in all of these 
disciplines and fields." (P.10)
In addition, he adds that:
"In general, case studies are the preferred 
strategy when "How" or "Why" questions are 
being posed, when the investigator has little 
control over events, and when the focus is on 
a contemporary phenomenon within some real- 
life context." (P. 13)
Yin believes that direct observation is an advantage 
of case study strategy. He claims that:
"the case study relies on many of the same 
techniques as a history, but it adds two 
sources of evidence not usually included in 
historians' repertoire: direct observation and 
systematic interviewing." (P.19)
Based on the previous theoretical arguments, the case 
study method was used in this research to describe in 
detail how events happened in the organization to be 
studied. However, it is necessary to be aware of the
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limitations of the case study methods in order to attempt 
to overcome them in the research. This will be dealt with 
in the following section.
Limitations of the Case Study Method.
The use of the case study method in research has its 
limitations. Some of these limitations are pointed out by 
management research methodology theorists. A principal 
criticism of case study methods is that they are 
unrepresentative. For example, Smith (1990) argues that 
theoretical conclusions derived from case studies are not 
considered to be valid unless the cases' can be 
demonstrated to be 1 typical ’ of the phenomena under 
investigation.
However, such an argument does not seem to be so 
applicable to practitioner research because the 
practitioner tends to maintain a holistic knowledge of the 
organizations with which he deals and so he has already a 
sense of whether the case has general application. On the 
other hand, an outside researcher who mainly depends on 
the case study method may not be able to broaden his data 
particularly if the process being described is changing 
over time. Hence, the situation described by the practiti­
oner is more likely to have general representation.
On the other hand, considerable theoretical arguments 
have been put forward to show the irrelevance of the 
representativeness problem of the case study approach.
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Smith (1990) suggests that:
" the problem of representativeness may be­
come temporarily irrelevant either by choosing to 
view case studies as appropriate to exploratory 
work only, or by making them representative thro­
ugh the application of quantitative procedures. 
However, both solutions still accept the espiste- 
mological requirement for representativeness. One 
may, alternatively, view it as absolutely 
irrelevant." (P.13)
He further argues that:
"Representativeness is irrelevant for many rese­
arch purposes, particularly when the distinction 
is made between logical and statistical infe­
rence. The validity of explanations or theory 
derived from case studies depends on the logic of 
the analysis and acknowledgment of ceteris
paribus conditions, not on how typical the cases 
may be." (P. 4)
Yin (1984) has also enumerated the following
prejudices against the case study strategy:
(1) "  single and multi-case studies have been
viewed as a less desirable form of inquiry 
than either experiments or surveys." (P.21); 
(2)" .... they provide very little basis for 
scientific generalization. How can you 
generalize from a single case? is a frequently 
heard questions." (P. 21); (3) "they take too 
long and result in massive, unreadable 
documents." (P. 21)
A major complaint about the case study method in this 
particular research is that it is an endeavour to confine 
to a few pages (by limited description), an interactive, 
changing and shifting process. It cannot reflect the 
daily events and processes which take place inside the 
organization. The reflection of all that takes place in 
the phenomena to be studied may reguire thousands of 
pages to describe. The practitioner deals with an on­
going social context which cannot be described in the 
limited space available.
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However, this problem is less likely to affect the 
validity of the work of the practitioner because the 
latter has the insight to select the most recursive but 
significant incidents to make detailed rich description 
of the phenomenon being studied. In other words, the 
insight of the practitioner helps him to recount what is 
and is not significant of his daily incidents to be 
included in the case study.
Scapens (1990) adds to the weaknesses and problems of 
case studies by arguing that:
"First, there is difficulty of drawing boundaries 
around the subject matter of the case. The holi­
stic perspective emphasizes the importance of 
relating parts of social systems to the larger 
system of which they are part. But how far should 
a researcher expand the case in studying inter­
relations with larger systems? A similar problem 
occurs in the historical dimensions, as social 
systems and practices evolve through time... How 
far back in time should the case study researcher 
probe?" (P. 276)
Adding to the problems of the case study method, 
Scapens also points to the ethics of the researcherfs 
relationship with the subject. His argument on ethics 
states that:
"Many accounting case studies require access to 
organizations and to confidential information." 
(P. 277)
The above limitations of the case study method were 
taken into consideration in this practitioner research. 
With regard to the problem of how far back in time should 
the researcher probe, I have attempted to include the
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historical information which I considered was relevant for 
the era since I started with Mosnic until the present 
time. As for the ethical problem which stems from the 
release of confidential information, I have tried to 
include all the relevant information without jeopardizing 
the interest of the organizations involved in the research.
In the next section, I discuss the advantages and 
limitations of the practitioner research and how it 
attempts to make the best use of the case study method in 
this context.
Relevance of Practitioner Research
Accounting academics (e.g. the authors cited at the
beginning of the chapter) have recently started to
appreciate the need for more field research. Tomkins and
Groves argue that
••academics might profitably move more into 
detailed field-work (i.e. recording what is 
happening in the setting within which decisions 
are made and action occurs) and focus rather more 
on studying how practitioners perceive their 
worlds, what issues concern them, why these 
issues concern them and how they perceive them 
affecting accounting practices and the influence 
accounting has." (1983: 364 emphasis in original)
They further claim that
uin this way it is far more likely that academic 
research can be linked up with practitioners and 
their views of the world; in this way it is more 
likely that reliable theories about accounting in 
action and theories about the effects of alterna­
tive accounting procedures can be developed."
(P.364), emphasis in original).
On the other' hand, Bruns and Kaplan (1987) justify their 
call for more field research in accounting on the grounds 
that:
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"since management accounting phenomena exist 
only in complex organizations, with their rich 
interaction of people, products, processes, 
markets, technologies, and cultures, it becomes 
extremely difficult to study the subject except 
in actual organizational settings; management 
accounting systems must be studied in the 
settings where they have been developed and where 
they function. (pp. 1-2, emphasis in original)
The concept of practitioner research advocated and 
implemented by this thesis attempts to give an additional 
dimension to the call of the above academics for field 
research.
The practitioner, as a researcher of his own 
organization, might be qualified to have more insights 
than the academic getting close to the practitioner. This 
is due to his continuous presence in the scene of the 
research as part of the organization. Such a privileged 
position, enables the practitioner to sharpen his insights 
from the field throughout the whole research process. 
This is supported by Glaser and Strauss (1979) who argue 
that:
"The root source of all significant theorizing is 
the sensitive insights of the observer himself.
As every one knows these can come...while at 
work..." (P.251)
Also, due to his presence at work, the practitioner 
enjoys an early and mature knowledge of the data he uses 
to ground his theory. The insights which the practitioner 
is bound to gain from his involvement in the day to day 
problems of his organization, qualifies him to bring to 
light the complexities of the problem he addresses. 
Indeed, Otley believes that:
-22-
"it is unrealistic to expect purely statistical 
methods of analysis to unravel a complex pattern 
of interaction. The researcher must have a 
closer involvement and develop hypotheses as to 
likely relationships as he explores the 
organization he is exploring." (1980:424)
From a different perspective, Emory (1980) argues 
that a practical problem-solving emphasis is a critical 
feature of applied research. To Emory, one should expect 
such studies to be closely related to action or policy 
needs. He further argues that pure research is also 
problem solving but in a different sense. He adds that 
pure research is aimed at solving perplexing questions 
i.e. problems of a theoretical nature that have little 
direct impact on action or policy decisions. Hence, to 
Emory, both applied and pure research are problem 
directed, but applied research is much more decision 
directed. Nevertheless, this study attempted to produce 
theory from the Controller's insights and compare it with 
existing theory. Thus, it aimed to provide theoretical 
explanations to real world problem in addition to 
highlighting policy making proposition.
In addition to the previous theoretical arguments in 
favour of practitioner research, the following advantages 
should also be appreciated. The author of this thesis is 
involved in the decisions and control problems of the 
organization to be studied. Such a privileged position 
was utilized in this research to produce knowledge through 
interpreting the pragmatic decision and control problems 
of real life.
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Furthermore, the author of this thesis has continuous 
access to information and data required for the research. 
An outside researcher would not have been able to have 
access to information in the manner that was available to 
the practitioner conducting this study. Indeed, beside 
his involvement as a Corporate Controller, the author has 
also been the custodian and the manager of information for 
Mosnic. Thus, to give strong support to the theory 
advocated in this thesis, the researcher depended on first 
hand information.
The involvement of the researcher in solving the 
control problems of Mosnic helped in enriching the data 
that was used in the qualitative analysis. On the other 
hand, unlike the practitioner, a researcher who does not 
have the privileged position of participating in solving 
the real life problems of his organization is likely to 
develop interest in his research only after familiarizing 
himself with the problem.
A further advantage of this research approach is that 
the researcher attempted to provide an explanation to 
complex decision and control problems of real life 
situation through the development of a conceptual 
framework based on the rich information that was available 
to him.
This research developed working hypotheses to broaden 
our understanding of the theoretical associations between 
the variables incorporating the research contingency
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model. The advancement of our understanding of the 
working hypotheses were to be achieved through further 
detailed case studies on specific agents operating as 
portfolio managers for Mosnic.
One of the advantages of the qualitative approach of 
this research is that it did not depend on either 
statistical inference or cases from outside to 
substantiate the validity of its analysis. The researcher 
in this situation was part of the phenomenon under 
investigation from the start to the end. Thus, the 
approach to this thesis is in agreement with Karim et. al 
(1989) who argue that:
"While, obviously, broad statistical analyses can 
add considerably to human knowledge, such work 
in accounting seems to have resulted in loss of 
relevance in terms of both accounting research 
to practitioners and the set of measures which 
management accounting systems produce in today$s 
environment." (P.3 & 4)
One can add to the above arguments that, through 
quantitative data analysis, the relationships between the 
contingent variables of this research would be difficult 
to observe. The researcher had the opportunity to sharpen 
his observations through interaction with the senior 
executives involved in decision making, i.e. either 
stakeholders or discretionary portfolio managers. Outside 
researchers may not be successful in observing the 
processual interaction between constructs of the 
contingent variables which determine the features of 
control system in this context. An outsider could conduct 
this research but would be remote from the inside source
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of information used in decision processes. This actually 
involves the risk of not ensuring the quality of data the 
outsider would use in his analysis.
Based on the above, one can suggest that conducting 
accounting research through practitioners can enrich the 
field study research and may make it less costly. Less 
costly because an ordinary research student would find it 
difficult to bear the costs to obtain evidence from 
portfolio managers scattered in the most expensive cities 
in the West e.g. the banking and financial centres in 
Geneva, London, New York, etc.
Field research methods alone cannot give insights of 
the theory produced. Validity of the theory produced by 
field research can gain more support from the involvement 
of the practitioner in the field study. The limited 
presence of the academic researcher in the field of 
research, or the distant presence of the field researcher 
from the phenomenon under study after collecting limited 
data are problems for accounting research. The methodology 
in this research overcomes that problem. Indeed, Tomkins 
and Groves (1983) have expressed the complaint of 
practitioners about accounting research as follows:
"Very little accounting research has been publi­
shed of this naturalistic type. This, in itself, 
may be a fundamental reason why practitioners 
often claim that accounting research is of 
little relevance to accounting practice(P.364)
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Based on the approach of this thesis, one can add 
that there is likely to be more relevance in the manage­
ment accounting researches conducted by practitioners than 
those conducted even by academics who usually stay for 
only a short time at the site of the research.
The approach of this research also addresses the 
problem of internal validity suffered by field research 
methods. The work of Bruns and Kaplan (1987) has 
highlighted the internal validity problem as follows:
"field research methods, in contrast, tend to be 
high on external validity and low on internal 
validity." (P.3)
However, practitioner research is likely to reduce 
the problem of internal validity suffered by the field 
research methods. This is because given that he is close 
to his data, the experience of the practitioner helps him 
to understand it better and, therefore, be able to select 
freely the important explanatory variables and not to 
overlook or fail to observe significant alternative 
explanations.
In their concern about applying grounded theory, 
Glaser and Strauss (1979) have discussed how theory has 
been developed in order to facilitate its application in 
daily situation by sociologists and Laymen. They argue 
that:
"The practical application of grounded sociolo­
gical theory, whether substantive or formal, 
requires developing a theory with (at least) 
four highly inter-related properties. The first 
requisite property is that the theory must
-27
closely fit the substantive area in which it 
will be used. Second, it must be readily 
understandable by laymen concerned with this 
area.
Third, it must be sufficiently general to be 
applicable to a multitude of diverse daily 
situations within the substantive area, not just 
to a specific type of situation. Fourth, it must 
allow the user partial control over the struc­
ture and process of daily situations as they 
change through time." (P.237)
The argument of the author of this thesis is that the 
involvement of executives in accounting research can help 
to satisfy the requisites specified by Glaser and Strauss 
to a considerable extent. This point leads us to draw from 
the argument of Emory (1980) who argues that executives 
who once functioned effectively by relying on their own 
experience and informal analysis, need to be better 
equipped to manage in the future. He adds that, even 
though the major interests of the executives lie 
elsewhere, they must be able to do research for themselves 
and others. Students in management areas can, therefore, 
benefit from knowledge contributed- by the practitioners 
because the latter are best positioned to produce theories 
of high external validity. Thus readers can extrapolate 
the finding to similar organizations.
The previous arguments regarding the applicability of 
the practitioner1s research, its credibility, and signifi­
cance lead us to draw a number of conclusions. As said 
previously, the practitioner has easy access to decision 
making and control data because he participates in both 
processes. Thus, the practitioner's privileged position
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helps him to overcome many of the limitations suffered by 
scholars who conduct field researches to generate grounded 
knowledge. However, the latters* access to information 
could be restricted by the members of the organization. 
On the other hand, the practitioner is more qualified to 
give more depth to the research than an outsider. The 
latter may suffer lack of experience with the industry 
under research.
The practitioner uses first hand evidence to ground 
his theory while the outside researcher may depend on
intermediation to obtain the necessary data from the
organization. In other words, uninvolved researchers may 
need to interview executives in the organizations to
elicit the necessary data. However, unlike the case of 
the practitioner, even with such a mechanism it would be 
difficult to describe complex processes for ensuring the 
quality of data. In fact, the practitioner has the 
opportunity of testing the quality of data before using it 
for analysis purpose. In addition, the risk of conducting 
research through outsiders is that members of the 
organization to be studied may respond formally,
conservatively and cautiously to such information
gathering process. Indeed, executives are usually 
reluctant to disclose sensitive information to an 
outsider.
The possession of first hand information and the 
continuous surveillance of the phenomenon to be studied 
enables the practitioner to develop a relevant theory
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which, if well argued, would be difficult to reject by 
more data or replaced by another theory.
Having enumerated the merits of practitioner research, 
it is now appropriate to caution the reader with the 
limitations of this type of research. This is done in the 
next section.
Limitations of Practitioner Research
The risk of this type of research is that the 
practitioner has the tendency to look into everything in 
his real world. He is accustomed to describing the minute 
details of the decision making processes of his real 
world. Hence, he has the tendency to give more information 
than necessary. His job in business is the surveillance 
of a very limited situation in depth. This may expose the 
practitioner researcher to lack of clarity of concepts. 
This is because over-description of the phenomenon to be 
studied might trigger numerous but unrelated issues.
The audiences of this research are from different 
backgrounds. For example, we have the investors, the 
controllers in investment departments in big companies, 
the global portfolio managers and academics. Thus, the 
approach of this research may have problems in satisfying 
the requirements of the different audiences. The
practitioners are expected to be seeking solutions for 
their problems in a clearly prescribed way. This research 
cannot describe every action that a portfolio manager
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would need to do in order to develop a good investment 
model. On the other hand, a controller in an investment 
house would expect to read a description of an accounting 
control system that he can adapt to his own investment 
house. Indeed, the author of this research is not aiming 
to conduct management consultancy. However, it is planned 
in this study to address fundamental issues which can help 
different audiences to perceive their different concerns 
from a new perspective.
The practitioner, while researching a problem 
academically, cannot reflect all the bits and parts of the 
iterative decision making and control processes he lives 
everyday. Moreover, he may be confronted with the problem 
of changing processes in the organization being researched 
as the researched goes on. On the one hand, he has deeper 
insight than the academic field researcher because he sees 
all the movements and shifts taking place in the 
organization which the academic researcher may well miss 
especially if he was only allowed limited visits to the 
organizations. On the other hand, this also provide a 
problem to the practitioner because he has to try to 
unravel key concepts from a much more complex set of data 
which is changing through time.
The practitioner may be critical of the simplicity of 
the research conceptual framework which obviously does not 
encompass completely the processes lived by the 
practitioner.' He is accustomed to interacting in a 
processual manner with his surroundings to formulate
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decisions and to exercise control.
Practitioners may even have the tendency to ignore the 
research framework. They might have a tendency to drift 
away from academic research and seek a solution for a 
certain decision in a specific situation. Therefore, 
they might seek specific action courses to help them to 
make a decision. In that sense, there is a risk of the 
practitioner becoming a decision consultant rather than 
undertaking the role of an academic researcher.
The practitioner is usually surrounded by a huge 
amount of information. Hence, in conducting academic 
research, the practitioner would need to select the 
relevant information that would fit his research problem. 
However, this may require skillful abilities which the 
practitioner may not posses and would need to develop in 
order to identify the "wood from the trees".
The practitioner1s decision-making style may not 
coincide in all respects with academic research 
methodology. The first involves courses of action while 
the latter enhances literature and develops arguments. 
The lack of coincidence of approach is ascribed to the 
difference in the task of the executive and the goal of 
the academic researcher. This means that the practitioner 
may require more time to adapt to the academic research 
mission.
Practitioners have the tendency of reporting in their 
own style. Their reporting cannot be called ‘research1.
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Change of the reporting style is a problem for practition­
ers and it may consume a considerable part of the research 
time.
Conclusion
This chapter justified the research methodology 
pursued in this research. The advantages and limitations 
of the case study method were highlighted together with 
the concept of practitioner research. In the next 
chapter, the initial case study of Mosnic is presented.
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CHAPTER - 3 
THE INITIAL CASE STUDY 
(The case of Mosnic)
Objectives and Outline
The objectives of this Chapter are to describe how 
Mosnic, an Investment House located in the Islamic World, 
operates and to highlight its major characteristics. This 
will not include how Mosnic operates with specific 
portfolio managers as this will be covered later in the 
thesis. Nevertheless, the chapter gives a lot of details 
about Mosnic as an investment house.
This case study is divided into three parts. Part (A) 
presents basic description (characteristics) of Mosnic. 
Part (B) emphasizes the investment decision levels in 
Mosnic. In part (A) Sections 1 and 2 describe the 
formation of Mosnic, the nature of its business, the 
organizational goals, the stakeholders' conception of 
investment risk and the evolution of Mosnic in terms of 
managerial and organizational aspects. These sections 
point out that Mosnic's goals are defined by its 
stakeholders who interact with the fast-moving and often 
unpredictable global financial markets. The section bn 
goals also discusses the impact of the Islamic religious 
beliefs of the stakeholders on their goals. The section 
also explains how the investors in this context perceive 
and manage investment risk.
Part (A) also examines the need for the structure 
maintained by Mosnic. Section 3 addresses the issue of why
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Mosnic needs to operate through agents. This section 
concludes that as a result of decentralizing investment 
decision to agents, certain strategy and control problems 
emerge. Hence, to address these problems, Mosnic needed to 
look for a Corporate Financial Controller.
Sections 4 and 5 in part (A) elaborately tell the story 
of how the Corporate Controller was recruited, without 
clearly perceiving the job required from him, and how he 
developed his own job description in cooperation with the 
company President. In particular, section 5 shows how the 
Corporate Controller found a lack of clarity about how 
Mosnic operated. To remove this, the Corporate Controller 
surveyed two levels at which investment decisions are 
taken in Mosnic namely the principals level and the agents 
level. Hence, this chapter describes two decision and 
control levels.
In part (B), section 6 explains the types of the 
corporate decisions taken at the level of the principal 
stakeholders without the direct involvement of the agents. 
Section 7 discusses, in general terms, the strategic 
decision making problems at the corporate level. Section 
8 gives an idea about how agents undertake their fiduciary 
management role within the overall investment process 
while section 9 provides an integrated view of the whole 
investment decision processes.
In this chapter, it is argued that one of the most 
significant decision processes in Mosnic was the selection 
of agents to manage the security investments. Maintaining
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the portfolio of the agents and evaluating the performance 
of the discretionary portfolios were also found equally 
important aspects of the corporate control system.
Part (C) is concerned with the Controllers 
preliminary thoughts and his initial perception of the 
decision and control problems. This part concludes the 
chapter by identifying the general control problems 
inherent in the selection of agents. Part (c) also 
discusses the corporate investment portfolio appraisal
problems resulting from decentralization to external
agents. The conclusions of the Chapter are presented in 
Section 10.
(A) BASIC DESCRIPTION OF MOSNIC
1. FORMATION AND NATURE OF BUSINESS
Mosnic is an off-shore investment house owned by a 
group of investors. The company was formed in 1970 to
invest the surplus funds of its owners in the 
international financial markets through portfolio
managers. In other words, Mosnic*s investments are 
decentralized to a number of external portfolio managers 
mainly operating in Western and Pacific financial markets. 
Portfolio managers are given a considerable degree of 
discretion over how they invest the company's funds put 
into their care.
In term& of resource allocation, Mosnic invests 
mainly in financial assets, particularly marketable 
securities which represent 90% of the total holdings. The
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financial assets held by Mosnic are divided up over a 
number of discretionary portfolio managers. Thus, 
maintaining the portfolio of agents and evaluating their 
performance represented the major feature of Mosnic 
control system.
There was no specific number of agents set to be
maintained by Mosnic. This depended on how the
stakeholders viewed diversification and risk spread. The
articles of incorporation of Mosnic specify the areas of
business in which it can operate as follows.
" The purchase, sale of marketable securities in the 
global stock, capital and money markets, dealing in the 
precious metals, the purchase, sale, exchange, lease and 
negotiating of properties whether movable or immovable, 
over and above other commercial or financial operation 
as well as participation in other corporations, or the 
acquisition by purchase of the whole corporate capital 
of enterprises."
The asset managers (the agents) were given 
discretionary powers to invest on behalf of Mosnic in the 
global financial markets but at Mosnic*s own risk. The 
fiduciary portfolio managers obviously undertook a major 
role in investment decision making which involved never- 
ending interaction processes between Mosnic and its 
agents. This projected the importance of post-investment 
monitoring of agents and the evaluation of their 
performance.
The fiduciary investment policy adopted by Mosnic led 
to complex financial relations with the agents. Beside the 
control problems stemming from the interaction processes, 
agents selection and de-selection was a complicated
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decision perpetually interacting with the investment 
strategy. Agent performance measurement was also a 
problem. The interaction processes made it difficult to 
define the effective agent in a clear cut manner. It 
seemed that Mosnic was struggling to be rational, dynamic, 
and to maintain a portfolio of agents who could achieve 
acceptable performance. However, it was difficult to 
manage these contradictory aspects without a Controller. 
These were contradictory because the principals did not 
want simplistic dependency on rate of return on investment 
(ROI) for evaluating portfolio managers1 performance. In 
fact, the records of the company hardly showed a fiduciary 
relationship being terminated due to unsatisfactory 
performance of agents. The reasons had to be explored.
Before the employment of the Corporate Controller the 
absence of a Corporate Financial Control Department with 
clear responsibilities meant that attending to information 
about intended agents was an unorganized process. Thus, 
trust dominated the major decisions in Mosnic at that 
time. This situation created a range of control system 
problems.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MOSNIC'S 
MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION
From the company's inception through to 1990, Mosnic 
evolved from an organization small in size (number of 
personnel) and simple in structure (limited number of 
agents) to a ’ relatively large organization managing a 
sizeable portfolio of agents. The company also
experienced growth in its financial assets. This projected
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the need for further diversification of risk. The growth 
of investments was associated with an increase in the 
number of the fiduciary asset managers working with 
Mosnic. As the need arose for more agents to manage the 
growing financial assets, Mosnic tended to improve the 
system of both choosing and controlling the appropriate 
agents. Accordingly, and as said previously, decision and 
control at the corporate and the agents level became a 
function of the principal-agent interaction. The
managerial and the organizational developments in Mosnic 
are described in the following paragraphs in a 
chronological order.
THE 1970 - 1982 ERA
During this period, the amount of expatriated assets 
was not material. The investment decisions were confined 
to small transactions with some leading commercial banks 
of brand names. Moreover, the time of stakeholders was 
mostly devoted to their local businesses (the cash cows). 
The brand name agents were simply selected based on their 
general reputation. The directors hardly thought of 
rigorous pre-decision analysis to choose an agent. The 
whole operation was on trust.
Mosnic was relatively small in terms of the number of 
the in-house personnel. Due to the limited size of 
operations, decentralization was not a major managerial 
issue. Thus, agent performance evaluation and control were 
given little importance. The principals were of the
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opinion that "money management is an easy enjoyable game." 
After the simple process of selecting brand name agents, 
unlimited trust was vested on them. These agents were 
considered by the principals to be of high expertise and 
dependable to the extent that the principals would deal 
with them directly without realizing the need to 
intermediate any in-house Corporate Controller.
Hence, there was no formal system to select, monitor 
and evaluate the performance of the agents in the post­
investment phase. There was no corporate strategy nor was 
there a business plan to be monitored in the post­
investment stage. Corporate investment goal setting was 
handled in a dynamic manner corresponding to the market 
circumstance. Hence, the strategy process was
unprogrammed. Agents almost had a free hand in the 
financial strategy process. They would even structure the 
portfolio, select securities based on their own risk 
perception and would liquidate the portfolios as they 
considered appropriate. There had not been a situation 
where an agent was deselected following his failure to 
produce a certain return on investment.
THE 1982 - 1986 ERA
Recruitment of an Investment Advisor.
Reviewing the portfolio performance of 1982, the 
founder realized that the brand name agents (e.g Vidicorp, 
Orange bank Manhattan etc.) were strong in commercial 
banking, but poor in attending to private investment
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management. The private investment banks proved to have 
more readiness to interact with the investors to perceive 
their requirements on a timely basis.
Moreover, with the increase of funds to be managed, 
Mosnic*s interest became more exposed to the volatile 
financial markets. These factors made the stakeholders 
anxious about the risk they were taking in their agents. 
Hence, considering the risks of investing through the 
brand name commercial banks, and bearing in mind the 
markets* uncertainties, the principals realized the need 
for recruiting somebody to help them in both their 
investment decision of selecting private investment 
management banks and in evaluating the portfolio 
performance. In particular, the stakeholders were 
interested to recruit a person to assist them in the
following: (1) allocation of the corporate fund surpluses;
(2) formalizing a system for regulating the selection of 
the appropriate asset managers and for monitoring the
performance of each agent; and (3) for evaluating the
performance of the corporate portfolio.
Thus, the Board of Directors (The Board) decided to 
recruit a local commercial banker to work on a part-time 
basis in consultation with the directors. This Advisor 
started to play a significant role in selecting the
agents. He dominated the appraisal of the intended agents. 
However, he did not explain to the Board how he conducted 
the appraisal process nor did he formalize the analysis of 
the critical factors for choosing an agent. Nevertheless,
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his opinion was a determining factor to classify an agent 
as appropriate or inappropriate. The role of the Advisor 
in the performance evaluation of agents was, however, 
quite minor. The Advisor also determined the overall mix 
of agents to be maintained by Mosnic. He did not explain 
the logic behind maintaining a certain portfolio of 
agents.
The Advisor did not explain to the Board the risks 
involved in selecting a particular agent. On the other 
hand, he was not asked to explain how he measured the risk 
associated with the way he allocated assets through 
negotiation with agents. The Advisor believed that risk 
management, within a certain portfolio, was the 
discretionary responsibility of the agent with little 
feedback from his (the Advisor) side. He did not strive to 
exercise tight control over the agents. He simply put high 
trust on particular agents, their methods and decision 
styles.
The Advisor was also entrusted with reviewing the 
proposed asset management agreements before they were 
signed by the principals. Despite the lack of rigor in 
his control procedures, the monitoring and evaluation of 
the performance of the portfolio managers remained the 
formal responsibility of the investment Advisor. But, as 
explained above, the depth of these procedures were not 
clear. He used to compare agents on the basis of their 
performance. In cases of unsatisfactory performance i.e. 
lower ROI, he would recommend, orally, actions to be
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taken. He did not explain any detailed processes to 
compare agents based on ROI produced. The process of 
negotiating strategy amendment with the agents, and then 
communicating them to the principals, was verbally 
undertaken by the Advisor who used to call himself 'the 
Manager of Managers* but without clear accountability for 
corporate performance.
The Advisor succeeded in recommending to Mosnic some 
private investment banks to replace the unsatisfactorily 
performing brand name commercial banks. Nevertheless, he 
failed to formalize a control system that should ensure 
the implementation of the corporate investment.
THE 1986 - 1990 ERA
Following a report on performance at the end of 
1985, the stakeholders decided to intervene more heavily 
in the asset allocation matters. At the beginning of 1986, 
the asset mix decision was approved by the Board. 
Allocation of the assets into shares and fixed income 
securities and short-terms was achieved through a process 
of iteration between the principals and the agents. It was 
not clear how the Advisor was conveying to the agents the 
stakeholders' perception of markets' uncertainties. It 
seemed that the process of interaction between the 
principals and the agents was not adequately fluid. 
Indeed, the Advisor was living in a different city far 
away from the principals (1000 km away). The principals 
started getting more concerned about examining the rational
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economic and financial analysis forwarded by the agents to 
the Advisor. They showed interest in closely interacting 
with the agents for giving additional information about 
their perception of the nature of the financial markets1 
risk. In fact, they started feeling that the agents were 
responding to the Advisor1s perception of uncertainty and 
not to the stakeholders'. Indeed, they started seeing the 
need for an in-house corporate financial controller to 
translate their perception of risk to the agents.
By the start of 1987, the Board considered reducing 
the role of the investment Advisor. The chairman of the 
Board expressed his concern as follows:
"The Advisor could not tailor an investment model that 
could solve all our problems, I think he depends on 
interacting with the agent to form his opinions. Now I 
believe our in-house management can do his job in a 
better way through interaction with our agents. Our 
system is dynamic. We do not require ready-tailored 
investment models. They do not work. We need more 
presence from our side in the investment control 
processes. A board member has to reside permanently in 
Mosnic offices to look after our interest. We have to 
start controlling our information through an in-house 
financial control department. The person to be in­
charge of the control department has to work very close 
to the agents. The Board wants to expand the role of the 
in-house management in corporate decision making and 
control of agents."
At the end of 1987, the Advisor's appointment was 
terminated. The Board then decided to establish a 
corporate finance control department to improve the 
selection of agents and to actively monitor them. An 
Investment Policy Committee (IPC) was then formed to 
formulate investment policies for the Board. The Board 
members agreed on the following points as major reasons 
for terminating the Advisor's appointment:
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1. The best manager of agents could be an involved 
Controller. The latter can be of a value in formula­
ting investment strategy through interaction with 
agents and in controlling them.
2. The Advisor did not have more expertise than the 
Western agents have. Hence, there was no point in 
making him as manager of agents.
3. The Western agents had shown readiness to give advice 
to their principals within the agreed fees. Thus, the 
cost of keeping the advisor could be saved.
4. The principals wanted to be closer to their agents:
(1) to participate in risk management^ and (2) to
control any potential conflict of interest between the
Advisor and the principals. i.e they planned to 
eliminate the risk inherent in intermediating the 
Advisor as a middle-man in accessing their agents.
5. The Advisor could not develop a complete management 
control system.
6. Trust on the Advisor was not an objective way to
evaluate agents for selection. The principals needed 
to know more about the agents1 means and methods.
THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING
Mosnic maintained the organizational setting shown in 
figure 3.1 (the current organizational chart) after the 
cancellation of the Advisorfs position. The Investment 
Policy Committee emerged as a coalition dominating the 
corporate decision of selecting agents. The Investment 
Policy Committee consisted of the Controller and two 
principals. One principal was nominated as the executive 
member of the Board and called the Resident Director (the 
Director).
The current chart of the organization shows the 
hierarchial relationships between the in-house divisions 
of Mosnic. Note that there is no responsibility centre 
that undertakes the investment management functions. The 
discretionary portfolio managers do not have line
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relationships with the divisions of Mosnic. There is no 
line relationship between Mosnic internal divisions and 
the external agents. The current chart of the organization 
depicts that most of the investment management functions 
are decentralized to external agents.
The job descriptions of the Controller are presented 
in section 4. However, it is necessary to emphasize that 
the Corporate Controller operated as a dominant figure in 
the IPC. The Controller was the link between Mosnic and 
its agents. The Director wanted him to attend to every 
information necessary for managing the strategic 
uncertainties.
2. THE ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND THE 
STAKEHOLDERS1 CONCEPTION OF RISK
The Goals.
The prime goal of Mosnic has been to maximize the 
wealth of its stakeholders. To do this, Mosnic was 
established with a view to investing all around the world, 
particularly in the financial markets. A global investment 
strategy was adopted because of the limited local invest­
ment opportunities and local economic risks and also to 
achieve better diversification of the funds by expatria­
tion and holding a portfolio of currencies and agents.
However, the maximization of wealth through globali­
zation proved to be a debatable goal considering the 
turbulences in the financial markets. Mosnic had no option 
but to adopt•dynamic investment strategies. It could not 
set measurable (standard) goals. The financial markets
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were fast-moving in an unpredictable manner rendering pre­
determination of financial goals unrealistic. Hence, the 
corporate goal setting was an unprogrammed process and 
rendering performance evaluation to be problematic. ROI 
predetermination and ex-post performance measurement was 
difficult considering the uncertainty of the markets'
behaviour.
The dynamic management style followed by Mosnic seems 
to have the stakeholders amending their goals from time to 
time. The pattern of amending the goal was dependent on 
the way they perceived the risks of the financial markets. 
They were often not sure whether to go for long-term 
profit maximization or short-term benchmark objectives. 
Indeed, there was no standard investment model that Mosnic 
distributed to every agent for implementation.
Mosnic was also formed as an offshore institution to 
gain tax advantages. In addition, it was also designed as 
an investment vehicle to reduce transaction costs and 
fixed overhead expenses. The stakeholders believed that 
one way of managing the risks associated with operating 
through agents was by reducing the number of agents. But 
they were not definite about an exact number of agents to 
be maintained as standard.
RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND INVESTMENT GOAL
Profit Maximization as a goal is allowed by Islam but 
care-fully regulated. A Muslim has to manage the source of 
his income.
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Certain economic and religious factors affected the 
annual income realized by Mosnic. First, Islamic investors 
have a religious commitment to pay a tax (2.5% of the 
annualized market value of the marketable securities) to 
the needy citizens. This is called Zakah. Second, Islamic 
investors must deduct from the return on investment any 
interest earned which has been added to the value of the 
portfolios. This is because the receipt and payment of 
interest is defined as usury which is prohibited by Islam. 
Hence, the stakeholders have always been keen to make sure 
that any interest earned should properly be accounted for 
throughout the investment strategy implementation 
processes. The principals had difficulties in technically 
conveying their reservations about interest income to the 
Western portfolio managers.
THE STAKEHOLDERS' CONCEPTION OF THE RISKS 
ATTACHED TO STRATEGY AND GOALS
While risk is critical to every investment decision, 
there is no conceptual clarity or sophisticated management 
of risk in Mosnic.
The Director claims that: "We try to manage risk through
setting investment policies and through frequent liaison 
with the agent and the Controller. Despite all measures we 
take to reduce risk, we cannot totally eliminate it.
(1) The expatriated funds still face foreign and local
environment risk, (2) Choosing the fiduciary asset 
managers involves risk taken on the selected agent. The
agent's market is not that efficient. (3) Diversification 
over the asset managers, involves risk taken on the number 
of the agents. We do not know how many agents to maintain.
(4) Diversification of the corporate assets, does not 
eliminate risk taken on the securities chosen. We cannot 
check corporate risk implications of each new security 
added to the portfolio. (5) Diversification of the assets 
within each portfolio aims at managing portfolio risk. But 
the portfolio risk is still there. (6) Monitoring and
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assessing the performance of the agents is subject to risk 
taken in relying on the agents1 information system
As for the diversification of the company's portfolio to
control risk, the President of the company commented:-
" We broadly talk about risk, while we do not have a clear 
measure for it. We worry about "exposure to loss' and 
uncertainties surrounding "future returns.' The only 
exceptions are the treasury bills and their equivalents 
(which offer low risk of loss and high certainty of 
return) . Despite that, the treasury bills carry the risks 
of lost opportunity or diminishing purchasing power. So, 
risk determination is very imprecise."
The Director believed that subjectivity is always
involved in risk assessment. He thought that changing
conditions in the financial markets meant the future
seldom directly paralleled the past. Therefore, he
believed that even the most sophisticated calculation of
risk would lead to suspect conclusions. There was no one
decision situation where management calculated risk using
a mathematical formula. Risks attached to all decisions
were managed through principal-agent negotiation and
exchange of opinions. Also, the perception of risk
differed from one stakeholder to the other. The difference
was ascribed to variation in the investing personality of
each principal. One of the Directors commented that:
"The perception of risk by agents often differs from that 
of the principals' . That led to different responses from 
different agents to the markets' event. Moreover, risk 
perception even differs from agent to agent depending on 
each ones self-image. It was not even clear to us how risk 
was managed by each agent".
Time was an important factor in each party's 
perception of risk. When unrealized losses were incurred 
on portfolios, the Director had a tendency to allow less
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time for the portfolios to pick-up whereas the Chairman
and the other Director tolerated unrealized losses for a
longer time. Also, in terms of measuring the performance
of the portfolios, some stakeholders preferred the 
* ** 
benchmark system. Others liked the bottom line approach.
The resident Director wanted to know about agents
performance as frequent as possible. His response to the
market fluctuations was higher than the other director.
The latter wanted to allow longer time for the agent
before judging on his performance. However, all the board
members encouraged the interaction with agents to attend
for the information necessary to manage strategic
uncertainties. Even for the same stakeholder, risk
attitudes could vary from one market circumstance to the
other.
One of the Directors saw lower risk in allocating 
most of the assets to the fixed income securities, namely 
in bonds. He expressed his worry about bonds as follows.
* Benchmark system of portfolio performance appraisal 
represents comparison with market indices. The 
' performance of equity portion of portfolios (common 
stocks, convertible securities and warrants or options) 
may be measured against anyone of a number of stock 
market indices e.g. Standard and Poors 500, New York
Stock Exchange index, Dow Jones composite index, etc. 
Fixed income or bond portfolios can be appropriately 
compared to bond indices e.g. Salomon Brothers, Moody"s 
index, Merril Lynch index, etc.
** The bottom line approach to measurement is concerned 
with a longer-term appraisal of portfolio performance 
based on, say, the increase in wealth. This approach is 
known to the portfolio managers as a system whereby
investors- will have little concern for the manner in
which the results were produced but concern very much 
for the absolute result in aggregate. This is inadequ­
ate for Mosnic.
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" The financial risk in a bond is the rise in interest 
rates over and above usury problems. Some agents advise 
that if you sell bonds before maturity you overcome the 
interest income problem."
He suggests that one might hold fixed income 
securities. However, the risk did not just relate to 
interest rate investments but also whether or not he was 
guilty of usury if he realized capital gains from fixed 
interest stock even though he received no interest 
payment. In other words, there was a religious risk 
involved. The President has also commented on this theme. 
He believes that:
" (1) The agents1 culture is different. Their belief is 
different. The agents• personnel neither believe in the 
cause nor have the right perception of the concept of 
interest in Islam. (2) Separation of interest from the 
investment instruments traded in the Western financial 
markets is beyond the reach of both the principals and the 
agents. (3) Agents may accept the idea of filtering out 
interest earned from the portfolio but they argue that it 
is expensive to change the whole data processing system of 
the bank to report separately interests earned."
Turning to equity risk, the Director explained the 
nature of market risk by saying that:
" If the big risk in stocks is in a rising and falling 
market, it can largely be offset by long-term holding. We 
must not worry about the stocks short-term depreciation of 
value, nor should we care for the short-term capital 
gains.
By all means we need to diversify. By diversification I 
mean choosing a number of agents for the discretionary 
management of the portfolios and requesting them to spread 
our money over a number of companies, industries, areas 
and currencies. This is then followed by efficient and 
close monitoring of the agents performance. Most important 
of all we must keep in touch with the agents to manage 
risk."
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Risk management within each portfolio was considered 
the discretionary responsibility of the agent. Agents 
took a view on their principals' risk attitudes and then 
managed the portfolios without disclosing detailed data 
showing how they calculated the risks actually being taken 
by the principals. Hence, in effect, the agents managed 
risk on behalf of Mosnic and yet the stakeholders never 
formalized a method of measuring the risk taken in 
choosing an agent. The major risks faced by Mosnic 
stakeholders were therefore in the first place choosing 
the agents and also controlling the agents by being aware 
of what risks they were taking on behalf of the 
stakeholders. It is, therefore, important to consider the 
need to operate through agents.
3. THE NEED TO OPERATE THROUGH AGENTS
The Chairman (the President) advocated the use of the 
external portfolio managers as follows. 11We need to 
invest through a portfolio of agents for a lot of reasons. 
I will give some of these reasons.
1. The use of outside services facilitates diversification 
over the styles or philosophies applied to portfolio 
management.
2. There is less risk of conceptual stagnation. 
Principal-agent interaction creates new ideas and 
refines the investment decision process.
3. Outside managers have survival needs that motivate 
them continually toward excellence.
4. The use of multiple external managers eliminates 
dependence on a few key people.
5. Investment professionals have only limited career 
opportunities in a corporate environment."
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The stakeholders also believed that their funds were 
not large enough to justify the cost of establishing a 
huge in-house portfolio management team. Moreover, they 
believed that investing abroad was the appropriate 
strategy for their situation in the Middle East. They 
argued that the high cost of internal management, imported 
technology, etc outweighed the other factors in favour of 
internalization.
Commenting on expatriation of portfolio management, 
the Director stated that the lack of local skills and the 
scarcity of investment opportunities led Mosnic to 
expatriate the management of its financial assets to 
Western portfolio managers. Above all, the Western 
investment environment was viewed more stable and safe. 
Hence, the stakeholders gained more security by 
externalizing their investment management.
Also Mosnic did not think it would be feasible to 
recruit full time Western portfolio managers. They 
eliminated "internalization* from their options because of 
the difficulty involved in keeping internal portfolio 
managers' skills up-to-date. In addition, the President 
believes that:
"More foreign agents means better attendance to informa­
tion necessary for managing strategic uncertainties. How­
ever,, to benefit from the foreign agents we must have the 
right person to interact with the agents to get the 
maximum possible information.1
The challenge was therefore how to select, de-select, 
and maintain an appropriate portfolio of agents. This
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challenge involved evaluating their performance in 
handling discretionary investment portfolios. For that 
reason it was decided to recruit a corporate controller. 
He was appointed to develop a better system to choose and 
control agents.
4. THE NEED TO RECRUIT A CORPORATE CONTROLLER
It can now be seen how the use of external agents by 
Mosnic triggered the need for both a corporate control 
system and the recruitment of a controller to boost the 
efficiency of strategic management. Previously, the 
appraisal and selection of the agents, the most important 
financial decision, was taken without rigorous pre­
decision analysis. There was no corporate control 
department in Mosnic to engage in agent selection or 
portfolio performance evaluation. There was no system to 
regulate the appraisal of the agents. It also seemed clear 
that it would not be easy to provide such a system. The 
Advisor did not document agents selection processes. 
Agents' misjudgment and imprudent investment decisions 
were not easy to discover without detailed involvement in 
decision-making with agents. Information on agents' 
performance was processed and developed by the agents 
themselves. It needed somebody inside Mosnic to monitor 
and understand in more depth the information provided by 
the external agents.
The President of the company emphasized the need for a 
Corporate Controller as follows:-
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" The agents are supposed to be our investment managers. 
It is risky to depend on them as our information 
managers. We need to establish a corporate financial 
control cell, to regulate agent selection and their 
performance monitoring processes."
5. RECRUITMENT AND JOB SPECIFICATION 
OF THE CORPORATE CONTROLLER
The President of the Board clearly stated the three 
dimensions of the task to be undertaken by the new 
controllership function:
"The in-house Financial Control Department is needed for:-
1 . Interacting with the current agents to make the 
corporate strategy more efficient.
2 . Providing information necessary for selecting the 
agents.
3 . Post-investment monitoring of the portfolios and 
controlling of the agents."
But it was not clear to the Chairman how to go about 
achieving these goals. The Chairman could not provide a 
detailed job description for the Corporate Finance 
Controller (CFC), alternatively called *the Controller*.
The Controller had worked as a senior audit manager 
with Arthur Young International (AYI). While practicing 
with AYI, the Controller was introduced to the Chairman of 
Mosnic. The occasion was an audit assignment to AYI by. the 
Chairman. Over five years of serving the Chairman (a 
client of AYI), the Controller gained the former*s trust. 
Eventually, it became a mutual trust and a friendly 
relationship. The Chairman seemed impressed with the expe­
rience, the performance, and the personality of the AYI 
Audit Manager. This resulted in the Chairman approaching
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the Audit Manager to join Mosnic as a Corporate Financial 
Controller. As said before, the Chairman was not very 
clear about the detailed job specification of the Control­
ler. He just indicated to the latter that there were three 
main dimensions to the job, as indicated above, and he 
trusted that the Controller could develop a role to 
achieve those ends.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROLLERSHIP 
JOB DESCRIPTION
Mosnic's financial success was dependent to a great 
extent on the success of the agents in achieving high 
performance in terms of the bottom line ROI produced. 
Accordingly, the choice of the appropriate asset managers 
seemed to be the most significant financial decision. 
Appropriate agent selection had to be followed by both 
monitoring their performance effectively and realistically 
measuring portfolio performance. However, as already 
stated, details of the tasks to be undertaken by the 
Controller were not yet clear in the minds of the 
stakeholders who looked to the new Controller to help in 
developing his own role.
After some deliberation, the Controller and the 
Managing Director developed the following job description:
(1) Provision of information necessary for selection 
of agents and for corporate strategic planning.
(2) Designing and implementing an internal control 
system which would:
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i) set financial strategies and goals for 
agents.
ii) determine the information needed to control 
each agent;
iii) design the appropriate control system for 
monitoring each agent;
iv) measure the performance of each
discretionary portfolio;
v) convey stakeholders* views to the agents;
vi) recommend, if necessary, to de-select any 
agent;
vii) monitor the implementation of the corporate 
strategy; and
viii) recommend, if the need arises, a re­
allocation of corporate assets.
Indeed, the Controller could not get a clear 
explanation from the management about who actually claimed 
the responsibility for formulating the strategic 
investment decisions. It was clear that the management had 
a role beside the discretionary agents. In the absence of 
formally prepared strategic plans, and considering the 
negative views the principals had already formed against
value of formal quantitative models for selecting
*
securities the Controller found himself in the dilemma of 
what strategy to monitor and who was to be held 
accountable for the investment decisions. This prompted 
him to understand the decision levels in the organization 
to distinguish between them.
* The stakeholders did not object to the use of formal 
quantitative models by the agents. However, they would 
not accept the agents1 proposals without debate and 
negotiations. The Controller was not clear about the 
nature of these negotiations. It needed time to 
understand what the principals would like to tell the 
agents.
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(B) THE DECISION LEVELS IN MOSNIC
A number of problems faced the Controller in attemp­
ting to move from the job specification to its implementa­
tion. It was not clear to the Controller how investment 
decisions were being taken.As stated before,the Controller 
observed that decision processes in Mosnic were not 
programmed. The whole operation was a dynamic management 
process. The allocation of the corporate assets was 
verbally negotiated among the directors.The Controller was 
required to formalize the decision making processes. The 
necessary information for monitoring the agents was 
controlled and processed by the asset managers themselves. 
Hence, the Controller was required to determine whether 
the data provided by any agent was appropriate without a 
very clear specification of what was meant by "being 
appropriate.” No one could tell the Controller what would 
be considered as effective investment strategy. It became 
crystally clear to the Controller that understanding the 
strategy formulation processes could not be achieved 
without studying the case of each individual portfolio 
manager. However, the Controller had to try understand the 
decision classes as a first step.
As stated previously, decision classes, the decision 
making processes, and the implementation of decisions were 
not clear. The division of responsibilities between Mosnic 
and its agents needed to be clarified and explained. Yet, 
at that time; the Managing Director could not describe 
them. As a consequence, the Controller began to study the
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decision levels and processes as described in the 
forthcoming pages. Sections (6) and (7) of this Chapter 
describe the corporate decisions and their problems. The 
following pages emphasize the strategic decisions taken 
inside Mosnic.
6. LEVEL (I) DECISIONS 
(CORPORATE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE PRINCIPALS)
The corporate investment decisions in Mosnic stemmed 
from the broad strategies set for achieving the corporate 
goal which was the maximization of the stakeholders* 
wealth. Fig 3.2 shows the hierarchical nature of the cor­
porate decisions in Mosnic. It shows how decisions at one 
level feed into subsidiary decisions. To give a brief idea 
about the nature of the corporate strategic decisions I 
will select few decisions from figure 3.2 to discuss them.
(i) The Decision to Invest in Marketable Securities/ 
Financial Markets (Fig 3.2).
With regard to the general strategy of investing in the 
global financial markets, it was not clear what form of 
investment should be undertaken. The investment could be 
in marketable securities, real estate, direct investment 
in companies and projects and so on. Mosnic invested in 
all these forms of assets. But the majority of investments 
were in marketable securities which is the focus of this 
thesis. This decision was taken when Mosnic was incorpor­
ated. The decision was primarily taken by the founders of 
Mosnic. (As this thesis is coming towards end^ this 
decision is undergoing fundamental revisions).
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The decision to invest predominantly in securities in 
the world financial markets was not based on any sophisti­
cated financial analysis nor were any capital budgeting 
techniques applied. The stakeholders simply saw a poten­
tial in the Western securities markets and they wanted to 
hold financial assets which were easily convertible into 
cash. As argued earlier, the limited local investment 
opportunities, the local currency (diversification problem) 
and the local environment risks were possible reasons 
which convinced the stakeholders to invest in the rela­
tively more secure Western financial markets.
(ii) The decision of allocating corporate Assets (Fig.3.2) 
Fig 3.2 also shows the allocation of assets by type of 
the security and by the broad currency category. The stake­
holders set a guideline that at least 70% of the portfolio 
should be denominated in US Dollars. The stakeholders were 
used to earning their income in US Dollars and spending in 
US Dollars. Hence, there was lower currency risk in adopt­
ing this policy. Once again the decision to allocate 70% of 
the corporate portfolio to US Dollars was not a result of 
sophisticated analysis. The stakeholders simply saw safety 
and conservation of the invested funds in the US Dollar.
The reason behind allocating a major part of the 
assets in the portfolio to fixed income securities and a 
small portion to shares was to avoid the stock market 
uncertainties. High exposure to equities was felt to be a 
sign of aggressive investing. This was not based on 
rational analysis. In fact, the problem of earning
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interest on fixed income securities was resolved by 
instructing the agents to sell the bonds before maturity. 
However, allocating most of the portfolio to the bonds 
was not the end of the resources allocation problem. Even 
within the category of bonds, Mosnic had to worry about 
allocation of assets:





- High yield or zero coupon etc.
Hence, the need for the agents was inevitable to run even 
pure bond portfolios.
On the other hand, the investment strategy of the 
company was dynamic. Asset mix by instruments was continu­
ously shifted in response to changing market conditions. 
There were, therefore, different levels of decision-making 
in allocating funds to assets. The Chairman stated:
« We set the asset mix policy. Agents on our behalf tackle 
asset allocation in individual portfolios."
To understand properly the different roles of stakeholders
and agents, one needed to see two types of decision making:
1. The policy asset allocation decision
2. Dynamic strategic decision-making
3. Tactical asset allocation decisions.
The policy asset mix decisions were characterized by 
being long-term. They were primarily taken by the 
stakeholders who certainly consulted the agents, but used 
their advice to formulate a general strategy on the types 
of assets to be held in order to maintain their total 
wealth within an acceptable risk-return profile. In
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FIG. 3.2
CORPORATE STRATEGIC DECISIONS AT LEVEL 1
STRATEGY DECISION TAKEN BY
INVESTMENT IN THE FINANCIAL 
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DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ASSETS 
(ASSET ALLOCATION)
i] ALLOCATE CURRENCIES INTO 
US $ 70% 
OTHER CURRENCIES 30% 
100%
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ii] ALLOCATE SECURITIES INTO 




EXTERNAL IZATION OF THE PORT­
FOLIO MANAGEMENT (DECENTRA­
LIZED STRUCTURE)
CHOOSE THE APPROPRIATE 
ASSET MANAGERS MD,IPC,CFC
MAINTAINING AN ORGANIZATION 
SMALL IN SIZE, WITH LIMITED 
NUMBER OF IN-HOUSE EMPLOYEES
INTERNAL OVERHEAD EXPENSES 
MUST NOT EXCEED US$300,000/ BD
ESTABLISHING FIDUCIARY RELA­
TIONSHIPS WITH THE AGENTS 
BEYOND THE FORMAL ASSET 
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS
SPEND UP TO US$1,500,000 
TO MAINTAIN THE FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIPS I.E. ALLOWED 
ASSET MANAGEMENT FEE
BD
INTERNALIZATION OF AGENTS 
MONITORING
ESTABLISH THE CORPORATE 
FINANCIAL CONTROL DEPT. BD
DIVERSIFICATION OVER THE 
AGENTS AND MAINTAINING AN 
APPROPRIATE PORTFOLIO OF 
AGENTS
SELECT:
5 AGENTS FROM SWITZERLAND 
2 AGENTS FROM LONDON 
2 FROM U.S.A.
J. BAHRAIN - MANAMA 
10 TOTAL
BD
(Fig. 3.2 Shows examples of corporate decisions steming from the corporate 
strategy. Those decisions were "corporate”, in the sense that 
they were taken inside Mosnic apart from the direct involvement 
of agents).
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addition, and as stated previously, policy asset mix 
decisions generally aimed at adopting a very safe 
approach. Safety meant accepting modest return opportuni­
ties whereas long-term rewards tended to be more specula­
tive. The stakeholders retained the responsibility for 
balancing those conflicting goals. Such a process involved 
the interaction of the principal with the current and 
intended agents.
In contrast to the long-run strategic mix of invest­
ment types, dynamic strategic decisions dealt with 
reconstructing the corporate portfolios in response to the 
markets1 shifting uncertainties. For example, when the 
stock crash occurred in October 1987, the stakeholders 
intervened with the portfolio managers to formulate the 
post-crash strategy. One of the major dynamic corporate 
decisions taken at that time was to stay out for some time 
to recover part of the unrealized book losses of shares 
and then refraining totally from equities to park funds in 
short-terms and AAA bonds. The stakeholders expressed to 
the agents their high concern about that defensive 
strategy. Views of the agents were different. However, the 
stakeholders were very clear about their interest in 
avoiding any further problems in the stock markets as a 
result of the crash.
The following memo is an example of how Mosnic conveys 
its dynamic asset allocation policies to the agent while 
giving the agents the discretion to design and implement 
the tactical asset allocation procedures as necessary.
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"Dear Sirs,
To follow on the strategy matters, the following are 
your guidelines to re-construct our portfolio when you see 
appropriate and time is viewed opportune by yourself.
1. Eliminate short-terms (fixed deposit holdings) 
from the allocation of the assets, unless there is 
a tactical need for parking the assets in cash.
2. Allocate 100 % of the portfolio to the most 
secured fixed income instruments, such as, AAA 
governmental bonds, state treasury bills, etc.
3. Refrain from inclusion of any types of equities in 
the portfolio. We are not yet certain about the 
stock markets.
4. Within the above broad guidelines, tactical re­
allocation of the assets remains your total 
discretionary responsibility.
5. Despite our spiritual concern about interest and 
usury, temporary fiduciary placements and their 
returns are not prohibited within the portfolio 
management process. However, permanent short-term 
investments in fixed deposit accounts must be 
avoided.
We confirm that the above are not rigid instructions. 
If you see otherwise, please let us exchange opinions.
In spite of the fact that the above proposed 
allocation of resources represents our intended strategy, 
timing and details of implementation remain within your 
total fiduciary management responsibilities."
The need for the dynamic re-allocation of the assets 
arose as the stakeholders interacted with the markets. 
Dynamic asset allocation decisions, in technical terms, 
were formulated by the agents whose views were considered 
by the stakeholders in taking the policy asset allocation 
decision. Dynamic asset allocation decisions were negoti­
ated within the principals-agents fiduciary relationships. 
The agents were part of the actual decision-making process 
within a continuous agent-principal iterative process.
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Moreover, this could, on occasions, lead to an amendment 
of the policy asset allocation decision.
In contrast to the higher levels of decision-making, 
tactical asset allocation decisions, related to individual 
portfolios and they were solely the responsibility of the 
discretionary asset managers. They reflected how agents 
opportunistically shift the asset mix of portfolio in 
response to short-term changing patterns of reward 
available in the financial markets. The principal-agent 
interaction helped the agents to reflect the principals' 
requirements in the tactical asset allocation decisions, 
but agents dominated the actual short-term adjustment 
decisions.
(iii) STRUCTURE OF MOSNIC BY DECENTRALIZATION TO AGENTS 
IFiq..__3.2),
Fig 3.2 also shows that externalization of portfolio 
management was an structural problem to Mosnic as an 
organization. The previous sections emphasized that Mosnic 
was structured in a way that the external portfolio 
managers represented responsibility centres. The earlier 
section on the need to operate through agents showed why 
the founders decided on that type of structure. The 
strategic decision of structuring Mosnic in that way led 
to the following: (i) The establishment of a network of 
fiduciary relationships with a number of agents, (ii) The 
need to internalize controllership. (iii) The need to 
manage a portfolio of different agents.
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Indeed, fig 3.2 shows numerous types of corporate 
decisions. The following are examples taken from fig. 3.2.
(i) How much to spend on internal overhead expenses, was a 
corporate decision; (ii) how much to budget for asset 
management fee was negotiated and authorized by the 
Director; (iii) establishment of a corporate finance 
department; (iv) the number of agents to be contracted 
with; and (v) how much funds were to be exposed to each 
agent? These were the types of strategic decisions taken 
by the Director and the Board in coordination with the 
Investment Policy Committee. The Corporate Controller 
also had a significant role to play in all those corporate 
decision processes.
7. PROBLEMS AT LEVEL-I DECISION
According to the Corporate Controller, the major 
control problem was found to be the fast movement in and 
the unpredictability of the financial markets. The 
previous section highlights the difficulty of adopting a 
formal investment strategy. As a result, the strategic 
control system faced the problem of monitoring volatile 
strategies. Strategic uncertainties were extremely high. 
To make the investment strategy effective, Mosnic had to 
attend frequently to market information provided by the 
agents which was mainly the job of the Controller. But 
Mosnic did not have a formalized system to attend to 
market information. Thus, the required interaction with 
the agents was not specified to the Controller.
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Furthermore, Mosnic's structure of decentralizing its 
investment to agents made the task of the Controller 
difficult, particularly how to evaluate the performance of 
external responsibility centres.
In addition, the stakeholders1 risk management 
approach was not programmed. Therefore, organizational 
effectiveness was not precisely defined. Due to that, the 
notion of designing an effective corporate control 
measurement system under dynamic management circumstances 
seemed paradoxical. Indeed, the problem was what to do 
after measuring ROI. The market uncertainties were never 
the same. They would hardly repeat themselves in the same 
order of the past.
Moreover, the Controller did not find a strategic 
control system to accommodate the specific control needs 
of all agents. This seems to have been the case despite 
the recognized role of the agents in the corporate 
strategy process, i.e., strategy formulation and implemen­
tation were externally decentralized to agents leading to 
strategic control problems.
At any rate, detailed aspects of the investment 
decisions taken by the agents seemed to be critical and a 
key factor for the Controller to consider if he were to 
tackle the control problem. The detailed aspects of the 
decisions assigned to the discretionary agents will be 
presented in* the forthcoming stages of the research. The
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next section gives the reader an idea about this type of 
decision.
8. LEVEL II DECISIONS (INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
BY THE AGENTS)
Agents work closely with the principals in an 
interactive process. The agents* task involved decision 
making and controlling processes. They performed their 
fiduciary investment responsibilities at the risk of the 
principals. This is portrayed in Fig. 3.3 which describes 
the processes involved in working with agents. It is 
important to recognize that figure 3.3 shows the relation­
ships of different activities to each other. However, 
there is a 'never-ending* continuous exchange of views 
between Mosnic and its agents with the possibility of 
decision and actions at one level feeding back to 
decisions and actions at other levels.
It should be recognized that at this stage of the 
research we did not know yet how those processes in fig. 
3.3 were performed by each specific agent. It was possible 
to find a lot of differences between agents if one studied 
each agent separately.
Boxes 1 to 4 in Fig 3.3 show the stages and processes of 
portfolio decision making by agents. Boxes 5 to 7 describe 
the agents role in performance monitoring. The following 
is a general explanation of the processes in Fig. 3.3.
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However, the reader will appreciate that one can hardly 
understand the details of agents pre-and-post investment 
processes before studying specific agents cases.
[1] UNDERSTANDING THE PRINCIPALS* OBJECTIVES 
(BOXES 1 TO 3 FIG.3.3.).
To formulate a specific portfolio policy, agents have 
to understand the principals* objectives which stemmed 
from the broad organizational goals. Hence, agents needed 
to understand the specific requirements of their 
principals under different environmental conditions. This 
meant that they needed to liaise with the Controller (the 
interpreter).
[2] INTEGRATION OF MARKET EXPECTATIONS WITH THE PRINCIPALS 
OBJECTIVES (BOX 4 Fig.3.3).
Agents needed to analyze the expected rate of return 
for each of the asset categories and individual 
securities. By integrating the expected market outlook 
with the principals' objectives, agents worked towards 
optimizing the portfolio combination from the available 
choices. The end product of these processes usually could 
lead to certain asset allocation to be taken as a 
financial strategy for the agent. Hence, the role of the 
Controller became important in this asset allocation 
process. In addition, the allocation of the assets in each 
discretionary portfolio was the prime job of the 
designated agent. However, agents were required to attend 
to both the principals' strategic asset allocation policy 
and dynamic asset allocation views as the principals 
interacted with the financial markets.
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FIG. 3.3
LEVEL (II) INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESSES OF AGENTS
PRE-INVESTMENT PROCESSES 
(1,2,3,4 and 5)
PROCESS SOURCES OF INFORMATION
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[3] PORTFOLIO MONITORING AND PERFORMANCES MEASUREMENT BY 
THE AGENTS (BOXES 5 TO 7 FIG 3.3.).
The constant monitoring of the various factors which 
tend to affect the composition of the portfolio held by 
each agent was done by the agents themselves. Agents used 
to relate their performance to the risk level generally 
perceived to be acceptable by the principals. They used to 
measure their own performance and provide a report on that 
together with a commentary to Mosnic. They were required 
to provide comparative statistics to disclose what had 
been achieved relative to the market as a whole. Agents 
were sensitive to the feedback on performance from the 
principals.
9. CONCLUSION TO THE DECISION LEVELS (AN INTEGRATED 
VIEW OF THE INVESTMENT PROCESS)
The study of Mosnic's decisions and strategy and the 
description of the general role of agents have disclosed 
two levels of strategy and decision-making. In fact, they 
are complementary and both are taking place simultaneously 
and are related to each other. In this section we try to 
combine the corporate strategic decisions at level I (fig. 
3.2) with the agents role (in fig 3.3) to find out who is 
dominant in affecting the investment performance of 
Mosnic.
Notwithstanding the clearly different features of the 
corporate strategic decisions at level I and the agents' 
discretionary investment decisions at level II, in 
practical terms they could hardly be performed separately.
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The principals and the agents worked close with each other 
to achieve one goal. Hence, the two decision levels were 
interrelated. Fig. 3.4 is an attempt to integrate fig. 3.2 
and fig. 3.3.
WHO DOES WHAT IN THE DISCRETIONARY INVESTMENT 
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES (FIG.3.4)
We can now see the two decision levels in Mosnic. 
Indeed, it is a process whereby the agents undertook a 
functional and advisory role in the complicated portfolio 
investment processes. Indeed, fig. 3.4 is an attempt to 
show the different emphasis at the two decision levels in 
Mosnic. It portrays who does what in the discretionary 
investment process. The two decision levels draw a clear 
line of demarcation between what Mosnic did and what its 
agents did. This seems to be inappropriate. It distorts 
the fact that decisions at both levels were taken through 
a process of extended principal-agent negotiation.
Principal-agent interaction was important, encouraged 
by both parties and was the major factor for efficient 
management investment. In addition to that interaction, 
there was an iterative process inside Mosnic divisions. An 
example of what took place inside Mosnic could be the work 
of the investment policies committee in terms of negotia­
ting what view was to be conveyed to the agents. The board 
members also made a contribution to the major strategic 
decisions such as determining the main categories of 
securities to be held in the corporate portfolio. Thus, 
Mosnic took some responsibility for performance along with
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fig. 3.4.
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the discretionary asset managers. But how much of the 
total responsibility related to the portfolio performance 
and how much was to be charged to corporate management was 
left vague.
(C) CONTROLLER'S PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS AND HIS 
PERCEPTION OF CONTROL PROBLEMS
(i) Agents Selection Problems (Pre-Investment).
The study of decision problems in Mosnic has 
generally highlighted, in different places throughout the 
case study, the significance of agents selection as a 
fundamental pre-investment process. The problem of 
selecting agents is critical to both resource allocation 
and the monitoring of appropriate problems of agents. 
Hence, it is a central theme to this research. Given the 
significance of the agent selection problem, it is 
imperative to go back through the case study and examine 
its major aspects.
It became evident to the Controller that working with 
agents was clearly central to Mosnic1s operations. 
Nevertheless, upon being appointed, the Controller could 
not see clearly how agents were selected nor was there a 
formalized system that described how to select agents. 
There were no clear attributes for the selection of 
agents.
The stages of appraising agents were not clear. The 
financial markets influence on the corporate strategy and
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goal was a problem which needed to be understood by the 
Controller. The stakeholders seemed unable to fix a goal 
to be pursued without changing it. Consequently, the 
Controller was not definite about the financial management 
approach that he could adopt. The market uncertainty also 
made it difficult for Mosnic to stick to one strategy. 
Pursuant to the strategy and goal setting problems, the 
Controller could not tell what kind of strategic plan or a 
corporate investment model to forward to the intended 
agents to see the latters1 input and to test their 
capability of implementation.
How to design a control system for each intended 
agent without studying their structure and processes was a 
delicate issue. It was difficult for the Controller to 
tell in advance what kind of strategic control procedures 
would be necessary to monitor the system of each intended 
agent. The Controller saw a potential problem in 
strategically controlling heterogeneous financial institu­
tions (agents).
The worldwide market for agents also seemed too big 
to understand fully. Accordingly, the Controller was not 
sure if any particular agent that would be selected would 
prove to be appropriate for Mosnic or not. It was clear to 
the Controller that it was not cost effective to have all 
the necessary and relevant information about all the 
agents with whom Mosnic could approach to explore the 
possibility of appointing them as its agents. Yet, it was
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inevitable to select a number of agents from the wide 
range of available agents to conduct Mosnic*s investments 
on its behalf.
The Controller*s principals placed great store on 
past performance results in guiding their choice of 
agents. However, the Controller perceived that historical 
performance statistics could be offered by agents as a 
bait to catch the fish. It was possible that the 
historical performance might be deceptive. This could 
possibly be avoided if the company had the ability to 
examine the performance of every intended agent. Moreover, 
one could not believe that agents who had done well in the 
past could repeat the same performance in an extremely 
variable and volatile environment.
The Controller was not given a clear guideline in 
terms of how many agents to deal with. Thus, he could not 
know the maximum portfolio of agents to be maintained. 
Moreover, the Controller was not clear when an agent could 
be de-selected. All this could involve potential problems 
for the diversification of the corporate portfolio. It was 
difficult to tell exactly how.
There was also a possibility of conflict between the 
principals and the intended agent. The agent could use the 
minimum possible resources to manage the portfolio. On the 
other hand, it could be to the interest of the principal 
that the agent used the optimal resources relative to the 
fees paid. Such a conflict could not be removed by
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carefully wording the asset management agreements. There 
was no standard form of contract to be drawn up with each 
agent. As a result, the task of the Controller was made 
more difficult in securing the interest of the principals 
in the pre-contracting negotiation processes.
The delicate issue of the management fee was a problem 
to be considered by the Controller before entering into 
any agency relationship with the fiduciary portfolio 
managers. The Controller was not aware of how to apply 
the asset management fees as a means of controlling the 
behaviour of the intended agents. He discovered that a 
fixed contracting system was applied by the company to 
acquire the services of all its agents. It was not easy 
for the Controller to design an agent reward system in the 
presence of the fixed fee asset management agreements. It 
was obvious to the Controller that, once the intended 
agent was awarded the contract, he (the agent) would draw 
a fee that varied with the value of assets held by the 
agent. The ex-post calculations carried out by the 
Controller indicated that portfolio performance variations 
had an immaterial impact on agents* fee. (e.g. 1/2% of say 
of a 4% increase of ROI equals only to 0.0002% of the 
portfolio. It was too small to control agents' behaviour).
As said before, the Controller needed to have clarity 
about the agent's attributes as criteria for selecting the 
appropriate fiduciary relationships. It was unclear to the 
Controller whether the current agents were good for Mosnic
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or not. To make a judgement, the Controller needed to 
interact with each agent to discover each one's style, 
strategy, structure and processes. This seemed to need 
time.
Apart from the formal asset management agreement, the 
stakeholders seemed to have different degrees of trust in 
their agents and yet the basis for trust was unclear to 
the Controller. The pattern of their relationship with 
each agent was not clear to the Controller.
The stakeholders investment ^personality' and their 
perception of risk lacked clarity. Yet, the lack of 
clarity in the principals' own risk perception could be a 
source of the agents' lack of clarity. It could even cause 
ambiguity in terms of agents' future accountability.
(ii) Performance Measurement Problems (Post-Investment).
Another central theme to be examined in this research 
is the post-investment control system. The Corporate 
Controller arrived at a general conclusion that the 
corporate control system was not effective. His judgement 
was based on the problems found in measuring the corporate 
portfolio performance. He observed that the financial 
measurement of an agent's performance was the last stage 
of the investment control process although it emerged as 
part of an on-going operation.
The portfolio managers were hired by Mosnic with the 
aspiration of achieving superior performance. At the same
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time, the Chairman of the board urged the Controller to 
maintain the right to know what sort of performance was 
actually being attained. The interactive involvement with 
the agents and urging them to boost tactical management of 
the portfolio was viewed by the Chairman as a means of 
mitigating the problem of controlling dynamic goals. 
Thus, the paradox of operating a dynamic strategy and 
simultaneously worrying about the achievement of financial 
goals was present. Besides this, the Controller was not 
clear about: (1) his involvement with the principals and 
the agents; and (2) his independence in spite of this 
involvement in the decision process.
With this situation it was obvious to the Controller 
that his first major problem was how to obtain reliable 
information on the measurement of performance. Information 
technology was still primitive in the Middle East. The 
Corporate Controller had to be careful because he operated 
as a gate-keeper between the principals and the agents. In 
particular the Controller was worried about measuring 
agents* performance inappropriately because of possible 
wrong interpretation of stakeholders' interest to agents. 
Mis-interpretation could also negatively impact the 
agents' decision making style.
The Controller was not clear about the post-investment 
monitoring processes Mosnic carried out to control the 
agents. As explained in the case study, agents were 
assigned a wide role in assessing their own performance.
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The Controller was worried about agents' bias in reporting 
their performance. An investment manager, by measuring and 
diagnosing his or her own performance, could manipulate 
sources of strength or weakness. Thus, the Controller
faced the responsibility of looking into each agent 
situation to tackle this problem in corporate performance 
measurement. To do that, he had to understand how each 
agent operated. This seemed to take a long time before 
getting familiarized with each relationship.
The Chairman (the President) could not provide the
Controller with criteria for resuming or terminating the
relationship with any particular agent. It seemed 
difficult for the Corporate Controller to separate 
performance resulting from an agent's skill from that due 
to mere luck. Yet, switching from one agent to the other 
on the basis of minor differences in short-term performa­
nce, involved the risk of incurring considerable corporate 
transaction costs in terms of evaluating new agents and
also the change of agents due to unsatisfactory perform­
ance might not guarantee improvement of performance. 
Despite the existence of that problem, the company did not 
have clear set of policies and procedures to tackle each 
poor performance situation. Poor performance was not even 
clearly defined. For example, when the stock market 
crashed on 19th of October 1987 and substantial losses 
were incurred, no agent was de-selected. As a result, poor 
performance determination was not an easy process to 
understand from a first glance. As said earlier, it was
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not clear whether the stakeholders required bottom line 
measurement or benchmark measurement of performance to be 
achieved by the discretionary portfolios. Thus, there were 
no clear cut rationally set models to tell when to switch 
from an agent. This meant the Controller had to understand 
each agent's situation and to handle it accordingly.
The Controller could not execute post-investment 
control procedures independently from agents because 
information necessary for evaluating the corporate 
portfolio performance was processed by the agents and then 
passed to Mosnic. That could be one of the 
decentralization problems. The Director could not explain 
the dimension of this problem at the level of each agent 
to the new Controller.
The lack of clarity in the stakeholders' risk 
perception led to the lack of clarity of objectives to be 
pursued by agents. Hence, the risk of stakeholders' 
objectives being misconceived by agents was high. That 
could make holding the agents accountable for their 
performance problematic.
It was not clear to the Controller how the 
enforcement of corrective actions on agents should be done 
in the absence of a line relationship between Mosnic and 
its agents. Consequently, it was still vague to the 
Controller how the company's structure (decentralization 
to agents) could affect the control system to be designed 
for measuring agents performance.
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At any rate the final assessment of the situation by 
the Controller was that the problem needed to be studied 
in further detail within a clear framework. Such a frame­
work had to be used to gain insights of the problem at the 
level of each specific agent.
10. CONCLUSION TO THE CASE STUDY
The initial case study of Mosnic which is presented 
in this chapter aims at describing how the company 
operates and highlights its major characteristic. Part (A) 
is a basic description of Mosnic. It has projected the 
fact that Mosnic deals in the world financial markets 
which are volatile. The volatility of the financial 
markets has made setting of strategic goals, assessment of 
investment risk, and the formulation of investment 
decision dependent on the stakeholders' reaction to an 
extremely turbulent environment. Part (A) also discusses 
the need to operate through discretionary agents. It is 
argued that for a number of considerations Mosnic has 
opted to externalize the management of its investment 
portfolios to a group of global asset managers. As a 
result, a unique structure emerged in Mosnic. In this 
structure the external agents represent the accountable 
units for the corporate management of Mosnic.
Part (A) also argues that Mosnic needed to recruit a 
Corporate Controller to help in managing the complicated 
process of formulating the corporate investment strategy,
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implementing it and then facilitating the operation of 
agents1 accountability system. Thus, this Part (A) is a 
basic description of Mosnic plus the initial case study of 
the Corporate Controller which describes the processes of 
the recruitment and the difficulties involved in specify­
ing the job of the Controller who should be involved in a 
complicated decision and control processes. Part (B) has 
reflected on the complexities involved in identifying the 
decision levels in Mosnic. Part (C) has described the 
Controller's preliminary thoughts and his initial percep­
tion found in Mosnic. The thoughts of the Controller at 
this stage are general. They do not reflect detailed 
insights of the problem. These problems need to be put 
into a clear framework for the Controller to further his 
understanding of them.
Hence, chapter (4) will be concerned with the 
analysis of the initial case study to generate specific 
working hypotheses which are hoped to help in developing a 
framework for pursuing the study of the initial case of 
Mosnic.
CHAPTER-4 
ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL CASE STUDY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Objectives and Outline of the Chapter
Part (A) of this chapter analyzes the initial case 
study to give general indications of the nature of contro- 
llership in Investment Houses. These general indications 
will be summarized and used as working hypotheses to be
pursued later in the research.
Part (B) is mainly concerned with developing a 
conceptual framework for the research. Clarity about the 
relationships between the contingent variables is a pre­
requisite to build-up such a conceptual framework which 
would help in understanding the interrelationships between 
the contingent variables which pertain to the specific 
features of controllership in Investment Houses.
The Major Characteristics of Mosnic
First, the Corporate Controller of Mosnic also served 
as Finance Director. This meant that he had direct 
contact with the stakeholders and had direct involvement 
in the strategic decision processes.
Second, Mosnic operated under uncertain financial 
market conditions which made it difficult to adopt a 
programmed approach to goal setting and decision making. 
The environmental uncertainties led Mosnic to adopt an 
extremely dynamic investment strategy. As a result, the
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Controller did not observe any formal quantitative models 
for the selection of securities based on a clear strategy. 
The Controller also observed that Mosnic did not have one 
formal stable strategy. It seemed that strategy was what 
emerged as part of the on-going operations to cope with 
fluctuating markets.
Third, Mosnic strived to Islamize its investment 
while operating in Western Financial markets.
Fourth, Mosnic operations were delegated to external 
agents. This meant that it was decentralized within a 
network which was rather different from divisionalization 
within a large company.
Fifth, agents' selection was a complicated decision, 
but it was the most important. How each agent was 
selected or de-selected could not be clearly understood 
from the case study of Mosnic. One needed to examine how 
specific agents had been selected.
Sixth, evaluation of discretionary portfolios and 
monitoring of agents involved problems stemming from the 
inter-organizational structure of the Mosnic-agent net­
work. These problems were characterized by lack of clarity 
of risk perception, mix of benchmark approach with bottom 
line approach in performance assessment. However, those 
characteristics alone did not in themselves provide clear 
suggestions for control systems in Investment Houses. 
Hence, this Chapter examines the inter-relationships 
between the relevant contingent variables to see how they
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may affect the design of controllership and control system 
in Investment Houses.
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(A) ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL CASE STUDY
4.1. INTERACTION OF CORPORATE STRATEGY 
WITH THE ENVIRONMENT
This section argues that the financial markets in 
which Mosnic operates influenced the design of the control 
system and the functions of controllership which were also 
influenced by the Islamic religion and technology of 
communication and information.
(i) The Financial Markets
This part of the analysis studies the features of 
controllership emerging from the stakeholder's interaction 
with the unpredictable, fast-moving and the uncertain 
financial markets. The argument in this section suggests 
that Mosnic and its agents could not set investment goals 
regardless of the current situation in the markets.
Mosnic needed to adopt dynamic investment policies. 
For example, when the financial markets experienced severe 
turmoil, the stakeholders were content with capital 
preservation as a realistic target in lieu of profit 
maximization. Consequently, wealth maximization became a 
broad but a highly dynamic and relative goal in Mosnic. 
Beside the continuous shift in the stakeholders' goals, 
information necessary to amend the corporate investment 
goals was not easy to obtain. The circumstances of the 
world financial markets, the agents future outlook, and 
the specific requirements of the stakeholders were all 
relevant sources of information to be attended to for the 
purpose of setting realistic investment targets.
-88
It was obvious that Mosnic did not have clearly
quantified goals which could be compared with what had 
been attained nor did it have a formal long term strategy. 
Also, the stakeholders did not want to depend on formal 
quantitative models or techniques for formulating their
investment strategy. On the other hand, they would not 
mind if the Controller discussed with the agents, the
quantitative models which they used to support their 
rather more general financial and economic analysis. 
However, the Controller was definite about the fact that, 
to the principals, portfolio management was not the pure 
application of "scientific” concepts and quantitative
techniques. Rather, they wanted their requirements to be 
closely attended to so that they could explain to the 
agents on a timely basis their perception of the markets* 
uncertainties and how they should be responding to them at 
present.
Required investment targets were relative to what 
could be achieved within the available opportunities 
without putting the stakeholders* capital into a jeopardy. 
Towards that end, the stakeholders had a tendency to amend 
the corporate strategy which they thought suited the 
situation in the financial markets. This was executed 
through re-allocating the corporate fund resources. Thus, 
tactical change of the corporate financial strategy 
emerged as a significant aspect of control. It was 
difficult to distinguish between strategy and tactical 
decisions. Both seemed to have merged in one operational
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activity which followed the trends in the financial
markets.
The interaction of stakeholders goals and strategy 
with the financial markets also influenced the strategic 
control system and the functions of the Corporate 
Controller. First/ The Corporate Controller had to be 
recruited to deal with market information from different 
sources and to make the role of the stakeholders more 
effective in formulating the investment strategy. During 
the time of the investment Advisor, the stakeholders 
involvement in risk management was negligible. Second, 
the corporate control department had to design strategic 
monitoring procedures which ensured that the corporate 
asset allocation policy set by the stakeholders was
implemented by the use of agents who were supposed to have 
better expertise in reading the financial markets. These 
procedures had to be flexible to match the dynamic 
financial strategies to be monitored. Third, timely
information necessary for measuring the performance of the
corporate portfolio was not available inside Mosnic. This 
was needed in order to make sure that investment strategic 
goals were in the process of being amended and achieved. 
The role of the Controller was important to overcome that 
problem. The market performance information necessary for 
the controllership function to exercise strategic 
assessment of the corporate portfolio performance had to 
be acquired from the agents and interpreted by the 
Controller. Fourth, the financial forecasting of
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performance in the turbulent financial markets was not an 
easy thing to be done accurately. Thus, the company had 
the problem of identifying measurable goals to be achieved 
by the corporate investment strategy. The process of
determining which types of realistic goals to be pursued 
in the financial markets required an active role to be 
played by the Corporate Controller.
Thus, in Mosnic, the interaction of the stakeholders1
strategy and goals with the turbulent, fast-moving and
unpredictable financial markets influenced the features of 
the control system and the functions of controllership.
Hence, the previous arguments suggest the following 
working hypothesis:
"The turbulence of the financial markets in
which investment houses operate tend to influ­
ence the way stakeholders formulate investment 
strategy and goals. This, in turn, is likely to 
affect the control system and the controller­
ship function in investment houses (Working 
hypothesis # l.l)
(ii) Influence of the Principal's Religious 
Ideology on the Corporate Strategy and Goal
The religious beliefs of the stakeholders influenced 
the way in which the resources of Mosnic should be 
invested in the Western (non-Islamic) financial markets. 
All Muslims are required to make sure that their 
investments are compatible with the Islamic precepts. For 
example, the receipt and payment of usury (interest) is 
prohibited in Islam. Hence, the Mosnic strategic control
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system had to ensure compliance with the Islamic religious 
guidelines.
The Corporate Controller had difficulties in ensuring 
compliance with these guidelines for a number of reasons. 
First, the global financial markets operate on an interest 
basis. Second, the agents do not fully understand the 
concept of usury. Third, the information to be used by 
the Controller for classifying the portfolio income into 
revenue from interest and non-interest income is processed 
and controlled by the discretionary agents i.e. outside 
Mosnic. Fourth, although the definition of interest is 
established by the Muslim religious experts, the 
stakeholders still have differences about which financial 
instruments involve interest and those that do not. As a 
result, views were divided in terms of how to separate 
interest from the income of the corporate portfolios. 
Fifth, it was not clear whether the degree of compliance 
with the principals* religious beliefs was an attribute to 
measure the quality of the agent. Before recruiting the 
Controller, the question of how to invest in the West 
according to the Islamic precepts was not discussed 
rigorously with the Western Agents. The Advisor was not 
interested to raise the issue and the principals had 
little contact with their agents.
These arguments clearly indicate that in the 
investment houses, which adhere to their Islamic faith, 
religion impacts the design of the management control 
system and influences the functions of strategic control-
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lership. Moreover, corporate controllers are expected to 
play a key role in making the religious beliefs of the 
principals understandable to Western Agents.
Thus it can be hypothesized that:
"The religious beliefs of the stakeholders 
impact the management control system of 
investment houses and influence the function 
of the controller. (Working hypothesis # 1.2)“
However, it has to be recognized that one does not 
know yet how each Western agent tackled the principals' 
religious requirements. In this respect, agents could be 
different. Such a difference could lead to operating 
different control processes for different agents. This 
issue will be teased out in depth in the specific agent's 
case studies presented in Chapters (5) and (6).
(iii) Impact of Technology on Controllership 
and Management Control Systems
The modern communication technology made it possible 
for Mosnic to operate in the Continental financial markets 
despite the geographical distance from the agents. Mosnic 
has its portfolio managers thousands of miles away from 
the Middle East. Nevertheless, they are readily accessible 
and controllable. The technology of communication has made 
it possible for investors all around the world to keep in 
touch with their brokers and agents and to be updated on 
the daily situation in the financial markets. Modern 
information systems (cable television, telefaxes, radio, 
etc.) now serve to link the world investment markets. The 
Controller had to come to terms with this changing scene
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Controller had to come to terms with this changing scene 
and decide which technology was needed to maintain links 
with both agents and principals.
The historical background of Mosnic showed that the 
use of information to select agents or to evaluate 
portfolio performance was confined to what the previous 
investment Advisor wanted to utilize. Given that the 
Advisor placed high trust in the agents, he was not 
anxious to dig for information about them or their past 
performance records in a rigorous manner. Consequently, 
his use of information technology was limited. As a 
result, he used a crude information system. He did not 
differentiate between agents according to their 
differences in the use of communication technology. This 
seemed critically important to the newly recruited 
Controller in ranking the intended agents. In other words, 
the use of communication technology by agents was an 
important attribute for the Controller to construct a 
portfolio of reliable agents. The information required by 
the Controller in performance evaluation ranged from 
regular information on bottom line performance to detailed 
benchmark data prepared by the agents about their 
performance.
Hence, the Controller started to appreciate that both 
an agent's communication technology and the information 
technology available for Mosnic helped to determine which 
agent to select and how to evaluate his performance. 
Moreover, it seems that the information technology applied
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influence the level of sophistication and the efficiency 
of the control system.
Hence, "The implementation of modern information 
technology by investment houses operating in 
international financial markets through external 
portfolio managers influences the design and 
efficiency of the organization1s control system 
(Working hypothesis # 1.3)
4.2. THE INTERACTION OF ENVIRONMENT, PRINCIPAL'S
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND TECHNOLOGY WITH AGENTS' 
STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES.
(i) The influence of the Financial Markets 
and Technology on Agents
The objective of Mosnic's case study was not to
describe how each particular agent could be structured and
what kind of investment strategy each agent would suggest.
Nevertheless, it was obvious that an agent's structure and
style of investment (i.e. the agent's methods and means)
reflected the pattern of his interaction with the markets.
But one cannot study in one thesis why all agents are
structured in different ways. What mattered to the
Controller was to see whether the intended agent's
structure can impact the decision to select him or not.
This will be pursued further in subsequent cases developed
specifically to examine how agents' attributes impact on
Mosnic control systems.
The asset allocation policies described in Chapter 
(3) referred to tactical and dynamic asset allocation 
policies. Mosnic decision types and levels indicated that 
agents played a significant role in (1) the tactical
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agents played a significant role in (1) the tactical 
management of the portfolios; (2) scanning the financial 
markets; and (3) interpreting them to the principals.
Hence, it was important to know the structure of the 
agents to ascertain the appropriateness of their 
investment decision processes.
The agents* role led the Controller to consider their 
influence on the corporate investment strategy process.
For example, the involvement of the agents in the
investment strategy process obviously indicated that the 
strategy, structure and processes of agents could be key 
factors which Mosnic would need to consider in selecting 
any agent. On the other hand, any agent*s investment 
management model (system) would be influenced by how that 
particular agent reads the financial markets.
Based on the initial general survey, the Controller 
could observe that different portfolio managers have 
different uses of communication technology to scan the 
financial markets. The Controller also observed that 
investment management banks adapt their structure to (1) 
the investment market requirements, (2) the competition in 
the agents markets; and (3) the local market regulations. 
These were clear in the general survey conducted by the 
Controller to form a general idea about agents. Indeed, 
this was general information which the Controller would 
need to examine further with specific agents.
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At any rate, the Corporate Controller started to 
appreciate the following potential problems of designing a 
control system for Mosnic. (1) The investment approach 
suggested by an intended agent could possibly be an 
outcome of how that particular agent reads the financial 
markets to develop the investment model, interprets the 
market information, and communicates it to the principals 
through certain means/technology of communication. (2) In 
doing that, different agents could depend on different 
types of communication technology. (3) Due to (2) , 
different agents come up with different types of strategy 
and investment models and recommend them to Mosnic to be 
adopted. (4) different agents could interact differently 
with the financial markets and their domestic environment. 
Hence, agents* organizational structure could be 
different. This meant to the Controller different 
indications for Mosnic investment strategy process.
Up to that time, the Controller had not yet gone to 
the depth of understanding the principals' relationship 
with each particular agent. Hence, he could come up with 
only general indications to the corporate control system. 
These are: First, the way agents interpret the financial
markets determine their style of investment, the strategy 
proposed by them, their risk-taking attitude, the way they 
structure their firms and their internal control processes. 
Such relationships and how they differ between agents are 
of importance to the design of Mosnic's own control system.
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Secondly, the technology applied by agents also 
affected their organizational structure, strategy and 
processes. The Controller presumed that agents* internal 
structures could also affect their processes. These 
processes were assumed to be key factors for the strategy 
and processes of Mosnic. In fact, the initial case of 
Mosnic alone does not provide an adequate picture of the 
influence of the financial markets on agents* structure. 
To research this facet of the controllership problem, the 
following working hypotheses were developed:
2.1.a. "The way intended agents interact with
financial markets influences their strategy, 
structure and processes (i.e. their methods 
and means).
b. Consequently, investment houses operating 
through a portfolio of agents would tend to 
formulate their corporate strategies by 
utilizing a number of heterogeneous sub­
strategies .
c. Thus, the corporate control system emerges 
from a number of different strategic control 
sub-systems.
d. These systems could be more effective by 
using an "involved controller."
2.2.a. "The level of information and communication
technology used by intended portfolio 
managers influences their strategy, structure 
and processes.
b. Hence, operating through a portfolio of 
agents leads to the emergence of a number of 
control sub-systems tailored to meet the 
specific control needs with regard to each 
agent."
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(ii) The Impact of the Principal's Religious
Ideology on the Agents' Strategy, structure 
and Processes.
In the previous section, it was argued that the 
religious ideology of the stakeholders influence their 
corporate investment strategy and goals. This section 
attempts to demonstrate that the principal's religious 
ideology also influences the agents' strategy, structure 
and processes.
\
Investing in the Western financial markets according 
to Islamic principals has always been a challenge facing 
Mosnic. The Controller expected to find Western agents 
unaware of how Muslims define interest. This is mainly 
because the financial environment in the West is dominated 
by the concept of interest. Agents' portfolio management 
systems were designed for investors whose income from 
interest is not prohibited. The Corporate Controller had 
to judge which of the agents was showing signs of 
cooperation to meet the religious requirements of the 
principals.
The Controller was required to ask agents to modify 
their processes to separate interest from other returns 
generated by the portfolios. In some aspects, the 
effectiveness of Mosnic strategy was judged by the extent 
to which agents complied with the Islamic religious rules 
of earning income. Thus, the effectiveness of the 
strategic control system can be evaluated in terms of its 
success in monitoring the corporate strategy to ensure the 
latters' compliance with the stakeholders' religious
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guidelines. The challenge that faced the new Controller 
in monitoring the implementation of the investment 
strategy from an Islamic perspective was to convey the 
right interpretation of the stakeholders1 religious 
requirements to the Western portfolio managers and to help 
them how to Islamize the investment of the funds entrusted 
on them in a manner that would not violate the principals* 
faith. Hence, it can be hypothesized that:-
2.3.a. "The religious beliefs of the stakeholders of 
investment houses influence agents1 strategy, 
structure and processes. This in turn 
influences the control sub-systems to be 
designed for controlling a portfolio of 
different agents.
b. The role of corporate controller in invest­
ment houses in interpreting stakeholders 
religious precepts to their agents is 
important."
4.3. THE INTERACTION OF AGENTS* STRATEGY, STRUCTURE
AND PROCESSES WITH THE PRINCIPAL'S SYSTEM OF 
MAINTAINING THE PORTFOLIO OF AGENTS
A pre-requisite to understand better the inter­
connection of agents* strategy, structure and processes 
with the principals' system of maintaining the portfolio 
of agents is to document in minute details how specific 
agents work. This issue is examined in more depth in the 
specific agents' cases presented in Chapters (5) and (6). 
However, the analysis in this section suggests that 
agents' investment approach, strategy, structure and 
processes have interrelationships with the system of 
agents' selection and de-selection implemented by the 
principal. Strategy, structure and processes can be the
criteria that determine whether to select or to de-select 
an agent. These interrelationships can have a number of 
meanings to strategic controllership in the Investment 
Houses. Based on the knowledge built from the Mosnic case, 
these interrelationships involve two variables. The first 
one is agents* strategy, methods, structure, and 
processes. The second variable is the principals* system 
of maintaining the portfolio of agents which has two
aspects, namely the selection of portfolio managers and 
their de-selection.
The initial case study does not show how a particular 
agent is selected or de-selected. This will be examined in 
the following stage of the research. However, it was 
previously argued that the major success factor of Mosnic 
was the selection of appropriate agents. The Corporate 
Financial Controller was recruited to ensure the selection 
of competent agents who could contribute to the 
achievement of the stakeholders' goals. The major task
assigned to the Corporate Controller in the process of 
maintaining an appropriate portfolio of agents involved
the evaluation of intended agents investment strategy,
internal structure, and processes.
As a result of the recruitment of the Controller, the 
de-selection of agents (i.e. the termination of the 
fiduciary relationship with any particular agent) was 
based on more factors than just measuring the financial 
performance using the ROI produced by the agents. 
Relationships with agents in terms of continuity depended
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partially on the achievement of financial objectives and 
mainly on uninterrupted satisfaction of the principals 
with the strategy, structure and processes of the selected 
agent. In other words, there was general flexibility in 
agents1 accountability depending on the principals* 
satisfaction with the way agents operated using the 
necessary methods for each market situation. As a result, 
agents' performance measurement emerged as a process of 
interaction between Mosnic and its portfolio managers.
It was natural to expect to see different patterns of 
interaction with different agents which meant different 
control processes. The operation of the latter highlighted 
the importance of the presence of the Controller. As indi­
cated by the initial case study the Controller did not 
find in Mosnic a formal investment strategy. It appeared 
that the strategic investment decisions were tackled in a 
continuous process through maintaining the portfolio of the 
discretionary agents. This meant to the Controller that the 
means and the methods of the discretionary agents could be 
critical to the corporate investment decision processes 
concerned with allocating the fund resources of Mosnic. 
In fact, the Controller needed to look into this problem 
in all the agents situations. It was clear that there 
could be complicated and different processes by which the 
strategic decision segments could emerge with each one of 
the ten agents. The initial case study alone could not 
help us to understand the insights of the problems.
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Also, the initial case study (Mosnic and the 
Controller) indicated that agents performance evaluation 
in Mosnic depended on the appropriate treatment of the 
information provided by a portfolio of agents. Thus, the 
Controller could generally interpret that the information 
system of the intended agent was an important attribute 
when examining agents* processes. In other words, for 
selecting an agent it seemed important to examine how 
efficient the expected agent*s information system could 
be. Moreover, for maintaining a portfolio of agents, the 
Controller had to determine the necessary procedures to 
monitor each specific intended agent. As a result, the 
Controller induced that the corporate control system could 
be a product of a number of sub-systems which were 
dependent on numerous agents control processes and 
different information sub-systems. However, the Controller 
developed the belief that life could be a lot more 
complicated if each agent case was studied.
In fact, the recruitment of the Controller indicated 
that the stakeholders were not content with the informal 
system of the Advisor in monitoring the agents. The 
Advisor vested equal trust on all agents. The Corporate 
Controller observed that agents might not be the same in 
terms of their methods and means i.e. structure, their 
strategy, and their processes concerned with formulating 
the investment strategy. Depending on the variations 
between agents* tasks and methods, the Corporate 
Controller contemplated designing a diversified control
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system that would meet the specific control needs of each 
agent. The potential effectiveness of the system to be 
designed seemed to depend on studying the characteristics 
of the fiduciary relationship with each particular agent 
in the portfolio. This could be indicated by understanding 
the means and the methods of the intended agents.
Based on the preceding arguments one can hypothesize 
that:-
" Agents1 strategy, structure and processes 
influence the pre-investment processes carried 
out in investment houses to maintain an 
appropriate portfolio of agents. (Working 
hypothesis # 3)."
More light will be shed on this hypothesis when we 
investigate in Chapter (5) how the attributes for agents 
selection interacted with the processes of maintaining a 
portfolio of agents.
4.4. THE RELATIONSHIP OF AGENTS' SELECTION 
PROCESSES WITH THE DESIGN OF CONTROL 
SYSTEM AND THE EVALUATION OF DISCRET­
IONARY PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE.
The initial case study of Mosnic demonstrated that 
the control system had two objectives. First, the pre­
investment system should ensure that an appropriate 
portfolio of agents was structured. Second, to operate a 
system for the evaluation of portfolio performance. These 
objectives were clear throughout the initial case study. 
For example, the job description of the Corporate 
Controller involved the regulation and the formalization 
of the agent selection processes. Moreover, the Corporate
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Controller had to evaluate agents* performance and to be 
aware of the control features of each agent to tailor the 
system that could ensure their effective monitoring.
After his involvement in the management of Mosnic, 
the Controller observed that a control process could not 
be operated without determining in participation with each 
agent some short-term financial strategy to be pursued. 
In establishing the latter, the Controller assumed that 
this can take place simultaneously while designing the 
monitoring procedures for the intended agents. However, 
the Controller was not sure how this could be done without 
studying the specific control needs of each intended 
agent. This also meant that the objectives defined for 
intended agents were to be set in the latter's selection 
stage. In addition, before selecting any agent, the 
Controller felt that the stakeholders* risk perception and 
the extent to which they would like to be involved in the 
control of the intended agents had to be defined.
Indeed the corporate control system aimed at managing
the risk of the stakeholders in a process agreeable to
their requirements. The presence of the Corporate
Controller in future agents selection or de-selection
procedures was a key factor to ensure risk management in a
manner compatible to the principals' perception of
different types of risk.
Hence, it can be hypothesized that:
"The processes of maintaining the portfolio of 
agents in an investment house influence the 
design of the corporate control system to 
monitor the agents (Working hypothesis # 4)."
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4.5. THE IMPACT OF THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
SYSTEM ON MAINTAINING THE PORTFOLIO OF AGENTS
In Chapter (3) the discussion of the feedback loop 
problems showed that Mosnic had to negotiate with the 
each agent any corrective actions needed. The control 
cycle in such a process would complete its loop by viewing 
whether the agent concerned would be ready to amend the 
relevant investment strategy to rectify the unsatisfactory 
result or not. This process also might involve changing 
the financial strategy which had already been negotiated 
with that agent, i.e. ascribing the low performance to the 
uncontrollable financial markets. An alternative procedure 
might be to call for de-selecting the agent.
These arguments propose that the principals1 system
of evaluating the portfolio performance can influence the
selection and de-selection of agents. Moreover, it can
change the investment strategy and consequently the
strategic control. Hence,
" The process of appraising agents1 performance 
has a feedback effect on the process of
maintaining the portfolio of agents used by an 
investment house (Working hypothesis # 5)."
4.6. SUMMARY OF THE WORKING HYPOTHESES.
Table 4.1 summarizes the working hypotheses developed 
from the analysis of the initial case study.
Summary of the Research Working Hypotheses
1.1. The turbulence of the financial markets in which 
investment houses operate tend to influence the way 
stakeholders formulate investment strategy and
goals. This, in turn, is likely to affect the
control system and the controllership function in 
investment houses.
2. The religious beliefs of the stakeholders impact the 
management control system of investment houses and 
influence the function of the controller.
3. The implementation of modern information technology
by investment houses operating in international 
financial markets through portfolio managers
influences the design and efficiency of the 
organization's control system.
1. a. The way intended agents interact with financial
markets influence their strategy, structure and 
processes, (i.e. their methods and means).
b. Consequently, investment houses operating
through a portfolio of agents tend to formulate 
their corporate strategies by utilizing a number 
of heterogeneous sub-strategies.
c. Thus, the corporate control system emerges from 
a number of different strategic control sub­
systems .
d. These systems could be more effective by using
an "involved controller."
2. a. The level of information and communication
technology used by intended portfolio managers 
influences their strategy, structure and 
processes.
b. Hence, operating through a portfolio of agents 
leads to the emergence of a number of control 
sub-systems tailored to meet the specific 
control needs with regard to each agent.
3. a. The religious beliefs of the stakeholders of
investment houses influence agents' strategy, 
structure and processes. This in turn
influences the control sub-systems to be 
designed for controlling a portfolio of 
different agents.
b. The role of the corporate controller in 
investment houses in interpreting stakeholders' 
religious precepts to their agents is important.
Agents' strategy, structure and processes influence 
the pre-investment processes carried out in investment 
houses to maintain an appropriate portfolio of agents.
The processes of maintaining the portfolio of agents 
in an investment house influences the design of the 
corporate control system to monitor the agents.
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5. The process of appraising agents1 performance has a 
feedback effect on the process of maintaining the 
portfolio of agents maintained by an investment house.
The above hypothesized relationships are presented in 
Fig. 4.1. This represents the general conceptual 
framework of the research which is discussed in Part (B).
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PART (B)
THE GENERAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
4.7. THE GENERAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK DERIVED 
FROM THE INITIAL CASE STUDY
Fig. 4.1 is developed from the five working
hypotheses summarized in section 4.6.
Fig. 4.1.
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The main contingent variables of the conceptual 
framework are variable (B) , which represents the 
principals' goals and strategy, and variable (A) which 
represents a number of environmental factors which 
influence the management control system in investment 
houses. These environmental factors are: (i) The financial 
markets; (ii) the domestic environment of Mosnic i.e., the
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Middle East; (iii) the stakeholders* religious ideology; 
and (v) technology.
As said previously, the domestic environment of Mosnic 
(The Middle East) was separated from the stakeholders* 
religious ideology because there are organizations in the 
Middle East which do not adhere to the Islamic precepts. 
For example, the secular commercial banks (which are not 
governed by any religious beliefs) outnumber the Islamic 
banks in the Middle East. However, in the case of Mosnic, 
the religious beliefs of the stakeholders is an 
influencing variable which impacts the investment process.
Box (C) represents the agents* strategy structure and 
processes (means and methods). Variable (D) stands for 
Mosnic*s (the principal*s) control system. Boxes (E) and 
(F) are the components of the corporate (the principal*s) 
control system. The latter variable represents the system 
of maintaining the appropriate portfolio of agents while 
the former signifies the design of the control system for 
specific agents and the performance evaluation process. 
The components of these two sub-systems will be further 
examined in Chapters (5) and (6) which address specific 
agents * pre-investment and post-investment selection and 
monitoring processes, respectively.
4.8. THE NEED FOR AND THE LIMITATIONS 
OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The general conceptual framework developed in Fig. 
4.1. will be used to guide the preparation of case
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studies for specific agents. As stated in the research 
approach chapter, the conceptual framework is needed to 
confine the description to the aspects of the cases which 
are relevant to the research.
It is obvious from the approach to this practitioner 
research (see Chapter 2) that further cases will be used 
to explain and give further insights to the initial case 
study. This means the trend of the research is moving 
towards the description of detailed and complicated 
processes. These processes are endless. Different sets 
of people from different organizations are involved in the 
pre-investment and post-investment processes indicating 
that the processes to be described could be variable also. 
The researcher (the Controller) is part of these 
processes. The amount of information he has about the 
research problem is extremely detailed. The conceptual 
framework is hoped to help the practitioner conducting 
this research to present the problem in a relatively 
simple form to all the audiences of the academic issues 
inherent in this research.
However, a conceptual framework may not highlight all 
the processes of the phenomena to be studied in this 
context. For example, investment decisions are taken in an 
iterative process of interaction and through frequent 
negotiations between the agents and the principals. Such a 
process has no formal boundaries as the conceptual 
framework suggests. Thus, the conceptual framework shown 
in Fig 4.1 is not more than a simple diagram that attempts
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to represent the broad contingent variables. The 
hypothesized relationships between the contingent 
variables are shown by connecting lines which do not fully 
portray the principal-agent interactions nor fully reflect 
the control system changing processes and their minute 
details.
Another limitation of the conceptual framework 
diagram is that it cannot accommodate the whole constructs 
of each contingent variable in this research. Sometimes 
the constructs of the variables themselves may be 
complicated processes.
Another problem of the conceptual framework is that 
this research is devoted to one investment category i.e, 
the marketable securities. It would not be possible for 
one conceptual framework to reflect real world decisions 
and control problems of organizations investing through 
agents in other investment products. Hence, this
conceptual framework may need adjustments if it is to be 
used by other investment houses operating in different 
investment products.
One of the main reasons why the conceptual framework 
is needed at this stage is to guide the research in 
conducting further case studies to advance our 
understanding of the general relationships between the 
contingent variables mentioned in the five working 
hypotheses.
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4.9 THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CASES ON 
SPECIFIC AGENTS
As argued before, in order to further our 
understanding of the hypothesized relationships, an 
additional five case studies on specific agents will be 
presented that demonstrate Mosnicfs pre-investment and 
post-investment processes in dealing with portfolio 
managers. In particular, these case studies attempt to 
shed more light on the five working hypotheses. Table 4.1, 
shows the processes that require further investigations. 
The agents* cases to be studied are shown against each 
aspect of the control system.
Table 4.1
Specific Agents Cases Selection Framework
MOSNIC CONTROL SYSTEM 
[Variables (E) & (F) in 
Fig. 4.1 (The Conceptual 
Framework)].
Agents to be Studied No. of 
Cases
Processes (Systems) to 
be better Understood




of Acrents variable (FV.
( i) Selection of Agents.
(ii) De-selection of 
agents.
(1) Selection of MIP 
Bank as an Agent.
(2) Selection of BJ-S 
Bank as an Agent.
(1) Vontov Bank De­
selection
(b)Evaluation of Agents 
Performance [variable 








Total Number of Cases.......  5
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4.10. DATA COLLECTION
All the relevant information of the selected asset 
managers is under the custody of the researcher. Also, the 
agents were very cooperative in providing the researcher 
with additional data. The business trips and the working 
relationship between the researcher and the agents also 
have facilitated the collection of data. For example, the 
agents used to voluntarily provide the researcher with new 
publications in the professional literature on the 
selection and monitoring of portfolio managers.
Selection of Cases
The cases on agents were selected from the following 
total population of agents that were dealt with by the 
researcher.
Total number of Agents evaluated with a view to *
selection over three years is around.................. 50
Total number of Agents de-selected ...................  3
Agents currently in service............................10
The selected five case studies were intended to be 
representative of the other cases. This was helped by the 
fact that the Controller had been involved in all the 
selection, de-selection and performance evaluation 
processes for the last four years since his appointment. 
The logic behind selecting the same banks for the pre­
* Out of the 50 agents offering their services about 35 
were dropped after the preliminary evaluation tests. 
15 were able to stand the detailed analysis. Currently 
only 10 are assigned business with Mosnic.
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investment and post-investment stages was to provide the 
reader with a comprehensive picture of the control process 
involved in dealing with each specific agent.
4.11 CONCLUSION
In this Chapter the initial case study was analyzed 
and specific working hypotheses were generated and 
developed into a research conceptual framework. The 
latter shows the hypothesized inter-relationship between 
the contingent variables (principals* goals and strategy 
and environmental factors) which influenced the design of 
the management control system of Mosnic. These 
relationships will be teased out in the five case studies 
presented in Chapters (5) and (6) . It is to be remembered 
that while the cases on specific agents were used to 
describe the pre-investment and post-investment processes, 
the role of the Corporate Controller was projected 
throughout the description.
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CHAPTER - 5 
MAINTAINING THE PORTFOLIO OF AGENTS 
(Pre-Investment Case Studies)
Objectives and Outline
This Chapter aims at improving our understanding of 
the working hypotheses generated from the analysis of the 
initial case study.
The analysis of the initial case study shown that 
maintaining an appropriate portfolio of asset managers was 
an important aspect of the control system in Mosnic. 
However, it is necessary to examine the insights of the 
processes and relationships which affected the 
appropriateness of diversification over agents. This is 
the objective of the three case studies presented in this 
chapter which deals with the selection of agents. The pre­
investment (selection of agents) cases explain important 
aspects of the investment strategy formulation through 
interaction with the intended agents. It is also one of 
the objectives of the agent selection and de-selection 
case studies to reveal whether agents depended on a purely 
security analysis approach to formulate the strategic 
investment decision or whether they interacted in a 
flexible manner with the principals to understand the 
latters' opinion on risk and investment objectives.
The study of agent selection aims at projecting the 
potential problem of the control system resulting from 
differences between agents in terms of methods and means. 
Such differences seemed to have made it necessary to ope­
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rate a number of strategic control sub-systems to be 
tailored for controlling heterogeneous agents. The case 
studies show how the Controller determined how to monitor 
each specific agent as part of the complicated pre­
investment analysis process carried out to choose the 
discretionary agents. The issue of ROI standard setting is 
also considered in the pre-investment case studies.
This chapter also discusses the question of market 
inefficiency in the market for agents in informing the 
investors about the best agent who would expend the 
optimum method and means to maximize the welfare of the 
principals. This is followed by a description of how the 
principal (Mosnic) went about selecting MIP bank to be a 
discretionary asset manager. That is done in Section 5-A. 
Section 5-B describes the selection of BJ-S bank as an 
intended agent; while the Vontov Bank case study presented 
in Section 5-C gives the reader a picture about the 
complicated processes involved in the de-selection 
(termination of the fiduciary relationship) of a 
discretionary agent.
Section 5-D is concerned with the emerging issues 
from the three case studies. It emphasizes the 
Controller's further thoughts about the critical problems 
in maintaining the portfolio of agents i.e. the complicat­
ions involved in the agents' selection and de-selection 
processes.
At the end of each agent appraisal process the 
Controller reflected on the criteria and the results of 
the three appraisal processes to show the complications 
involved in measuring the qualities (the methods and the 
means) of the intended agents.
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SECTION 5-A 
THE CASE OP MIP BANK SELECTION
1. THE PROBLEM OF AGENTS' SELECTION
Rosenberg (1986) estimated that between 1970 and 1984 
the amount of money under professional management jumped 
tenfold from approximately $100 billion to $ 1 trillion 
and the number of registered investment advisors rose from 
3,060 to 9000 (2,000 joined the field in 1984 alone). The 
portfolio managers also believed that the explosively 
growing field of investment management was riddled with 
questionable practices that made it difficult for even the 
most sophisticated clients to tell the deceivers from the 
performers. As a result, finding the best person or the 
best organization to invest their money was one of the 
most important financial decisions. It was also one of 
the toughest. This was because selection had to be made 
in a world where professional investors had access to the 
same information -sometimes too much of it. At the same 
time it was extremely difficult to ascertain the decisive 
advantages which a portfolio manager would have had over 
others.
Each time Mosnic needed to invest some of its surplus 
funds through a new agent, it did not have a system which 
would give (at a glance) a list of the available portfolio 
managers from which to make the choice. In fact, Mosnic 
did not possess the necessary information about the global 
markets of the agents. It was almost impossible. However, 
every investor may suffer this limitation. Thus, MIP had
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to seek and choose from an extremely wide market of global 
portfolio managers. In fact, even before the recruitment 
of the Controller, Mosnic had some agents selected by the 
ex-Advisor. But, the criteria followed to select the 
agents were not clearly set. As explained in Chapter (3), 
Mosnic started with some reputed brand name commercial and 
investment banks which reported disturbingly poor 
performance mainly resulting from unsatisfactory methods 
and means. These brand name banks also had the least 
understanding for how the stakeholders perceived the 
financial markets' uncertainties. The Advisor did make 
some minor changes in the portfolio of agents maintained 
by Mosnic by establishing fiduciary relationships with 
some of the European private investment banks. However, 
the Controller found out that the stakeholders were not 
satisfied with the degree of compatibility between their 
risk perception and the investment style of the agents 
appointed by the Advisor.
In the case of MIP, the general guideline of the 
stakeholders was to deal with one of Geneva's private 
investment banks. Thus, the difficult question of scanning 
the global agents market was substantially moderated by 
this guideline. Otherwise the Corporate Controller would 
have had to enter the whole world of portfolio manager's 
market to choose a winner; a market characterized by being 
too wide. In fact, the Controller knew that, regardless 
of the opportunity which might have been lost, the 
stakeholders decided to make their selection within Geneva
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private investment banks. There was a general belief in 
Mosnic that Geneva private investment banks were 
conservative, experienced, soundly structured, enjoyed 
reliable internal control systems, and had high technology 
application. That was beside the general conviction that 
Switzerland is neutral, politically stable, and allows 
secrecy of banking. Hence, within those parameters, the 
Corporate Controller had to orchestrate an agent (MIP 
bank) selection process.
2. INTRODUCTION TO THE SELECTION OF MIP
When the Corporate Controller was assigned the 
responsibility of organizing the selection of MIP to 
operate as an agent for Mosnic, he was more or less clear 
about the factors which should determine the fiduciary 
relationship with this Swiss private investment bank. He 
knew that agents' means and methods could be complicated 
attributes to follow for making the choice. However, as a 
guideline to ensure that MIP strategy, structure and 
processes were properly studied, the Controller needed two 
things: First, the agent strategy, structure and
processes (ASSPQ) questionnaire (see Appendix 5.1 p. 169). 
Second, to set a framework for the selection stages in a 
diagrammatic form as in Fig. 5.1. The ASSPQ (Appendix 
5.1) was to be used as a checklist that would ensure 
proper coverage of attributes to examine MIP strategy 
processes, structure and processes. The ASSPQ was first 
developed by* the Controller. Actually, the ASSPQ 
reflected the initial technical approaches to control the
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Controller wanted to adopt. Given his Arthur Young firm 
auditing background of using checklists to ensure the 
quality of implementing procedures, the Controller assumed 
that the ASSPQ would be the formal solution for the agent 
selection system to be adopted by Mosnic. Later on he 
discovered that the ASSPQ alone could not resolve the 
problem. Intended agents appraisal proved to be much more 
complex and involved the formulation of investment 




STAGES, PROCESSES AND ATTRIBUTES (FACTORS) 
INVOLVED IN SELECTION OF AN AGENT 
(PRE-INVESTMENT PROCESSES)
1. CORPORATE DECISION TO SELECT ONE OF GENEVA 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT BANKS AS AN EXTERNAL 
DISCRETIONARY AGENT
V
2. INITIAL NOMINATION OF THE INTENDED AGENT.
\ r
3. THE CORPORATE CONTROLLER'S INITIAL









5. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE INTENDED 
AGENT I.e., ANALYSIS OF AGENTS' 
STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES
6. FORMULATING THE FIRST YEAR FINANCIAL STRA­
TEGY AND DETERMINING THE NECESSARY 
PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLING THE AGENT.
7. REVIEW OF THE ASSET MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT 
AND COMPLETION OF THE ACCOUNTS 
DOCUMENTATION
f
8. TRANSFER OF FUNDS OR SECURITIES
(C)
AGENTS' STRATEGY AND PROCESSES
( I) Investment approach risk taking 
attitude asset allocation.
( ii) Market scanning, informing prin­
cipals and communication techno­
logy.
(iii) Personnel rewarding system,
stability and portfolio manage­
ment efficiency.
( iv) Effectiveness of internal control 
system.
( v) Frequency and accurancy of per­
formance reporting.
AGENT'S STRUCTURE
( i) Organizational set-up.
( ii) Diversified market specialism, 
(iii) Branches and Associates,
( iv) Custodian and correspondents.
( v) Number and type of clients.
( vi) Number of accounts assigned to 
each portfolio manager.
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Fig 5.1. is an attempt to simplify in a diagrammatic 
presentation the chronological processes which took place 
to select MIP. It starts by restating the corporate 
strategic decision of externalizing portfolio management 
to external agents. It then portrays (briefly) processes 
involved in selecting the agent together with the 
formulation of strategy with the agent. The reader will 
appreciate that a simple diagram cannot give a complete 
picture of all the human and inter-organizational 
processes involved in selecting an external agent while 
also formulating investment strategy.
Notwithstanding the tidiness and the systematic flow 
of stages shown in Fig. 5.1, the MIP selection process was 
not done in a pre-determined systematic manner. The 
Corporate Controller and the Director were the main actors 
from the side of Mosnic to conduct most of the analysis. 
Both of them were aiming to cover all the aspects 
emphasized in the ASSPQ. The analysis process was not 
even in the same order of the ASSPQ. The Director had his 
own style of analyzing the agents by touching on different 
aspects of the intended agent. Nevertheless, the 
Corporate Controller was cautious to look into the agent's 
structure and processes as in the ASSPQ.
3. MIP SELECTION PROCESSES
History of MIP Bank 
MIP Bank introduced itself as a bank that was founded 
in Geneva in 1810 after the French Revolution. Geneva was
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under French occupation at that time, and for many people 
it was a period of great uncertainty. In the years 
following the Napoleonic wars, however, the commercial 
opportunities available in the wider international field 
were to be discovered. Just as Geneva grew in importance 
as a financial centre, MIP has become, over the years, 
one of the world's leading private investment banks, 
developing its expertise in its principal area of 
activity: international investment management.
This history attracted the Controller towards MIP. 
Thus, he decided to meet with MIP.
THE INVESTMENT APPROACH
The Controller said to the representative of MIP:
" The historical background you gave on MIP is quite 




Today in a world made smaller by highly 
sophisticated communication technology and the 
easy flow of information, the management of 
investment assets is a complex business. At MIP 
the constant objective is to preserve client's 
capital by achieving superior levels of investment 
performance. This can only be done by taking a 
worldwide approach to investment, seeking out and 
capitalizing on the best opportunities available 
in the market. If our investment philosophy, 
built on 180 years of global experience remains 
consistent in stressing quality without 
compromise, our investment approach is re-adapted 
periodically to a changing environment. It is then 




" How do you build-up the investment strategy for 
your client's assets? Can you describe how the 
investment decision is formulated, and how 
flexible is your investment strategy?"
MIP Representative replied:
" Investment strategy is based upon a rigorous 
analysis of world markets. Each week, several
regional investment policy meetings take place 
between the partners, the senior manager in charge 
of portfolio strategy and the specialists of the 
geographical area under study. A top-down 
approach is used, starting with a review of the
international economic situation, that of the
particular country on the agenda, then the foreign 
exchange outlook. Decisions are taken as to the
asset allocation and finally as to the selection 
of securities which have been proposed by the 
bank's investment research staff. An investment
strategy report is published internally defining 
guidelines and listing specific recommendations. 
In addition to this, research meetings are held 
every morning in Geneva, at which all partners,
investment managers and research staff are 
present."
MIP ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING AND MARKET SPECIALISM
The Controller:
"How is MIP Set-Up for investment decision making?"
MIP Representative replied:
" MIP Research Department consists of a team of 
fifteen senior analysts in Geneva and one in 
Tokyo. Each analyst is a specialist in a 
particular geographical area or investment medium. 
The world's major economies, currencies industries 
and companies are closely analyzed and monitored. 
Frequent visits are made to principal world 
markets and detailed studies and reports 
published. Furthermore, our Research Department 
is one of Switzerland major sources of primary 
research on the Swiss Financial markets."
ESTABLISHMENT OF FINANCIAL STRATEGY
The Controller Asked:
" I presume your bank has its investment strategy 
and internal policies to preserve. Does your
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strategy contradict with the specific guidelines 
and requirements of different clients? I mean, how 
flexible is MIP in retailoring its investment 
model to be compatible with the investors' 
different objectives?"
MIP Representative:
" In all MIP has more than fifty investment managers 
in its various offices around the world, the 
majority of whom are located in Geneva. All are 
multilingual, travel extensively abroad, and are 
both experts in both the equity and fixed interest 
securities markets. The challenge facing them is 
to adapt our investment strategy guidelines to 
each clients specific requirements, while 
achieving superior levels of return. They also 
provide tailor-made reporting and other banking 
services.
MIP success relies on a combination of highly 
automated investment management systems,
experience, and professional staff.
Institutional portfolio management has become an 
increasingly important aspect of our investment 
services. A highly specialized group of investment 
officers are responsible for the management of 
pension funds, corporate cash, insurance company 
assets, and domestic or foreign government funds. 
They adhere to strict legal, administrative, and 
fiscal rules imposed both by the government 
regulatory authorities and the funds themselves. 
In addition, they act as consultants to many of 
the international organizations in Geneva. Our 
management team works closely with MIP U.K, Ltd. 
and MIP-LEM Ltd. located in London. As a result, 
we have established a cohesive and methodical 
approach to portfolio management, as well as 
providing the necessary reporting services, both 
of which are tailored to the requirement of the 
clients. Accounts are managed quantitatively, so 
that the analysis and evaluation of performance 
and the administration and verification of 
reporting practices and procedures are continually 
upgraded to improve our services."
The Director:
" Can you predict specific ROI that you can produce 
in the first years, should we leave certain funds 
under your discretionary management.?" In other 
words, are you comfortable with a specific method 
of measuring performance you would achieve for us?"
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MIP Representative:
" Forecasting ROI in the financial markets is 
difficult. Money Managers cannot assume control 
over the environmental independent factors."
The Director:
" What is the investment strategy recommended by MIP 
to Mosnic?”
MIP Representative:
" As discretionary asset managers we do not have a 
universal investment strategy. Our general invest­
ment policy is flexible enough to accommodate a 
wide range of clients' objectives. However, we 
propose to our clients specific risk classes.
Some managers follow the quantified strategy 
format disclosing figures, which is very seldom. 
We depend on the narrative format in its very 
general term, either in a short or a long 
statement. Then specifics can be added depending 
on what the client requires. We depend on the 
open interaction with our clients to understand 
their requirements."
The Director commented to the Controller:
11 The reason why the discretionary portfolio 
managers avoid promising a guaranteed rate of 
return to be achieved through a clearly formulated 
strategy, is that those agents are completely 
uncertain about the future. Their sophisticated 
security analysis systems are unable to help them 
to forecast the future. Their investment models 
change so frequently."
ASSETS ALLOCATION STYLE
The Controller said to the Director:
” I have requested MIP, as an intended portfolio 
manager for Mosnic, to provide an assets 
allocation formula to cope with the forthcoming 
year, indicating how the securities are to be 
allocated by:
The types of the investment instruments.
- By the portfolio currencies.
- By industries
- Geographically, showing how such proposed 
asset allocation will lead at the end of the 
year to a certain quantifiable return on the 
assets. MIP gave a number of reasons why 
they cannot do that. 1
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The Director:
” How to allocate the assets In the portfolio, in my 
view, depends on what we want in Mosnic, and how 
much risk we are prepared to take. If you succeed 
to clarify those two aspects i.e. goals and risk, 
MIP can provide a proforma assets allocation 
schedule special for Mosnic. However, you never 
know the markets. Even after the agent allocates 
the assets to our satisfaction at a particular 
point of time, we may intervene if we see a market 
turmoil or any unforeseen crisis. The stakeholders 
may even change their desires."
The Controller:
" The discretionary portfolio managers will use 
their delegated power to change the asset 
allocation wherever they feel, to the best of 
their belief and knowledge, a change is needed to 
preserve the interest of Mosnic.1'
The Director:
11 Do you then agree with me that asking the intended 
portfolio manager to work out a long-term 
investment strategy formulated in its minute 
details is unfair and unrealistic?"
The Controller:
" Some guidelines in the form of how the intended 
manager analyzes the factors making the future 
uncertain is possible, but not more than that. If 
Mosnic insists on a certain asset allocation as a 
guide to MIP for a year to come, Mosnic may be 
releasing MIP from being accountable for any low 
performance in future. Moreover, MIP must have 
the power for tactical allocation of resources to 
manage the portfolio opportunistically,"
The Director:
" Don't you think that completely entrusting the 
allocation of the assets in the portfolio to MIP, 
leaves the door open for the manager to 
concentrate on, say, equities where they can trade 
more and earn at the cost of Mosnic more brokerage 
fee? I need a way not to involve ourselves in 
individual securities analysis while we still 
control MIP."
The Controller explained the worry of the Director to MIP. 
MIP responded:
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11 That is not true for a number of reasons. First, MIP 
aims at long-term relations, and continuity. Second, 
MIP cares much for its professional future. We must 
not forget that such reputable organizations route 
their investment policies through highly
sophisticated internal organizational set-up. We 
believe that our bottom line performance will bring 
the relationship to the real test. Of course it is 
not practical to involve Mosnic in the individual 
securities selection process. However, to manage the 
portfolio to your satisfaction we encourage 
understanding the process by which your investment 
objectives shift. This is an important input for MIP 
processes of analyzing the different securities to 
make the selection."
The Controller and the Director, however, wanted to be 
more definite about the investment approach of MIP.
PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF MIP INVESTMENT APPROACH
Responding to the requirements of Mosnic to reflect 
on the investment strategy to be followed, MIP bank gave 
the following statement as part of a long report.
11 There is an uncomfortably high possibility that 
security value could fall further in the 
atmosphere of uncertainty generated by volatile 
exchange rates, conflicting policy statements, and 
a U.S. presidential election campaign."
Then rather more briefly in the view of its market 
judgements, MIP summarized the strategies as follows:
1 As a result we feel it is only prudent to take 
some defensive steps"
MIP summarized these steps as follows:
1 1. Though we seldom hold cash as a matter of 
policy, there seems to be little opportunity 
cost to holding cash over the next few months.
2. Bonds seem attractive, especially since we 
would be willing to hold them through short 
periods of higher interest rates.
3. Equities almost certainly will remain volatile."
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The Director commented:
" The investment strategy presented by MIP is not 
more than a general investment philosophy of the 
firm. Therefore, I suggest we make sure that our 
guidelines, goals, and objectives can be served by 
MIP investment strategy. They have to be more 
specific."
Then the Controller proposed to the Director to make more 
specific inquiries about MIP processes. He said:
11 Before releasing the investment guidelines to MIP, 
we need to know more about MIP investing style, 
i.e.:
(i) Specific Approach to Investment
1. What kind of current income from investments 
shall Mosnic expect i.e. high current income, 
medium current income or total return investors.
(ii) Risk
2. Risk taking: Which type of investors is MIP 
designed to serve - high risk investors or medium 
risk investors?
3. Specific Investment styles/Management style.
Is MIP most comfortable with:
- Growth stocks
- Lower P/E stocks.
4. What is MIP philosophy regarding the use of cash 
in the portfolio?
(iii) Performance
5. What are MIP investment objectives? i.e. Do they 
aim at exceptional performance. ? at what risk?
6. Do they have varying goals under the different 
market circumstances, i.e. when the markets are 
abnormally strong, normal or volatile?
7. How does MIP communicate? In writing, written 
report, planned number of visits by both parties, 
etc.'1
The Director:
" I propose you take a further step and request MIP
to reply to your inquiries and provide you with
the proposed form of fiduciary relationship which 
MIP would like to have with Mosnic. We can then 
carry on analyzing MIP while looking into the 
proposed agreement.1
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The Controller then addressed the following telefax memo 
to MIP.
" You are kindly requested to provide Mosnic 
Investment Policies Committee with the following:
1. About MIP.
- The kind of current income you plan for.
- MIP risk management approach.
- MIP investment style.
- MIP performance objectives.
- MIP tactics under the different market 
circumstances.
- How big is MIP?
The volume of the assets managed by MIP.
- MIP reporting lines and communication 
with Mosnic.
2. Specimen format of the proposed asset 
management agreement together with the 
account opening forms."
The representative of MIP responded as follows:
"Generally speaking, most of the information you 
have asked for is provided in the literature we have 
passed to you. However, our policies are flexible 
enough to adjust to the maximum specific requirement 
you have to tell about your portfolio. For further 
knowledge of your goals and specific requirements 
try to answer the following inquiries. We may need 
your highlights on Mosnic philosophies and
objectives such as:
1. Your current income requirement.
2. Your risk tolerance.
3. Your investment style. Do you mind leaving 
the determination of your investment style 
at our discretion. ?
4. Some written guidelines if possible.
5. Description of the characteristics of the 
accounts we are supposed to manage.
6. Do you have in mind specific allocation of 
the assets by the type of securities and by 
currencies ?
7. For how long do you think the account will 
remain without withdrawal?
8. Any specific requirements or restrictions 
you may see important to be taken into 
consideration by us."
The Formal Fiduciary Relationship and Authority
In response to the request of the Controller to 
explain the type of relationship it contemplated to
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establish with Mosnic, MIP responded as follows:
"Once you take us as Asset Managers in MIP we 
believe in serving our client beyond any formal 
limits. You feel free to tell us anything you may 
require in specific."
DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY AND 
AGENT RESPONSIBILITY
The following quotations from the documents sent to 
MIP, explains the limit of authority requested by MIP.
"The agreement confirms the appointment of MIP as 
investment adviser to supervise, manage and direct 
the investment of and for the above captioned 
Account (the account), with authority as agent and 
attorney-in-fact on behalf of the account, when MIP 
shall deem the same appropriate (a) to purchase, 
sell, invest, re-invest, exchange, convert, trade 
in and otherwise deal with such assets of the 
account, and (b) to place orders for the purchase 
or sale of portfolio securities for the account 
with or through brokers, dealers or issuers 
selected by MIP or designated by the Client.
It is further understood that MIP may deliver to 
any securities brokerage firm executing 
transactions on behalf of the Account, or to the 
Custodian for the Account, a copy of this document 
as evidence of its authority to act for and on 
behalf of the Account. "
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
Mosnic was to employ MIP to provide investment
advisory services for an Investment Management Account to
be established on behalf of Mosnic (the Account), in
accordance with the following terms and conditions:
"(1)Authority:
MIP will have the following power and authority 
with respect to the Account:
(2) Discretionary Account.
MIP shall have discretion to supervise, manage.
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and direct the assets in the Account and, as 
agent and attorney-in-fact with full power and 
authority on behalf of the client MIP may, 
without prior consultation with the Client and 
at such times when MIP deems appropriate, (a) 
purchase, sell, invest, re-invest, exchange, 
convert, trade in and otherwise deal with such 
assets; and (b) place all orders for the 
purchase or sale of portfolio securities for 
the account with or through brokers, dealers or 
issuers selected by it or designated by the
Client. MIP may vote the proxies solicited by 
or with respect to the issuers of securities in 
which assets of the Account may be invested 
from time to time.
(3) Brokerage.
Brokers or dealers may be selected to provide 
brokerage and/or research services to the 
Account and/or other accounts over which the 
Investment Manager or its affiliates exercises 
investment discretion. Brokers or dealers who 
execute portfolio transactions on behalf of the 
Account may receive commissions which are in 
excess of the amount of commission which other 
brokers or dealers would have charged for 
affecting such transactions. In order to cause 
the Account to pay such higher commissions the 
Investment Manager must determine in good faith 
that such commissions are reasonable in
relation to the value of the brokerage and/or 
research services provided by such executing 
brokers or dealers, viewed in terms of a 
particular transaction or the Investment
Managers' overall responsibilities to the 
Account or its other discretionary.
(4) Investment Restrictions.
It shall be Mosaic's responsibility to advise 
MIP of the investment objectives for the
Account and as to any modifications of 
objectives as they may occur.
(5) Fees.
Compensation to MIP for its services shall be
0.5% per annum on the assets under management. 
The fee shall be paid quarterly in advance.
(6) Custody of Assets.
MIP shall not act as custodian for the Account 
or take or have possession of any assets of the 
client.
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(7) Limit of Liability (Accountability).
It is understood that MIP shall act in good 
faith and shall not be liable for any loss 
incurred in connection with recommendations or 
investments made or other action taken on 
behalf of the Account due to errors of 
judgement or by reasons of its advice, 
including action taken or omitted prior to a 
written notice of termination. MIP shall not be 
excluded from liability for losses occasioned 
by reason of its wilful misfeasance, bad faith 
or gross negligence in the performance of its 
duties here-under. MIP shall not be
responsible for any loss incurred by reasons of 
any act or omission of the Client, a custodian 
or any broker or dealer.
(8) Assignment.
This Agreement may not be assigned without the 
prior written consent of the Client or MIP.
(9) Termination.
This Agreement may be terminated at any time by 
the Client or MIP by thirty (30) days notice. 
Fees paid in advance here-under will be pro­
rated to the date of termination and any 
unearned portion thereof will be refunded to 
the client.
(10) Notices.
Unless otherwise specified herein, all notices, 
instructions and advices with respect to 
security transactions or any other matters 
contemplated by this Agreement shall be deemed 
dully given when received in writing by MIP, or 
when deposited by first class mail addressed to 
the client to the address appearing below and 
to any custodian designated by the client, at 
such address as it may specify to MIP in 
writing, or at such other address or addresses 
as shall be specified, in each case, in a 
notice similarly given.
(11) Governing Law.
This Agreement shall be governed and implemen­
ted in accordance with the laws of Geneva 
Cantoon. If some assets are managed by MIP 
London, then where relevant the agreement shall 
be governed and construed in accordance with 
the laws of England."
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PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
On receipt of the proposed management agreement,
the Controller raised the following comments:
"Discretionary Account/Fiduciary Relationship (Limit of 
Authority):-
MIP suggests to have discretion to supervise, manage and 
direct the assets in the account and, as agent and 
attorney-in-fact with full power and authority on behalf 
of the client (Mosnic), without prior consultation with 
Mosnic and as such times when MIP deems appropriate, I 
suggest to add:
1. Attaining and abiding with portfolio diversification 
objectives.
Prof it-takina
- Maximum values whenever reached to liquidate and cash 
the securities to avoid loss of value in cases of 
market crises. (See investment restrictions).
2. Certain level of consultation, exchange of opinions 
must be maintained among the client and the manager
Brokerage
Paid brokers commissions have to be reported separately, 
for us to keep track of our costs.
Custody of Assets
1. The agreement must give a magnitude for costs 
we may undertake for custody of assets with other 
custodians.
2. What procedures will MIP provide to ensure 
safety of assets kept with other custodians ?
3. MIP has to nominate the custodian.
Fees
0.5% p.a. on the asset under management.
(i) - Mosnic will need to discuss reduction of this fee 
with MIP. The stock market rally is slowing 
downward, a depression in bonds is expected. 
Accounts may not perform as before. All managers 
have to be requested to consider cut-down in their 
fee rate.
- No fee should be paid in advance.
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ii) Any fee or commission to be charged to our account 
must be preceded by a detailed bill showing 
particulars of fee computation so that a track of 
costs can be kept by us.
Limit of Liability
The agreement states that MIP shall not be responsible 
for any loss incurred by reason of any act of omission 
of a custodian or any other broker or dealer.
Suggestion
MIP has to be discussed in the ways and means we follow 
to exercise physical control over our securities with 
the custodian chosen by MIP.
General Remarks
1) The fee side of the agreement has to be more 
detailed showing:
- Custody fees.
Commissions levied on security transitions.
Management and administrative charges.
Suggestions
2) The expense shall be charged to the accounts in 
June and December and computed from an average 
between the evaluation of the two previous quarters.
Adequacy of Reporting:
Since we contemplate, central complete general ledger 
and other records keeping in the Head Quarter, we need 
to consider with the asset manager how the reports will 
look, their contents, and the frequency of reporting.
Currencies Translation and the Accounting Methods:
Mosnic is a U.S. dollar-based client. The manager will 
hold securities in currencies other than the dollar. 
Meaning that, all securities in currencies other than 
the U.S. dollar will be translated into the reporting 
currency. We need to consider with the concerned MIP 
portfolio manager, the currencies translation methods.
Advanceable amounts against pledges of each form of 
Assets:
I understand that Mosnic may need to arrange loans 
against the securities. It is imperative that we 
understand if MIP can extend loans and advances, 
establish letters of guarantee, etc., and type of 
collateral might be required.”
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On lending issue MIP said:
"If we get the required information, we have the due 
expertise to make arrangements."
Then the Controller expressed his worry as follows:
"I understand Mosnic does not entrust management of its 
assets to banks involved in commercial lending and 
suffering in their financials, the problem of non­
performing loans. So, can we be assured of the 
Financial strength of MIP"?
MIP Fees:
The Controller further inquired:
”Compared to the others, are they reasonable or 
excessive?
Past track record of Performance:
Before hiring MIP we need to know what did it achieve 
for other clients?, i.e., Historical performance 
record."
FORMAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM
Indeed, the limit of MIP liability for performance 
was, in the Controller's view, the most significant 
aspect of the proposed asset management agreement. It was 
obvious that MIP would not take the responsibility for 
setting pre-determined financial targets to be the base 
for future accountability. When the Controller raised his 
concern about clause No (7) of liability and accountabi­
lity, both MIP and the Director of Mosnic mostly agreed 
that the agent could not be formally punished in case of 
poor performance. The Director commented:
11once you choose the agent and assign the portfolio 
management there is nothing formal that you can do 
about unsatisfactory performance. The only weapon 
the principal may have is to pull the business from 
the agent in case of unsatisfactory performance. 
However, we do not use that so easily. There are a 
number of considerations and may be lengthy 
processes that you may need to carry out before 
pulling-out from the agent."
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Thus, the Controller was convinced that he had to identify 
how the fiduciary relationship would work in the post 
selection stage.
MANAGING SHIFTING OBJECTIVES
The Director referred to the points 
Controller on the proposed Asset Management 
to the recent requirements of MIP and said:
" The proposed asset management agreement has taken 
us more steps forward to understand what type of 
relationship we may have with MIP. Our concern is 
to make sure that our shifting requirements and 
goals can smoothly be accommodated by MIP 
investment strategy and there will arise no 
contradictions with MIP internal policies."
Depending on his knowledge about the general guidelines of 
the Corporate Investment Policy, the Controller released 
the following to MIP:
" 1. Current income is not a problem for the owners, 
and may not need to withdraw funds frequently.
2. Growth is the goal, however realization of 
value at levels the manager sees reasonable is 
important.
At any rate standard setting of these two 
objectives is very difficult. In times of
crises, which you cannot predict nor you can 
manage through your sophisticated analysis
technique, the principals may intervene 
heavily, as they see appropriate for the
particular turmoil situation.
3. Capital preservation is a prime objective.
4. To Mosnic's view, being fully invested in 
equities means aggressiveness. Therefore, MIP 
must not take more than 40% equity exposure.
If MIP has any objection the stakeholders would 
be glad to hear about it.
5. 60 % of the holdings is recommended to be in 
fixed income securities. However, MIP has the
raised by the 
agreement and
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freedom of tactical changes of the portfolio 
composition in consultation with Mosnic. The 
stakeholders have restrictions on interest 
taking. You may need to understand this 
restriction.
6. The selection of the individual securities and 
allocation by the type of the instrument and by 
currencies are the responsibility of MIP.
7. Mosnic hopes for expected ROI to be at least 
more than the money market price measured by 
U.S. dollar rates of interest over the 
performance period.
8. Cash can only be temporarily parked in the 
fiduciary placement accounts with AAA banks 
until that time it is re-invested. You know 
our stance from interest income. Thus, it is 
prohibited to keep funds in fixed deposit 
money markets accounts as a permanent type of 
investment.
9. Investment in securities of companies dealing 
in alcoholic products is not allowed.
10. The style of investment i.e. high, medium, or 
low capitalization companies, etc. selection is 
left at the discretion of MIP.
11. As explained in (6) diversification and 
securities allocation geographically and by the 
type of securities is the responsibility of MIP 
as a discretionary portfolio manager.
12. Selection of the right custodian, ■is the 
responsibility of MIP. However, the
stakeholders would like to keep a list of the 
custodians used by MIP.
For further reflection on the above guidelines and 
specific requirements, let us meet as early as your 
convenience."
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ASSESSMENT OF THE RELIABILITY OF MIP'S 
INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM
The Controller hinted to the Director that investors 
rely, to a certain extent, on the agent's control 
procedures. Thus, the Director showed interest in knowing 
about the effectiveness of MIP controls over the 
contracted assets. MIP was requested to provide a list of 
controls it would exercise both to safeguard the assets 
and to ensure that all the operations would be correct and 
complete. Specifically, the Controller wanted to be sure 
about the following: 1. all transactions related to the
assets were accounted for; 2. all transactions were real;
3. all transactions were properly valued; 4. all 
transactions were entered on a timely basis; 5. classifi­
cation was accurate; 6. summarization was correct; and 7. 
posting was accurate.
For MIP to identify the required internal controls on 
the contracted assets, the Controller emphasized the 
following applications and transactions and other aspects 
of the accounting system:
1. Sale of Securities.
2. Purchase of Securities.
3. Commission related to trading in securities thru 
our accounts.
4. Withdrawals and Transfer of Funds.
5. Direct charges to the Current Accounts.
6. Unrealized gains.
7. Realized gains.
8. Accrued interest on bonds.
9. Dividends/Coupons
10. Valuation of Assets.
11. Commitments and Liabilities related to Mosnic 
accounts.
12. Currency translation to the reporting currency (US 
Dollalrs) , i.e. The source of information and the 
mechanism of translation.
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13. Cut-off procedures related to Trade of Securities.
14. Method and policy of valuation disclosing in 
details the formula how:
Weighted average invested capital is computed. 
The reported rate of return is calculated. 
Market value for historical cost concept is 
implemented.
15. Areas of MIP management judgement affecting the 
valuation.
MIP INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEM DISCLOSED
MIP reflected on its specific internal control reliability
as follows.
" In general, the controls are implemented by two 
different institutions (MIP - London as Manager 
and MIP - Geneva as custodian), using two separate 
and independent staffs and computer based systems. 
These two sets of records are reconciled against 
one another providing an important basis for 
double checking and error correction.
Having said that, the responsibilities of the 
custodian and the manager, though they overlap to 
a large extent, are somewhat different for 
practical reasons. For example, it is the 
custodian who has exclusive control over transfer 
into and out of your account, who has exclusive 
direct control over all assets, and who is 
responsible for activities directly connected with 
the proof of ownership of the assets, such as 
dividend collection. By contrast, the manager is 
responsible for making and implementing decisions 
to buy and sell securities, to control brokerage 
commissions, and to report to your performance.
MIP - Geneva system is a complete overview of our 
controls and procedures, which are very
comprehensive.
Complemented by the additional controls of MIP - 
Geneva as custodian, these procedures provides a 
sophisticated system or separation of
responsibility, double checking automated quality 
control, and objective determination of prices and 
value. We believe our system is among the very 
best currently in use in the world."
The following is a summary of the control process claimed 
by MIP as safeguarding the interest of the principals.
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MIP - London does not have direct control over your 
assets. All assets are held by MIP - Geneva. All purchase 
and sale transactions are normally delivered against 
payment. We do not authorize any third party payment 
instructions. All entries over your account at Geneva (i.e 
fees, charges, monies received or withdrawn on your 
instructions, dividends, etc) are mirrored over our record 
keeping system.
Details of Controls
1. MIP carries out a weekly cash reconciliation between 
our system (Impart) and Piclink, received from MIP 
Geneva. A monthly reconciliation of assets held at MIP 
- Geneva and on Impart is our method of identifying any 
differences.
2. Purchase and sale transactions are only entered into 
the system on receipt of an authorized ticket from the 
Fund Manager.
3. Ticket details include the previous night's closing 
price of the security. Impart alerts us to any 
significant divergence from this price when the 
transaction is executed.
4. A weekly review of open orders identified brokers who 
need chasing. Upon receipt of the Brokers execution 
telex, the details are entered to Impart and 
instructions telexes to the custodian are automatically 
created.
5,6. The London Stock Exchange 'SEDOL' code book is used 
to identify accurate security descriptions.
7. Any differences raised under No. 1 above are 
investigated and corrected.
For the control over the sale and purchase of securities,
MIP referred the Controller to (1) and (2) above. MIP
response to the Controllers' inquiry 1-15 came as follows:
3. Impart has defaults for each country with provisions to 
enter special negotiated rates. Impart alerts us to any 
divergence.
4. Transfer and withdrawal instructions to the custodian 
bank (MIP - Geneva) are reflected over our records. We 
have no control over their execution.
5. All charges of any nature are passed by the custodian. 
We have no control over their execution, but reflect 
them over our records.
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6. MIP monthly valuation reflects the book-cost and 
market valuation in U.S. Dollars.
7. Realized gains are reported in our Quarterly Summary 
Report, together with details of income and charges 
received during the quarter.
8. Interest accrued is reflected in the value of the 
relevant bond on our monthly valuation.
9. Dividends are received by the custodian and upon 
credit to the account, we reflect them on our records. 
We do not monitor dividends due, as this is the 
responsibility of the custodian.
10- All month-end prices are entered using Data stream, 
Reuters, or by contacting a market maker.
11. Not applicable.
12. Impart is a multi- currency system. Exchange rates 
are entered daily from Reuters.
13. MIP reports are on a 1 Transacted" basis, so we enter 
on the system all trades that occurred prior to month- 
end.
14. Weighted average capital is calculated by time- 
weighting cash flow to the exact day received/ 
withdrawn. The rate of return is calculated monthly 
and linked to build quarterly, annual or other period 
rates of return. All returns use market value, not 
book cost.
15. Valuations are objectively determined using external 
pricing services, so management judgment does not 
affect the end result at all.
SELECTED ADDITIONAL CONTROLS AND PROCEDURES
MIP Geneva as Custodian have a computerized accounting and 
record keeping system. These records reflect security 
holdings by client, together with details of the 
depository where the shares in Nominee Name.
MIP also is required to satisfy its internal auditors, 
external auditors and Swiss Banking Authorities as to the 
accuracy of its records.
Other specific features of interest are:
(a) For all purchase and sale instructions received from 
MIP, securities are normally delivered or received 
against payment. MIP therefore, have either Cash in 
the account or the Security.
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(b) All instructions for Withdrawal or Transfer of Funds 
would have to be duly authorized before MIP would 
effect them.
(c) MIP computer system aids their Dividend Department in 
the monitoring and collection of dividend/CPNS due on 
equities and bonds.
(d) MIP generates their monthly valuations based on 
instructions received prior to month-end. They 
receive their month-end pricing information from 
Telekurs.
It was not convenient for the Controller to request 
MIP to allow him to enter the bank premises to check 
whether the system was working as described by MIP. This 
was not usual practice. The Director did not encourage 
it. It was then agreed in the Investment Policies 
Committee that the Controller would assume that MIP 
internal control system would be operating as described. 
Accordingly, the Controller considered designing the 
corporate specific control procedures which would 
meet the needs for controlling MIP.
MIP STABILITY, STRENGTHS, PERSONNEL 
REWARDING SYSTEM AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
(MEANS AND METHODS)
The Controller proposed to the Investment Committee
to investigate more about MIP's organizational structure,
the stability, drawbacks, etc. to be more clear about the
risk Mosnic would take on MIP. The Director argued that
the intended portfolio managers might give some
information but not all. However, the Controller made
further inquiries about MIP emphasizing the following:
1. Has MIP come across a crisis where it needed to 
effect fundamental personnel changes?
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2. Does MIP arrange commercial loans, Letters of 
Guarantees, letter of credit, etc. If any, what kind 
of Department and personnel does MIP maintain to 
control that type of activity?
3. What is the salary structure and the other 
compensational aspects MIP offers to:
- The Portfolio Managers.
- The key Investment Strategists
- The Research Analysts.
4. Does MIP conduct research and development? and are 
the research and development final reports 
accessible to MIP clients?
5. Has MIP ever suffered from taking strategic 
investment decisions and how did MIP rectify the 
mistake and overcame the shortfall?
6. How does MIP keep up-to-date with competitions by 
other investment?
7. How do MIP portfolio managers select stocks?
8. What is the role of the computers in the stock 
selection process and the portfolio management?
9. What internal departmental links does MIP maintain?
10. What ensures that the decision makers undertaking 
the investment management function are on top of the 
events in the investment markets?
11. Who or which department conducts the final review of 
the reports despatched to the investors (the 
clients)?
12. Can you quote on situation where an internal review 
conducted by MIP revealed mistakes and the mistakes 
had been corrected in a retroactive manner?
13. How do you notify your client under such 
circumstances i.e.. if a mistake on his account is 
subsequently discovered?
14. Who are MIP independent auditors?
15. What is the scope of their examinations on the 
clients accounts?
16. Have they ever discovered mistakes and 
irregularities?
17. How do' you ensure periodically to your clients that 
their securities are physically available with the 
custodian and that the securities are free of
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charges, pledges and encumbrances?
18. What are the standards MIP applies in selecting the 
custodians for the investors securities?
19. Does MIP use its parent MIP company as the custodian 
for the investors securities held with any one of 
its branches.
20. Does the fact that - if it happens-MIP may use its 
own parent company as the custodian, for Mosnic 
securities result in any risk on the side of Mosnic?
21. How does the follow-up on the investment decision 
occur in MIP in the post-investment phase?
22. Can MIP provide Mosnic with a write-up on how MIP as 
an organization formulates the investment decision?
23. Can Mosnic have a chart of organization that 
describes MIP investments related departments and 
functions ? plus a narrative description of the 
organizational structure.
24. How often does MIP review the investment policies 
and strategies?
25. How does MIP cope with situation where the revised 
investment policies contradict with the client 
guidelines?
It was difficult for the Controller, at that stage, 
to adopt quantitative criteria for assessing the result of 
testing all the above attributes to the selection of MIP. 
The replies obtained and the information disclosed and 
tested through a lengthy process of interaction with the 
intended agent, made Mosnic management feel comfortable 
dealing with MIP.
At the end of this description, the criteria for 
evaluating the agent selection process is discussed.
ASSESSMENT OF MIP PERSONNEL, AND THEIR EFFECT 
ON THE INVESTMENT DECISION
The Controller suggested to the Director that before
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entering into any commitment with MIP, it would be
necessary to discover something about the quality and 
capabilities of MIP personnel, manager quality, staff 
satisfaction and the position of the portfolio manager in 
the firm.
Thus, the Financial Controller requested MIP to 
provide the following information:
" 1. The owners of the firm.
2. Are any partners take an effective part in 
management?
3. Describe the organizational structure of the 
Investment Department?
4. How is the investment decision taken? 
Collectively or individually?
5. How many analysts work for the firm? And what 
are the major areas of their specialization?
6. How many portfolio managers do work for the 
firm?
7. What is the average age of the portfolio 
managers?
8. How many years have they spent in the 
professional money management
9. How many years of service do they have with 
MIP?
10. Are the portfolio managers overloaded by the 
clients i.e. how many client meetings are 
annually scheduled for each portfolio manager?
11. Can the portfolio managers render service other 
than investment and mere portfolio management."
Based on the literature provided by MIP and the 
replies given by the representative of MIP, the Controller 
was convinced with MIP personnel in terms of experience,
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qualification, satisfaction, and the readiness of the 
portfolio managers to liaise with Mosnic without any 
restrictions.
4. MIP RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH AND STRATEGY 
FORMULATION PROBLEM
The Director made it clear to the Controller that 
risk assessment had always been their major problem in 
setting their investment goals. Neither the Director nor 
the Controller were clear about how to approach the risk 
management problem with MIP. Both assumed that even 
sophisticated risk analysis may not be capable of 
adequately dealing with the markets unpredictable movement 
and the corresponding shift in the principals' objectives. 
The Director commented that there was a risk taken on any 
agent since Mosnic could not know who was the best manager 
in the world. Thus, the issue of risk and asset 
allocation were reiterated.
The Director said:
"The experience of Mosnic with the portfolio 
managers has proven that managers given the same 
guidelines, operating in the same environment, 
charging the same fee and located in the same 
geographical area, have shown varying rates of 
performance. Either their undisclosed risk 
attitude is different, or the markets are not 
equally efficient for them."
While discussing the risk which would be taken on MIP the 
Controller asked:
" 1. If risk is akin to all forms of investment, can 
Mosnic assess it in the pre-investment phase? 
How much money it might expect to lose or make 
with choosing MIP rather than any other 
manager?"
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2. Is it economical to jump from a portfolio 
manager to the other following poor 
performance?”
The Director further commented on the risk issue as 
follows:
" The surrounding uncertainties are so numerous, 
even beyond all the analysis of the portfolio 
manager. Therefore, I doubt MIP representatives 
can come up with a strict figure for the expected 
returns under the investment markets 
uncertainties."
The Controller said about risk associated with decisions:
1. "By setting certain investment objectives to 
the portfolio managers, did Mosnic lose money 
which could have been made if the objectives 
were not the same?
2. Have we considered having in-house portfolio 
managers and establishing a research and 
development department to do the investment 
business ourselves?
3. Have we tried to quantify money lost or money 
made by choosing a specific portfolio manager 
among the alternative selections Mosnic had?
4. Have we tried to assess money lost by Mosnic as 
a result of hiring managers rather than doing 
by itself the investment ?
5. In general, how does MIP plan to manage risk?"
The Director made the following counter comments:-
" Mosnic, a long time ago, decided to go for 
portfolio management externalization for the 
following reasons:
1. Mosnic being geographically far away from the 
investment scene, it is unable to get timely 
information to conduct security analysis.
2. The cost associated with keeping in-house a
huge number of portfolio managers and markets
analysts. Mosnic's business is relatively 
small.
3. The Western portfolio managers are reluctant to
live' in our environment. Beside that, there is
risk in depending on individually taken 
decision. Mosnic is better off depending on
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other financial institutions concerning risk 
analysis. This analysis will need to consider 
the process by which the stakeholders change 
their objectives.
4. The time lag between the international
securities trading markets will need three
teams of management by Mosnic. Imagine the
cost. The fact that Mosnic may lose money by 
choosing a certain manager from the
international selection available has been
lengthy considered in the light of: -
(i) The American portfolio managers are 
aggressive due to job instability and 
competition, while Mosnic goals are 
capital preservation and a reasonable rate 
of growth and capital income.
(ii) Switzerland has proved to be the safest 
country during the political turmoils and 
upheavals in the international economic 
and political bilateral relations. Due to 
job stability, the Swiss portfolio 
managers are also less aggressive.
(Hi) MIP and the other Swiss private banks 
enjoy stability and continuity.
(iv) The Swiss private banking conventions have 
proven to be reliable.
However, I think your inquiries on risk management 
are quite valid. Let's try to remain diversified 
in all respects, manage risk through close inter­
action with our agents, and I believe risk 
measurement is difficult, complicated and can not 
guarantee healthy decisions without the 
Controller's input."
MIP STRUCTURE FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND ASSET ALLOCATION
The Director commented that it could be a very 
complicated exercise to get involved with MIP in 
individual securities risk measurement issues. He 
recommended a study of MIP investment style in general 
with emphasis on how MIP managed risk on behalf of its 
principals. Having gone through the literature on invest-
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ment strategy provided by MIP, the Controller was more 
convinced that risk measurement by the agent would be a 
fruitless exercise due to the tendency of the stakeholders 
to change their attitude towards risk taking in response 
to their perception of the market situation. Thus, the
Controller thought that the best way for practical
management of risk was to leave MIP deal with level II
decision which involved individual securities analysis.
It was clear from the negotiations with MIP that they 
would need the maximum possible information on the 
stakeholders' shifts in their perception of risk. MIP 
thought the Controller could be the best mechanism by 
which to ensure timely interpretation of the stakeholders' 
perception of risk. The Controller made it clear to MIP 
that he could help in formulating the investment decision 
by reflecting the true requirements of the principals on 
condition that MIP would not consider this participation 
as a release from accountability for their portfolio 
performance. MIP totally agreed to take the 
responsibility on condition that it would be satisfied 
with the amended investment objective.
However, MIP was not enthusiastic to defend one way 
of risk measurement to formulate the appropriate 
investment decision. The readiness of MIP to be flexible 
about investment risk joint management meant that it would 
not mind openly interacting with Mosnic. Indeed, MIP 
repeatedly promised to amend its models, policies and risk 
measurement assumptions parallel to the objectives of the
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principals to be conveyed by the Controller.
At any rate the Controller proposed to MIP to provide 
a proforma asset allocation to be studied and used as a 
guideline by Mosnic. The Director stated that it would be 
useful to form an opinion about the MIP risk management 
approach. The Director agreed with the Controller to 
interact with MIP to convey the maximum possible 
stakeholders' input without arguing with MIP about how to 
analyze risk attached to the selection of individual 
securities. The Controller then decided to give general 
asset mix policy guidelines to MIP and to interact later 
on in the post-investment phase with MIP to manage asset 
allocation problems while closely monitoring the 
performance of the portfolio. Thus, the Controller 
requested MIP to highlight its risk management approach 
before Mosnic could enter into any agreement.
MIP disclosed its organizational structure for risk 
management as shown in Fig. 5.2. MIP was organized in a 
way that each portfolio manager was a regional specialist 
and all clients accounts were being managed by the 
appropriate team, dependent upon the investment mandate. 
MIP representative made an argument that their structured 
approach utilizing the Portfolio Management System (PMS) 
could provide the basis for successfully operating a risk 
class approach.
MIP representative also asserted that they used to 
maintain portfolios structured on the basis of client risk
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tolerance because they recognized that different clients 
might have different requirements.
The representative of MIP further added that risk
could be defined by their institution as residual risk
i.e. the difference from the appropriate index i.e. the
relevant market benchmark.
MIP APPROACH TO RISK CONTROL AND 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT
The following is a brief summary (based on Fig 5.2) 
of the investment process as explained by the 
representative of MIP.
(1) Input: Input to the investment decision would be
through "In-house" research arid strategy
formulated by the head office.
(2) Asset/Country allocation: Would remain under
collective responsibility of the team.
(3) Stock Selection: Would be the individual
responsibility of country specialists within the 
team.
(4) Portfolio Management System would be: "Hands-on" 
control beside the decision implementation.
(5) Quality Control: As shown in Fig. 5.2
implementation of investment strategy would be 
cross checked with the Head Office.
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FIG. 5.2















QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW MIP GENEVA
INDIVIDUAL STOCK SELECTION









MIP's representative also said that his firm uses 
five standard risk classes (A) to (E) as shown on Fig. 
5.3. Clients choose which category they want and 
according to the choice, the client gets a portfolio 
constructed as shown in Fig. 5.4. Mosnic was asked which 
of the categories (A) to (E) it preferred.
In fact, Fig. 5.3 shows the investment models 
(strategies) which emerged from the rational, economic, 
financial and securities analysis carried out by MIP. 
Mosnic would not accept any one of the risk classes 
proposed by MIP without negotiation. As, I am going to 
describe in the post-investment case studies, the 
emerging investment strategy developed through negotiation 
with MIP was fundamentally different from the risk classes 
(strategies) initially proposed. Indeed, the major factor 
leading to the difference was the stakeholders' perception 
of risk which MIP had to take into consideration.
To help the reader understand Fig. 5.3 the following 
are some explanations and clues:
(1) EAFE stands for Europe Asia and the Far East. 
In fact, EAFE is a sub-index of the Morgan 
Stanley world index.
(2) In Fig. 5.3 Europe is also a sub-index of the 
world index.
(3) 789 refers to the number of stocks in the EAFE 
index.
(4) 550 refers to the number of stocks in the Europe 
index.
(5) 16 refers to the number of countries in the EAFE 
index.
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(6) 12 refers to the number of countries in the
Europe index.
MIP representative commented on the risk classes 
approach (Fig. 5.3) as follows:
"To report on your portfolio performance we will 
provide you with 'impact charts' which show the 
percentage points differences between country 
weightings in your portfolio and, say, in the EAFE 
index, to help identify where we are making 
significant asset allocation 'bets' versus the 
passive index."
Fig. 5.4 is an attempt to illustrate how the MIP risk 
classes approach is applied to country allocation of 
equities. In Fig. 5.4 the reader can see EAFE includes 
the highest level of shares. Class (C) includes fewer 
shares; while class (E) is the alternative structure which 
includes the least number of shares. Thus, the investor 
who wants the least exposure to the stock markets would 
select class (E), which also proposes certain country 
allocation.
Indeed, the stakeholders and the Controller viewed this 
approach as too mechanistic. Its bed-rock seemed to be 
theoretical measurement of risk and expected ROI. In 
fact, the Director commented on the risk classes as 
follows:
"If we select one risk class, this will mean 
blindly following how MIP perceives the markets' 
uncertainty. This is not acceptable. We can work 
with MIP. But we have our own worries and views. 
They have to be taken into consideration to 
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Ref erring to the five risk classes offered by MIP, 
the Controller hinted to the Director that: "This
approach seems too mechanistic. The principals' change 
their objectives so frequently."
The Director commented:
"You will need to tell MIP what we require. 
MIP's model can be a general basis for our 
negotiations with MIP. It is not a bad framework to 
start with. You have to help them develop a special 
risk class for Mosnic. This may require from you 
going through a long process liaising with MIP."
The representative of MIP added that the investment 
process and portfolio structure for which they could 
tolerate risk, may vary according to: (1) level of
exposure in’international; (2) number of international 
managers, and (3) risk profile of total fund. He 
concluded that:
"Risk" is defined as residual risk - "Bets away from 
the index."
The Controller reflected on this definition as 
follows:
"We may not totally agree with this definition.
You may need to convince us that the characteristics 
of the market portfolio relating to the index has 
the same characteristics of Mosnic portfolio. We 
need to make sure that Mosnic's portfolio structure 
considers greatly the specific objectives of the 
stakeholders. You will need to be patient with us.
The process of understanding what we need may not be 
easy. What we need may also be unique. It may be 
shifting as well."
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METHOD OP RISK CONTROL - (MIP'S MODEL)
MIP representative made a comment that,
"aggressiveness would be achieved through concentra­
tion, High risk category = fewer stocks and fewer 
markets. Potential for cash exposure could be 
increased by risk category (the index has no cash) ,
ASSETS ALLOCATION BY COUNTRY IN MIP 
INVESTMENT PROCESS
MIP representative said "in our risk management 
system, countries are ranked and quantified. Negative 
views about countries are reflected in progressive under­
weighting of countries,
* Most Preferred Market
U.K, 8 percentage points overweight in risk C.
- And 10 Percentage points overweight in risk E,
* Least Preferred Market:-
- Japan 20 percentage points underweight in risk 
C,
- And 30 percentage points underweight in risk E.
* Views on all markets reflected in a progressive 
over or underweighting by risk category."
STOCK SELECTION
Key Considerations relating to stock selection by MIP 
were the following.
(*) Accelerating earnings growth.
(*) Growth not fully reflected in market expectation. 
(*) Improved outlook not yet reflected in the price.
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MIP Method of Implementation of this policy.
1 - Concentration: Risk (E) holds less stocks than
risk (C) (40 versus 60).
2 - Stocks in risk (E) represent larger positions
than risk (C) (55% versus 35% of stocks, each
being over 2% of the total portfolio).
The Controller reflected on the stock selection 
method presented by MIP as follows:
"You will appreciate that at this level of the 
portfolio decision making we do not intervene to 
tell you how to analyze the securities and to select 
the high growth or the high income ones. However, 
you may need to understand that the end result of 
your analysis conducted to select the appropriate 
securities will need to account for the process of 
shifting the stakeholders' requirements parallel to 
the markets."
The risk categories in MIP's model ranged from (A) 
(least aggressive, most diversified) to (E) most 
aggressive, most diversified ) to (E) most aggressive, 
most concentrated) . It was understood from the 
presentation made by the representative of MIP that 
normally Risk (A) account would hold between 40 to 80 
stocks versus, for example, the EAFE index at 800. The 
risk (E) account could hold between 0 and 400 stocks.
In terms of markets, the model proposed by MIP also 
indicated the number of markets held. Again, risk (A) is 
most diversified, yet more concentrated than the index. 
The risk (E) is significantly more concentrated.
The final component in MIP's investment model was the 
potential to hold cash. MIP's index would hold no cash.
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The risk (A) would have a cash parameter between 0 and 
25%. The representative of MIP asserted that should 
Mosnic wish to vary the cash parameters, MIP would not 
mind amending its model to do that.
MIP RELUCTANT TO SET ROI STANDARD
In terms of expected performance, the representative 
of MIP claimed that their history had shown that the 
higher the risk class, the stronger the performance. 
Thus, in its market portfolio mandate accounts where MIP 
had investors in all the classes of risk from (A) to (E) , 
performance had progressively improved from risk class (A) 
through to risk class (E), consistent with the increased 
aggressiveness. However, MIP did not want to agree on 
setting a forecast target for ROI to be produced if Mosnic 
would select one class of risk from MIP's model. The 
representative said:
"Jt is unrealistic to promise you a specific 
ROI that we can produce. We are dealing in 
unpredictable financial markets. However, we assure 
you that if you select one of our risk classes we 
will hopefully outperform the market index."
PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY FORMULATION BESET IN MIP'S 
MODEL FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
The risk classes model proposed by MIP had a number 
of implications for the Controller in terms of strategy 
formulation. First, the Controller expressed to MIP that 
while Mosnic was becoming satisfied with the abilities of 
the bank, the stakeholders would not agree to be either 
fully invested in stocks or allocate their resources
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between stocks and cash. This was because they believed
that the stock markets could be more risky than the bond
markets. Concerning cash, the stakeholders were concerned 
not to take interest. With regard to these, MIP confirmed 
that it could amend its model to satisfy the specific
requirements of Mosnic. Their only condition was to 
interact with the Controller to understand exactly the 
objectives of the stakeholders and their stance from the 
risk of investing in the volatile financial markets.
Second, both MIP and Mosnic arrived at an agreement 
that security analyses for the selection of the individual 
assets based on risk reward approach, beside the use of 
the market index to measure the portfolio performance, 
could be only one block in the complicated process to
manage the discretionary portfolio. The Controller 
asserted to MIP that the stakeholders did not want to be 
involved in the rigid mechanism followed by MIP in 
deciding which individual security to select. However, he 
re-confirmed to MIP that Mosnic would like to be sure that 
the shift in the stakeholders' perception of risk would be 
taken by MIP from the Controller as an extremely important 
input to any investment decision MIP would take on behalf 
of Mosnic.
Third, both parties became convinced that ROI pre­
determination might be inappropriate due to the financial 
markets' volatility. It was agreed that the portfolio 
performance evaluation would be carried out through a 
process which could involve: (1) evaluation of MIP's
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prudence in all the decision processes relating to the 
different market circumstance. In this sense even if ROI 
was negative Mosnic would not blame MIP before assessing 
the appropriateness of actions taken by MIP. (2) Both 
parties arrived to the common understanding that the 
bottomline assessment of the ROI would be a significant 
way of evaluating MIP performance. However, a period was 
not fixed to carry out the bottomline assessment. (3) It 
was also made clear that the involvement of Mosnic 
management with MIP would be intended to give information 
on the specific reguirements of the stakeholders, but 
under no circumstance this would release MIP from account­
ability.
5. THE CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING 
MIP'S MEANS AND METHODS
Based on the continuous feedback process managed by 
the Controller, the investment policies committee decided 
to take MIP as a discretionary portfolio manager.
Indeed, it was difficult to set quantitative measures 
for assessing the acceptability of MIP strategy, structure 
and processes. The selection process went through a 
complicated qualitative process. However, % it was 
necessary to set a criterion for determining the 
principals' level of satisfaction with the MIP investment 
strategy, structure and processes.
The Controller sat back and thought again about the 




( i) Clarity and Consistency of investment
strategy/model. MIP was found satisfactory in:
(a) Clarity in identifying major trends and their 
implications for the investment decision.
(b) MIP was clear in weighing risks and 
uncertainties.
(c) MIP was ready to watch stakeholders' 
perception of risk and the other possible 
inflection points and alert signals.
(ii) Portfolio Allocation and the Financial Markets.
(a) MIP seemed capable of reading/identifying 
major trends and in assessing the risks of 
deviation. This would determine the key 
investment strategy and the precautionary 
measures in case of unexpected problems and 
crises which markets might not be efficient 
to inform about.
(b) MIP confirmed not to dissociate asset 
allocation from currency allocation.
(iii) Quick and Effective Decision Process.
MIP was qualified and equipped with the right 
caliber of executives in setting up investment 
strategy and if necessary to amend the strategy 
weekly.
(iv) Clarity and Efficiency at all the Organizational 
Levels.
Analysis and communication processes within MIP 
and with the outside, selection of the custodians and the 
external advisors, information to Mosnic, organization of 
internal investment meetings and portfolio management were 
found satisfactory.
(II) ADEQUACY OF MEANS
MIP was found satisfactory in terms of the following.
( i) Highly integrated research team.
(ii) Personalization and dedication of portfolio
management services.
(iii) Sophistication of the technical backing.
(iv) Satisfactory integration with other banking 
services.
( v) Application of reliable internal control system 
and accurate reporting.
(vi) High flexibility of the investment 
model/strategy and potential compatibility with 
Mosnic's corporate strategy.
6. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SPECIFIC 
CONTROL NEEDS TO MONITOR MIP
The Controller made the measures which would ensure 
that MIP aggressiveness would not put the stakeholders'
interest into any kind of jeopardy. The control strategy 
set by the Corporate Controller was to boost the 
intervening of the stakeholders (without weakening agent 
accountability) and the IPC with MIP in the tactical 
assets re-allocation processes. That process was intended 
to control over-aggressive investment in shares. In
addition, the Controller proposed to the IPC to set a 
conservative profit-take policy for MIP. MIP did not like 
it and made fair arguments about the impracticability of 
this approach.
7. CONCLUSION TO THE SELECTION OF MIP
The selection of MIP was completed through intensive 
consultation1 and exchanging of opinions between the 
Managing Director and the Corporate Controller. The role
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of the Controller was vivid in interpreting the informa­
tion presented by the agent to the principal and vice 
versa.
The selection process involved studying all MIP 
structure and processes in a detailed but in a selective 
rather than systematic manner. The selection process 
discussed strategy formulation in interaction with the 
intended agent. The analyses were qualitative. Involvement 
of the Controller in the analysis process gave comfort to 
and made the principals happy about the decision to be 
made. The selection process included evaluation of MIP 
strategy, amending it and agreeing on a financial strategy 
for the first year. Nevertheless, management planned to 
allow MIP room for tactical re-allocation of the asset to 
be coupled with close monitoring by the Controller to 
reflect on the specific requirements of the investors.
Mosnic management was not convinced that equities 
(stock) markets out-performed the fixed income securities 
in the post-war era. Therefore, the standard policy of 
MIP of remaining fully invested in shares had been viewed 
by management as a sign of aggressiveness, which Mosnic 
(as a conservative investor) did not agree. Thus, conside­
ring the other merits of MIP in terns of strategy, struc­
ture and processes, the Corporate Controller took the 
following controlling measures to compensate for the 
unsatisfactory aspects of MIP. First, ensuring that MIP 
changed its asset allocation style to take into count the 
principals' guideline by reducing the exposure to shares.
Second, to monitor MIP more frequently. Third, to make 
sure that shares of cyclical nature were not included in 
the composition of the portfolio. Fourth, to resolve 
through principal-agent negotiations (to be orchestrated 
by the Controller) the issue of growth shares or high cash 
income shares. With the above controlling precautions MIP 
was selected. The financial strategy was agreed and the 
Controller made sure that it was in consistency with the 
corporate investment strategy.
In Section 5-B another agent selection case is 
studied to find out, in comparison with the case of MIP, 
the differences in the intended agent's methods and means 
and what these differences meant to strategy formulation, 
investment decision, and control.
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* APPENDIX 5.1
AGENTS' STRATEGY STRUCTURES & PROCESSES QUESTIONNAIRE
(ASSPQ)
A]
1. Years in global businesses.
2. Branches/subsidiaries/affiliates.
3. Staff: (Number. Qualification, exoerience)
(-) Portfolio managers 
(-) Analysts 
(-) Economists
(-) Finance and administration 
(-) Traders 










8. Number of accounts assigned to each portfolio 
manager.
B] 1. Investment approach
2. Investment strategy
3. Investment philosophy
4. Investment management style
Bl, B2, B3 and B4 cover:
Technology of communication 





(-) Emphasis on (income, growth, assets,
large companies, small companies,market 
place)
(-) Does the manager intend to outperform 
market?
(-) How?
(-) Does the manager has alternative risk 
levels to be selected?
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b] BONDS;
(-) Turnover ; High or Low?
(-) Coupon : Currency/discount?
(-) Quality : (AAA,AA,BAA under BAA)
(-) Maturity ; 10-20 years or less
10 -20 years 
over 20 years 
(-) Issue Type; U.S. Treasuries
U.S. Government Agencies 
European Government
C] ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING FOR INVESTMENT DECISION 
MAKING;
(-) Who sets the investment policy?
(-) How does the agent decide on the pro-forma 
asset allocation?
(-) Does the agent develop list of approved 
securities for all the portfolio manager? 
(-) Who sets bonds maturity or issuer types? 
(-) Who will be in-charge of Mosnic portfolio
i.e., an individual manager or a team?
D] PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION AND CONTROL;
(-) How many securities will be held in Mosnic 
portfolio?
(-) How does the agent control risk and diversi­
fication? i.e. is it quantitative or other­
wise?
E] AGENT/S SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR INVESTMENT
DECISIONS;
(-) How does the agent get informed about:
i ) Stock market situation
ii ) Industry trends
iii ) Bond market
iv ) Economics
v ) Common stock selection
vi ) Bond selection
vii ) Portfolio models
(-) Does the agent use internal or external 
sources?
(-) In case information is provided by external 
source who provides it? and, why that parti­
cular source?
F] AGENT INTERNAL CONTROL RELIABILITY:
(-) What kind of accounting reports does the agent 
provide?
(-) Can the agent provide report be in harmony 
with Mosnic internal reporting system?
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(-) Is the agent internal control set-up sufficient 
to safeguard the investors' assets?
(-) * How does the agent select the custodians? i.e 
the custodians selection formula.
* Who are the agent custodians?
(-) Does agent provide adequate information on 
performance?
(-) How does the agent report the portfolio perfor­
mance? i.e.




- Dollar weighted 
Comparison
(-) How frequent can the agent meet with the prin­
cipals?
(-) Is the agent prepared to negotiate the funda­
mental investment decisions with the principal 
before implementation?
(-) Is the agent ready to put on effect the prin­
cipals' with the investment strategy before 
implementation.
(-) How efficient is the agent in taking the correc 
tive action negotiated with the principal?
(-) How efficient is the agent in reporting:
- The periodic portfolio valuation.
- Sale and purchase transactions.
- The realized/unrealized gains.
- The current account cash movement.
(-) How does the agent ensure that the asset held 
through different custodians are free of liens, 
charges and encumbrances?
G] AGENCY (ASSET MANAGEMENT) FEE AND OTHER COSTS 
CONTROL:
(-) What form of asset management agreement does 
agent proposes in relation to fee?
(-) Is the agent interested in the short-term fee 
generation or longer term relationship.
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(-) How does the agent ensure optimal resources 
use to promote the principal's interest?
(-) How does the agent understand optimal 
resources utilization?
(-) Does the agent accept fee forfeiture if the
principal points to poor resources application 
by the agent?
(-) Does the agent accept being interfaced with 
other agents to negotiate varying opinions on 
the same issue of investment decision?
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* ASSPQ in Appendix 5.1 was developed by the Controller 
to study the agents analysis underlying factors considered 
by Mosnic. There was no formalized approach to follow in 
choosing an agent. The Controller observed that the 
principals and the advisor had some underlying factors to 
look for in appraising an agent. Those factors were not 
systematically analyzed. Occasionally, the principals 
would consult other agents about the intended agent 
capabilities. With a view to that situation, the 
Controller developed his own questionnaire in the ASSPQ as 
a checklist. The ASSPQ aims at the coverage of all the 




SELECTION OF BJ-S BANK
The Need for BJ-S Bank
On November 1, 1987, the Director said to the
Corporate Controller:
"The rally in the financial markets is over. Our 
goal has to be set more realistically. My colleagues in 
the Board are provisionally abandoning the idea of out­
performing the markets as targets for our agents. We have 
already made enough selection of Geneva group of six 
private investment banks to be our agents. Having received 
fresh funds for investment, take my word as your 
authorization to look for a conservative, of stable track 
record of reasonable performance, we11-structured, highly 
reputed and experienced Swiss Bank to invest those funds 
with. BJ-S Bank has been recommended to me. If you do not 
see any sign of incompetence in BJ-S bank liaise with it, 
analyze it and let me know. Ask two of our current port­
folio managers their opinion on BJ-S. If it is fine go 
ahead. Explain to them about the lessons learned from 
October 19, 1987 Black Monday. You know well how we have 
reconsidered our investment objective to cope with the 
post-crash era."
1. Establishment, Volume of Assets Managed, 
Formation, and Internal Setting
In response to the request of the Controller to their 1) 
Establishment; (2) volume of assets managed; (3) legal 
entity; (4) branches and affiliates; (5) size of personnel 
employed, BJ-S feedback as follows:
BACK GROUND
BJ-S has its origin in 1890. Its banking activities 
started with foreign exchange transactions from a 
small office in Switzerland.
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THE CLIENT'S OBJECTIVES
Obtaining details of the client's objectives is based 
on a close personal relationship with the client, 
where business is never conducted simply for the sake 
of doing business. The overiding service principle 
is that the client's objectives take precedent over 
all other considerations.
BELONGING TO PRIVATE BANKING
There's also a personal pride in belonging to one 
of the most prestigious professions, private banking, 
which demands identification with the clients wishes, 
total integrity and financial expertise.
COMMERCIAL CREDIT SERVICES
In addition to its commercial credit business, the 
bank rapidly expanded into other specialized 
activities with bond dealing and stockbrokering 
becoming major sources of revenue.
SEATS IN INTERNATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE
The bank was among the first sixteen Swiss 
institutions to have a seat on the Zurich Stock 
Exchange. The bank quickly extended its arbitrate 
business to all the world's major stock exchanges. 
This early involvement in international stock broking 
was the bank's initial strength which set the 
stage for moving into portfolio management some 40 
years ago. This service was added to provide a 
total money management capacity to customers
176-
whose capital needed safe custody and prudent 
investment.
PRESENCE IN THE U.S.A
In 1940, the bank established a subsidiary in New 
York to seek a safe haven for capital outside war 
torn Europe.
PRESENCE IN LONDON
As early as the late sixties, BJ-S established 
its presence in the Euromarket by forming a 
merchant bank in London.
MANAGEMENT INTEGRITY 
The BJ-S bank family still plays, however, a very 
active role in the management of the bank which 
remains largely privately owned.
VOLUME OF MANAGED FUNDS AND THE CAPITAL BASE
Assets held in safe custody and managed funds have 
reached several billion dollars, of which the 
specialized BJ-S Bank investment funds account 
several million U.S. dollars
GLOBAL MONEY MANAGEMENT EXPERTISE
BJ-S believes that money management cannot be handled 
by computers alone, but requires the expertise, 
flair and broad experience of human beings.
PERSONALIZATION OF SERVICE
Private1 clients as well as institutional investors 
expect personalized service, capable evaluation of
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individual investment objectives and development of 
strategies that take fully into consideration 
differing personal financial needs.
NUMBER OF STAFF AND THE INVESTORS
BJ-S bank is an integral part of the Swiss private 
banking heritage. The bank employs a staff of 
approximately 750 and is responsible for the assets 
of some 10,000 investors throughout the world.
GLOBAL NETWORK
BJ-S maintains full service facilities in Zurich, 
London and New York, with a global network and 
representatives."
To decide on BJ-S bank as a potential asset manager, 
the analysis was done in an untidy process because 
different sets of people were involved. BJ-S showed 
appreciable co-operation in providing data and in 
explaining facts. The appraisal process was completed in 
two simultaneous directions, (1) Mosnic/BJ-S interaction 
and negotiations, and (2) Mosnic in-house discussions. 
The role played by the Controller was significant. Agent 
analysis factors of obvious nature which could be traced 
in BJ-S brochures were not discussed in the selection 
process. The Controller's experience in appraising the 
portfolio managers helped in shortening the selection 
process.
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2. The Appraisal Process
The Director confirmed his interest in BJ-S by stating:
" The opinion of our ex-Advisor was negative on BJ-S. I 
suggest you study the means and methods of BJ-S to 
consider appointing this bank as one of Mosnic's 
discretionary agents. We need to diversify further over 
the portfolio of asset managers constructed by the ex- 
Advisor."
Thus, the Controller telefaxed BJ-S Bank - Geneva, as 
follows:-
" Our group is considering the utilization of your bank in 
the management of an investment portfolio. You are 
kindly requested to provide the following for the
preliminary assessment of BJ-S methods and means:-
1. The bank directory - if any-or a write-up 
outlining your investment approach, philosophy
etc.
2. The bank structure for investment decision 
making.
3. Copies of the bank yearly reports disclosing
performance in the clients accounts during the
last five years.
4. The staff and their capabilities.
5. Classes/names of some of your major clients.
6. The Management fee structure.11
BJ-S Bank feedback was as follows:
1 J duly noted your interest in our portfolio investment 
management service which BJ-S Bank Group provides to 
clientele - individuals and international institutions - 
Worldwide. May I invite your attention to the booklet 
International Investment Management and, in particular, 
pages captioned "Performance Comparison of a US Dollar 
Based Client" and "Pin (various funds)" which clearly 
demonstrates the performance and the growth of assets of 
the portfolios of individual institutions.
Incidentally, Pin Funds are published daily in the 
Financial Times and these are managed by us on a fully 
discretionary basis. Broadly, the major international 
markets have fallen by 30% approximately, which compares 
rather favourably with the decline in the value of 
assets managed by us. The fees for managing a 
discretionary portfolio of US $ 10,000,000 will be 0.5% 
per annum and any amount exceeding this figure will be
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levied at 0.25% per annum. You should also note that for 
such managed accounts we do not charge safe custody fees 
and coupon collection fees."
The Controller As An Interpreter 
(between the principals and BJ-S)
During the negotiations with BJ-S Bank, the 
Corporate Controller kept the principals updated on most 
of the details and developments taking place. In the 
negotiations with BJ-S, the ASSPQ (Appendix 5.1) was used 
as a guide by the Controller. The Controller took a 
further step and confirmed with BJ-S bank the following 
general points which were orally discussed:
11 1. You will not charge any fee for holding U.S. 
Government Treasury Bills, we contemplate to 
transfer from another bank to be managed by 
BJ-S.
2. You will not charge any cost for sale/purchase 
of the Treasury Bills.
3. Your bid and offer basis cost related to the 
U.S. government Treasury Bills shall be 
quantified to give an idea roughly how much it 
will cost.
4. Your management fee for handling the investment 
portfolio on a discretionary basis shall be 
determined while considering the volume of 
business which I speculate to grow big.
5. You will set-up a fixed fee structure when we 
come to the stage of formalizing the agreement.
6. You shall alternatively present London versus 
Geneva asset management cost figures for us to 
compare and choose between your affiliates.
7. In case we start our mutual fiduciary 
relationship, you will keep a reporting line to 
enable us monitoring the portfolio performance.
8. Should we start accounts in Geneva, you will 
explain the chargeable commission on the returns 
of the Fiduciary placements.
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9. At all times at our request a portfolio manager 
will be at our disposal."
Description of the Principals'
Investment Objectives
For more explanation about the specific terms and
requirements of Mosnic, BJ-S requested the Controller to
respond to the following message
"Re: Investment objectives.
I should be grateful if you would care to give careful 
thought to the following, in particular to the aims and 
objectives, also any specific requirements the investors 
might have in mind, in respect of investment of the 














D. Frequency of Funds Movements.
i) Injection of capital





a) Takeover and Mergers
b) Growth companies requiring mezzanine 
financing
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F. Projection of Liabilities.
i) Amount and period estimates only.
G. Restrictions.
i) Any restrictions and constraints should be 
specified in detail.
It would be helpful if you would reply to me at your 
earliest convenience.
The Principals' Objectives 
Explained to BJ-S by the Controller
Income and Growth Objective
The Controller informed BJ-S that the primary aim of 
stakeholders was the growth of their assets. They might 
not need income from their discretionary portfolios (in 
the short-run) to withdraw. However, the stakeholders 
would be a lot happier to see the high gains realized. 
Thus, it could be left to BJ-S to judge in terms of how to 
mix the portfolio between growth and income. Indeed, once 
the Director told the Controller that: "global investment 
sometimes take you into a vicious circle. At a time the 
agents report high unrealized gains. A market turmoil 
comes. Then you are back to square one (i.e. you loose 
the unrealized gains to start the process again). I am 
convinced now to see some gains realized. How much of it? 
When to realize it ? and in which currency? are questions 
to be answered by BJ-S."
Thus, BJ-S was informed about these views of the 
Director. However, the Controller emphasized to BJ-S that, 
depending on'the markets situation, the stakeholders might 
change their income and growth objectives. The Controller
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The Controller informed BJ-S that the US Dollar
should remain the major currency of the portfolio. It was 
set to be 70% - 80%. The remaining balance of the
currency allocation was completely left to the discretion 
of BJ-S. The Controller also informed BJ-S that Mosnic 
could allow hedging cost to offset the currency risk on 
the portfolio. Management of the hedging cost would be 
left to the discretion of BJ-S.
(ii) Asset Mix Objective
The Controller agreed with BJ-S to discuss the broad 
categories of the assets in longer sessions to reflect
adequately on the principals' views about investment risk.
However, the Controller ensured BJ-S that Mosnic would not 
intervene in analyzing the individual securities. The 
Controller promised to keep observing, to interpret and to 
describe for BJ-S the process by which the stakeholders 
changed their objectives.
(iii) Geographical Spread Objective
The Controller notified BJ-S that any security 
selected for the portfolio should be marketable in the 
North American, Western European, Tokyo, Australia and 




The Controller informed BJ-S that Mosnic would leave 
its assets to grow over long periods. However, the Contro­
ller made a reservation that it would be difficult to set 
a standard for this objective. The markets do not always 
give signals about crises before they happen. Under emerg­
encies, the principals would take any measures,even to the 
extent of liquidating the portfolio as protection/defensive 
measures to preserve the capital. BJ-S appreciated this 
problem and agreed to leave setting this objective to the 
future.
(v) Trading Restriction
The Controller made it clear to BJ-S that Mosnic did 
not accept speculation. Once the Director said "we are 
not speculators. We need real portfolio management". The 
Controller further informed BJ-S to keep off speculation 
in currencies, new issues, special situations, internal 
fund investments (e.g. takeover and mergers, growth 
companies requiring mezzanine money or any other form of 
direct investment which would lead to holding unlisted 
stocks.) The reasons as understood by the Controller 
were: (1) Speculation meant gambling to the principals and 
in their Islamic belief gambling was prohibited; (2) 
speculation also meant putting the invested capital under 
high risk-particularly with respect to the unpredictable 
money market volatilities; and (3) use of unlisted stocks 
meant losing the flexibility of changing the strategy if 
the need would arise. Strategies pertaining to the 
marketable securities were considered easily revocable.
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(vi) Interest Restrictions
The BJ-S representative was kept informed about the 
Controller's intentions of handling the question of 
prohibited interest in detail if an agreement would be 
reached. The representative showed great enthusiasm and 
made a comment that he would like to learn about the 
interest issue since it concerned a group of his clients.
The following are some quotations from the Controller's 
detailed description of the stakeholders' investment 
objectives as telefaxed to the representative of BJ-S.
Specific Requirements
”Regarding income and growth as requirements,
maximization of profits is an ultimate objective, 
should it not put capital into jeopardy. Capital 
preservation is important.
Gains maximization must be associated with 
realization. We would like the assets to grow but not 
only in the books. At a reasonable level of growth 
gains have to be cashed i.e. "profit-taking strategy". 
Gains must not stay in the portfolio unreasonably 
unrealized.
B . Global Investment
The currency mix, the asset mix, and the geographical 
spread of the assets are where the asset manager has 
to advise in a prudent manner to the conservative 
investors of Mosnic.
C. Investment Period if a Fiduciary Relationship is 
Established Should be open.
D. Frequency of Funds Movements.
i) Injection of Capital.
Conservatively speaking, injection of further 
funds or transfer of short-term securities shall 
be the function of two factors:
1) The performance of BJ-S with us.
2) The group getting more fresh funds.
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ii) Withdrawal of Funds.
Not foreseen. Should be none or very minimal.
E . Trading.
It is not authorized, however, Our group would like to 
receive from BJ-S solid proposals regarding:
Currencies dealings/speculations in a reasonably 
secured way.
New issues/stocks.
- Any special situations such as:
(-) Corporate acquisition with management buy-out. 
(-) Growth companies requiring mezzanine financing.
F. Restrictions.
As stated before, our group do not advise interest to 
be mixed with revenue earned. However, temporary 
placed deposits are allowed until the cash proceeds 
are re-invested in the allowable instruments.
Investment in shares of companies manufacturing or 
trading in all types of liquor/alcoholic products is 
be to avoided.
The above guidelines can be negotiated elaborately. We are 
careful to have you satisfied with the principals objec­
tives ."
The principals7 requirements specifically described
The Controller conveyed the following guidelines to 
BJ-S for further negotiations
” We feel it is imperative to convey to you how the Board 
of Owners and the Directors of Mosnic view the current 
position of the U.S Treasury Bills to be held with BJ-S:
(1) They prefer holding the U.S. Treasury bills for 
the time being, as part of the current strategy 
of parking the fund temporarily.
(2) It is not yet opportune time to buy treasury 
bonds, for the bond prices are high.
(3) BJ-S Bank shall advise the right time - if there 
is any, within the coming 45 days time to move 
to the T-bonds partially.
(4) The investors still prefer the U.S. Treasury 
Bills for their security. That is a temporary 
strategy to cope with the market volatilities.
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(5) The investors do not allow permanent deposit 
placements as an alternative instrument. They 
very well know it is secured and gives higher 
yield than the U.S. Treasury bills. But you 
need to know that fixed deposits are against the 
belief of our investors.
(6) Unless notified and consulted on exceptionally 
attractive shares, the investors are of the 
opinion to:
- Eliminate equities from their portfolio.
- Raise Treasury Bills and bonds.
- Increase the capital preservation character­
istics/measures of their holdings.
Avoid interest income of fixed deposits.
The Proposed Allocation of Assets
(7) The following medium-term asset mix is proposed 
at the maturity of the treasury bills:
Treasury Bills 60%




(8) As of today, Eurobonds - you recommend, and
U.S .long-term Corporate bonds in general, do not 
attract the investors relative the U.S. Treasury 
issues, since the yield advantage for the 
Eurobonds is often only 50 basis points for the
best names, whereas in the recent past it has
been in the 120-180 basis points range. It is 
advised that a recession is expected in 1989, 
which could at some points cause spreads to 
widen. Investors feel they need to wait for bad 
news before moving out of the treasuries. How do 
you think?
(9) There is an attractive bond yield increase 
between three months. If opportune moment comes 
to buy treasury bonds, they recommend to keep 
maturities below 5 years, since the potential 
for further falls in U.S. interest rates seems 
limited, due to the expected increase in the 
borrowing requirements of the U.S. Treasury.
(10) Diversification out of the dollar being
recommended by BJ-S Bank.
The investors believe that the success of 
purchasing bonds outside the U.S. dollar depends 
on both the relative movement of interest rates 
and the change in the exchange rate. Foreign
-187-
bonds seem more attractive than U.S. bonds as 
regards the interest rate profile, but as the 
currency outlook the investors will require your 
justification.
The investors would like to hear from BJ-S Bank 
regarding diversification out of the dollar on a 
hedged basis and on an unhedged basis, (if Euro­
bonds are recommended by you) . The final 
decision before implementation has to be 
presented in a comprehensively documented report 
to the board."
The Controller then undertook some preliminary tests 
on BJ-S means and methods and the signs were promising 
about BJ-S bank. Thus, the Controller moved to the 
detailed analysis process as presented in the forthcoming 
pages. The inquiries were mostly around BJ-S strategy, 
structure and processes.
BJ-S Strategy, structure and Processes 
(methods and means assessment)
The stages of BJ-S selection were not in the same 
order as in MIP and other banks selection. In the case of 
the BJ-S selection, the Director nearly gave directives to 
the Controller to select BJ-S if there was no clear 
reservation about the bank. Thus, the Controller started 
by deepening the understanding between BJ-S and Mosnic. 
Every party was then clear about what the other was 
looking for. Only after that, the process of analyzing 
BJ-S strategy, structure and processes started. In this 
process the Controller turned back again to BJ-S to get 
more highlights on the following:
1. - BJ-S cooperation with the Mosnic objectives and 
specific requirements.
- BJ-S geographical spread.





7. Currency neutral strategy
8. Investment model
9. Investment performance.
10. Asset management and commission rates.
BJ-S responded as follows:- (The forthcoming details are 
quoted to give the reader an idea about the model and the 
contribution of the agent to the principal's strategy 
formulation process.)
INVESTMENT APPROACH (BJ-S PHILOSOPHY)
" Our approach to discretionary investment management is 












A full understanding of our clients' 
investment objectives and requirements.
Adherence to the principle of long-term 
protection of invested capital rather 
than speculative and unsustainable short­
term gains.
A spread of portfolio risks across the 
worlds major markets taking political 
stability, economic strength and
liquidity into close consideration.
A prudent diversification by currency,one 
of the most decisive investment criteria.
A broad asset mix of equities, straight 
bonds, convertible bonds and cash to
achieve optimal returns in changing
market conditions.
The essence of our approach is the international 
diversification of investment by a country, market sector 
and currencyOver the longer terms, we consider that 
this approach will continue to provide potentially higher 
and more stable returns than "single country" portfolios:
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Overseas diversification lessens the investors 
exposure to adverse currency and economic 
developments in any single markets;
A wider spread and choice of overseas investment 
opportunities offer higher potential returns."
The views of the Controller started becoming positive 
about BJ-S.
PRIVATE BANKING TRADITION
BJ-S said the following about the London banking required 
by Mosnic.
"Private bankers by tradition with a personalized 







Through the London office, private investors have
access to:
Discretionary Investment Management Services, 
Cheque book and deposit accounts,
Loans and overdrafts in all major currencies, 
Foreign exchange transactions,
Money Market Instruments 
Euromarket dealings,
Securities brokerage,
Offshore trust and company management services".
DIFFERENT STRATEGIES TO DIFFERENT CURRENCIES
On their intended strategies to operate Mosnic portfolio, 
BJ-S said:
" Consistent with this approach to international 
diversification, we formulate for our clients specific 
investment strategies.
Each strategy is first related to a base currency. This 
is the currency in which the client thinks and 
calculates. It is also the currency against which our 
performance will be measured. Where clients have no
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natural bias to any one currency, we adopt a "currency 
neutral" strategy. For each base currency, our 
strategies then project an optimal currency and 
international asset mix. When the appropriate client 
strategy has been determined, this is used as the basis 
on which to agree and build a personalized portfolio. 
This will take into account any special investment 
requirements, objectives or preferences the client may 
have. Our basic strategies are closely monitored by our 
group Research Department who revise them as and when 
our market expectations change. Our management 
capabilities here are also supported by fundamental 
equity and bond research. This is through both in-house 
and outside technical analysis to which our portfolio 
managers have direct access. The investor goal and 
strategy guide BJ-S to come up with strategy suitable 
for the situation. So, investors have presence with us."
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Conv. Bonds Gold Cash Totals
U.S. Dollar 20 15 15 50
Yen 7 7 14
Sterling 2 2
Europe 6 18 24
Gold .— — — 10 — — S 10
Totals 35 40 10 15 100





Conv. Bonds Gold Cash Totals
Sterling 20 10 20 50
U.S. Dollar 9 6 15
Yen 5 5 10













Conv. Bonds Gold Cash Totals
Sterling 10 5 10 25
U.S. Dollar 14 7 21
Yen 8 6 14














Digital Equipment Corp. (Computers)





Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. (Financials) 
EUROPE
Carrefour (Retailing)
Jacobs Suchards AG PS
National Westminster Bank PLC (Banks)
Royal Dutch (Oils)
BONDS: (40%)
USD Swedish Export Credit 8.625% 1991 
DEM European Economic Community 5.375% 1993 
DEM European Investment Bank 6.25% 1995 
YEN Canada 5.635% 1993 





STERLING BASED STRATEGY (RESIDENT) 
EQUITIES: (40%)
UK
BAT Industries (Consumer Goods)
Glaxo (Pharmaceuticals)
Great Universal Stores (Retailing) 
National Westminster Bank Pic (Banks)
Rio Tinto Zinc (Natural Resources)





Nalco Chemical Co. (Chemicals)
Time Inc. ( Publishing)
JAPAN
Aoki Corp. (Construction)
Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. (Financials) 
EUROPE
Jacobs Suchard AG PS (Foods)
Royal utch (Oils)
BONDS: (35%)
STG Treasury 9% 1996
USD Swedish Export Credit 8.625% 1991 
DEM European Investment Bank 6.25% 1995 






BJ-S Bank Avoids Financial Forecasts of ROI 
but Discloses Historical Performance Numbers
According to BJ-S: "Some clients ask us to guarantee 
or predict performance levels for selected strategies. We 
do not do this financial forecasting. However well it is 
researched, it can be quickly invalidated by events - both 
favorable and unfavorable. What we do hope to achieve is 
a consistent level of performance over the longer term to 
protect and increase the real value of a client's assets. 
An indication of our achievement in recent years is shown 
below.
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Performance of Individually Managed Portfolios
Annual Percentage of Return in Local Currency 
Year US $ Strategy DM strategy S.Fr.
Strategy
1982 14.3 13.6 18.2
1983 11.4 20.4 20.4
1984 2.7 10.7 15.1
1985 34.1 13.0 14.5
1986 23.5 6.3 5.2
These are representatives of our performance for sterling 
based accounts and are illustrated over the page. The data 
supporting these performances are a matter of public 
record. We know some brokers do not mind bombarding their 
potential clients with unrealistic or even deceptive 
performance data. We are not brokers."
ASSET MANAGEMENT COST AND COMMISSION RATES
While still exploring BJ-S as an intended portfolio 
manager, the Controller addressed the following question 
to BJ-S Geneva.
" BJ-S is kindly requested to give an idea how much will 
it cost Mosnic to have the marketable securities managed 
by BJ-S Geneva?"
The response of BJ-S was a summary of Agreement on
Commission rates by the Association of Swiss Stock
Exchanges.
BJ-S Means and Methods Reiterated
Following the replies provided by BJ-S, in the following 
meeting, the Director led the discussion and raised 
inquires about:
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1. BJ-S investment philosophy
2. BJ-S investment decision
3. Investment policy
4. Portfolio composition
The discussion went on as follows:-
The Director:
" Can you explain your investment philosophy and style, to
see if Mosnic can be accommodated with BJ-S Bank, and
how BJ-S Bank can help in achieving the capital
preservation and growth goals ?"
BJ-S Representative:
" Our investment philosophy can be summarized as follows:
1. Our main task is first to understand our clients' 
investment objectives. Principal-manager co­
operation is our style.
2. We always adhere to the principle of long-term 
protection of invested capital rather than 
speculative short-term gains.
3. We believe it is essential to spread risks
internationally, taking political stability and 
economic strength into close consideration.
4. We consider currency selection one of the most 
decisive investment criteria.
5. We always aim at asset mix that takes optimum 
advantage of changing market conditions.




" Can you brief us on your investment policy related to 
portfolio management? I mean your investment decision 
making process?"
BJ-S Representative:
11 You must have known by now that, for decades BJ-S has 
been specialized in the management of private and 
institutional securities portfolio. In all these years, 
there has' been a constant growth both in the amount of 
funds placed under our custody and in the number of the 
investment managers looking after these funds.
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Logically enough, this expansion in business volumes 
resulted in structural adjustments involving adminis­
tration, electronic data processing and information 
systems and also brought about changes in how 
investment management services are rendered. One of 
our key management instruments is the formulation and 
implementation of a uniform investment policy for the 
entire group. For our clients, the policy is a visible 
and tangible image of our business philosophy and 
investment strategy while constituting our identity 
within the Swiss and International banking community."
On the Investment policies, strategies and the decision 
making process, BJ-S representative added
" Our investment policy is based on time-tried and 
conservative principles. The long-term preservation of 
assets is given priority over short-term profits on 
gains associated with increased risk. Investments are 
only placed in countries with stable economic and 
political backgrounds. surveyable foreign exchange 
policies and liberal capital markets."
Portfolio Structure
On portfolio structure the representative said:
11 In our portfolios, the focus is on investments in prime 
fixed income securities and on shares of leading 
corporations with sound earnings and dividend 
perspective."
About concentration on the major markets combined with 
diversification of Investments, the representative 
commented:
11 A balanced combination between the necessary 
diversification of investments and concentration of 
major markets and currencies results in clearly 
structured portfolios and simultaneously gives the 
investment manager enough liberty to devote time to 
personal_counsel. an aspect of the job to which we still 
attach considerable importance. "
Structure for Investment Decision Making
About the role of BJ-S Investment Committee, the 
representative stated:
” The investment policy committee is the backbone of the 
decision making process needed to formulate our 
investment policy. Once a month, three members of the 
management committee get together with the heads of the 
private and the institutional investment management
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departments, the Research Department, and senior 
officers of the securities trading and foreign exchange 
departments."
Establishing Investment Strategy
On the establishment of investment strategy issue the 
representative said:
11 The committee's main responsibility is to establish the 
overall investment strategy, issuing guidelines for 
currency diversification for the asset mix for 
geographical risk diversification."
Formulation of the Investment Policy
The representative stated that the final approval of the 
investment policy, considering the importance of portfolio 
management, was the responsibility of the executive 
committee of the Board of Directors and the Management 
Committee. Therefore, the investment policy had to be 
submitted to them. The Controller, going through BJ-S 
investment decision making process, proposed to the 
Director to request more information on the subject. 
Getting a green light from the Director, the Controller 
made the following telefax request:
" Mosnic Investment Committee finds it interesting to 
understand more about your investment policy 
formulation/implementation and the related decision 
making process. We shall highly appreciate having more 
information on the subject."
Control of the Investment Decision Making Process
About the structure maintained in decision making BJ-S 
response came as follows:
" The actual decision making process for the investment 
strategy relies extensively on the analysis conducted by 
the Research Department. The specialists in this 
department submit studies which outline the political 
and economic background of the major investment 
countries and their potential impact on the foreign
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exchange, bond and stock markets. Also, the members of 
the Investment policy Committee each month contribute 
their quantitative estimates of the development of 
currencies, interest rates and stock markets. Based on 
these estimates, a total return forecast is calculated 
for each major stock and bond market. The scale of 
anticipated returns on investments supplies the basis 
for the weighting of the individual markets, resulting 
in the "currencies-neutral international investment 
policy guidelines."
Once this basic concept has been defined, several 
subsequent steps lead to the establishment of a refined 
investment policy arid. Modifications are made to 
reflect currency-related preferences of the individual 
private or institutional investor and the local needs of 
our branches in London and New York."
Implementation of the Investment Strategy
BJ-S Bank commented on strategy implementation as follows:
1 Within the framework defined by the investment policy 
committee, the stock and bond selection committees will 
implement the strategy by issuing specific investment 
lists. The buy lists for the key international stock, 
bond and convertible bond markets contain detailed and 
carefully analyzed investment proposals. Special
quality ratings are made for bonds, and corporate 
studies are published on companies whose shares we 
recommend."
Mosnic asks for Specific Policy
Going through the report of BJ-S, the Director asked:
" Is the investment policy designed by BJ-S suitable for 
all types of clients? And how can you satisfy Mosnic 
special needs? How can Mosnic keep current on informa­
tion produced by BJ-S investment policy committee?"
BJ-S Bank Representative replied:
" Of course we can retailor our policy to meet your 
requirement.1
BJ-S Information Technology as Management Instrument
He added:
" The highly' diversified information kits produced by our 
Research Department are not only available to our in- 
house investment managers, but are also mailed to a
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selected circle of institutional clients. Both the 
organizational framewdrk of this multilevel decision 
making process and the detailed definition of the 
investment policy in writing have become indispensable 
tools in portfolio management. In fact, they represent a 
management instrument which takes into account the 
diversification or our business activities in terms of 
geographical focal points and client categories. The 
management responsibilities are entrusted to the top 
executive officer of our bank while the individual 
investment managers tailor the general investment policy 
to reflect the wishes and needs of our clients, select 
the financial instruments and continually monitor the 
portfolios."
The Problem of the Uniform Investment 
Strategies and Policies
The Director commented on the investment decision making
process and on the formulation of the investment policy in
BJ-S as follows:
” BJ-S has the right organizational structure and the
sophisticated procedures of formulating the investment 
policies and I think what is presented to us by BJ-S 
(like any portfolio manager) is a standard/uniform model 
which cannot be applied universally to all the 
investors' objectives. Will you have the patience to 
accept our input and amend your standard strategy."
BJ-S Representative argued as Follows:
" I do not fully agree with the Director. Other advantages 
can be derived from the formulation of a fundamentally 
uniform investment policy. It makes it possible for us 
to systematically review the implementation of the
policy, to obtain comparable results among different 
clients and client groups, and thus to get an objective 
performance comparison, an important factor when 
addressing potential institutional clients in an
internationally competitive market. However, this is
not the only reason why we attach great importance to 
investment policy as a management tool. Our traditional 
business philosophy stresses the need for a uniform and 
positive identity of the bank in the awareness of the 
public as well as among current and prospective clients. 
A clearly formulated and implemented investment policy 
contributes a great deal to the attainment of this 
significant objective."
BJ-S Internal Control System
The Controller observed that by using BJ-S, Mosnic 
would actually rely on the agent's management control
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systems as the backbone for the management control system 
of the company as a whole. Moreover, the Controller was 
convinced that the principals' system for monitoring 
different agents could not be universal. This conviction 
was based on the fact that different agents would have 
different means and methods. In the light of the above 
views, and taking into count the significance of the 
accounting information system for monitoring BJ-S, and for 
safeguarding the principals' assets, the Controller 
decided to study BJ-S internal control system's 
reliability as an underlying factor to decide whether or 
not to select BJ-S as Mosnic's agent. The Director liked 
the idea and gave the Controller a 'green light' to try 
it. The Controller addressed the issue as follows 
with BJ-S.
Request bv Telefax
"Re: Contracted Assets' Outside Controls
You will agree with me that investors rely to a certain 
extent on the asset Managers' Control Procedures related 
to data presented to the Manager's Report users. Moreover, 
the managers undertake the physical safeguard of the 
assets and selects the custodians. Our Board of Management 
would like to evaluate the effectiveness of your controls 
over its contracted assets. You are requested to provide a 
list of internal controls you exercise which ensure that:
1. All transactions related to the assets are accounted 
for,
2. All transactions are real.
3. All transactions are properly valued.
4. All transactions are entered on a timely basis.
5. Classification is accurate.
6. Summarization is correct.
7. Posting is accurate.
In listing your internal controls on the contracted 
assets, please consider the following Applications 
Transactions and other aspects:
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1. Sale of Securities.
2. Purchase of Securities.
3. Commissions related to trading in securities through 
our accounts.
4. Our withdrawals and Transfer of Funds.
5. Direct charges to the Current accounts.
. 6. Unrealized gains.
7. Realized gains.
8. Accrued interest on bonds.
9. Dividends/Coupons
10. Valuation of Assets.
11. Commitments & Liabilities related to our accounts.
12. Currency translation to the reporting currency (US 
Dollars) i.e. The source of information and 
mechanism of translation.
13. Cut-off procedures related to trade of securities.
14. Method and policy of valuation - disclose in details 
your formula how:
- weighted average invested capital is computed.
- the reported rate of return is calculated.
- market value vs. historical cost is implemented.
15. Management judgment affecting the valuation. If you 
have English version of your policies and procedures 
manual you can provide copies of relevant pages. We 
are keen to have an idea about your machine control,
i.e. EDP controls, General control, etc. Your 
cooperation to any extent shall be highly 
appreciated and will lay foundation for longer and 
deeply rooted further understanding. Of course it 
will minimize time you spend in future, responding 
to our inquiries".
BJ-S Internal Audit Function
The following memo was the answer from BJ-S to the 
Controller's telefax requests in the same order of numbers 
used by him.
"All transactions and classifications mentioned in your 
points item 1 to 7 of the first page are checked by a 
"Department of Internal Control", directly subordinated to 
the top management. Then, the "Internal Audit" inspects 
the transaction in the bank and files a report with the 
Board of Directors, made up of the partners.
Thirdly, the federal law on banking prescribes the use of 
external auditors who file a report:
a) with the Swiss Banking Commission.
b) with the Board of Directors of the bank.
This procedure is also applicable to the following points.
2. and 2. Purchase and sale of securities are executed by
the Stock Exchange Department and checked by 
the Securities Department.
3. Commissions related to trading in securities are fixed 
in the Agreement of the Association of Swiss Stock 
Exchanges and programed into our Electronic Data 
Processing (EDP) system.
4. All instructions to withdraw or transfer funds are 
first checked by the portfolio manager who will 
control, amongst others, the authenticity of the 
signature. Afterwards, the Internal Audit will check 
again.
5. Administrative charges are based on the rate fixed by 
the bank and introduced in the EDP system. The safe­
keeping charges are fixed in the Agreement of the 
Swiss Bankers Association which allows rebates under 
certain conditions.
7. Realized gains directly depend on a sale and as such, 
the answer to points 1 and 2 are also applicable.
8. The EDP system calculates accrued interest on bonds 
every day and controls the total amount on the payment 
day of the coupons.
9. Dividends and coupons are checked by the EDP system, 
following a daily schedule and then controlled by the 
Securities Department.
11. All commitments, liabilities and credits are 
investigated by the Credit Department. The decision 
to grant a credit must be approved by the Board of 
Directors.
The next points are dealt with in the following manner:
6. Unrealized gains are not precise accounting amounts as 
they depend on a valuation which can change at any 
minute. The valuation is based on prices supplied 
every morning by a well-known international service 
called Investdata. For certain unusual or private 
placements, they do not give any price and we appraise 
the price ourself.
10. The valuation of assets has already been defined under 
point 6.
12. Every morning, the Foreign Exchange Department takes 
note of the exchange rates fixed at the opening of the 
market and introduces them in the EDP systems. These 
rates are used for the valuation and the comments
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under point 6 also apply here.
13. We are not sure to understand what you mean by cut-off
procedures in trading securities. If this is related
to mechanisms to automatically stop the sale of 
securities when the market drops too fast, we do not 
use them.
14. We do not use the "average invested capital", as it
can be quite misleading. To calculate the rate of
return, we use an "amount of reference" which is the 
grand total of the valuation of assets at the 
beginning of the year (initial valuation) indexed by 
all transfer, remittances or withdrawals (cash and 
securities). After each transfer, a new "amount of 
reference" is calculated, using the formula:
New amount of
reference = former amount of x actual valuation
reference (or initial including transfer
valuation if applicable) _______ ________
valuation before 
transfer
The difference between the "new amount of reference" 
and the "actual valuation" measures the rate of
return.
If the transfer is an addition three times larger, or 
more than the amount of reference, or withdrawal 
representing three quarters, or more, of that amount, 
the rate of return is calculated as if the amount had 
been opened.
15. The decisions taken by the portfolio manager will
affect the valuation , at least over a certain period 
of time. Each account has at least two portfolio
managers: one who is responsible to follow the account 
daily, and a substitute to replace him or to build up 
a team with him. In some cases, there is also an
assistant portfolio manager.
The committee for Investment Policy, headed by the
partner in charge of the Research Department, is
responsible for the bank's investment policy. The
partner in charge of the department of portfolio
management is responsible to check the application of 
this policy.
1. and 2. Purchases and sales when authorized are
processed through a dealing desk and contract note is 
produced, which is checked.
3. All commissions or charges wherever applicable are 
shown on the advice.
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4. Withdrawals or transfers are only made when duly 
authorized and checked thereafter.
5. All charges are shown on the advice, no direct charges 
other than credits and debits.
6. Unrealized gains can be calculated from the valuation, 
no separate postings.
7. Realized gains are shown by the contract note and by 
entries across current account.
8. Accrued interest is shown on valuation with specific 
details.
9. Credit advises are produced.
10. Telekurs, an outside source provides daily market 
price for valuation.
11* Specific transaction note produced to show all 
commitments.
12. Foreign exchange rates are put into the system on 
daily basis, and they are provided by the Foreign 
Exchange and Treasury Department of the Bank.
13. All bargains are processed on the day of the 
transaction, late bargains are processed for the next 
day.
BJ-S System for Controlling the Portfolio 
Transactions
1. All transactions are subject to checks and controls: 
initiations, accounting, movements and reconciliations 
are done on daily basis. Computer processes entries 
automatically.
2. Only duly authorized transactions are put through the 
system and checked against third party confirmation.
3. An outside independent source is used, such as
Telekurs who provide daily prices.
4. Transaction note on execution is stamped by time-
machine .
5. Valuation shows the classification of assets.
6. Valuation shows the summary.
7. Valid computer input result in automatic accounting
entries and checked daily".
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The Controller's View on BJ-S 
Internal Control System
The Controller was not quite satisfied that BJ-S 
enjoyed a reliable internal control system. The reporting 
package demonstrated by BJ-S was not satisfactory. It was 
difficult to see at a glance the realized and the 
unrealized gains. Also BJ-S was not clear about how to 
segregate and report interest as part of the portfolio 
income. But at least, the representative showed a high 
appreciation and cooperation to amend the system for 
processing interest income separately.
BJ-S did not show its detailed methods for security 
analysis and for managing risk.However, the representative 
assured the Controller that BJ-S intended to remain 
conservative and slightly exposed to shares. Accordingly, 
the Controller set his own specific control measures to 
cope with the specific and different aspects of BJ-S's 
control system. The detailed monitoring procedures to 
suit the situation of BJ-S are presented in the post 
investment case studies in the next chapter.
The Proposed Form of the Fiduciary 
Relationship
Very rarely Money Managers and Mosnic have recoursed 
to the stipulations of the Investment Management agreement 
to have their differences settled. The agreement was a 
precautionary document and just routine (for Mosnic) in 
investment management through agents. The contents of the 
discretionary’ investment management agreements were always 
carefully written and addressed, in a very formal style,
fundamental issues related to authority and responsibility 
in the complicated process of discretionary portfolio 
management.
For a successful and good business relation to be 
built, mutual respect and trust has been the corner-stone 
to the relations between the Asset Managers and 
Mosnic. However, an agreement has to be formalized.
BJ-S Bank proposed the following major aspects to be 
covered by the proposed agreement.
1. Responsibilities of the BJ-S as a discretionary 
asset manager.
2. Responsibilities of BJ-S Bank as a custodian.
3. Responsibilities of Mosnic as a client of BJ-S 
bank.
4. Fees and remuneration chargeable to Mosnic by BJ-S 
bank for services to be rendered.
5. Termination formalities.
6. General.
It is important to give the reader a view of how the 
fiduciary relationship appeared in its purely formal 
stipulation.
Indeed, BJ-S proposed to Mosnic the following:
Responsibilities of the Bank 
as Investment Manager
To manage the assets of the Client that are subject to 
this agreement "Assets" on a discretionary basis within 
the investment policy guidelines agreed with the 
client.
In making'investment decisions the Bank will exercise 
its discretion to the best of its ability. However, the 
Bank will not use information received in a capacity
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which obliges it not to use or disclose it for any 
other purpose. The Bank shall not be responsible for 
any loss in value or for profit not taken whether 
resulting from changes in market conditions or in 
consequence of the Bank's management of the Assets.
The Bank shall execute the purchase or sale of the 
Assets, the exercise of all rights, and debit and 
credit the Client's Accounts as appropriate.
Notification of all changes in the Assets will be sent 
as soon as possible after transactions have been 
conf irmed.
All transactions will be carried out on terms as 
favourable as those on which the Client could deal 
direct.
The Bank will provide to the client or the client's 
nominated representative.
i ) valuations of the Assets based upon middle market
prices as at 31st March (or 5th April if elected 
by the Client) , 30th June, 30th September and 31st 
December, and these will be despatched to the 
Client no later than 5 weeks from the valuation 
date.
ii ) statements of the Capital and Income Accounts, 
ii) appropriate tax vouchers.
The Bank's Investment Management Fee Scale forms part 
of Discretionary Investment Management Terms and 
Conditions.
Responsibilities of the Bank 
as Custodian
All Assets shall be held at the Client risk in the name 
or custody of the Bank and/or its nominee and/or its 
agent for the Client's beneficial ownership.
The registration of any securities by the Banks nominee 
or agents may be as part of larger holding of 
securities of other clients of the Bank which will not 
separately identify or allocate the holding of any 
particular client. By signing this Agreement Mosnic 
acknowledges that the Client's entitlement to any such 
larger holding shall be the proportion which the 
securities owned by the Client bears to the securities 
owned by all other co-owners for the time being of the 
particular securities concerned. The client further 
acknowledges that the client will have no greater or 
lesser rights either as against the Bank's nominee or 
agents or any of the Bank's clients other than those
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which the client would have as some beneficial owner 
or, in the case of joint signatories to this agreement, 
joint beneficial owners.
The Bank shall open Capital and Income accounts for and 
on behalf of Mosnic.
The Bank shall collect dividends and interest due after 
deducting tax where applicable on the Assets and credit 
the Client's income account when received.
Responsibilities of the Client
Mosnic warrants that the Assets are owned beneficially 
free from all encumbrances.
Mosnic undertakes not to deal with any of the Assets or 
to authorize anyone else so to deal.
Any request or instructions relating to the Assets, the 
accounts or this agreement shall be made in writing to 
the Bank.
Mosnic shall indemnify the Bank against all costs, 
expenses, demands and losses which may be incurred in 
the lawful exercise of its duties and recognizes that 
any advice given by the Bank under this Agreement shall 
not entail any responsibility on its part.
This agreement shall be binding on Mosnic's estate and 
personal representatives. In the event of more than 
one investor jointly signing this Agreement, and unless 
the Bank is notified in writing to the contract, on the 
decease of any of the Clients, the Bank shall hold any 
balances on any accounts in their joint names and all 
securities and other property of theirs to the order of 
either:
Fees and Remuneration
Investment Management Fees will be charged quarterly in 
arrears as per the Bank's Current Investment Management 
Fee Scale (para 1.7) on the basis of the Asset 
valuation to be provided under paragraph 1.6.
The Investment Management Fees are inclusive of the 
Bank's safe custody charges but do not include 
correspondents charges which will be debited in 
addition when incurred by the Bank.
Normal commissions and transaction charges will be 
debited by the Bank in accordance with its current 
terms and‘conditions.
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The Bank's fees will be charged and directly debited to 
the Client's Capital account even though as a result 
the account may become overdrawn. For this reason and 
also to cover any temporary mis-overdraft together with 
associated interest and cost, and hereby charges as 
security for such overdraft all Assets, to be applied 
by the Bank at its sole discretion in repayment. The 
Bank undertakes that the overdraft facility will not be 
used to purchase additional investments.
Purchases and sales of investments by the Bank for the 
Client may form part of larger transactions in which 
other clients or parties are interested. In such cases, 
the Client authorizes the Bank to retain any additional 
benefit that my be earned by the sale of such 
transactions.
Interest payable on Mosnic's Capital Accounts in 
accordance with the Bank's current terms and 
conditions.
Termination
This Agreement may be ended without penalty by the 
Client at any time. However, the Bank shall give at 
least 30 days written notice of termination.
On termination the Bank will not execute any further 
transactions except at the Client's request and will 
arrange for delivery of the Assets to the Client, as 
soon as practicable, after deductions of management 
fees and other sums due.
Criteria for the Appraisal of BJ-S 
Means and Methods
The Controller learnt that it would be difficult to 
quantify why a portfolio manager should be selected. 
Rational measurement of agent qualities may not be easy. 
One had to go through a complicated process which involved 
a lot of qualitative judgement. However, the Controller 
tried to evaluate the result of appraising BJ-S. There 
had to be some criteria. Thus, the Controller evaluated
(a) the means, and (b) the methods in BJ-S as follows:
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(a) Means
(i) Global Portfolio Management Capability:
The Controller became convinced that BJ-S would be 
qualified to manage a domestic and global portfolio 
(internationally) in the major financial markets with its 
portfolio managers officiating from Western Europe, Japan 
and North America.
(ii) Staff:
BJ-S staff were found to be adequately experienced (i.e. 
with a long period in service and satisfied (motivated) to 
implement the investment strategy). The Controller found 
adequate number of strategists (economic analysts), 
traders, marketing experts, administrative and support 
staff.
(iii) Support:
In all the major aspects of security investing, BJ-S had 
been found adequately supported by security analysis and 
economic research facilities. BJ-S also was adopting an 
acceptable global investment strategy produced by a fairly 




BJ-S portfolio management was tailored with room for 
flexibility to meet the specific investment objectives of 
Mosnic's stakeholders. BJ-S agreed to try to invest in 
relatively under-valued securities within Mosnic's risk
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tolerance which might shift. Indeed, BJ-S showed maximum 
flexibility to meet the changing requirements of Mosnic.
(ii) Fixed Income Philosophy:
BJ-S view on bonds maturity, quality etc. were compatible 
with Mosnic's current income and liquidity requirement 
plans. Regarding the problem of interest, BJ-S showed the 
utmost cooperation to preserve the restrictions set by 
Mosnic.
(iii) Criterion for Equity Selection:
Generally, Mosnic did not see a problem with BJ-S with 
regard to the above.
(iv) Personalization of Service:
BJ-S ensured to the Controller that their client 
communication system supported the maximum possible 
frequent contacts with Mosnic and could be a guarantee for 
individualization of the discretionary account management. 
The BJ-S style of portfolio management would cater for 
personalization of investors' services. These personalized 
services could provide for amending BJ-S models to 
different investors objectives, expectations and concepts 
on risk. BJ-S portfolio management service programme was 
found satisfactory in terms of: (1) daily supervision of 
the portfolio decision processes; (2) monthly investment 
policy commentary; (3) quarterly review of the portfolio;
(4) quarterly appraisal of the portfolio; (5) continuous 




(i) Different investors had assigned management of more 
than 20 Billion U.S. Dollars to BJ-S. Thus BJ-S 
size was found satisfactory.
(ii) BJ-S had been operating for a long time.
(iii) The performance track record of BJ-S was 
satisfactory.
Based on these positive results of evaluating BJ-S 
means and methods, BJ-S was then chosen as a discretionary 
agent for Mosnic. The Controller had now to think about 
how to treat an external agent as an accountable unit.
Conclusion to the Selection of BJ-S
The case of BJ-S bank selection as a discretionary 
agent has disclosed the complicated processes followed by 
Mosnic for formulating the investment decision. Neither 
Mosnic nor BJ-S had to impose on each other a standard 
investment model/strategy. Investment strategy formulation 
would depend on: (1) BJ-S using its means and methods in
conducting sophisticated analysis of the securities to be 
selected; and (2) the Controller continuously reflecting 
the shift in the stakeholders' objectives. This process 
was different from the process by which strategy emerged 
with MIP. The impact of this difference on the principal's 
(Mosnic) control system is discussed in chapter (7).
The additional control requirements of BJ-S designed 
by the Controller were numerous and significant to 
compensate for BJ-S weaknesses in reporting and in the
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other internal control aspects. The pattern of the 
Controller's involvement in formulating the portfolio 
strategy and in interpreting the objectives of the
stakeholders' requirements to BJ-S was an important aspect 
of BJ-S selection processes.
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SECTION 5-C 
DE-SELECTION OF AN AGENT 
THE CASE OF VONTOV BANK
OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE
This case study attempts to describe part of the 
problem involved in maintaining a portfolio of agents. It 
tells the story of an agent selection and de-selection 
(termination of the fiduciary relationship) due to: (1) 
unsatisfactory performance resulting from the agents 
violation of Mosnic's investment strategy and the set of 
guidelines given to the agent, and (2) change of agent 
strategy, structure, and processes. The case study shows 
that the agent de-selection decision cannot be easily 
based on sophisticated rational measurement of the 
portfolio performance. It also establishes the fact the 
risk-adjusted return approach to the appraisal of 
discretionary portfolio becomes trivial if not coupled 
with a number of other processes.
The case study concludes by giving an overview of 
some of the problems confronting investment houses in the 
process of maintaining an appropriate portfolio of agents.
1. VONTOV SELECTION PROCESSES 
The Stock Market Rally Attraction and the Need for 
Vontov.
On his return from a trip to the United States, the
Director of Mosnic said to the Controller:
"So many professional portfolio managers I have met with 
believe that ' 3000 on the Dow Jones before Christmas is 
possible. None of those professionals think that we would 
see the Dow as low as 2300. Stocks are selling at 20
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times earnings. I think as a result of our conservative 
approach, great opportunities are lost.
Tell me, how can we take the advantage of the rally in 
the stock markets while ensuring that the principal to be 
invested will not be put into jeopardy? Can you think of 
controlling aggressive agents, tell me how?"
The Controller replied:
"Unfortunately we are taught a scaring rule. That is 
return is the function of risk. However, I think we can 
go a bit aggressive without exposing capital to loss."
The Director:
11Not a bad idea. Let us search for an asset manager to 
play that game. Mind your controls. We must not change 
the corporate asset allocation policy. Shares in the 
corporate portfolio must not exceed 20%. So we can be 
aggressive only within the 20% limit allowed exposure to 
shares".
So the Controller went back to the market for agents 
to look for an agent specialized in investment only in 
global equity portfolios.
Vontov Investment Strategy, Structure 
and Processes
The Corporate Controller proposed three agents to the 
Director for the special task. The Controller knew about 
Vontov from another agent. Moreover, Vontov had once sent 
its literature to Mosnic. This was kept in a file. The 
Director agreed to consider Vontov as a potential agent. 
Thus, the Controller went back to his old files to 
revitalize the contacts with Vontov.
The Controller started the analysis of Vontov in 
coordination with the Director and the other members of
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the IPC. As usual, the Corporate Controller used the ASSPQ 
(Appendix 5.1) as a guide to ensure that all the aspects 
pertaining to Vontov strategy, structure and processes 
were covered. Notwithstanding the use of the ASSPQ, the
study of Vontov was not conducted in the same
chronological order of the ASSPQ (appendix 5.1).
Using different means of communication (e.g., the
telephone, telefax, meetings and literature provided by
Vontov) the Controller conveyed to Vontov that Mosnic 
wanted to be clear about the following aspects of the bank 
strategy, structure and processes (i.e., the means and the 
methods):






(7) General Investment Philosophy and Style.
(8) Portfolio Structure.
(9) Risk Management.
(10) Investment Decision Making Structure.
(11) Powers Required by Vontov.
(12) Approach to portfolio performance
(13) Fees
(14) Readiness for Informal Cooperation and 
Communication.
(i.e., personnalization of services)
(15) Size of Global Equity Portfolio.
(16) Management of Currency Risk.
(17) Technological Support.
(18) Reporting and Internal Accounting Control.
The Controller asked Vontov to explain how (despite 
the financial market's volatility) one can select the 
least cyclical shares to construct a conservative 
portfolio. In response to the Controller's request, 
Vontov showed a high level of cooperation. In fact, the 
appraisal process was long and it required a lot of effort
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and time from the Controller. To make it simple, the
following is a summary of the feedback by Vontov in
response to the Controllers inquiry about its methods and
means.
Vontov as a Global Equity Portfolio Manager
Vontov representative said:
"If an investor wishes to appoint outside managers to
advise on equity investments in international markets, 
an early decision has to be taken on whether to appoint 
a global manager to advise on equity markets worldwide 
or a regional equity specialist in one or a number of 
markets. We believe that there is merit in considering 
a "global ' approach at the outset because most value 
added is gained from a manager switching between 
markets, rather than from a manager seeking to 
outperform an index in one specific market".
Size of Vontov Business
The Vontov Group had over US $16.7 billion of assets under 
management and had been advising its clients on the allo­
cation of assets internationally.
Market Coverage and Scanning Abilities
Vontov representative said:
"Vontov develops its existing presence and information 
base in the world's major markets (the United States 
and Japan) and maintains its comprehensive coverage of 
the U.K., continental European markets and Hongkong. In 
each of these Vontov has an investment management 
operation. In addition a representative office has 
recently been set up in South Korea. Another office 
was scheduled to be established in Australia in early 
1987".
Staff Stability
"The company maintains a working environment which 
ensures continuity of staff. Vontov group has an 
exceptional record in this respect and this has been 
critical in building the excellent relationships Vontov 
enjoys with their professional clients. The group is 
also committed to developing further its international 
staff base,with a diverse pool of talent from different 
nationalities contributing to investment policy".
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Information Access
"Vontov Maintained a full macro-economic and portfolio 
research capability based upon:
a) input from the overseas operations mentioned 
above;
b) competent full time in-house economists;
c) a quantitative research unit developing and 
proving new techniques for investment opportunity 
identification, analyzing risk and protecting 
portfolios.
The combination of the above ensured a diverse and 
consistent input of macro-economic research, together 
with sector and company analysis, to contribute to 
effective performance".
Experience
"Vontov had a long experience of investing worldwide. 
Vontov Investment Management Limited (VIM), which 
assumed all the investment management activities of 
Vontov & Co., Ltd. in early 1976, is responsible for 
the management of international equity portfolios and 
for coordinating the specialist expertise in the group 
in various markets".
Branches
"The full investment process i.e.dealing, administrating 
and reporting of a global portfolio is conducted out of 
London. In the management of the Far East segment of 
portfolio, VIM would want to involve as closely as 
possible the London office of the company's Far Eastern 
specialist fund managers, Vontov international 
Investment Management Limited (VIIM). VIIM would be 
responsible to VIM for the performance for that segment 
of the portfolio and would be remunerated by VIM".
Custody Services
"The registration, nominee and safe custody services of 
Vontov Brothers & Co., Limited (the banking arm of the 
Vontov group) are available if this is permitted and 
desired".
General Investment Philosophy
"VIM's investment aim is to achieve consistent above 
average performance in the expectation that this will 
translate to top quartile performance over the medium 
to long-term without incurring excessive risk in
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attaining short-term performance. The virtue of this 
approach has been demonstrated in the performance of 
existing clients.
This philosophy applied to VIM's Global Investment 
Management requires a decision making process which 
combines macro-economic •top down1 assessment of 
markets together with a micro-economic assessment of 
sector and company potential. It requires an active 
approach to determining and comparing value (and 
assessment of the time horizon within which value will 
be recognized), and decisive moves to secure perceived 
benefits.
VIM's style is therefore to take positive decisions in 
terms of asset allocation geographically and by sector. 
Vontov believes strategy applied to markets affects 
turnover. Investment managers who seek to outperform 
increasingly rotational markets by anticipating short 
term sector and company preferences have a relatively 
high turnover; those managers who by temperament and 
philosophy are disinclined to follow the rotational 
aspects of markets and who invest on the basis of 
fundamental analysis, will have a lower turnover.
Vontov1s basic philosophy places them in the second 
category but rotational characteristics have in recent 
years made acceptance of a high level of turnover 
essential to performance in some markets such as Japan 
where interest - and performance - tend to be 
concentrated. The greater part of our overall turnover 
has, however, continued to result from changes of 
investment strategy -i.e., between rather than within 
markets.
A feature of Vontov investment management, which has 
led to superior performance in the past, is the lower 
emphasis placed on investment in the U.S. This remains 
our current stance, although there has recently been 
some increase of the U.S.A. at the expense of Japan. 
Vontov have been consistent in giving higher emphasis 
than many competing managers to Europe over the past 
three years".
Investment Style
"Vontov approach to risk can perhaps be illustrated by 
the long-term minimum/maximum ranges they would 
consider appropriate for an international portfolio. 
In terms of sector and stock selection, they would be 
driven by stock selection. with consequent sector 




"The structure of the portfolio in terms of weighting 
and number of stocks held will vary from market to 
market and portfolio manager to manager. The overall 
number of stocks in the portfolio is unlikely to exceed 
80 stocks in normal circumstances".
Use of Quantitative Techniques in Assessing Risk
"Periodically, the position of international portfolios 
is reviewed and adopted by the use of optimization 
technigues. In these exercises, an efficient frontier 
is drawn up for portfolios on the basis of six monthly 
forecasts of returns and volatility of returns. Five 
geographical allocations for portfolios are arrived at, 
varying from a risk averse allocation up to maximum 
return allocation, with risk being defined in absolute 
terms. If necessary, the position of the portfolio is 
changed to reflect the appropriate risk profile".
Decision Making Structure
"A Director of VIM is responsible for global portfolios. 
He sits on the International Investment Management 
Committee, which meets monthly, and, in addition to 
contributing to strategy, is responsible for
i) coordinating the equity specialists within VIM 
with those elsewhere in the Vontov investment 
group;
ii) monitoring the implementation of asset 
allocation decisions.
Hi) monitoring liquidity levels.
He is to be assisted in the management of a portfolio 
by a group of equity specialists, who also sit on the 
Committee and include a representative from their 
office".
Investment Decision Making Powers Required by Vontov
"Vontov is comfortable with wide investment powers, in 
that they have found that their best performance has 
been achieved when they have been given wide 
discretion. This of course requires confidence that VIM 
will not abuse this discretion and, in pursuit of 
short-term performance. accepts levels of risk, which 
are not consistent with the philosophical approach out­
lined to Mosnic".
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As part of their discretion, managers would welcome a 
facility to cover or hedge:
i ) Currency exposure; 
ii) Stocks;
by use of futures and options as available.
It might however, be unacceptable. and unwise, to 
permit the "crearincr' of a portfolio by taking out 
uncovered open positions without the client's specific 
prior consent".
Measurement of Performance
"In Vontov, they believe comparison with domestic 
benchmarks of performance measurement although of 
critical interest to investors, is insignificant to 
measure global performance achievement. Investment 
performance statistics to demonstrate their competence 
in the U.S., U.K., and Europe and Far Eastern markets 
are available to clients if required".
Fees
"The inclusive investment management fee which they 
would charge for the management of a US $30 million 
global portfolio would be 0.7% on the first US $10 
million, 0.5% on the next $15 million, and 0.375% 
thereafter. VIM would earn no further remuneration 
from the management of the portfolio. The above fee 
scale would include all incidental expenses, and travel 
and accommodation expenses in connection with reporting 
visit and a less formal interim visits as required by 
Mosnic".
Readiness for Cooperation
"Vontov belief is that a successful ongoing relationship 
with any client can only be fostered by a full under­
standing of the client’s requirements by them and of 
their philosophy and strategy by the client.In addition 
to full quarterly reviews, two meetings per annum is 
normally desirable. In addition Vontov would welcome 
the opportunity of receiving the Controller in London 
or in Geneva, in order that investment philosophy and 
process can be more readily appreciated and the control 
and capability of their organization demonstrated".
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Size of Individual Global Equity Portfolios
"Global equity portfolios managed by VIM are divided 
into two categories:
Largest Size Average 
No. of Funds of Global of Global 
Funds Under Mat Portfolio Portfolio 
$M $M $M
i) International
Equity Element 46 860 114 18.6
Funds.
ii) Global Equity
Portfolio Managed 5 105 40 21
for Institutional 
Customers.
International customers include Middle Eastern high 
value investors."
The Management of Currency Risk
"Vontov managers aim to avoid currency risks. Currency 
positions are always hedged, by one of two methods. 
The foreign exchange hedge or swap is less frequently 
used. This method involves the purchase of a particular 
currency by selling dollars. At the same time a 
commensurate sale of that currency position is fixed at 
an agreed exchange rate on some predetermined date in 
the future".
Technological, Computer and reporting support system
"Vontov portfolio managers have two important technical 
aids. The Computer Management Support System enhances 
investment decisions. The Computer Reporting System 
allows the availability of a continually updated, 
accurate picture of each client's positions. By means 
of this system comprehensive month end reports are 
produced for clients detailing not only the value of 
current holdings but also a summary of all transactions 
carried out for their account during the period".
The system had been developed and continually enhanced
by Vontov since the late 1987. The system incorporated an
evaluation system for the whole gambit of instruments. The
system also tracks, on a daily basis, 3,000 equity related
instruments and the underlying stocks, representing the
largest markets.
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At the beginning of each month, Vontov promised 
Mosnic to prepare a detailed valuation of the portfolio. 
The valuation would have a number of features, which would 
enable Mosnic to have a clear picture of the current 
position of its portfolio. The valuation package would 
also contain an extensive breakdown of the portfolio. All 
current holdings would be detailed, including the size of 
the holdings, the cost price and the market value. Each 
holding would also be valued as a percentage of the 
overall portfolio. The cash balance as well as the cash 
statement would give the full cash element of the 
portfolio.
The valuation also would include details of all 
holdings which would be bought or sold within the period 
which might not yet be settled. A list of all the 
transactions performed during the period would be part of 
the reporting product.
Finally the portfolio's performance record would be 
laid out for Mosnic so that it could appraise the current 
state of the portfolio.
2. THE RESULT OF EVALUATING VONTOV AS A 
POTENTIAL AGENT
Having gone through the process of studying Vontov's 
strategy, structure and processes, the Controller became 
more convinced that there could hardly be a universal 
truth about agents' means and methods. The satisfaction of 
the principals with the agent means and methods 
specifically depended on what the agent would be used for.
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The Controller was satisfied with the means and methods of 
Vontov which were different from those of MIP and BJ-S. 
The analysis of the case studies in the next chapter will 
disclose these differences.
THE METHODS
(i) THE GLOBAL EQUITY PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
CAPABILITIES:
Vontov was found unique in its belief that there 
could be merit in considering a 'global1 approach to 
equity portfolio management at the outset because most 
value added would be gained from a manager switching 
between markets rather than from a manager seeking to out­
perform an index in one specific market. For globalization 
of equity investment, Vontov demonstrated superb
infrastructure.
(ii) INVESTMENT APPROACH 
Vontovfs philosophy of achieving consistent average 
performance in the expectation that this would translate 
to top performance over the medium to long-term without 
incurring excessive risk in attaining short-term 
performance, was a good sign to Mosnic.
(iii) RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE 
The study of Vontov's strategy, structure and 
processes indicated that it (Vontov) could apply 
sophisticated security analysis techniques to select the 
stocks. In addition, Vontov promised to be flexible in 
understanding the objectives of the stakeholders to assess
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risk as might be necessary and required by the principals. 
In fact, Vontov demonstrated high concern about 
personalization of its services.
THE MEANS
STAFF:
Vontov succeeded to maintain a working environment 
which ensured the continuity of its professional
personnel. The number was adequate. The staff specialism
and experience was satisfactory.
DECISION MAKING STRUCTURE
The team formed of the director and the equity 
specialist was found qualified. The team structure was
made in a way that the quality of the decision would be
cross-checked.
TECHNICAL, COMPUTER MANAGEMENT SUPPORT,
AND THE REPORTING SYSTEM
The following were provided to Mosnic by Vontov 
bank's technological, computer and reporting support
system:
(i) Month end reporting with details of the current 
holding's value and also a summary of all
transactions carried out for Mosnic's account 
during the month.
(ii) Vontov system tracked on a daily basis, 3000
equity related instruments and the underlying
stocks, representing the largest markets.
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(iii) The month end portfolio valuation report 
demonstrated by Vontov was comprehensive. It 
reported interest separately.
The Controller was then authorized to agree with 
Vontov on managing a purely equity global portfolio. 
However, the following conditions were suggested by the 
Director to be observed by the Controller. First, Vontov 
would take profit on any equity which might appreciate to 
the level of 10% above its cost. Vontov objected to the 
practicability of such a policy, but promised to try it. 
Second, the Controller would closely monitor Vontov to 
ensure the application of the above policy. Vontov*s 
reservation about the policy was that if a sale was made 
at 10% profit or more, there would be no option but to buy 
over-valued shares or to keep the realized proceeds in 
interest-bearing account which would mean violation of the 
Islamic precepts. Vontov also argued that if one had to 
sell in a rallying market, opportunities might be lost if 
profit taking time was earlier than it should be. 
Moreover, if one had to wait for market decline to buy 
again, one would never know how much would be the loss in 
the time value of the funds. In addition, Vontov argued 
that, whatever would be earned as interest income,would be 
a lost income for Mosnic because of the Islamic belief of 
the stakeholders and their guidelines to Vontov. Indeed, 
these points made by Vontov were very valid. The reader 
may wonder: So why did Mosnic persist with the 'sell at
10% up strategy1? In fact, the Controller and the Director
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thought this strategy would increase the turnover (the 
number of times shares were to be bought and sold) . So 
Mosnic would realize little gains in a number of 
transactions without setting a conservative standard ROI 
to be produced and consequently losing opportunities. The 
argument of Vontov was that the velocity of turnover of 
shares was not as fast as Mosnic imagined and the 
transaction cost was under estimated.
(3) THE POST-INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP 
WITH VONTOV
The invasion of Kuwait left the global investors in 
panic. The markets were volatile and were extremely 
panicky. On 5/8/90 the Mosnic stakeholders decided to quit 
the stock markets completely and to remain 100% liquid. 
Just before the Gulf crisis, all shares in Mosnic 
portfolio managed by Vontov were appreciating by more than 
10% as a semi-annual ROI.
Vontov was not active in taking the profits. Vontov 
seemed to favour a bottom line performance evaluation 
approach. Its representative has always pointed out that 
Mosnic should not panic at the decline of the investment 
value during crises. The representative repeatedly made 
arguments that profit-taking policy could release Vontov 
from claiming its full responsibility for performance. He 
also argued that such a policy might not be practical. 
Indeed, Vontov was reluctant and unsatisfied with this 
guideline. It thought the market would rally further.
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When Kuwait was invaded, the Controller contacted 
Vontov to examine the situation in the portfolio following 
the unpleasant news about the stock markets. He received 
the following information on performance from Vontov.
PERFORMANCE:
o For the third quarter of 1990, the Mosnic account 
declined by 18.2% in dollar terms. This was in 
line with the World Index.
o For the year to date, the account portfolio has 
fallen by 16.5% versus a 24.3% decline in the 
World Index.
The Controller and the director expressed their worry 
about this poor performance and asked Vontov to explain 
the reasons and what should be done to rectify the 
critical situation. Vontov responded asserting the 
following points:
MARKET MOVEMENTS:
o All equity markets registered a decline in the 
third quarter.
o Japan, Germany, Spain and Sweden all fell by 
greater than 25% in local currency terms.
o The dollar was generally weak against all
currencies.
ASSET ALLOCATION:
o The third quarter equity profile favoured markets 
with generally higher earnings growth. A fully 
liquid position will be adopted.
COUNTRY IMPACT:
o Over the third quarter most emphasis was placed on 
the larger European markets with the exception of 
Germany.
o Japan remained underweight.
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The Controller then asked Vontov to disclose more 
information about market movements. Vontov replied as 
follows:
INVESTMENT COMMENTARY:
o There could be near-term uncertainties stemming 
from weakening economies and events in the Middle 
East.
o The longer term fundamental outlook could be 
favourable.
o During the third quarter of 1990, Mosnic account 
declined by 18.2% in dollar terms which matched 
the Index over the period.
o For the year to date, the portfolio had fallen by 
16.5% versus a 24.3% decline in the World Index.
MARKET MOVEMENTS:
o The EAFE index fell by 21% during the third 
quarter, with most of its constituents declining 
by 15-25%.
o The U.K., Netherlands and Australia were 
relatively good performers, falling by 10% or less 
(U.S. was down 14%) as their energy resources 
apparently afforded some downside protection 
against the unsettled backdrop in the Persian 
Gulf.
o Most currencies strengthened by 3-5% versus the 
U.S. Dollar partially cushioning even larger 
index declines measured in local currencies.
o The widely publicized plunge in Japanese share 
prices in the quarter is notable principally 
because it follows the large declines seen earlier 
in the year, and not because of any uniqueness 
over the last three months when half a dozen other 




The Controller asked Vontov to advise him what it 




o The near term aim is to generate full liquidity in 
the account in order to protect against current 
uncertainties and equity markets' volatility.
o Longer term, it is clear that, on a valuation 
basis, significant opportunities will be presented 
in many equity markets.
Vontov Commented on country impact by stating:
OVERWEIGHT POSITIONS:
o The largest overweight position was in France with 
an impact of 8% versus the Index. Singapore, Nor­
way, Denmark, and the U.K. were also overweight.
UNDERWEIGHT POSITIONS:
o Japan continued as the largest negative bet 
throughout the period.
IMPACT CHANGES:
o The major changes in emphasis reflected a greater 
exposure to France. The sharp reduction in
exposure to the U.S. was as a result of the 
decision to enhance liquidity.
The Controller asked for more reflection on the
future outlook. The following was part of Vontov's
commentary in response to the Controller's request:-
Vontov continue to believe that the world financial
markets will produce very good returns over the interme­
diate to longer term.In fact, the recent pronounced weak­
ness in securities prices undoubtedly provides a window of 
opportunity for investors with two year time horizon.
These investors can think of a rewarding bottom line ROI.
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The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a major surprise 
and did much damage to asset values (especially equity 
values which were very fully priced at the beginning of 
the third quarter). This "problem" will subside in 
importance as time passes, and market attention will focus 
once again on the enduring economic factors which 
ultimately determine asset values. The precise manner in 
which the "problem" is resolved is impossible to predict, 
so we have chosen not to repeat the various possible 
scenarios in this report. For what it is worth, we hope 
and expect soon to see quick action sufficient to push
this issue off the front pages of newspapers worldwide.
The most significant economic effect of the Iraqi 
surprise has been to increase the price of oil to a newly 
sustainable level of perhaps $25 per barrel.lt also pushed 
up interest rates, the price of gold, and military 
spending expectations, and these developments collectively 
should serve to push the impending peak in OECD inflation 
upward by perhaps one half of one percent versus our 
previous forecast and to push the valley in economic 
growth downward by a somewhat smaller amount. In other 
words, it should on balance produce a rather unimportant 
negative slip in economic terms.
Therefore, we have only marginally adjusted our OECD 
economic outlook to call for a somewhat "firm" rather than 
a soft landing. In most of the "Iraqi blip" already has 
been seen, the inflationary threat already appears to be
receding and economic policies have begun to east in 
Australia, the UK and the U.S. where they had been 
tightened earliest, beginning two years ago.
We remain fully invested in accounts with somewhat
longer time horizons, and in those with clearly-defined 
and fully invested benchmarks. While share prices could 
move lower on further bad news, the declines seen in the 
third quarter largely corrected the overly full valuations 
widely seen at the end of June.
Economic Outlook:
The OECD economic outlook continues to be relatively 
healthy and well-controlled. Growth is slowing as desired 
especially in the Anglo-Saxon economies, and inflationary 
pressures and fears are receding (with the notable 
exception of the uncertain prospect for oil). Earlier 
fears of strong consumption pressure from East Germany or 
Eastern Europe in general, and speculation about possible 
re-acceleration in demand growth in the U.S., U.K. and 
other countries have proven to be very wide of the mark. 
Monetary policies already have begun to ease in some 
countries and are likely to be relaxed in most others over 
the next two■to three quarters.
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We continue to expect slowing economic growth in the 
main economies and for the OECD as a whole. Most of these 
forecasts have been revised downward somewhat since June, 
especially for the U.S. and the U.K.
Market Outlook:
Share prices today represent much better value than 
they did three months ago. The large impact of the Iraq 
Shock on share prices worldwide has more than discounted 
the rather modest impact this development will have on 
inflation, economic growth, and interest rate levels.
In the very short-term, prices continue to be 
vulnerable to news from the Gulf and interest rate 
declines still appear to be a prerequisite to further 
advances in equity values, but we are inclined to look 
beyond any short-term "valley" in the expectation of 
rewarding gains just beyond.
As for currencies, Vontov now clearly favors the Yen 
which has begun to recover from a low level following a 
long period of under-performance versus its European 
counterparts. We are concerned about the U.S. dollar and 
currencies linked to it, is relatively low levels of U.S. 
interest rates, the short-term adverse effect on the U.S. 
trade deficit from higher oil prices, and continuing 
severe structural problems could push it significantly 
lower. With Sterling now a formal participant the EMS 
represents neutral ground between the Yen and the Dollar 
for the time being.
Opportunities among the main equity markets are less 
clear cut than they were three to six months ago, however, 
we continue to favour Continental European and Southern 
Asian shares. As a result of its dramatic fall this year, 
Japan now provides some interesting sectors and may be 
nearing a point where it would compare favourably overall. 
The U.S. and the U.K. are difficult to assess as they 
still face relatively severe economic conditions (with the 
related large, but unpredictable impact on corporate 
profits) and structural challenges (though the U.K. may 
have found new discipline within the EMS), while, on the 
other hand, they will take the lead in reducing interest 
rates. On balance we are prepared to increase U.K. 
holdings but still are reluctant on the U.S.
The Controller asked if there were any developments 
in the investment strategy.
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Vontov replied as follows:
"For the first time in almost one year, Vontov is making 
some notable changes in their strategy.
o Vontov continues to be fully invested in equities 
in the long-run.
o The Yen now is their currency of choice for 
holding cash and they may hedge into Yen from time 
to time. They are underweighting the Dollar.
o They maintain their European emphasis (in EAFE or
Global Accounts with active asset allocation 
mandates), increasing the U.K.. somewhat. The 
timing of a further increase in Japanese holdings 
is an active discussion.
o They are less inclined than three months ago to
increase the U.S. holdings, and would only do so
while hedging out of the Dollar.
o They continue to heavily emphasize value, both
relative and absolute, in selecting individual
issues."
The Vontov performance was not satisfactory. The loss 
was huge. The Investment Policies Committee met to discuss 
the situation of Vontov. Some argued that we should take 
the loss and move out from Vontov. Others called for 
waiting for a second rally in the markets to make-up the 
loss. Another opinion was to move the securities as they 
were to another agent to handle them. But underlying all 
this was a change in the investment approach followed by 
Vontov which the Controller was asked to investigate.
4. AGENT DE-SELECTION: A COMPLICATED PROCESS
The drastic decline in the portfolio performance 
following the Gulf crisis was not the only problem with 
Vontov. Indeed those losses were symptomatic of other 
concerns arising in Mosnic. Compared to the other 
portfolio managers serving Mosnic, the post-investment
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relationships with Vontov were different for the following 
reasons. First, Vontov as a firm ended its joint venture 
with its American Partner. This change was significant to 
the ownership structure and to a number of processes in 
Vontov. Second, Vontov considered a merger with another 
firm. This meant to the Controller a change in investment 
approach. Indeed, Vontov effected a fundamental change in 
its investment approach (philosophy) which had been a 
major attribute for Vontov's selection to be an agent for 
Mosnic. Third, the split in Vontov led to basic shifting 
in the key professional personnel attached to Mosnic 
portfolio managed by Vontov.
CHANGE OF VONTOV STRUCTURE
During the Gulf Crisis, and while Mosnic management 
was working hard to manage this new upheaval, Vontov sent 
the following notice to the Controller.
"Vontov plans to purchase the 49% of its stake currently 
owned by ML-Bank. The closing of the purchase is 
scheduled for August 30, 1990. Under the act and in 
accordance with the terms of your asset management 
contract with Vontov, the purchase of this interest is 
deemed.to constitute an assignment of your contract with 
the New Von which assignment require your consent. This 
letter seeks your consent."
Actually this information about the change of Vontov 
ownership structure led the Controller to raise a number 
of inquiries which were addressed by the Controller to the 
Director of Mosnic (the head of investment policy 
committee). These were:
1. How would the split in Vontov lead to changes in 
its organization for investment decision making ?
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2. How would the split in Vontov impact its
investment approach ? i.e., the style, the type of 
assets to be selected, risk taking attitude ?
3. Would this new situation lead to shift in the key 
portfolio management personnel ? If so, how long 
time will it take from the Controller to get
familiarized with the new key strategists,
/
economists, portfolio managers etc, who might have 
access to Mosnic's portfolio with Vontov ?
4. If the new key portfolio managers looking after 
Mosnic account have new views of shifting the 
current structure of the portfolio, is such shift 
in Vontov's general investment model affecting 
Mosnic's portfolio ? and at what cost ?
5. Given the new change in Vontov's ownership
structure, how different would it be from the 
other agents in terms of performance measurement 
system ? and would this difference, if any, need 
from the Controller designing new monitoring 
system ?
6. Considering the structural changes in Vontov, if 
any, how would that impact its methods, processes 
and investment strategy ?
7. To Mosnic's Controller, what should be the further 
measures to cope with the subsequent shifting in
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the strategy, structure and the processes of the 
accountable unit?
The director fully agreed with the Controller that 
there were fundamental changes in Vontov's means and 
methods and the Controller had to move quickly to gather 
information to decide whether Vontov could still satisfy 
the criteria set by Mosnic for agents selection or not.
Thus, the Controller started the process of working 
with the New Von (the new institution emerging from the 
merger) to clear all the above inquiries. In response to 
his oral inquiries, Von sent the following short message 
in a attempt to justify the new move.
"After more than ten years of co-operation, the Vontov 
global investment operations have matured to the point 
where the joint ownership no longer is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of both companies. Thus, Von has 
purchased Tov's shareholding in the joint venture.
The staff and products of Von will be positively 
reviewed, and as far as clients are concerned, it is 
"business as usual" but with an even greater ability to 
match resources to client needs. New products will be 
offered."
This short message from Von increased the worries of 
the Controller about what Von meant by "staff and products
will be positively reviewed .........  New products will
be offered".
The worry of the Controller arose from what could be 
the implications of these new changes to the investment 
strategy and the processes of Von.Moreover,the Controller 
needed to know about the impact of Von structural changes 
on its risk management style.
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VONTOV CONSIDERING A NEW MERGER
While still striving to know more about the split of 
Vontov joint venture, the Controller received news that 
the New Von was contemplating entering into a merger with 
another firm. Naturally, the Controller became keen to 
know about the impact of the new merger on Von strategy, 
structure and processes. The focal point in the search of 
the Controller was to find out how the new changes of 
structure would impact the strategy and the risk 
management processes of the New Von. Knowing about these 
differences was fundamental to the Controller to determine 
what type of changes in the corporate management control 
system could be necessary to match with the new situation.
CHANGE OF THE INVESTMENT APPROACH
Indeed, the structural changes in Vontov which 
followed the split resulted in a fundamental shift in its 
investment style, type of asset selection, strategy etc. 
These changes even made Vontov different in a lot of 
attributes from MIP, BJ-S (and from other portfolios 
managers used by Mosnic but not studied in this research). 
Compared to the other agents, the above-mentioned 
differences could be clearly seen in the following 
presentation made by the new Von to convince the 




"The new Von continues to maintain its balanced strategy 
for investors, emphasizing the importance of quality 
during this difficult period. As a result of the 
uncertainties in the Gulf we have retained levels of 
liquidity higher than normal but as can happen in 
turbulent markets, unusual opportunities have surfaced in 
selective investments. We expect a firmer market trend for 
equities overall. Our recommended global asset 
distribution for a balanced investment account for the 










R E A S O N
A redeployment of high cash 
positions by investors will
sustain both equity markets.
Rates of return, adjusted for 
volatility, will be better for 
equity investors than cash 
returns as equity markets rally 
in anticipation of monetary 
monetary easing. A firmer bond 
market will add to a better 
market trend.
MORGAN
NEW VON CAPITAL INT'L.
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FRANCE 5 5 3.6
HOLLAND 3 4 1.8
ITALY 2 1.7
SPAIN - 2 1.1
SWITZERLAND 4 4 2.1
SCANDINAVIA 1 1 1.5
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profit growth 
is deteriora­









Event Risk The outbreak of war in the Gulf really
represents the widening of a conflict that 
began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
The initial reaction of the markets to the 
intervention of the United Nations forces 
has been positive; a powerful rally in 
stocks and bonds suggests that markets 
expect a short war and a short recession. 
While we sincerely hope that the market*s 
optimism is justified, the balance of risk 
has clearly altered, such that disappoint­
ment either as a result of longer cyclical 
downturn or a wider and more protracted 
war may well reverse some of the market *s 
recent gains. Such an investment environ­
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ment is one which favors our philosophical 
preference for selective concentration of 
investment in quality stocks and the 
safety of government treasury bills.
Growth The defining feature of the present
economic situation has been the increasing 
divergence between the economic prospects 
of the U.S. and other Anglo Saxon
countries and Germany and Japan. In the 
U.S. the slowdown is marked by the efforts 
of all sectors-consumers, corporations,
and public-sector-to rebuild balance 
sheets in the wake of the credit binge of 
the 1980's. While the first signs of a 
slowdown are emerging in Germany and 
Japan, the central banks of both countries 
remain sufficiently concerned about latent 
inflationary pressures to remain quite
Inflation restrictive relative to the U.S. Thus
putting increasing pressure on the 
economies of other European countries tied 
to German policy through the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism.
Interest Rates The last time the U.S. experienced a
similar credit deflation, the Federal 
Reserve and Treasury responded by 
abandoning any target for the U.S. Dollar 
and lowered interest rates dramatically. 
We think that the Federal Reserve will 
respond to the present situation with a 
rapid reduction in the Federal Funds rate 
over the next two quarters. This should 
have a significant positive effect on 
financial assets in general, and on bond 
markets in particular, not only in the 
U.S., but also in Europe and Japan.
Currencies These moves will also impact the currency
markets, with the initial response being a 
further decline in the U.S. Dollar. The 
chances are very good, however, that the 
U.S.currency will turn sometime this year, 
as the perception grows that interest 
rates elsewhere, especially in Japan and 
Germany, will also decline.
INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY
11 Von believes in producing long-term returns that are 
in excess of the rate of inflation and of the rates 
available from holding cash through investment in global 
equity and fixed income markets.
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The selection of an appropriate asset mix is of prime 
importance in achieving this objective, and regular asset 
allocation meetings are held to review the performance of, 
and outlook for, the major equity and fixed income markets 
of the world, as well as for the major currencies.
Both in equity and fixed income investment, quality 
is the prime consideration. For equities, this means 
investment in companies with above average internal growth 
rates and good dividend growth prospects. Emphasis is 
placed on companies with a proven management record and 
which are likely to remain competitive because of the 
excellence of their product profiles whether they are 
engaged in manufacturing or service industries. In fixed 
income markets, investment is restricted to high quality 
government paper where there is no risk of default.
Because Von believes in the long-term outperformance 
of equities, portfolios are to be 50% fully invested in 
equities. Although on occasions an amount of cash may be 
held for tactical reasons determined by Von.”
It became obvious to the Controller that the strategy 
and the structure of Von had started to make differences 
in the investment processes of Vontov as will be explained 
later in this chapter. Indeed, the Controller could not 
be provided with adequate information to evaluate the 
impact of the new structure on the internal control system 
operated by the New Von to safeguard Mosnic assets.
Having gathered information about the new investment 
strategy and approach of Von, the Principals became 
unhappy with the way Von planned to manage the portfolio 
by investing in some funds created by Von. Moreover, the 
Controller expressed to Von the principals* reservations 
on having 50% of the portfolio in equities and 30% in 
interest bearing cash deposits which meant both 
aggressiveness and usury. He also explained to Von other 
problems which Mosnic started to have with the new 
fiduciary relationship.
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The Controller discovered another problem. The New 
Von mentioned that it was in the process of developing new 
products and that it would have the discretion to invest 
part of Mosnic funds in these new products.
The Controller consulted the principals who expressed 
their concerns about these new changes. The Director 
reiterated that if the new Von did not meet the general 
criteria set by Mosnic and if the new structural changes 
were going to expose the portfolio to any risk, the 
Controller would have to advise urgently what measures he 
would take to protect the interest of the principals.
The Controller expressed to the representative of the 
New Von his reservations about the new products which were 
not part of the investment approach initially negotiated 
with Vontov. The Controller also asked the representative 
of the New Von to explain a number of aspects about the 
new products. These were:
1. What is the investment objective of each fund, and 
does each objective differ from the principals* 
objectives assigned to Vontov?
2. Which kind of asset mix was in each fund ?
3. Who of the portfolio managers known to Mosnic 
would be involved in these funds management ?
4. What would be the redemption period for each fund?
5. How much of Mosnic portfolio would be allocated to 
the new Von funds ?
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6. How would the investment in these funds impact 
Mosnic's frequency of access to its assets ?
7. How much would be the fee Mosnic would be charged?
8. What were Von's forecast for each fund ROI?
The representative of the New Von gave the following 
brief replies.
MUTUAL FUNDS MANAGED BY THE NEW VON 
FUNDING INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE ASSET MIX
1.To achieve capital growth by 
investing primarily in equi­
ties, bonds and money market 
instruments offered in the 
international financial 
markets.
2.To achieve capital growth by 
investing in equities in the 
USA, Europe, Japan and the 
Pacific Basin.
3.To provide long-term capital 
growth through investment in 
international bonds.
International Equities; 60% 
maximum. International Bond 
and money market instruments 
40%. A maximum of 60% of 
assets may be invested in 
non-U.S. currencies.
International Equities; 100% 
A maximum of 60% of total 
assets may be invested in 
non-U.S. denominated 
securities.
International Bonds; 100%. A 
maximum of 40% of the assets 
may be invested in non-USA 
currencies.
4.To achieve long-term capital 
growth through investments in 
cash and money market instru­
ments .
5.To achieve capital growth by 
investing primarily in money 
market instruments, fixed 
income bonds and equities in 
the USA, Europe, Japan and the 
Pacific Basin.
6.To achieve capital growth by 
investing primarily in shares 
of companies in the USA, 
Europe, Japan and the Pacific 
Basin. A minimum of 50% of the 
total portfolio will be inves­
ted in Islamic Trade Finance.
Money Market Instruments: 
100%. Approximately 50% of 
the assets may be invested 
in non-U.S. currencies.
Money Market Instruments: 
100%. Approximately 50% of 
the total portfolio. Inter­
national Bonds: a maximum of 
35% of assets may be invest­
ed in non-U.S. currencies.
Islamic Trade Finance: a 
minimum of 50%. Equities: a 
maximum of 50% of total 
portfolio. Commodities: a 
maximum of 10% in precious 
metals. A maximum of 30% of 
assets may be invested in 
non-U.S. currencies.
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VONTOV1 S DIFFERENCES FROM MIP AND BJ-S
In a number of aspects Vontov was different from MIP 
and BJ-S. For example, the ownership structure in Vontov 
was different. Most of the portfolio managers in Vontov 
were specialized in equities. The investment approach in 
Vontov was different from the approach of the other 
agents. After the split, the difference in the investment 
approach became wider. Moreover, the shift in the 
investment approach led to major differences between 
Mosnic*s objectives and those spelled out by the approach 
of the New Von. Indeed, the New Von became different from 
the other agents in aspect such as, assets allocation, 
choice of stocks and the products to be managed. Vontov 
had been different from the other agents even in the way 
it selected the equities based on income, growth,companies 
etc. Vontov wanted to remain fully invested in growth 
stocks of small companies. The number of stocks in the 
portfolio was also an aspect of difference between Vontov 
and the other portfolio managers.
In terms of investment input (i.e., sources of 
information) , the New Von became more different from the 
other agents. In asset allocation policy the views of Von 
were different from the other agents in: (1) monetary
economic analysis, and (2) interest rate forecasts. In 
terms of security selection, Von had different views about 
the industry factors and the fundamentals of security.
After the split in Vontov, the Controller observed 
that the investment decision making in Vontov had changed.
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For example, the new portfolio managers were given more 
powers than before to select the securities with a general 
policy guideline. This was found to be different from the 
system followed in MIP and BJ-S where the investment 
policy committee used to approve comprehensive lists of 
securities.
On one occasion, the Controller tried to discuss with 
the new portfolio manager assigned by Von to Mosnic 
s account the cost impact of shifting the portfolio struc­
ture corresponding to the proposed change in Von strategy. 
The portfolio manager argued that in the long-run the new 
strategy would out-perform ROI expected for the current 
one.
The Controller discussed the question of parking 30% 
of Mosnic resources in interest generating cash accounts 
and stressed the concern of the principals with interest. 
The representative of the New Von mentioned that to the 
opinion of his institution and to his view the new model 
being proposed would achieve diversification of the 
portfolio in a way suitable for the prevailing market 
situation. In this respect, Von was different from MIP and 
BJ-S. Also these opinions of Von indicated differences 
from Mosnic objectives.
In measuring their investment performance, Vontov and 
the New Von had similarities and differences from the 
other agents. They were in agreement in the following:
(1) measurement of performance based on asset allocation
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at market value including the realized and the unrealized 
gains; and (2) accounting for the return on time weighted 
basis.
The major difference between the New Von and the rest 
of the agents was that the latter had more readiness to 
take into consideration the way the principals perceived 
risk in measuring risk and return. The new Von wanted to 
stick to its model irrespective of the views of the 
principals about:
(1) Von funds investment.
(2) Interest bearing investments.
(3) Over-exposure to equities.
The differences in strategy and processes were serious 
enough for the Controller and the Director of Mosnic to 
quit doing business with the New Von.
The views of Von about comparing investment performance
were different also. In this respect, the representative
of the New Von made the following statements.
"It is our view that the investors must not compare the 
portfolio we manage with other portfolios managed by 
others. We have our own philosophy of assets allocation 
and assets classification. By the assets classification 
we mean, for example, the convertible bonds are not to be 
included with equities
He further added that, "from what we have learned by 
going through your account background, your investment 
objectives, and your views about investment risk that in 
some times your objectives were fundamentally different 
from the objectives aimed at by the models set by Vontov.
There have been a great deal of compromise going on
between your objectives. We suggest you give us more 
freedom and to agree with us to judge on our performance 
after a loiiger period. We are comfortable with say 3-4
years. We know you care very much for timely
surveillance of what Vontov achieves compared to the
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other managers you may be dealing with. In doing this, 
some investors like comparing their portfolio to market 
indices. It is our view that: (1) you can not use one 
index for all purposes. (2) Each index is made up of 
specific list of securities. These securities may be 
weighted in a specific way, and (3) The prevailing 
indices have problems and shortfalls."
In this particular aspect the Controller asked for more 
explanation. Von representative replied:
" Standard and Poor's 500 policy is to measure the
pattern of common stock movements; for this purpose 500
large companies are used; the list is timely revised for 
change by a body in S & P*. Standard and Poor's 400 deals 
with the measurement of industrial stocks; in all other
respects it is similar to S & P 500. Dow Jones 
industrials deals with measuring movements of industrial 
companies. This includes 30 large industrials.It does not 
change so frequently. In cases of merger or acquisitions 
for example changes are made."
THE DECISION OF TERMINATING THE RELATIONSHIP
WITH VONTOV
Mosnic arrived at the conclusion that the strategy, 
structure and processes of Vontov had changed to levels 
which were inconsistent with Mosnic investment objectives. 
Moreover, compared to the performance of equities assigned 
to the other portfolio managers, the results reported by 
Vontov during the Gulf Crisis indicated imprudence in the 
selection of securities. Moreover, the risk management 
style of the New Von showed fundamental differences from 
the investment risk perceived by the principals. Thus, it 
was decided to terminate the formal fiduciary relationship 
with Vontov. The formulation of the de-selection 
processes was not easy to take and required a close 
analysis of Vontov's change in investment style and 
policy. It involved the application of complicated 
" ' systems before the final judgement was made.
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SECTION 5-D
CONCLUSION TO CHAPTER-5 
EMERGING ISSUES FROM AGENTS SELECTION CASE STUDIES
The selection of the three agents is an integral part 
of the corporate investment decision. The three agents
were selected to operate as part of the portfolio of
agents maintained by Mosnic. The three case studies also
showed the maintenance of the portfolio of agents could be 
a cornerstone for allocating the resources of Mosnic.
Indeed, the pre-selection processes conducted by 
Mosnic revealed other processes which were significant for 
the formulation and later on the implementation of the 
strategic investment decision. These were complicated 
processes and the Controller found it difficult to follow 
a totally objective planning perspective to carry out 
these processes. Some of the important processes were:
(1) evaluation of the three agents' strategy, structure 
and processes; (2) introducing the principals' investment 
objectives, such as assets mix, currency allocation,
income and growth mix, the investment period etc. to the 
intended discretionary agents; (3) amending the investment 
models and the proposed investment strategies of the 
discretionary agents to make them compatible with risk 
taking attitude and hence the objectives of the 
stakeholders; and (4) determining the control needs of the 
specific agents to compensate for the manageable 
problems found in the intended agents' methods and means.
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In fact, these processes clearly projected the 
different functions and roles of the three agents in the 
principal's strategy formulation process. It was evident 
that each one of the three agents would participate in 
negotiating and forming the investment strategy which 
would be satisfactory for them to implement and which 
would accommodate the specific requirements of Mosnic's 
stakeholders. The Controller played a key role in 
orchestrating the interaction between the three agents and 
the principals.
The Controller had problems in determining the 
control procedures which would keep each agent under 
control. Indeed, the Controller found these problems a lot 
more difficult than what he had expected after studying 
the general control problems of the company [see chapter
(3) the case of Mosnic]. The Controller found the three 
agents different in methods and means. These differences 
were clearly impacting the manner by which each agent 
would analyze securities. This meant that the Controller 
would end-up with three agents managing three portfolios 
different in aspects like the geographical mix of the 
assets, the currencies mix, income/growth mix, industry 
mix, etc. In other words, at deeper levels of the 
investment decision, the three agents were expected to be 
extremely different. This actually made the Controller 
feel that, as he went deeper to understand the control 
processes for monitoring the discretionary portfolios, 
life was very complicated. Thus, the Controller thought it
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could be quite inappropriate to assume that there could be 
a universal truth for the three agents control 
requirements.
Another problem which beset the Controller in the 
three agents selection processes was that he could not 
arrive at rational (measure-based) criteria acceptable to 
the three agents > to set an ROI standard for portfolio 
performance appraisal. Indeed, the stakeholders would not 
even rely on a measure of ROI relative to the best (or 
average) achieved in the market. They thought their 
perception of the markets1 uncertainty was not well 
reflected by the rational economic and financial or 
security analysis carried out by the agents. Their 
capital preservation objective, their religious percepts, 
risks they assumed in their investment other than the 
marketable securities, their own experience with the 
financial markets, their own calculation of the 
transaction costs (including extensive tests required of 
new agents), their conception of realizing gains, their 
forecast of their future cash requirements in different 
currencies, were all factors about which agents would need 
additional information in order to analyze the 
characteristics of risk and uncertainty taken by the 
stakeholders. The Controller discovered that quantitative 
risk measurement techniques of return were considered 
simplistic and too theoretical by the stakeholders. The 
absolute measures which include standard deviation, 
variance,and mean absolute deviation which the agents used
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to measure portfolio rates of return in order to measure 
the volatility or risk of the portfolios were viewed as 
techniques perhaps useful to the agents, but not so useful 
for Mosnic*s principals and the satisfaction of their own 
objectives. For that, these statistical devices seemed of 
marginal significance.
In fact, using the standard deviation, the 
portfolio*s variability of returns was being measured by 
the intended agents in relation to the average return. In 
the beta analysis conducted by the agents, the portfolio*s 
covariance was measured in relation to the market place, 
but the principals considered Beta, which is a calculation 
that results from making an historic regression analysis, 
as inadequate for their purpose. In fact, relating two 
variables such as:
(1) rate of return on a stock or a portfolio; and
(2) the rate of return of the market,
was considered hardly applicable to the principals. They 
believed the markett portfolio risk classification into 
diversifiable or non-diversifiable risk was different from 
their conception of the risk involved in the fixed income 
instruments. This was also complicated by their beliefs 
whereby fixed income (interest) also involved religious 
risks. Moreover, they wanted a portfolio which would 
reflect the shift in their perception of future market 
place specific conditions which were regularly reviewed 
and revised. Therefore, they thought measurement of ROI 
and assessment of historic, long-term covariances could
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lead to rigid and simplistic decision-making besides being 
time and effort consuming. Rightly or wrongly the Mosnic 
stakeholders* conception of risk was fundamentally 
different from that implied by simply adjusting the
expected returns to reflect the portfolio beta. Risk was 
therefore to be continually re-assessed and managed and, 
if necessary, avoided - not calculated passively and
merely * compensated' for by expected return which might
not materialize anyway.
The Controller also went through a complicated 
process to make the three agents understand that the 
principals would often intervene with the agents to 
explain the process by which the investment objectives 
would shift in order to avoid currently perceived risks. 
At the same time, the Controller explained to the agents 
the process of holding them accountable for their 
performance despite the intervention of the principals 
because, after discussion and interaction, the agents were 
supposed to formulate portfolios to reflect the
principals* current desires. Of course, this fluid 
process of objective shifting and interaction made it more 
difficult to assess whether agents were at fault, but, in 
principle, they were still responsible for portfolio 
construction and revision.
ISSUES EMERGING FROM AGENT DE-SELECTION 
CASE STUDY
The de-selection of Vontov bank indicated that 
maintaining a balanced portfolio of agents prepared to
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interact with Mosnic was a key factor for appropriately 
allocating the resources of Mosnic. In other words, Mosnic 
de-selected Vontov to remain diversified over the least 
risky discretionary managers. However, Vontov could not be 
de-selected based on a risk-return performance measurement 
criterion alone. The Controller discovered that the 
process by which Mosnic terminated its relationship with 
Vontov was complicated and needed the consideration of a 
number of inter-connected factors before a final judgement 
was passed. The incompatibility of Vontov's decision 
processes with the shifting expectations of the principals 
was proved to be too complicated to be measured simply by 
applying rational ROI criteria. Although there had been a 
large loss at the time of the Gulf crisis, deeper 
inquiries were needed to see whether in Mosnic's view, 
Vontov's investment strategy had been imprudent and 
inconsistent with Mosnic's desires.
The cases also projected the fact that Mosnic had to 
depend on a mix of performance appraisal approaches to 
arrive at the conclusion that the fiduciary relationship 
with Vontov had become unmanageable. Hence, the Controller 
learned that the agents pre-selection processes had to 
involve designing a suitable mix of the procedures to 
evaluate the performance of the intended discretionary 
portfolio managers.
Furthermore, the emerging lessons from the pre­
investment case studies clearly show that life is also
complicated in the post-investment stage (i.e. after 
agreeing to work with specific agents). Therefore, it 
seemed necessary to conduct more detailed post-investment 
case studies to understand further the post-investment 
strategic control processes involved in monitoring the 
discretionary agents. These are presented in the next 
Chapter.
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CHAPTER - 6 
AGENTS MONITORING AND PORTFOLIO
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CASE STUDIES
Objectives and Outline of the Chapter
Performance evaluation of the discretionary portfolio 
managers was a major control issue in Mosnic. The effecti­
veness of Mosnic's control system depended to a great 
extent on evaluating the performance of the discretionary 
agents in the post-investment stage.
This chapter is concerned with post-investment case 
studies for two agents. Section 6-A deals with the post­
investment processes carried out by Mosnic to monitor MIP 
bank. While Section 6-B deals with BJ-S bank. The compari­
son between the two cases aims to project the differences 
in the decision and the control processes between the 
discretionary agents serving in the same portfolio of 
asset managers.
This chapter also describes Mosnic's processes of 
interaction with the two discretionary agents in the post­
investment stage. The description unfolds strategic 
control aspects and throws light on the responsibility 
accounting problems caused by the difficulty faced in 
setting standard financial elements for the agents (the 
accountable units). The post-investment case studies also 
describe strategy implementation, operation, and the 
tactical investment decisions.
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Section 5-C summarizes the major issues emerging from 
the post-investment case studies. In this section the 
Controller reflected (by comparatively looking into the 
two cases) on how the differences in the agent's means and 




THE CASE OF MONITORING MIP BANK
I. Post-Investment Control Process Overview.
It is impossible to describe in few pages all the 
iterative process which took place between MIP and Mosnic 
in the post-investment stage. Therefore, it seems logical 
once again to simplify the description by depicting such 
an iterative process in a diagrammatic framework. Fig. 
6.1 represents a framework developed by the Controller to 
project the independent variables which influenced the 
post-investment control processes and actions which took 
place for monitoring the performance of any agent. Both 
time and the state of financial markets were the key 
influencing variables as shown in Fig. 6.1 which also 
explains the shifting process of the key variables in the 
general conceptual framework of the research (Fig.4.1 in 
chapter 4).
The following is a brief description of Fig. 6.1.
THE KEY VARIABLES SHIFTING OVER TIME 
(Fig. 6.1)
(1) Time Factor.
The upper top block (1) in Fig. 6.1. represents the 
time factor subsequent to investing through MIP.
(2) Environment.
Block (2) represents the environment. Environment 
refers to the global financial markets, the Middle East
Fig. 6.1 









6) Corporate Records Keeping and 
Information System.
7) Portfolio of Agents (The Account­
able Units) Agent 1,2 ......... n
3) The Principal's Corporate Strategy 
Process and Goals.








i) Measurement of performance (ROI). 
ii) Comparison with benchmarks and 
with other agents, 
iii) Bottomline assessment of ROI. 
iv) Identifying reason for unsatis­
factory performance, 
v) Tactical re-allocation of assets, 
vi) Tightening the controls.
5) a. Post-investment: Design of Con 
trol System Specially for Agent






Islamic environment', and technology. As time passes, the 
financial markets change depending on a lot of external 
factors beyond the control of the investors and their 
agents. Over the history of Mosnic, information and 
communication technology has advanced. MIP as a new agent 
had an application of technology which could be different 
from the rest of the discretionary agents.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
(Fig. 6.1)
(3) Corporate Investment Strategy and Goal.
The financial strategy negotiated with MIP during the 
selection process was part of the corporate investment 
strategy pursued by Mosnic. The agreement on the financial 
strategy was not the end of the problem. As time passed, 
MIP and Mosnic negotiated a number of strategic matters. 
The selection of MIP as a discretionary agent involved 
formulating an important segment of the corporate strategy 
in complete coordination with MIP. The addition of MIP's 
investment strategy to Mosnic's portfolio of strategies 
made the Controller think about the necessary amendments 
of the strategic control system.
As time passed, the corporate investment strategy 
changed in response to two factors: (1) change of the
stakeholders' desires and, (2) change of agents' 
strategies.
One of the major controllership tasks in Mosnic was 
to monitor the strategy, structure and processes of MIP 
which were found in the selection (appraisal) stage. This
process (described in Chapter (5))ended up with evaluating 
the methods and the means of MIP. Any major change in MIP 
strategy, structure or process, was communicated by the 
Controller to the Stakeholders. Mosnic management would 
then consider with MIP the amendment of any unsatisfactory 
aspects in MIP's tasks, methods, and means to eliminate 
agents' weaknesses.
(4) Financial Strategy Agreed with MIP.
As time passed, the stakeholders, MIP, and the 
Controller showed high response to the volatile financial 
markets. The strategy initially negotiated with MIP did 
not remain static. Re-formulation of strategy was a key 
process to adjust the corporate strategy parallel to the 
change in the financial markets. The need for the re­
formulation was triggered by both the stakeholders' inter­
action with the markets and by the interim appraisal of 
the portfolio performance. The re-formulation of the 
strategy also reflected the shift (over time) in the 
Principal's objectives.
(5) Mosnic Control Svstem/Controllership.
The control system factor shown represents the post­
investment control processes carried out by Mosnic to 
evaluate the performance of MIP and to monitor the 
investment decision processes related to its strategy 
implementation. As time passed, the strategic control 
system changed to keep track of the impact left by change 
in the environment on MIP's strategy and processes.
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(6) The Principal's (Mosnic) Record Keeping 
and Information System.
Also, as time passed the environmental impact on the 
corporate goal setting led to a change of MIP's financial 
strategy which had to be met in terms of achieved 
objectives. Such a process led to changes in the corporate 
information system necessary for the strategic control 
procedures designed to monitor MIP's investment decision 
processes.
(7) Corporate Structure (Portfolio of Agents).
Once the asset management agreement was signed, MIP 
was considered a responsibility centre (a new accountable 
unit) within the structure of Mosnic. Moreover, as time 
passed, the control processes (Block 5), and strategy and 
goal setting (Block 3) were interacting and changing while 
taking on board the strategy agreed with the new agent. An 
addition of a new discretionary agent and the formaliza­
tion organizational relationship with the selected 
discretionary agent, meant a change in Mosnic's structure. 
Change of structure led to shift in the control processes.
II. Description of the Post-Investment 
Control Processes
Summary
The post-investment interaction with MIP was extremely 
frequent and a continuously circulating iterative process.
Signing the asset management agreement was the start 
of the formal and the informal fiduciary relationship 
between Mosnic and MIP. The process started by the Contro-
-262
H e r  trying to ensure that stakeholders' goals and 
guidelines already negotiated were maintained by MIP. The 
Controller started contacting MIP expressing the stakehol­
ders' readiness to discuss more realistic goals. He found 
a positive response from MIP.
Before any action was negotiated, MIP had to report 
on its recent performance as well as to comment on its 
future outlook, alternative strategy and any proposed 
investment objectives. On receipt of the reports, Mosnic 
expressed its worry about any declining performance. 
Indeed, the Controller was always approaching MIP to dis­
close any problems related to the portfolio performance. 
It was then argued by MIP that the negative performance 
could be good as it outperformed the market indices. 
Although Mosnic was concerned about the poor performance 
reported by MIP, it did not terminate the fiduciary
relationship for two considerations. First, markets in
general were not doing well. Second, it looked forward 
for improvement in MIP's performance in the long-run run. 
Mosnic expressed its worry about the low ROI and requested
MIP to propose how the latter thought a corrective
financial strategy could be formulated.
MIP proposed a re-structured portfolio which showed 
more conservative allocation of assets. Short-term
positions with fixed income were also suggested. From a 
religious stance, Mosnic did not feel comfortable with the 
fixed income short-term positions. Thus, MIP was requested
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to consider that special requirement of the stakeholders. 
MIP appreciated the request, but emphasized the technical 
difficulty of preserving it because of the domination of 
interest system in all the Western financial and economic 
systems. MIP promised to overcome this difficulty without 
guaranteeing the result of truly eliminating interest.
Amended objectives, revised strategy, new guidelines 
and adjusted asset mix policy were negotiated and 
approved. Thus, Mosnic started a new round of the 
fiduciary management process. Needless to say that the
negotiated financial strategy was not the last one. The 
market volatility continued. Mosnic and MIP negotiated new 
strategies, new objectives and alternative composition of 
the assets in the portfolio. The circle continued in an 
iterative process. Every time the following process was 
not typical to the one which preceded it, the Controller 
started to become less confident on the risk-return 
analysis models presented by the agents.
Detailed Description of MIP Monitoring Processes 
Amendment of the Financial Strategy
Soon after the inception of business, MIP reported an 
exceptional decline in the value of the portfolio. The 
financial markets were nervous and this led to instability 
in the investments performance. The principals found it 
necessary to take new measures to cope with the new market 
situation. The Controller, who was told to seek the 
opinion of MIP, sent the following advice:
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" We are unable to foresee how the market will behave. We 
feel we need to change the strategy by taking more 
defensive posture. Will you please reflect on:
a] Macro economic factors we have to account for in 
pianning. i.e., your outlook.
b] How does MIP judge the markets?
c] How does MIP see the future of the U.S. equities?" 
MIP replied
"A] Macro Factors.
On a global basis there seems to be little reason for, 
or desirability of, a slow-down or recession in 1988, 
perhaps not even in 1989.
Globally, inflation is not a problem, unemployment is 
excessive, and capacity remains ample. There are, 
however, several serious problems reflecting the uneven 
and unbalanced nature of the growth pattern to date.
The expansion imbalances appear to have reached a 
critical point. The U.S. consumer now must restore his 
savings at the expense of consumption (especially when 
compared with his Japanese or German counterpart).
We know that a critical point has been reached because 
the world's financial markets are telling us so. Dollar 
weakness threatens to put severe upward pressure on 
U.S. interest rates and perhaps U.S. inflation as well. 
Stock markets are still extremely nervous.
It seems that the world economic and financial system 
is in a period of maximum strain and high uncertainty. 
At best global economic expansion in aggregate seems 
likely to slow over the next several quarters, 
particularly in the U.S., Germany and other European 
economies. At worst, we may be about to enter a 
recessionary period or one of the very flat output.
B] Market Judgements.
Overall, it seems to us that 1988 (or most of it) may 
be a difficult year in which to generate attractive 
returns. There is an uncomfortably high possibility 
that security values could fall further in the 
atmosphere of uncertainty generated by volatile 
exchange rates, conflicting policy statements, and a 
U.S. presidential election campaign.
As a result we feel it is only prudent to take some
defensive steps. Though we seldom hold cash as a matter
of policy; there seems to be little opportunity cost to 
holding cash over the next few months. Bonds seem
attractive, especially since we would be willing to
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hold through short periods of higher interest rates. 
Equities almost certainly will remain volatile and 
selectivity by market and sector never has been more 
important.
C] Equity Strategy.
Our basic strategy is to use the next few months to re­
access the developing economy and to retain 
flexibility. In the first instance this involves 
holding some cash (and in the short-term, bonds) in 
order to be able to take advantage of possible market 
declines, a rare stance for MIP to adopt. In addition 
we are avoiding the US dollar, companies with great 
exposure to the US consumer, many European markets 
where growth is likely to be sluggish, and shares which 
rose to excessive valuations in the long bull market 
since 1982.
In the near term, the trend of US figures will be 
viewed by both investors and policy makers as a key 
test of whether the 're-balancing' process is already 
underway, or whether further moves in interest and 
exchange rates are necessary. Clarification of this 
issue is the major determinant of our strategy.
On a longer view, it seems clear that the case for 
international investment remains strong. There are 
distinct differences in country performances over the 
last twelve months and we are sure that there will be a 
similar range of opportunity over the next twelve 
months, reflecting the differing abilities or 
political, economic and corporate management around the 
world to react to the changing environment."
Problems in Change of Financial Strategy
The Controller conveyed to the IPC the feedback from 
MIP. It was evident that the financial strategy 
previously agreed with MIP was superseded by the markets 
volatilities. Again the Controller had to consider re­
formulating the strategy in consultation with MIP. 
Because it took a defensive strategic posture, it seemed 
that MIP had no choice but to park the funds in interest 
bearing money market instruments. This meant to the 
Controller further losses for Mosnic and violation of the
Islamic restrictions of the stakeholders.
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On the other hand, despite the depressed performance, 
Mosnic could not decide on the de-selection of MIP for the 
following reasons: (1) MIP performance was not worse than
the market indicators; (2) MIP did not promise to achieve 
a standard ROI target; (3) Mosnic hoped MIP would achieve 
a bottom line satisfactory performance in future; (4) 
Mosnic was reluctant to take the cost associated with de­
selecting MIP; (5) Mosnic did not have in mind a better 
replacement for MIP; and (6) MIP did not violate the 
stakeholders investment guidelines. In fact,its investment 
processes were appropriate and reflected high under­
standing of the principals' shifting objectives.
Unfortunately, the misfortune continued with MIP. 
During the first year of its relationship with Mosnic, the 
stock market crash occurred. In fact, MIP was a great 
loser during the stock markets break of October 1987. The 
dramatic decline in the value of the portfolio by nearly 
25 %, aroused the attention of all the stakeholders, but 
no one recommended to terminate the fiduciary relationship 
with MIP. They tried to deal with the situation without 
panic. However, MIP had to explain the problem and why it 
happened.
In spite of MIP's argument that 'crashes do not come 
everyday', the Mosnic investment committee met and 
requested from the Controller to work out with MIP steps 
to be taken in the post-crash era and to make sure that 
new strategies had been formulated. In response to the 
request of Mosnic Management, MIP reflected on the situa­
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tion and highlighted the macro and the micro factors 
impacting the formulation of the investment strategy for 
the post-crash era. MIP said:
" At MIP, we recently have become more optimistic 
regarding expected returns on equities, and as a result 
we are in the process of significantly restructuring 
your holdings. It is premature to be too cautious.
We had taken defensive action, raising cash and hedging 
back into the dollar, your base currency. In retrospect, 
these two steps followed and reinforced a third major 
move, the earlier decision to shift away from the 
"overvalued" Japanese equity market.
The recessionary environment we feared has not yet 
developed, and now seems unlikely to do so for sometime. 
Therefore, we see good opportunities to make money once 
again."
The Controller reiterated the stakeholders' high 
concern about the poor performance reflected by the 
negative ROI. MIP was asked to give more details and to be 
more specific as well as to propose new structure of the 
portfolio, the market outlook,and the strategy for equity. 
MIP mentioned to the Controller that it took a lot of 
strategic measures after the crash. It was clear that MIP 
had started becoming more conservative. The conservative 
strategy proposed by MIP involved fixed deposit investment 
which was considered by Mosnic as non-Islamic.
The feedback by MIP was detailed. The report emphasized 
the changes made in the previous strategy. It was clear 
that MIP aimed at convincing the Controller of the 
appropriateness of its investment decision processes 
irrespective of the depressed performance. MIP started by 
comparing the performance of Mosnic U.S. Dollar portfolio
(time-weighted for cash flow) with the World Index and the 
S & P 500. The report mentioned that during the first 
quarter of 1988, Mosnic portfolio declined by 11.85% 
compared with an 11.5% decrease in the World Index. MIP 
mentioned that their underweight position in Japan 
continued to be the major factor negatively impacting the 
portfolio's relative performance. It remained MIP's 
perception that the Tokyo market as a whole was distinctly 
overvalued.
MIP also mentioned that they added to the level of 
liquidity (meaning more interest) over the quarter, prima­
rily by reducing equity exposure. MIP also transferred 
Sterling exposure into the U.S. Dollar via the forward 
exchange markets. The report mentioned that their over­
weight positions in Hongkong and Spain benefitted from the 
strong performance of those markets.
STRUCTURE OF THE CHANGED PORTFOLIO
MIP outlined the changes made in and the structure of 
the portfolio at the end of the quarter. It commented on 
the outlook and policy over the next period. It pointed to 
the movement of the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
indices during the quarter divided between the large and 
smaller markets. The distribution of the portfolio assets 
by market or region was also shown. MIP mentioned in the 
report that the cash and bonds position increased over the 
quarter as a1 result of equity sales. The bond position 
accounts stood for 17.8% of the portfolio and was held
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main ly in U.S. Dollar bonds. This represented a switch 
from U.K. and DM bonds. Cash account formed 20.4% of the 
portfolio and was largely held in U.S. Dollars. The higher 
exposure to Japan at the end of the period largely reflec­
ted the superior relative performance of that market. In 
Europe, MIP reduced the U.K. and France whilst maintaining 
a significant exposure to Spain. The positions in
Switzerland and the Netherlands were increased. Canada and 
New Zealand were eliminated completely, whilst Australia 
was reduced.The exposure to Hongkong remained significant.
MIP explained the percentage points difference in
country weightings between the equity part of Mosnic 
portfolio and MSCI World Index. This helped to identify 
the areas in which MIP was making significant asset 
allocation 'bets' versus the passive index. The position 
at the end of December 1987 and June 1988 was compared. 
MIP commented that Japan continued to be a major negative
bet, although as stated earlier, the market's had
increased. Germany remained a negative bet. Canada was 
also a negative bet. The U.K., Hongkong, and Spain 
represented the major positive bets.
MIP displayed the significance of the major holdings 
in the portfolio at the end of the quarter. The following 
were emphasized: (1) Outside the U.S., the portfolio 
remained highly concentrated in individual holdings. (2) 
MIP's main Japanese holdings were in companies experien­
cing strong earnings growth -Tanabe in pharmaceuticals, 
Kyocera in semi-conductor materials,and Deichin in retail­
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ing. (3) In other Far Eastern markets, MIP had retained 
exposure to Hong Kong. (4) In the USA, MIP had adopted a 
quantitative approach to stock selection and portfolio 
construction which MIP believed had proven historical 
track record of superior performance.The result was that 
in this market, the portfolio was significantly more 
diversified than in prior periods. MIP believed this 
approach would be justified by greater value added over 
time.
The report was satisfactory to the Controller. 
Regardless of the low ROI (negative) , the Controller and 
the Director arrived to the conclusion that MIP's 
investment processes were appropriate for those market 
circumstances. Hence, they decided to give further support 
to MIP for improving the future returns on the portfolio. 
Thus, MIP was asked to provide the market outlook. In 
fact, the Controller wanted to check if the market outlook 
by MIP needed further input from the other portfolio 
managers view fed to the Controller.
MIP's Market Outlook
MIP mentioned that its 6-18 month outlook for markets 
changed though its longer-term view remained intact. 
Essentially, it believed that the longer term change in 
underlying trends could be several quarters in the future. 
MIP advised that for the immediate future the major market 
characteristics seemed likely to be as follows: (1)
Interest rates, though volatile, were likely to remain
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firm against the backdrop of continued growth and rising 
prices. This was particularly assumed by MIP to be true in 
the United States. (2) The Dollar might be stable for a 
time, but the risk of a further 10% or so drop later that 
year had increased. (3) Bonds might not be able to 
generate returns above the current Dollar coupon rates of 
approximately 9%. (4) The upward trend in equity prices 
could continue for somewhat longer, as good corporate 
profit growth outweigh the negative interest rate 
environment.
For the longer-term, MIP believed that the significant 
changes, which would be seen in the underlying economic 
environment in and after 1989, were likely to produce even 
more significant changes in major trends in the financial 
markets. It added that their impact would be all the 
greater if they could catch markets by surprise.
The Controller informed MIP that the decision of the 
stakeholders regarding the currencies allocation remained 
unchanged with regard to maintaining the level of 70% to 
80% of the portfolio currency in the U.S. dollar. Taking 
this into count, MIP began repositioning the portfolio in 
the light of the market outlook just discussed. It seemed 
that MIP saw there was enough time left in the current 
cycle to return to a tactically bullish stance moving back 
to a fully invested position and committing both cash and 
bonds to the equity markets. MIP showed tendency to move 
away from the pro-dollar stance, believing it to be 
tactically premature even if strategically correct. The
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Controller confirmed to MIP that the principals did not 
accept 100% exposure to equities. MIP resumed stock 
selection search for rapidly growing, late cycle issues 
where value still could be found. It argued that a 
significant number of those opportunities could be found 
in the one-quarter of the Japanese market which MIP 
believed still could be considered on fundamental grounds. 
Therefore, the Japanese exposure would increase.
MIP agreed with Mosnic that the longer-term strategic 
backdrop might call a significant shift to the dollar. 
However, MIP reiterated on the stakeholders' negative 
views about shares. It tried to convince them that even 
with high exposure to equities the portfolio can be 
structured conservatively. It mentioned that the new 
direction probably would be characterized by emphasis on 
defensive shares and/or liquidity, pro-dollar stock 
selection and currency investments, and strict control of 
Japanese exposure. However, at that moment the evidence 
was strong that there was a significant opportunity to 
generate further good equity returns before the cycle was 
exhausted and before a defensive posture was called for.
The Controller conveyed to MIP that the stakeholders 
were still looking unfavourably to total exposure to 
equities.
The Profit-taking Policy Problem
MIP's investment decision processes made the Controller 
and the Director feel comfortable. However the stake­
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holders' remained worried about the nervous stock markets. 
The stakeholders pressed the Director to negotiate with 
MIP early profit taking strategy. Nothing could be done 
before considering the matter with MIP. The following 
advice request was sent to MIP. Indeed, the Controller did 
the interpretation of what the principals wanted.The final 
wording of the specific requests of the stakeholders were:
1) "Sale of Securities and Portfolio Breakdown by 
Instruments:-
The crash losses are becoming a turning point to the 
long time back corporate strategy.
Our Board of Directors have decided to set securities 
sale criteria to avoid loss of unrealized gains if any 
market unexpected break occurs. You are kindly 
requested to advise on:
(1) Reasonable level.of gains whenever attained you 
recommend liquidation of securities.
(2) Optimal diversification of investment portfolio 
broken down into different instruments to suit 
market expectations for 1988.
You will appreciate that the Board of Directors does 
not like imposition of rigid guidelines, however, the 
objectives have been set at:-
- Realization of a reasonable [gain + income] not less 
than the money market rates.
- 100% capital preservation.
Therefore, it is imperative to have your opinion 
before consideration of 1988 investment guidelines and 
strategy.
2) Request of Advice on U.S. Equity Exposure
We are being advised by other professionals that there 
is an uncomfortably high possibility that securities 
values could fall sharply in the atmosphere of 
uncertainty generated by a U.S. presidential campaign. 
U.S. newly elected administration economical policies 
may conflict with the Reagan administration measures.
As a result, we feel it is only prudent to take some 
defensive steps. If you agree with us that equities in 
general, and U.S. portion of it, in particular, will 
sharply decline pursuant to the U.S. presidential
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elections will you please look into the following 
proposals.
1) Consider reduction of equity exposure.
2) Suggest a point and a period of time for 
implementation that we can adopt your plan as a 
formal guideline.
Otherwise, if you have any counter-opinion please feel 
free to convey it to us. Our ultimate objectives are:
1. Realization of equities gains.
2. Avoidance of presidential elections mal-effects on 
Dow Jones.
3) Reasonable gain Realization & Investment Portfolio 
Optimal Breakdown by Instruments.
As discussed in our meetings we believe investment 
strategy guideline set-up has to stem-out from what 
asset managers believe practical and client objective 
attaining. With that view, your professional opinion 
will be highly appreciated. We no longer believe in 
indefinite stay on the unrealized gains. A reasonable 
gain - considering the market circumstances - has to 
be realized and capital has to be fully preserved.
Please give specific recommendations such as sell 
equities at 12% gain.
Corrective strategy
MIP responded by asserting its previous stance that 
profit-take approach might contradict with the long-term 
portfolio management spirit. It also might trigger the 
question of what to do next with the cash position to be 
created. The markets might remain over-valued to re-buy 
securities. This would lead to the accumulation of 
interest income.
MIP suggested the following alternative strategy:
"We also are nervous about the outlook for equity returns. 
The world-wide economic recovery which began in 1982 now 
is well-advanced and has begun to show serious imbalances 
(trade) and excesses (U.S. consumer borrowing, Japanese 
P/E multiple, takeover activity) indicative of the late
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stages of the cycle. Coincident with these signals, the 
U.S, Presidential election cycle at least adds 
uncertainty, and could lead to policy changes bringing on 
a recession in the U.S., spreading elsewhere.
Our best guess is that the world is in fact heading for a 
very slow growth or recessionary environment sometime 
between now and mid - 1989. If the market decline last 
October had not been so large we would be selling now as 
our strategy is to become increasingly defensive.
The October crash, however, did occur, and price declines 
were so great they seemed to discount a certain and 
immediate onset of recession. Since the timing,likelihood, 
and severity of the slow-down is by no means certain, our 
tactical position has been to look for a rally as an 
opportunity to reduce equities further.
As you can see in the table below, (using Mosnic as an 
illustration), we already have made some significant 
changes since last September by:
* Raising cash and bonds to 34% of the total.
* Reducing U.S. and Canadian equities to 22% from 55% of 
the total.
* Switching into more "defensive" equities in some 
markets.
September 31. 1987 Current






Bonds 0.6 1.2 6.4 17.6
Equities: 
U.S. 25.4 51.4 8.1 22.3
Canada 2.4 4.8 0.0 0.0
Japan 4.1 8.3 6.JL 16.8
Far East 6.1 12.3 2.7 7.4
U.K. 6.9 14.1 4.0 10.8
Europe 3.9 7.9 3.1 8.5
Total $ 49.4 100.0% $ 36.4 100.0%
Recent developments have supported our tactical decision 
to wait for a rally. .
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* The U.S. consumer seems to have slowed his 
spending but rising net exports and industrial 
demand seem to be holding the U.S. economy steady.
* Recent US. Trade figures have seen the deficit 
decline somewhat.
* The Japanese domestic economy is growing,
* Recent German indicators suggest better-than- 
expected growth there also.
* George Bush, the candidate least likely to " rock 
the boat" has emerged as the front-runner for the 
presidency, while Richard Gephardt, a protection­
ist, has faded.
A rally is in progress in many markets and we are selling. 
While we have not set a specific target date nor a target 
amount for this selling program, we plan to be well over 
50% liquid within a month or two, given the appropriate 
opportunities.
As to your interest in setting specific guidelines and 
targets, we suggest that you give careful consideration to 
your basic objectives and the role you expect MIP to 
perform, before setting binding parameters.
The most useful guidelines from our point of view would 
set parameters for broad classes of assets, intended to be 
valid for many years and within which we, as manager, 
could exercise our professional discretion. For example, 
you might choose maximum and minimum ranges as follows, 
although you must make the final decision as to 
percentages.
Asset Class Range Permitted
Cash & Short-term 0% - 50%
Fixed Income i
o\oO 80%
Equities 30% - 60%
(U.S.) (0 - 25)
(Europe) (0 - 10)
(Asia) IQ.___- 151
Total 100%
Having done this, you can easily instruct us to move 
toward the upper or lower limit for each category as the 
cycle progresses and as you develop strong feelings of 
your own.
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Presently, for example, you might ask us to move in due 
course to a very low U.S. equity level (near 0) and to a 
high cash holding. With clear guidelines in place the 
implications of such instructions would be clear to both 
sides and easy to implement.
MIP's Alternative Approach to the 
Profit-Taking Standard
MIP's reply clearly stated that it had never found it 
useful to attempt to set precise capital gains targets for 
markets nor for specific securities. That was clear in 
MIP's statement which said:
"We always monitor the price movements of holdings and pay 
careful attention to relative price movements and relative 
valuation levels. Thus, we are stimulated to sell a stock 
when its price has moved up further than seems to be 
justified versus alternative holdings. We may also be 
prompted to sell in order to buy another share whose price 
has fallen to very good value. Also, at times we sell 
when the outlook for the company deteriorates, whatever 
the share price changes or not. IVe believe this is more 
effective than setting gain realization target."
MIP added:-
"I should say that in general we are looking to liquidate 
many existing U.S. and other equity holdings when they 
have risen 20% or so from last October's lows. However, 
the specific target and timing varies by stock".
MIP Amends Its Approach to Match 
with Mosnic Objective
"Finally, it is clear that you and we are on a very 
similar wavelength at this point in time. We are looking 
for a somewhat more opportune moment to increase the 
capital preservation characteristics of your holdings by 
reducing U.S. and other equities and switching into bonds 
or liquid holdings".
MIP's Role in The Tactical Re-Allocation 
of the Assets
Having discussed the unsatisfactory performance 
situation, the IPC moved to reconsidering the allocation
of the assets. The Controller asked MIP how it planned to 
diversify the assets?
MIP replied:
"Our decision to sell is based on the price appreciation 
to some extent, but also on the earnings outlook for the 
company. So, we do not have intentions to re-allocate 
your assets immediately. However, I would also like to 
mention that the strong diversification of the equity 
portfolio should limit the risk of a decline in its total 
value. Based on your objectives and on our in-house 
policy, WE NOW RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWNS OF 
ASSET MIX
Cash & Fix Income Securities 50 %






Amongst strong currencies, we put heavy emphasis on the 
Swiss Franc, as it is not linked to the European monetary 
system, and could, therefore, rise more than others in 
case of panic. As for the time frame, I think that this 
objective could be realized in the very short-term, this 
is a few weeks, as it reflects our current investment 
philosophy. A new assessment should be made in three 
months, when we will know more about the possible outcome 
of the presidential elections.
To conclude, we feel that these decisions should 
reasonably well protect the portfolios in case of 
disappointments engendered by the U.S. presidential 
campaign.
Mosnic Amends its Objectives
The Director did not like 40% exposure to equities as he 
received cautious views about the stock markets. Thus, the 
Controller told MIP:-
"Our consultations indicate that: A recession or a
slowdown in the U.S. economy cannot be avoided. Therefore, 
you are kindly requested to reduce exposure to equities in 
account to 15-20%. This is not a green light to liquidate 
shares which have good potential price appreciation nor
those which have good earnings outlook. This memo should 
not be viewed as rigid package of guidelines. Should you 
feel you have strong reasons to maintain equities at 40% 
of the portfolio, please firmly confirm to us."
MIP replied as follows
11 We did not see an urgency in reducing the equity 
proportion to 10/15% since the majority of the finance 
world was expecting another improvement of the U.S. trade 
figures. Good trade figures would have boosted stock 
markets considerably, since at the same time confidence 
into the $ was slowly coming back.
With respect to the economical outlook for 1988/early 
1989, our economists do not believe in a recession. The 
world economies are in much better shape than many 
investors had thought after the crash. In our view, we 
cannot exclude even an overheating of the US economy in 
1989.
For most of the companies where we have shares (with the 
exception of Germany), we expect a healthier growth of 
their earnings (two digit figures) for 1988 and even so it 
is too early to make serious forecasts for 1989, we see no 
reason for a significant slowdown.
Election years in the US are usually good years for the 
stock market; 7 out of 10 election year saw the stock 
market rise.
Where as we are moderately optimistic for the world 
economies, we are still concerned about a new financial 
crisis due to the huge US budget deficit and the 
difficulties of financing it. In view of your fax, we have 
reduced the equity by approx. 10% and we shall continue to 
do until we reach the level of 10-15% desired by you"
Mosnic Tightens the Strategic Control Processes
With a view to the poor performance of the portfolios 
after reducing equity exposure, Mosnic requested MIP to:
" (1) Give specific reasons for the bad results.
(2) Provide investment strategy for 1989, very
specifically giving the recommended allocations of 
the discretionary assets in terms of:
i. Instruments: Such as equities (%), bonds
(%),short-term (%) , precious metals 
(%), etc. Explaining why such asset
allocation, and your view on the
bond and equity markets for 1989.
ii. Currencies: US$ (%), C$ (%), P.Stg. (%), etc.
explaining how you view the money
markets during 1989.’1
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Mosnic tried to set fixed investment objective by giving 
the following instruction:-
11Our minimum required return on investments in terms of 
performance should be at least 8.5% other discretionary 
managers have achieved this performance. Please recommend 
how you will allocate assets to achieve that goal, at 
least.
We are waiting for your prompt telefax response to give 
our new guidelines and specific requirements for 1989."
MIP's Second Refusal of Setting 
ROI Standard
MIP justified the poor performance as follows
"Let me be clear, that we also are disappointed regarding 
the performances of your accounts with us in 1988, and 
have been giving the accounts our best efforts to try to 
recover some of the lost potential gains. So far our 
management of your accounts has resulted in an increase 
in the region of 4-5%.
Additionally, the accounts all did well in the 4th 
quarter with, for example,Mosnic advancing at 5.3%. This 
means that since the end of September, the accounts have 
been appreciating at an annualized rate in excess of 20%, 
well ahead of available deposit or fixed interest 
returns. The real problem, and drag upon the portfolios 
occurred earlier in the year 1988, and it is this problem 
that I wish to address.
Following the crash in October 1987, MIP moved to try to 
provide some form of insurance or protection for the 
portfolios against a further market decline. If we try to 
remember the market environment in the first quarter of 
last year, it was one of extreme nervousness with many 
prominent market commentators predicting a further sharp 
decline. We did not expect a second crash, or depression 
environment, and therefore took the bold step of keeping 
the overwhelming portion of your portfolio in equities. 
(For the purpose of this discussion, I am using Mosnic 
numbers but similar analysis applies to your other
accounts with the exception of the handling of fixed 
income).
This protection insurance in the end was not needed and, 
therefore, cost the portfolio nearly 2% of performance in 
the first quarter, due to bond declines. For the year as 
a whole, bonds exhibited a TWRR (time weighted rate of 
return) of nearly 8%."
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MIP further argued that Performance in most markets (for 



















The above table showed that most equity sub-portfolios had 
a TWRR greater than that obtainable on US deposits or 
fixed interest securities. MIP placed too large a weight­
ing on bonds and cash in the portfolio which counterbal­
anced the equity gains. The quarterly figures showed that 
MIP put this loss period behind and generated sound 
positive returns.
MIP Criticizes Mosnic Approach to 
Investment Decision
The Controller succeeded to build a trustful relation­
ship with MIP. Within this relationship, he requested from 
MIP to be frank in telling its problems with Mosnic's 
approach to the investment decision. MIP replied:
"First, in our opinion, it is ill-advised to try to 
become a market timer and to pull your money out of the
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financial markets and back into the financial markets 
every time you expect the market to move. Due to the high 
cost of the transactions and the probability of incorrect 
projections from time to time we think the ability to add 
value to your investment results is suspect. Furthermore 
this technique would substantially add risk to your 
portfolios and works against your stated objective of 
conservative, preservation of capital.
We recommend, as a conservative long term strategy a 
mixture of bonds and common stocks. We further recommend 
the decision of when to execute this policy be decided by 
your professional money manager. We think the stock market 
will likely be under short-term pressure and we would be 
looking for an appropriate timing before we initiate our 
purchase program. We expect this opportunity would arise 
by the autumn."
Performance Appraisal by Comparison to 
Other agents Objection by MIP
MIP added:
"A further reservation is concerned with your approach 
to the appraisal of our performance by comparison to the 
other discretionary asset managers. We do not believe in 
the appropriateness of this approach. We have experience 
dealing with Mosnic. We know you shift your investment 
objective in a direct response to the particular situation 
of the portfolio under consideration. We do appreciate 
that approach of dealing with the specific problems of the 
portfolio under evaluation. On the other hand, the 
portfolios' performance problems differ from one manger to 
the other depending on how different managers make the 
selection of the individual securities. Consequently, 
Mosnic's pattern of interaction and the shift in its 
investment objectives can be different. Hence, you can not 
compare managers assigned different objectives."
The Controller expressed his appreciation of the 
sincere advice given by MIP and promised to moderate the 
shift in the stakeholders' objectives by trying to 
encourage them to pursue longer-term results. Furthermore, 
the Controller accepted the argument of MIP regarding the 
comparison approach of appraising portfolio performance.
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Strategy 1989
MIP proposed to structure the portfolio as:
1/3 U.S. equities 
1/3 Far East equities 
1/3 European equities
MIP Adjusts its Approach to the Principal's Objective
MIP accepted to take into count Mosnic proposal by 
confirming on the following:
"I have carefully considered your comments regarding 
capital preservation and desire to improve upon the 
return obtainable from US dollar deposits. To fully meet 
that goal I suggest we slightly restructure as follows:
1. Increase the number of individual security names by 
30% .
2. Spread the geographic risk to be 1/3 US, 1/3 Far 
East, 1/3 Europe.
3. Use bonds/cash only in exceptional circumstances, and 
have no bonds at present.
4. Hedge 1/2 of the currency exposure associated with 
non-dollar equities into the U.S. dollar using the 
forward markets to remove much of the foreign currency 
risk.
Let me assure you that we at MIP have worked hard to 
produce a portfolio for you that balances risk and 
return. We were not happy with the results for the early 
part of 1988 as we placed too much emphasis on risk 
minimization through bonds/cash. We have produced an 
annualized rate of return of 20% since October 1988 to 
date, and believe the above four point restructuring will 
improve the risk/reward ratio for the remainder of 1989."
The Controller responded to MIP as follows:
11We still hope you can reverse the unpleasant performance 
and come up with a break through. Nevertheless, I will 
monitor the portfolio more closely than before. The 
Director requests, MIP to cooperate in making my 
monitoring task successful."
Thus, MIP proposed the following:
"If Mosnic requires more detailed monthly performance 
numbers of individual markets, asset types, stocks or 
currencies please let me know and I will extract the 
relevant figures. Also, if you desire a more detailed 
analysis regarding market weights or individual equity
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choices I can prepare a special report. Feel free to 
contact me either in the office on (international) or you 
can reach me at home outside of office hours on 
(international)."
Islamization of the Investment Process 
Through MIP
In an attempt to avoid interest income, the Director 
sent the following request to MIP:-
"As it may be clear to you our belief does not advise 
keeping permanent fixed deposit accounts within the 
portfolio for generation of interest income viewed as 
usury. It is our intention to study with you the 
possibility of replacing any fixed deposit investments by 
other money market instruments with secured income such 
as, US Government treasury bills.
You are kindly requested to advise us on the negative 
impact such step might have on the ROI.
If you have any comment on possible portfolio management 
complications which might be triggered by exclusion of the 
fixed deposit investments, please let us know.
As a matter of principle, we do not see a problem in 
transitional fiduciary placements until that time funds 
are re-invested."
MIP replied as follows:
"We do not consider fixed deposit investment as a 
permanent investment in uncertain times such as the first 
five months in 1990 when interest rates rose and equities 
fell. They represent a cheap flexible way of parking the 
funds earmarked for investments in tradeable securities.
However, certain markets offer interesting alternative 
with tax-free discount papers such as Treasury bills in 
the US and UK. Transactions in such papers with maturities 
up to 3 months are subject to brokerage fees of only 0.1% 
and Federal and local taxes of 0.115% of the amount which 
compares with 0.125% annually for a fixed deposit.
Redemption is free of fees and taxes. The following is a
comparison for you to see the difference.
Other markets such as Switzerland and Germany do not offer
such a choice of short term money market investments for
tax reasons.
In Switzerland however, one can buy "Money market claims 
on the Swiss' Confederation". Brokerage is 0.25% for
purchase only; no taxes. Provided the claims are sold 
before maturity, no with-holding tax is levied. Sales are
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free of costs whatsoever.




US Treasury Bills 3 months 8,02 0.86 (1) No cost
US$ Fixed deposit 3 months 8 1/4 0.125% No cost
UK Treasury Bills 3 months 13 1/2 0.86 (1) No cost
UK Fixed deposit 3 months 15 0.1255% No cost
Swiss Money market claims 8 1.00 (2) No cost
SFR. Fixed deposit 3 months 8 5/8 0.125 No cost
(1) 0.215% X 4 quarters
(2) 0.25% X 4 quarters
The difference between Money market instruments and 
deposit lie in the fact that fees on deposits are 
calculated on an annual basis whereas fees on Money market 
instruments are calculated on the amount (purchased for 3 
months) and therefore have to be multiplied by four for a 
yearly period."
Reporting of Interest Income Separately 
Considered Costly and Difficult by MIP
As a result of close interaction with the Controller,
MIP was aware of the stakeholders views on interest.
Therefore, MIP commented on interest reporting problem as
follows:-
"Our problem with you will remain the fixed income 
holdings in the portfolio. You will agree with us that the 
whole west is built on interest system.To be honest, we do 
not know how we can assist in interest reporting. It will 
require a new system researching cost and then demonstra­
tion and implementation. Definitely both of us are not 
prepared to bear that cost. Our cash managements (CMS) is 
designed for the wider base of our western clients.
We regret to inform you that, in terms of interest 
separate reporting, we suggest that you rely on your in- 
house system of data processing. We will definitely 
cooperate within certain limits."
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CONCLUSION TO CASE OF MIP
(MIP Accountability Problems)
The process described in this case study indicates 
that it was not an easy job to set specific financial 
targets for the discretionary agents to be the base for a 
strict responsibility accounting. The financial markets 
were difficult to predict.
The case study shows that for evaluation of performance, 
Mosnic system depended on information provided by MIP. It 
was only through an interactive inquiry process that the 
Controller managed to get information.
The process by which Mosnic appraised the performance 
of MIP depended on the nature of the current problem being 
faced in the portfolio. The portfolio performance apprai­
sal system seemed to be a mix between (1) benchmark
approach; (2) continuous principal-agent liaison process; 
and perhaps (3) a bottom line approach. Comparison of MIP 
performance with the other agents did not work. The
process by which Mosnic shifted its objectives was
complicated and it caused problems to the securities
analysis models adapted by MIP. Perhaps other post­
investment cases may be needed to shed more lights on this 
complicated multi-methods system.
The yardstick used by Mosnic for the measurement of 
MIP performance seemed inconsistent. The Controller 
observed the following: (a) if the markets were rallying,
MIP performance was compared with the other agents; (b) 
the market benchmarks was used by MIP to justify the weak 
performance in the portfolio; and (c) when the markets 
were troubled, MIP performance was compared with the 
Dollar Money Market Rates.
Timely liaison of MIP with Mosnic in a number of 
strategic matters led to ambiguity of discretionary power 
for MIP accountability in a formal manner. The Controller 
had to overcome this problem by seeking the view of MIP on 
Mosnic's approach to the investment decision. The whole 
process was found continuous and complicated. The compli­
cation was increased by the difficulty of separating 
strategy, tactical decisions (either Level I or Level II), 
and the operative management of the portfolio. To moderate 
these complexities and to make the shifting objectives 
manageable, the role of the Controller was important.
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SECTION 6-B 
THE CASE OF MONITORING BJ-S BANK
Objectives and Outline
This case also aims at advancing our understanding of 
how agents were controlled after selection. The purpose 
behind studying one more agent's performance evaluation 
processes in addition to the previous case of MIP, was to 
understand how differences in agents' means and methods 
led to different processes of evaluating the portfolio 
performance.
The study starts by emphasizing the major features of 
the control system set by the Controller to suit the 
situation of BJ-S. The case study also advances our under­
standing of the investment strategy operation through the 
agent and throws lights on the deeper level investment 
decision processes in the post-investment phase.
The case also emphasizes the day-to-day interaction 
(in an iterative process) between the principal and the 
agent and highlights the great overlap between strategy, 
operation, tactical decisions and the strategic control 
processes.
1. Special Control System Designed to 
Compensate for BJ-S Weaknesses
BJ-S bank's means and methods for portfolio management 
were quite satisfactory. However, the Controller was not 
satisfied with the internal control system of BJ-S bank. 
Mosnic view was to select BJ-S as a discretionary agent
but to compensate for its control system weaknesses. Thus, 
in the post-investment phase this became the first
priority for the Controller to handle. As such, he had to 
find ways to cover up this loophole.
By the time the selection of BJ-S was completed, the 
Controller was aware of the control procedures necessary
for monitoring BJ-S. Such knowledge about the control 
needs of BJ-S was acquired while studying its strategy, 
structure and processes in the selection stage. In
particular, the Controller was not happy with the 
performance information package which BJ-S promised to 
provide. It was obvious that the Controller would need to 
monitor BJ-S system closely to cover this weaknesses.
Nevertheless, BJ-S was good in other portfolio
management aspects. This conclusion was based on the 
result of evaluating BJ-S methods and means as shown in 
BJ-S selection case study. Moreover, BJ-S promised to 
report interest income separately from the realized and 
the unrealized returns of the portfolio. Another problem 
was that the Controller had to account for the influence 
of the individual portfolio manager (i.e. not the team) on 
the investment decision taken by BJ-S. The representative 
of BJ-S believed that the individual portfolio manager 
could have the authority to amend the investment policy to 
provide for the need of the client without the need for 
consulting the portfolio analysts on every situation. 
This was a good sign. However, the Controller had to be 
careful about the limitations of the individuals in
-290
formulating the investment decision.
By the nature of its investment policy, BJ-S was not 
an aggressive manager. Therefore, the control system 
designed by the Controller to monitor BJ-S investment 
policies governing the selection of securities were not as 
tight as in the case of MIP Bank which had a higher 
tendency to invest aggressively in shares. The procedures 
designed for monitoring the dominant role of the 
individual managers were more tight in the case of BJ-S 
and looser in the situation of MIP which had the team 
approach to portfolio management.
After the investment process started with BJ-S, the 
Controller discovered that the internal accounting control 
system (as one attribute to select BJ-S) was not operating 
as efficient as described by the representatives of BJ-S. 
For example, the initial value of assets transferred to 
BJ-S from another agent were not in reconciliation with 
Mosnic records. Portfolio performance measurement 
reported by BJ-S did not account accurately for fund 
withdrawals and remittances by Mosnic. In these processes 
the Controller observed some errors.
The reporting system applied by BJ-S failed to 
provide the adequate data on: (1) the realized and the
unrealized losses and gains of the portfolio; (2) details 
of bonds liquidated before maturity to avoid interest; and
(3) details of securities sale and purchase transactions. 
Later on, specific reservations made by the Controller
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about BJ-S system will be described.
In the first year of the post-investment relationship, 
the Controller observed that the response of BJ-S to the 
shift in the objectives of the stakeholders was a bit 
slow, particularly when it came to implementation. It 
seemed as if the portfolio manager was over-loaded. This 
will also be described after explaining the specific 
system designed for monitoring BJ-S.
The Corporate Controller decided to design a detailed 
monitoring system to overcome BJ-S internal accounting 
control weaknesses. To accomplish his task, the Controller 
depended on his past experience with the large accounting 
firms' (Arthur Young, Price Waterhouse) management 
consultancy departments to tailor the appropriate control 
procedures. Indeed, the Controller decided to formalize 
these procedures to control the quality of the work to be 
performed by his staff. This also aimed at raising 
specific remarks to BJ-S for improving the portfolio 
management system. Conveying the remarks and the 
exceptions orally to BJ-S was not enough. Without 
formalized procedures and the build-up of due work paper 
system, the Controller was not able to ensure the 
implementation of the designed procedures. The Controller 
also aimed at training his staff on the job. These 
procedures gave more comfort and trust to the stakeholders 
to maintain their fiduciary relationship with BJ-S. The 
Controller was open and frank with BJ-S and told them that 
these procedures were essential and they might be time
consuming. BJ-S promised to be cooperative and to spare 
time for the Controller and his crew to understand the
principals' objectives further. BJ-S also made a 
commitment to make the monitoring mission of the 
Controller successful.
BJ-S Bank Monitoring Detailed Procedures
o Ensure that objectives discussed with BJ-S are
well preserved and report any deficiency.
o Compare the portfolio account balances with those
of prior periods and investigate with BJ-S any 
unexpected changes (or the absence of expected 
changes).
o Perform an over-all test of the reasonableness of
interest income by multiplying the average 
interest rates by the average amounts invested.
o Review the marketable securities reports and
related accounts (e.g. interest and divided 
income) for unusual items.
o Verify the existence and ownership of reported/ 
recorded securities through confirmation/ 
examination of evidence of ownership (e.g. stock 
certificates).
o Determine the bases of which additions and
disposals are entered.
o Inspect brokers advices and other support to
verify that additions and disposals have been 
entered into the manager's reports properly.
o Inspect with BJ-S market quotations or other
evidence of the current value of marketable 
securities.
o Contact BJ-S to provide a report determining that
marketable securities are carried at the 
appropriate amounts. Generally, at the lower of 
cost or market value.
o Verify interest and dividend income by
calculating interest earned and referring to 
published records of dividends paid.
o Verify computations of gains and losses from
sales of securities.
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Permanent Impairment of Value of Investment.
o Ascertain with BJ-S that investments are carried 
and reported at the appropriate amounts (i.e. at 
cost, amortized cost, equity market value, or 
estimated net realizable value). Determine 
whether any decline in market value below cost 
represents "a permanent impairment" of value, 
and, if so, whether such impairment is properly 
reflected in reports provided by the portfolio
managers.
o Verify interest and dividend income and equity in 
earnings (Losses) of investees by calculating 
interest earned or by referring to published 
records of dividends paid or to the financial
statements of investees.
o Verify calculations of amortization of bond
premium or accumulation of bond discount.
o Verify computations of gains and losses from
sales of securities.
Verification of Existence.
When inspecting investment check:-
a. The exact names of the issuers.
b. The descriptions of the securities.
c. The name of the indicated owner of the 
securities.
d. Any evidence of pledging or restrictions on 
disposal shown on the certificates.
e. The certificate number of the documents.
Carrying Amount of Investment.
Review marketable equity securities reported by BJ-S
separately from other securities and determine:
a. The portfolio of marketable equity securities has
been properly aggregated.
b. Any valuation allowance has been properly 
computed.
c. Changes in the valuation allowance have been
properly approximately included. So as to
consider permanent impairment in value and the
corresponding effect on equities.
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Decline in Market Value other Than Temporary.
o Ensure that BJ-S evaluates all securities which
show a market value less than cost, say quarterly 
- to determine whether the decline in market 
values is other than temporary i.e. permanent 
impairment of value.
o To determine whether or not a decline in market
value below cost is temporary in nature or is 
reflective of conditions that are more persistent 
contact BJ-S to gather information.
o To ensure the ability of the portfolio to
ultimately recover the carrying amount of the 
investment discuss with BJ-S whether;
a. The decline in market value is attributable 
to specific adverse conditions for a 
particular security.
o Check the market price with the proper sources
i.e. The price which refers to each single share 
or unit of a marketable equity security, on a 
test basis for each portfolio report submitted by 
BJ-S.
o Perform spot checks on market value which refers
to the aggregate of the market price times the 
number of the shares or units of each marketable 
equity security in the portfolio.
o Consider with each BJ-S valuation allowance which
quantities the net unrealized loss in that 
portfolio.
o Ascertain that realized gain or loss represents 
the difference between the net proceeds from the 
sale of a marketable equity security and its cost 
and ensure that such gain or loss is reported 
only upon sale of a security.
o Perform spot checks to ascertain that net
unrealized gain or loss on a marketable 
securities as reported by the BJ-S represents at 
report date the difference between the aggregate 
market value and aggregate cost.
o Be sure that unrealized gain is not used as a
factor in the computation of taxable income.
o Discuss with BJ-S and obtain ascertainment of the
location of the investment securities.
o Inquire about the internal controls of the BJ-S
if there is any change.
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o Ensure that securities held with the BJ-S are
satisfactorily safeguarded.
o Consider possibility of physical inspection of
securities with each BJ-S three times during each 
fiscal year.
o Suggest to BJ-S that the dates for at least two
of these inspections shall be chosen at random by 
us.
o Inquire about any securities in transfer or
undelivered by brokers or others at the date of 
the examination and check the authenticity of the 
transactions usually by inspecting subsequent 
liquidation.
o Test portfolio transactions by representative
purchase, sale and exchange transactions, brokers 
advices or other documents should be examined to 
ascertain that they agree with the entries made 
by the BJ-S.





- Price reasonableness by reference to published 
sources
The test should again be made to ascertain that 
sales have been properly reported during the 
period.
o On a test basis for each period review securities
cost of acquisition and conclude on cost 
components.
o Review at a 100% scope all costs and fees charged
by BJ-S Brokers Custodian and document your 
comments.
o Review management agreement fee clauses and
ascertain that BJ-S charges are reasonable and in 
compliance with the agreed rates.
o Ascertain that management fee debit notes/advices
are charged to the correct holder account.
o Agree individual withdrawals and contributions to
the respective debit advices and credit notes.
o Ascertain that debit notes and credit notes in
support of withdrawals and contributions are 
backed-up by signatories authorization documents.
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o Ascertain that significant dividend and interest
receivables as of the prior period are correctly 
accounted for and reported by BJ-S.
o Review the investment schedules at the date of
the portfolio report and note securities which 
are "Non-income producing" in order to disclose 
such data on the schedule of portfolio 
securities.
o On an overall basis, perform analytical review
procedure (ARPS) by comparison of the total 
income in relation to prior periods income and 
obtain explanation for any significant variance 
from the concerned portfolio manager.
o Obtain schedule of tax deductions and review
their validity with the right tax expert in the 
region.
o Ascertain that the valuation methods utilized for
determining the market value of portfolios 
coincides with stated policies and rules of 
regulatory authorities.
o Document policies and methods noted in 42 and
report on any over-statement of portfolio value 
which may lead to unjustifiable uprise in 
management fee.
o To review methods of valuation refer to
quotations published by a reliable quotation 
service or a financial publication in order to 
substantiate the valuations used for the related 
securities.
o In case of the over the counter securities for
which quotations were not available from 
publicized sources, consider obtaining quotations 
as of the valuation date from more than one 
independent source.
o Use a form letter showing the security
description and a space where the broker, bank or 
other source may place the requested "Bid" and 
"Asked" prices for return to us.
o If you are not satisfied with valuation date
results, you may wish to obtain further 
quotations at a subsequent date or dates.
o For all securities valued in good faith review
the BJ-S procedures for its continuing appraisal 
of such securities and ascertain that the methods 
established for valuation are followed and that 
they have been reviewed and approved currently by 
the board of directors of BJ-S.
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o In case of values assigned by the portfolio 
managers themselves consider any investment 
limitations or conditions or the acquisition or 
holding of such securities which may be imposed.
o If such restrictions are met by a narrow margin, 
give extra care in satisfying yourself that the 
evidence indicates that the security valuation 
determinations were biased to meet those 
restrictions.
BJ-S was kept informed that Mosnic was unhappy with 
their errors in performance reporting. BJ-S was also told 
that Mosnic had decided to carry out intensive monitoring 
processes which would require a high level of interaction 
with BJ-S. The latter did not object. However, some 
methods and means of BJ-S obstructed the implementation of 
the special system in the way and time the Controller 
targeted for.
The following is a brief example of most of the
reservations raised by the Controller to BJ-S about its
system. In response to these reservations, BJ-S kept
Mosnic more informed about the detailed analysis of the
fundamentals influencing the investment decisions.
"You will note from the enclosed statement which had been 
prepared based on data availed by you, that an additional 
$ 4.1 million will be at our disposal, upon executing the 
changes in the portfolio as authorized by us.
Despite our satisfaction with the means and the methods 
of BJ-S as a portfolio manager and with your personal 
special attendance to our business, we regret to tell you 
frankly we had acute and critical difficulties with the 
deficiency noted in your reporting system. Our files and 
records are full of errors and contradicting information 
provided by BJ-S. We have managed to overcome these weak­
nesses of BJ-S by performing intensive extra-ordinary 
monitoring procedures. We have also observed that BJ-S 
response to the remarks raised by Mosnic concerning the 
allocation of the assets in the portfolio is slow. May be 
BJ-S is not convinced to change. We just need to know 
your justification.
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We hope you will manage with your organization to 
overcome this difficulty."
2. Description of the Post - 
Investment Processes
Beside the previous procedures, Mosnic needed to 
interact with BJ-S to discuss specific performance issues, 
re-evaluate the financial strategy and to get BJ-S opinion 
on the future strategy matters. The first priority of the 
Controller was to convey, in a timely manner, the shift in 
the objectives of the stakeholders to BJ-S.
The Controller was not keen to spend more time to 
examine the risk analysis techniques BJ-S followed to 
manage the portfolio. First, the analysis of individual 
securities and their selection was a task to be almost 
fully undertaken by the concerned discretionary agent. 
Second, the Controller was sure that the risk analysis 
models, irrespective of their level of sophistication, 
would require from BJ-S to go through the complicated 
process of understanding the shift in the investment 
objectives of the principals.
The general view about risk assessment, as a means of 
performance monitoring and agent appraisal, was that the 
assumptions of risk measurement could not be appropriate 
because the financial markets might move fast in 
unpredictable directions. Hence, close interaction with 
BJ-S and the day-by-day management of the investing 
process were preferred as a means for evaluating the 
performance of the discretionary portfolio. In most of the
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cases, corrective actions for straightening investment 
portfolio's performance deviations were executed through 
dynamic re-allocation of the assets in the account. Asset 
allocation proposals to improve the portfolio's rate of 
return were prepared by BJ-S and then negotiated with 
Mosnic. The asset allocation projections submitted by BJ-S 
were built on analysis of different factors such as (1) 
Western economies; (2) capital markets; (3) stock markets; 
and (4) social and political factors. This process was 
continuous and hardly had an end. The rest of this 
chapter is devoted to describe the post-investment 
interaction between BJ-S and Mosnic, namely:
(1) performance monitoring;
(2) controlling agent misjudgment and imprudent 
investment management;
(3) enforcement of corrective action by Mosnic on BJ-S; 
and
(4) dynamic strategy and assets re-allocation.
However, the processes to be described were pnly 
selected to give an idea about the processes involved in 
the post-investment stage to manage the discretionary 
portfolio.
(i) Performance Appraisal based on information 
provided by BJ-S
Taking the opportunity of a good performance achieved 
by BJ-S, the following debate took place between BJ-S and 
Mosnic investment committee. The Controller and the 
Director aimed at encouraging BJ-S to keep momentum.
The Director:
11 9 % for six month is not bad. Hopefully your annualized 
performance will out-perform the money market rates. It 
looks as if you will end-up this year by 18 %."
BJ-S Representative:
11 We hope so. But, you never know the markets. The 
currencies risk is growing beyond all the portfolio 
managers expectations. What ever you make on the 
investment side can easily be distorted by the sky high 
dollar and the sliding other currencies."
The Director:
" Paradoxically you provide data and we use it to evaluate 
your performance. Our problem now is the errors and 
inadequate information you provide."
BJ-S Representative:
" No, This is one of the business conventions. We are 
responsible legally and ethically for every bit of 
information we give. No prudent portfolio manager will 
risk his business future by giving deceptive 
information. You have the possession of the figures 
reported. Definitely you have your relationship with a 
number of our competitors. Feel free to obtain any 
number of independent opinions on our figures. I would 
not mind rendering my free professional views on their 
figures submitted to you."
The Controller:
" How do you measure performance in investment portfolio?"
BJ-S Representative:
” This is a lengthy process. In brief we try to stick to a
number of principles in the process:
1. To weight the returns time-wise is essential.
2. Totaling of the returns is necessary i.e., the 
returns must include both income and changes in 
market value (realized and unrealized capital 
appreciation)
3. Assets value measured at market must be the base for 
measurement of performances and not at any type of 
cost.
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4. In the measurement of performance we try to include 
cost as well as return.1
BJ-S Representative:
11 The dollar weighted return [DWR] is the measurement 
technique BJ-S follows. It considers:
- The ending value of the portfolio.
- The beginning amount of the portfolio plus the cash 
remittances to the portfolio."
He added that BJ-S system, at a point of time, before 
Mosnic relationships started, was using the [TWR]
measurement of performance. In BJ-S quest for more
meaningful information to the funds sponsors, the TWR i.e, 
the 'Time Weighted Return' system was brought to a halt.
The major reason for refraining from the TWR was that it
was viewed as disregarding the fact that money was
remitted to the portfolio or it was removed from the fund.
(ii) Comparison with the other Agents 
For the Appraisal of Performance
The Director:
" Based on consolidated information on Mosnic portfolios, 
BJ-S is ranked as of 06/30/1989 number 2 out of 8 
portfolio managers. There is a manager who made 10 % 
for the last six months. How do you view that ?”
BJ-S Portfolio Manager:
" In BJ-S we used to tell our business associates that
such comparison may not be useful to them. In your case 
I advise strongly to measure the portfolio in either of 
the ways:-
1. In comparison with Mosnic goals and objectives.
2. In comparison with Portfolios managed under the same
guidelines.
3. In comparison of our performance with international
markets benchmarks.1
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(iii) Responsibility for Mis judgment 
and Imprudent Investment Decision
The Director:
” For the sake of argument, if a manager under performs 
other portfolio manager or under-performs the 
International Financial Markets, does that mean 
imprudent management."
BJ-S Representative:
To my view that is difficult to prove. My personal 
advise is to terminate the investor-manager Fiduciary 
relationship if the mistrust reaches the level of taking 
the matter to the court. In BJ-S we believe the manager 
is a member of the investor organizational set up. In 
cases of mis judgment how do you act with-say-your 
Corporate Financial Controller ?
My only advise is: build-up your organization
internally, manage your portfolio managers efficiently 
and closely. Discover any misjudgment as it occurs. If 
investment is being handled imprudently, terminate the 
Fiduciary relationship. You do not have any other 
option. Time is value of the portfolio. ”
(iv) Enforcement of Corrective Actions
The Controller:
"The imprudence of judgement by discretionary managers is 
a problem. It may be difficult to prove it. It also 
relates to the organizational philosophy and the invest­
ment policy followed by that particular institution 
managing the assets. The question is: How is it possible 
to change the discretionary agents' organizational 
policies?"
(v) Checking the Safe Custody of the Assets
The Controller:
" We have not yet succeeded to obtain an evidence that 
Mosnic assets under the Fiduciary responsibility of BJ-S 
are under safe custody and free of liens, charges and 
encumbrances.
BJ-S Representatives:
What you mentioned seems to me unconventional. You are 
absolutely right in worrying about your asset safety and 
ownership.' I do not know how can a manager ensure that 
other than issuing periodic confirmations that assets 
under BJ-S Fiduciary management are free from all types
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of liens and charges. The discretionary portfolio 
managers, as we confirmed to you in the pre-agreement 
stage select the custodians according to criterion 
securing the interest of both the investor and the 
Fiduciary manager [BJ-S].
The fundamental qualities we search for in an 
organization to be vouched as able for dependable 
custodial services are:-
1. The discipline found in the organizational's security 
procedures.
2. The reliability of its information system and the 
record keeping.
3. Cost competitiveness .
4. The financial stand, strength and ability of the 
organization.
5. The organizations understanding of the Fiduciary 
Relationship."
(vi) Change of the Financial Strategy through 
the Tactical Re-Allocation of Assets
The Director addressed the following statement to BJ-S:-
" The fact that we expressed to BJ-S our concern about 
capital preservation, led the ROI to unprecedented low 
levels. That ROI cannot be tolerated, as we get news 
that other agents are performing better
BJ-S defended as follows
" Keeping in view the conservative investment approach 
which we have pursued in accordance with principals 
wishes, in this instance our present stances for the 
management of funds has been:
- Positive on the US $ exchange rate. 100 % invested in 
US $.
- Investing in the short end of the fixed interest
markets with the main emphasis on 3 month euro-
commercial paper, where today we are investing the
bulk of the funds at 10 -15 % p.a.
A synopsis of the four major economies of the world is 
attached.
Against this background, for U.S Dollar based clients, we 
as a Group currently advocate the following investment 
strategy:
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Currency - 60 % minimum U.S. $
Asset Structure :
Equities 45 %
Bonds (including convertibles) 35 %
Cash 20_%
100_% 11
The Director commented, "you will be over-exposed to 
equities."
BJ-S requested its evaluation to be over long periods i.e. 
more use of the bottom line approach to the portfolio 
performance appraisal.
In January 1988, the Controller requested BJ-S to 
promote post-crash investment strategy, beside further 
explanation of why 45% of the holdings were in shares.
The representative of BJ-S bank responded as follows:
" It is now imperative for any portfolio managers 
investment strategies to be re-tailored to cope with the 
outcomes of October market turmoil. The market break is 
over, but the troubled days are following. What to look 
out for under the new circumstances cannot be separated 
from the variables affecting the investment strategies 
of the forthcoming periods. Our views which we look 
forward to be discussed with your specific requirements 
and guidelines are reflected in the newly developed BJ-S 
investment strategy Please walk through and furnish us 
with your specific guidelines.1
The following are some of the quotations from BJ-S 
response to Mosnic inquiry on post-crash investment 
strategy. The purpose of these quotations is to give the 
reader an idea about the detailed decision analysis 
predominantly carried out by the agents. The opinions 
given at the end of each factor analysis were presented by 
BJ-S to be negotiated with Mosnic to end up amending the 
investment strategy. This process made the principals
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feed to BJ-S the maximum input relating to their 
objectives. It also made BJ-S satisfied with the amended 
strategy to be pursued. The role of the Controller was 
recognizable in the interaction process.
INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Economy.
BJ-S commented that the crash in the international equity 
markets had focused attention firmly on Americas twin 
deficits [trade and budget] since they were universally 
viewed as the real culprit of the present global financial 
crises.Given the good trend of economic activity worldwide 
prior to the stock market crash, BJ-S did not expect a 
recession to emerge. BJ-S added that since the necessary 
policy action was taken [in particular liquidity provision 
and initial moves to reduce the U.S. budget deficit], 
however, imperative as it had become, would not be 
achieved without further strains on the financial markets.
Capital Markets.
BJ-S drew attention to that whereas, since mid-summer, 
greater currency stability had been achieved at the price 
of increased volatility in interest rates. However, since 
Black Monday the situation had changed completely.
BJ-S Opinion; "We expect sentiment in the bond markets to
remain positive, at least until an
improvement in the economic outlook permits 
monetary authorities to become more
restrictive again".
BJ-S RECOMMENDS TOP QUALITY 
NON-CYCLICAL STOCKS
BJ-S argued that the October 19, 1987 marked the beginning
of a new chapter in the history of the stock markets. The
Dow Jones industrial index plunged 508 points or 22.6% in
one day taking the rest of the world stock markets with
it. BJ-S believed that the situation would stabilize
shortly.
BJ-S Opinion: "Until then we recommend a defensive
strategy, with the emphasis on top-quality 
non-cyclical stocks".
CURRENCIES/GOLD
According to BJ-S, the turmoil in the stock markets also 
could not fail to impact the dollar. It was, after all, a 
statement by U.S. Treasury Secretary, James Baker on the 
dollar exchange rate that precipitated the rout in the 
financial markets.
BJ-S Opinion: "We estimate the downside risk to the dollar
versus the Swiss Franc at around SF 1.30 
and versus the Dutch Mark at DM 1.60."
U.S.A.
BJ-S asserted that: "Economy will Grow at 1.5 for the
Year". It also added that the US-economy was still 
enjoying growing prosperity. The shift in the focus of 
economic momentum away from consumer spending toward 
business investment was in full swing. BJ-S expected real 
growth to average around 1.5 % for the year.
BJ-S Opinion: "We would therefore give preference to short




BJ-S advised that for the moment, as long as uncertainty 
about the future direction of the economy prevailed, the 
market would remain vulnerable.
BJ-S Opinion: "Should therefore focus on top-quality




The analysis of BJ-S indicated that the Japanese economy 
has once again demonstrated its flexibility and strength 
that year. It added that the overall real growth on GNP 
would be only slightly lower in 1988, at just under 3 %, 
than in the current year. Japan's trade surplus, which 
had shrunk substantially over the last six months from 
last year's level should continue to narrow in the year 
ahead.
Capital Market
BJ-S believed that fears that the Bank of Japan might 
raise the discount rate to curb the strong expansion in 
the money supply [over 10%] had now evaporated.
Opinion: "This makes the Japanese bond market one of the
most attractive in the world in our view."
Stock Market
BJ-S commented that shortly before the crash on Wall 
Street, the Tokyo stock market reached an all-time high of 
just under 27000. To the view of BJ-S, the Japanese 
market was thus still the most expensive in the world by a 
wide margin.
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BJ-S said that the dollar's renewed free fall and the 
collapse of share prices worldwide would inevitably have 
consequences for the German Economy. The future trend of 
the economy, however, would largely depend on the monetary 
course the Bundesbank would follow.
Capital Markets
BJ-S advised that: (1) The average yield on government 
bonds, which had fallen from its annual high of 7% in mid- 
October to currently 6%, would continue to decline 
steadily towards the annual low of 5.25 % it reached in 
spring that year. (2) Medium-term maturities were still 
worth buying.
Stock Market
BJ-S described the German stock market as one of the 
hardest hit by the October crash. Average price declined 
by 40%. This could provide the basis for the markets next 
countermove, which would be of a purely technical nature 




About the U.K. economy, BJ-S said that the current account 
would probably deteriorate, ending the year with a deficit
of P. Stg. 2bn. About the U.K capital market, BJ-S added 
that the relatively high level of nominal interest rates 
coupled with a currency which was virtually tied to the 
Dutch Mark made the UK gilts look extremely interesting, 
especially for dollars investors.
Stock Market
BJ-S, therefore, believed that the UK equity market would 
outperform the international markets as a whole in the 
coming weeks. The most likely candidates in their view 
would be the recently privatized monopolies such as 




Regarding the Swiss economy, BJ-S projected 0.8% real GDP 
growth in 1988 [previously 1.8 %] versus 2.0 % this year.
Capital Market
BJ-S hinted that with the danger of the Swiss Franc taking 
off on its own, the Swiss National Bank was in a monetary 
bind. The generous supply of liquidity to the money 
market would bring short-term interest rates down further 
over the next few months. In line with the downward trend 
in inflation expectations, bond yields would also ease 
further in the months ahead.
Stock Market
About the Swiss stock market BJ-S said that in the light
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of the risks underlying the current macro-economic 
scenario, the emphasis in investment selection should be 
on stocks of the highest quality. To improve portfolio 
structure BJ-S recommended at the current low levels 
shares of companies with sound balance sheet ratios, high 
earnings quality and clear growth prospects for the 90s. 
The following companies in particular met these criteria. 
Sandoz Nestle, Zurich Insurance, UBS, BBC, Reuter, 
Suizer, Holder-bank, Holzsoff and Ascom.
CURRENCIES
The view of BJ-S on the currencies were:
U.S. Dollar
Estimate of the downside risk to the dollar versus the 
Swiss Francs would be around SF 1.30 and versus the Dutch 
Mark it would be DM 1.60.
Yen
For the next few months BJ-S expected the yen to fluctuate 
against the dollar in a range between 130 and 145 yen. 
Dutch Mark
BJ-S said referring to the DM that again the background of 
a gloomy outlook for the economy, the rationale against an 
inflationary expansion of the money supply would lose its 
force.
BJ-S Opinion: 1 We do not expect any major shifts in the
Swiss Franc/ Dutch Mark parity. The 
similarity between monetary approaches in 
both countries will assure continuing 
stability in the relationship between 
these currencies [range SF 82 to SF 84.]"
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ECU
Concerning the ECU, the view of BJ-S was that as long as 
the dollar did not come under renewed pressure, BJ-S did 
not expect a realignment of key currencies in the next few 
months.
BJ-S Opinion: "We would nevertheless be cautious about
investing in high-interest currencies
[French and Belgian Francs] at the present 
time."
Pound Sterling
With respect to the British Pound, the stance of BJ-S was 
that given these good fundamentals and an exchange rate 
policy aimed at stabilizing the currency, the risk of the 
pound depreciating [also against the European currencies] 
would certainly be limited. (If the dollar continued to 
depreciate against the European currencies).
BJ-S Opinion: "However, we would expect the Pound to tend
weaker because the Bank of England might 
counter a further strengthening in the 
Sterling exchange rate with interest rate 
cuts".
Gold
About gold BJ-S commented:
"In the weeks of enormous losses in the stock markets 
precious metals have proved a haven of relative price 
stability. We expect gold to trade in a relatively broad 
range between 430 and 480 $/oz. in the month ahead. On 
one hand, fears of recession will adversely affect the 
market for sometime. On the other, current US monetary 
policy, which is bent on preventing a recessional all 
costs, could have a positive influence on gold over the 
long-term. In the latter case, the inverse relationship 
between gold and dollar prices would be rapidly 
restored."
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The Proposed Re-Allocation of the Assets
BJ-S proposed the following asset allocation for 
Mosnic as a dollar based investors.
Investment North Eurooe Pacific
Cateaorv America Others U.K. Area Gold Total
Short-term 15% 15%
Bonds 25% 5% 5% 35%
Shares 25% 3% 5% 12% 45%
Gold — — 5% 5%
Total by 
Currency 65% 8% 5% 17% 5% 100%
BJ-S added:
"The fundamental factors that determine the economy look 
altogether favourably. Hence, one can expect the 
financial markets to perform accordingly relatively well 
in 1988. It must be expected, however, that it can still 
last a while before the fundamental aspects, which were 
temporarily forgotten by the panic mood following the 
crash, again have an effect, as the situation still looks 
negative on the chart. Renewed serious setbacks cannot be 
excluded, but must put down to purely technical reasons. 
An engagement in U.S. shares can absolutely be recommen­
ded, but considerable volatility on the stock markets 
still has to be reckoned with throughout the year.
Opinion: "Stocks must therefore be chosen selectively."
(vii) Amendment of the strategic Controls
BJ-S started conservatively with minimum exposure to 
shares. It achieved fairly good performance. It gained 
the trust of the Investment Policy Committee. As a result, 
BJ-S was given the green light to allocate 35% of the 
' portfolio to shares. Pursuant to this, the Controller had 
to plan for more tighter monitoring procedures than before 
to make sure that increasing the percentage of shares in
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the portfolio would not make their situation more risky. 
Thus, the Controller started checking BJ-S process by 
which it selected the new shares to be added to the 
portfolio. The process did not end as long as the 




MAJOR ISSUES EMERGING FROM THE 
POST-INVESTMENT CASE STUDIES
(THE CONTROLLER'S ADVANCED THOUGHTS)
Strategy Implementation, Operation and Tactical
Decision
It is evident from the two case studies that the
investment strategy implementation involved amending the 
strategy to reflect the shift in the stakeholders' 
requirements caused by the volatility of the financial 
markets. Strategy does not stand aloof as independent of 
events. Strategy grows from events. In the strategy 
amendment process, the two agents did not depend on the
security analysis approach alone. Rather, the two agents
were careful to understand the nature of the shift in the
principal's objectives in response to financial market 
fluctuations.
A common tool for the amendment of each agent financial 
strategy was the tactical re-allocation of the assets in 
the portfolio. Throughout this process, the involvement of 
the principals through the Controller was clear in 
negotiating the structure of the portfolio at the first 
level allocation of the assets i.e. allocation to stocks, 
bonds, cash, and metals beside the currency allocation to 
the U.S. dollar. The analysis of individual securities and 
their selection was predominantly the task of the agent. 
While performing this task, the two discretionary agents 
were in a continuous interaction with the Controller who 
interpreted to them the shift in the stakeholders'
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perception of the investment risk.
The two cases also showed that tactical decisions, 
strategy amendment, operation and portfolio performance 
monitoring were emerging in one inseparable process. It 
was difficult for the Controller to separate them. The 
involvement of the Controller made the complex strategy 
process manageable for both the two agents and the 
stakeholders.
Multi-systems for Measurement of Performance
The two case studies did not emphasize the rational 
measurement of performance (ROI) achieved by the two 
discretionary agents as a fundamental method of appraisal. 
Indeed, the portfolio performance measurement system was a 
mixture of: (1) reading the agent's performance (ROI) 
compared to the markets' benchmarks. This was a general 
indicator. It was not used as a final standard for 
performance evaluation; (2) monitoring the investment 
decision processes of the agent emphasizing prudence and 
the quality of the agent judgement; (3) trying with one of 
the two agents to set a conservative profit-take standard;
(4) liaison with the agents to understand their problems 
which led to unsatisfactory performance; and (5) trying to 
make the agents feel that at the end of the day bottom 
line performance will be a major concern for Mosnic. Thus, 
a mixed system of portfolio performance evaluation emerged 
in the two post-investment case studies.
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Even this multi-dimensional performance appraisal 
system was different from one agent to the other: it
depended on the specific features of the problem 
confronted by each agent.
The presence of the owners and the Controller was 
essential for the mixed performance appraisal system to 
work. The Controller's easy access to the owners 
facilitated the day-by-day management of the extremely 
shifting process of amending the investment objectives.
The Paradox of Loose and Tight Control
The reader of the two cases can easily observe that a 
risk-return approach to the portfolio performance 
appraisal was used by the portfolio managers. But this did 
not work without the input of the Controller which 
depended on what the principals required. Due to the 
complicated changes in the principals requirements, the 
Controller felt that the goals to be pursued appeared as 
if they became ambiguous.The intervention of the principal 
through (the Controller) might give the feeling that the 
strategic control became loose. However, this was not the 
case. In fact, the two discretionary agents were given the 
full freedom to analyze securities in any sophisticated 
way their means could provide. However, Mosnic would not 
leave it loose for the agent to guess the shift in its 
objectives as the markets were never stable. The agents 
were free to’ select the securities, but they had to come 
back with their models to the Controller for understanding
-317-
the principal's specific requirements. Hence, to make the 
control both flexible and tight, the Controller had to be 
heavily involved to help the two agents understand the 
process by which the stakeholders amended their 
objectives.
To summarize, the two agents maintained the discretion 
to select the individual securities but within the broad 
shifting asset allocation policy negotiated in a 
complicated process with the stakeholders. Indeed, this 
was the thrust of the principal-agent interaction process 
described in the two cases.
Agents' Authority, Accountability and the 
Principals' Involvement
The interaction with the agents gave the principals 
great comfort. The question was whether this intervention 
released the agents from accountability or not. In fact,it 
did not.
The intervention of the principals through the 
Controller did not release the agents from accountability 
because the Controller carefully orchestrated the 
involvement process in a way that the two agents should 
take the full responsibility for their decisions. The 
Controller was careful not to leave the two agents 
dissatisfied with the principal's objectives. This was 
clear in the style of the Controllers' correspondence and 
negotiations with the agents. Despite the intervention of 
the principals to amend the agent's strategy, the latters 
never felt that unreasonable investment objectives were
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imposed on them to pursue. Moreover, the two agents were 
convinced to cope with the mixed performance appraisal 
system adopted by Mosnic. Neither one of the two agents 
objected to the mixed appraisal system which involved 
monitoring their involvement decision processes.
Different Control Processes with Different Agents
The processes by which Mosnic monitored the strategy 
with the two agents were different. Each one of the two 
agents had different views about how to cope with the 
markets' volatility. The two agents differently viewed 
the processes which impacted the strategic investment 
decisions differently. Thus, the asset allocation styles 
of the two agents were also different. The Controller did 
not impose on either of the agents to follow the style of 
the other. This meant different ways of appraising each 
agent investment decision process. The process by which 
the principals' shifted their investment objective 
depended on the specific problems discovered in the 
concerned portfolio. Hence, these processes were
different. Thus, amendment of the financial strategy (an 
important aspect of agents control) of each agent was 
different from the other. This meant that standard control 
processes were not appropriate for being universally 
applicable to both of the two agents.
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Conclusion
The post-investment case studies described how Mosnic 
worked with two of the selected portfolio managers to 
manage the investment process. The case studies also shed 
light on the problems of portfolio performance appraisal 
and concluded that Mosnic followed a mixed system approach 
to overcome the problems involved in the discretionary 
portfolio management processes. The major issues emerging 
from the two case studies in this Chapter center around 
strategy implementation, operation and the tactical 
decision processes. Problems of authority, involvement and 
accountability are also projected by the two case studies.
However, this is not the end of our research problem. 
In fact, only a simple conceptual framework was used to 
study the five agents cases. The cases have added a lot 
of insights to the contingent variables of the conceptual 
framework. It is now necessary to reflect further on the 
simple conceptual framework of the research to develop it 
into a detailed one. To do this, it is necessary to 
further our understanding of the hypothesized
relationships between the contingent variables of the 
simple conceptual framework of the research. This is 
achieved in the next Chapter where the five case studies 
of the specific agents are analyzed. The analysis also 
sheds light on strategy formulation, controllership and 
the control system of the investment houses.
CHAPTER-7
ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC AGENTS' CASE STUDIES AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DETAILED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Objectives and Outline
In this chapter,- the preceding case studies are 
analyzed with a view to shedding more light on the working 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The relationships 
which emerged from the analysis have been integrated into 
the general conceptual framework developed in Chapter 4 
(and depicted in Fig. 4.1) to produce a detailed 
conceptual framework (Fig. 7.6). The latter represents 
the grounded theory induced from the initial case study of 
Mosnic and the five case studies on specific agents.
The analyses are conducted at two levels. Level 1 
examines further the first working hypothesis and part of 
the second working hypothesis (2.1.a) (which deals with 
the interactive relationships between the stakeholders1 
goals, strategy and religious beliefs, environment, 
technology, portfolio managers and Mosnic*s control 
system) in the light of the insights gained from the case 
studies on the specific agents. The remaining parts of 
the second working hypothesis (2.1.b, 2.1.C, 2.1.d) are
discussed in Level II of the analysis which addresses the 
constructs of the contingent variables to take on board 
the additional relationships developed form the agents* 
case studies.
Section 7.1 expands our understanding of the first 
working hypothesis which deals with how the interaction
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between the stakeholders1 strategy and goals and the 
environment affected the features of the control system of 
Mosnic. It also examines further the impact of the 
information technology and the stakeholders* religious 
beliefs on the corporate control system and controllership 
function. In addition, the role of strategic
controllership in Mosnic is examined.
Section 7.2, which addresses the issues hypothesized 
in working hypothesis 2.1.a, highlights the relationship 
between the environment and the portfolio managers* 
strategy, structure and processes (agents* means and 
methods). It also expands the arguments that
technological resources expended by the portfolio managers 
impacted their related strategy, structure and processes. 
Furthermore, the section investigates how the religious 
values of the principals interacted with the agents means 
and methods and how such an interaction impacted the role 
of controllership and the control system in Mosnic.
In Level II, section 7.3 deals with the relationship 
in working hypothesis 3. At this level, the analysis 
traces the relationship between the attributes of agents* 
strategy, structure and processes with the control system 
of maintaining the portfolio of agents.
Sections 7.4 and 7.5, which investigate the working 
hypotheses 4 and 5, use the two case studies in Chapter 6 
to examine the effect of agents' performance evaluation 
processes on Mosnic's control system. In section 7.6 the 
detailed conceptual framework is developed.
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In order to refresh the memory of the reader, a 
summary of the working hypotheses generated in Chapter 4 
is reproduced below together with the general conceptual 
framework.
Summary of the Research Working Hypotheses
1.1. The turbulence of the financial markets in which 
investment houses operate tend to influence the way 
stakeholders formulate investment strategy and goals. 
This, in turn, is likely to affect the control system 
and the controllership function in investment houses.
1.2. The religious beliefs of the stakeholders impact the 
management control system of investment houses and 
influence the function of the controller.
1.3. The implementation of modern information technology 
by investment houses operating in international 
financial markets through portfolio managers 
influences the design and efficiency of the 
organization's control system.
2.1. a. The way intended agents interact with financial
markets influences their strategy, structure and 
processes (i.e. their methods and means).
b. Consequently, investment houses operating through 
a portfolio of agents tend to formulate their 
corporate strategies by utilizing a number of 
heterogeneous sub-strategies.
c. Thus, the corporate control system emerges from a 
number of different strategic control sub-systems.
d. These systems could be more effective by using an 
"involved controller".
2.2. a. The level of information and communication
technology used by intended portfolio managers 
influences their strategy, structure and 
processes.
b. Hence, operating through a portfolio of agents 
leads to the emergence of a number of control sub­
systems tailored to meet the specific control 
needs with regard to each agent.
2.3. a. The religious beliefs of the stakeholders of in­
vestment houses influence agents' strategy, 
structure and processes. This in turn influences 
the control sub-systems to be designed for 
controlling a portfolio of different agents.
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b. The role of the corporate controller in investment 
houses in interpreting stakeholders* religious
precepts to their agents is important.
3. Agents* strategy, structure and processes influence
the pre-investment processes carried out in investment 
houses to maintain an appropriate portfolio of agents.
4. The processes of maintaining the portfolio of agents
in an investment house influences the design of the 
corporate control system to monitor the agents.
5. The process of appraising agents' performance has a 
feedback effect on the process of maintaining the 
portfolio of agents maintained by an investment house.
Fig. 4.1





















































7.1. The Impact of Financial Markets, Religion, 
Strategy, and Technology on Mosnic's 
Control System (Working Hypothesis # 1)
In this section, I investigate the specific features 
of control in Mosnic emerging from the influencing 
variables in Fig. 7.1. The latter is part of the general 
conceptual framework developed in Fig. 4.1.
Fig. 7.1 
























The Impact of the Financial Markets on Mosnic*s Strategy. 
Goals and Control System (Working Hypothesis 1.1).
The nature of the uncertainties of the financial 
markets has always been a source of worry to the 
stakeholders. The agents' case studies show that formal 
long-term planning is of little value because of the 
volatility of the financial markets. Mosnic recruited the 
Controller to help in dealing with these financial market 
uncertainties. The five case studies do show some use of 
rational economic and financial rate of return analysis,
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but only as a small part of the total process of making 
significant investment decisions (e.g. allocation of the 
assets, diversification over the agents and in general, 
assessment of risk inherent in operating discretionary 
portfolios in the financial markets). Rates of return 
were always implicit behind all the analyses used, but 
could not be made so unambiguously explicit that sole or 
almost sole reliance could be made on them.
The agents case studies, which tackled the selection
of agents, substantiated the view that subsequent to
recruiting the Controller, the principals have been
significantly involved in managing both the risk they took 
on agents and that inherent in the uncertainties
surrounding strategic investment decision. This was
achieved by the active involvement of the Controller in 
the principal-agent interaction process.
The case studies also show that before the
appointment of the Controller, the stakeholders did not 
have the opportunity to spell out their continuously 
shifting views which was affected by their own interaction 
with and perception of the investment environment. Indeed, 
following the involvement of the Controller, the
perceptions of the stakeholders towards the situation in 
the financial markets were promptly translated into 
significant decision inputs to the agents who amended 
their general investment policies accordingly, while 
retaining responsibility also for selecting individual 
securities.
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On the other hand, Mosnic did not have written 
investment strategies on which the portfolio managers 
could advise the financial targets to be pursued. Unlike 
the situation prior to the recruitment of the Controller, 
the case studies of MIP and BJ-S show that Mosnic 
formulated its corporate strategy through the following 
stages: (1) evaluating each agent's proposed strategy
through debate and discussion; and (2) agreeing on a 
financial strategy with each agent separately. Hence, 
Mosnic did not have a pre-determined overall corporate 
strategy. Rather, an emergent strategy developed through 
interaction with independent sets of discretionary agents. 
On the other hand, Mosnic might amend the financial 
strategy agreed with a particular agent if the financial 
markets gave any signs of change. In the above processes 
the Controller played the role of gatekeeper in the sense 
that he explained the agents' investment models to the 
principals as well as the risk taking attitudes of the 
latter to the intended agents. This implies that the 
Mosnic investment strategy formation process relied to a 
great extent on the continued debate between agents and 
the Controller and not primarily on the sophisticated 
investment models of the portfolio managers.
The following are other important issues which 
emerged from the nature of strategy process (influenced by 
the financial markets) in Mosnic. First, the strategic 
control system in Mosnic was designed to help in 
monitoring a number of investment strategies acquired from 
a number of different portfolio managers. The Corporate
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Controller observed the differences between the agents and 
then designed the appropriate procedures. Second, the 
corporate strategic control procedures had to be flexible 
and dynamic to keep pace with the amendment of the 
corporate strategy in line with the changes in the 
financial markets. This projected the importance of the 
role of the Corporate Controller in such processes. Third, 
the control system not only monitored the implementation 
of the strategy; but also contributed to the strategy 
formation by taking part in amending the financial 
strategy process of each agent. This will be explained in 
more detail in Level II. Fourth, the presence of the
Controller facilitated the timely interaction of the
stakeholders and the portfolio managers with the financial 
markets. The control system deployed by the Controller 
was designed to monitor dynamic strategies and goals which 
had no pre-determined ROI target. Before recruiting the 
Controller, Mosnic did not have a system of monitoring the 
dynamic strategies. Thus, the effectiveness of the
corporate strategy process depended on the timely 
attendance to market information through an endless 
process of interaction between the Controller and the 
agents. The amount of information to be managed in the 
interaction process proved to be too much to be handled 
without the existence of an involved Controller.
Indeed, the nature of strategic decision processes 
show how the Controller needed a high degree of freedom in 
dealing with the agents and the stakeholders in order to
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attend to information necessary for the management of 
complicated strategic uncertainties resulting from the 
turbulence of the financial markets.
The Impact of Stakeholders1 Religious Beliefs on Mosnic's 
Control System and Controllership Function (working Hypo­
thesis 1.2).
The agents case studies show to what extent Mosnic*s 
Islamic investment goals were implemented by Western 
portfolio managers who had little or no knowledge about 
the Islamic financial systems. The religious influence on 
the control system and strategy process magnified after 
the recruitment of the Controller. It was also part of 
the latter*s task to interact with the agents to make 
plain to them the rules of the Islamic Shari*a concerning 
the receipt and earning of interest. As part of this 
process, the Controller included a pre-condition in 
setting the fiduciary relationship with MIP and BJ-S which 
enforced the compliance with the stakeholders* requirement 
of reporting interest separately. Hence, the control 
procedures designed to monitor the work of the two agents 
provided the necessary mechanism of checking the extent to 
which these agents* performance included revenue from 
interest. As an attribute of judging whether the agent 
was good enough for portfolio management or not, the 
Controller looked into the potential capabilities of each 
agent to implement the Islamic aspects of the investment 
strategy of the stakeholders.
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The feedback of the control system to the 
stakeholders and to the agents in relation to interest 
earned was an influencing factor that led to the amendment 
of the investment strategy to avoid interest. For 
example, the investment systems to both BJ-S and MIP 
included short-term cash investment (fixed deposits) as 
part of the standard asset allocation policy. Both agents 
initially proposed that an appropriately diversified 
portfolio ought to allocate part of the funds to fixed 
deposits or in general to money market instruments. In 
contrast to this, the Controller was decisive in telling 
the two agents that irrespective of their models, which 
presented well diversified portfolios, inclusion of 
interest generating investment in the portfolio was 
strictly prohibited. By taking a strict position from any 
income generated from interest, the stakeholders were 
actually taking the risk of holding a less diversified 
portfolio by eliminating many money market instruments* 
This meant a further complication of portfolio risk 
management because Mosnic had to think of more risky 
investments to utilize its funds. The Controller had to 
manage this complicated process by examining more closely 
the methods of the agents concerned with the selection of 
the individual securities.
* As mentioned in the initial case study in Chapter 3, the
reader is reminded that if bonds are sold before
maturity then the problem of usury which arises from
earning fixed income would be solved.
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MIP and BJ-S neither objected nor refused to do 
business with Mosnic in response to the stakeholders 
stance on interest. However, their response in making 
this requirement operational was different. For example, 
MIP was not enthusiastic about the principals* religious 
requirement. Its management was a bit * too Western *. 
However, it had a reliable system of reporting interest 
separately from other revenues. On the other hand, BJ-S 
showed a more sympathetic response to the stakeholders* 
religious restrictions, but would not report interest 
separately. At the same time, the portfolio manager in 
BJ-S who was in charge of Mosnic account was careful to 
understand the religious requirements of the stakeholders. 
His knowledge about Islamic concepts of investment was 
even better than the portfolio manager assigned by MIP 
bank. Hence, the control system had to be designed to 
suit the specific control needs of each agent from a 
religious stand point. The above differences meant that 
MIP required more rigorous monitoring procedures than 
BJ-S in terms of compliance with the religious restrict­
ions on certain investment instruments.
The Impact of Information and Technology on Mosnic*s 
Control System (Working Hypothesis 1.3)
The cases of MIP, BJ-S and Vontov show that 
information technology applied by the agents made it 
possible for the management of Mosnic to learn more about 
the art of portfolio management. Since, as a result of 
utilizing the huge volume of information made available to 
Mosnic by the three agents, the management of the company
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has improved its understanding of the investment strategic 
management processes. The role of the Corporate Controller 
also has been vital in achieving this improvement. He has 
succeeded in extracting strategic information from MIP and 
BJ-S to provide useful inputs to the corporate investment 
strategy negotiated with the stakeholders.
The role of the Controller also has been significant 
in the treatment of the different information systems 
provided by the agents. The different data processing 
systems of the three agents meant different information 
system used by each agent. For example, the style of 
reporting interest, the style of reporting the portfolio 
performance, the way each agent presents the market 
outlook and the investment strategy, etc. These variations 
led the Controller to deal differently (in terms of 
reliability) with each system of information to build-up 
the Corporate information system (as illustrated in 
section 5-D chapter 5, section 6-C chapter 6, and conclu­
sion to the selection of BJ-S in page 221 chapter 5.
The agents case studies also show that the Controller 
introduced the telefax system to Mosnic and boosted the 
efficiency of its use. The telefaxes and the Reuter links 
have made the world "very small". They also have 
substantially reduced the cost of communication. This 
facility, beside that of the three agents, has enhanced 
the strategy process in Mosnic. Mosnic management no 
longer needed to be in the West or to have the Western 
portfolio managers physically in the Middle East to re­
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formulate alternative strategy if need arises. Interaction 
could be carried out at a distance.
In addition, the three cases signify that the 
strategy monitoring process in Mosnic became more 
sophisticated and intensive due to the communication 
technology utilized by the Controller. By sophistication 
we mean further understanding of what the asset managers 
would do in the complicated investment decision processes 
and being able to interpret to the agents the 
stakeholders1 shifting objectives to make these objectives 
understandable and satisfactory for the discretionary 
agents to pursue.
The progress in and the low cost of the international 
communication technology together with the presence of the 
Corporate Controller have made it possible for Mosnic to 
ensure that a tactical re-allocation of the corporate 
resources was made by the agents whenever it was seen 
necessary. Moreover, the advanced communication 
technology has made it possible for the Controller to 
build-up the corporate record keeping system by utilizing 
much more information provided on a timely basis by the 
portfolio managers. This internal build-up of information 
expedited both the re-structuring of the corporate
portfolio and the adjustment of investment strategy as the 
need arose.
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Concluding Remarks on Working Hypothesis # 1
The analysis of the three pre-investment cases 
studies, which deal with the selection of portfolio 
managers, have advanced our understanding of the 
controllership functions and the control system in Mosnic 
in the following aspects.
Formal quantitative analysis presented by the 
portfolio managers had to be adjusted in order to 
accommodate the changing objectives of Mosnicfs owners in 
response to their perception of market uncertainties. 
Level II analysis will cast light on the quantitative 
investment proposals of the discretionary agents.
Further, the case studies substantiated that the 
corporate strategy in Mosnic emerged from a number of 
financial strategies which were negotiated in a continuing 
interactive process with a portfolio of agents.
The investment strategy became more efficient and 
effective by involving the Corporate Controller who played 
a key role in orchestrating the complicated corporate 
portfolio management processes while maintaining
organizational effectiveness. In addition, his presence 
helped Mosnic to deal with the uncertainties of the 
financial markets in a better manner than before by 
securing timely attendance to the problems. Indeed, after 
the recruitment of the Controller, the corporate control 
system in Mosnic started to attempt more effectively the 
challenge of Islamizing the corporate investment strategy 
to be implemented in the West.
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The analysis of the pre-investment case studies also 
show that the use of technology by the portfolio managers 
influenced the extent to which the Controller relied on 
the different agents' information systems. This in turn 
seemed to have affected the design of the corporate 
information system.
7.2. The Interaction of Environment, Principals' 
Religious Beliefs, and Technology With Agents' 
Strategy, Structure and Processes.
(Working Hypothesis 2)
The working hypothesis 2 of the general conceptual 
framework (Fig. 4.1) indicated that environment,
principals' religious beliefs, and technology influence 
the portfolio managers' strategy, structure and process. 
However, from the analysis of the case studies of the 
specific agents, it became clear that the impact of these 
is not necessarily a direct one. Rather, it sometimes 
took place through an intervening variable which was 
Mosnic's strategy and goals as shown in Fig. 7.2.
Level II analysis will demonstrate how the different 
constructs of the agents' strategy, structure and 
processes get inter-connected with the rest of the 
contingent variables and how such an inter-connection 
affected Mosnic's control system. Hence, it is appropriate 
to discuss hypotheses 2.1.b, 2.1.c and 2.1.d, which deal 
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The Impact of Financial Markets on Agents' Strategies. 
Structures and Processes (Working Hypothesis 2.1.a)
The three pre-investment case studies show how agents 
adjusted their standard investment strategies in response 
to market changes. After amending their investment 
models, the agents voluntarily provided the Controller 
with a copy of the adjusted strategy for negotiation. The 
case studies also highlight how the agents then adjusted 
their investment strategy to take into consideration the 
comments and guidelines of Mosnic. However, unlike the 
attitude of BJ-S, which showed considerable interest in 
understanding the pattern of the principals' interaction
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with the financial markets so as to modify their 
investment strategy accordingly, MIP did not show that 
flexibility. See Chapter (5) the case of MIP where it 
criticized the strategy proposed by Mosnic.
Another aspect of difference between agents was found 
in their organizational structure. An agent's structure 
(e.g. the investment departments found in both MIP and 
BJ-S) also depended on the type of the investment markets 
in which it aimed to operate. For example, MIP policies 
and expertise were geared towards global shares portfolio 
management. BJ-S was oriented to bond portfolio 
management. Even at the level of the portfolio management 
staff the Controller observed that the portfolio managers 
were differently specialized e.g. MIP had two of its men 
specialized in the U.S. securities and one in Japan. On 
the other hand, BJ-S was the best who advised Mosnic on 
bonds. This also meant the type of the investment market 
in which the agent operated, determined the structure of 
the agent. This in turn would affect the agent processes. 
This implies that agents' structures and processes would 
differ according to the markets in which they operate. 
Hence, Mosnic needed different control systems to deal 
with MIP and BJ-S. Level II of the analysis will 
highlight how such differences from one agent to the other 
were critical to the corporate control system.
Agents also changed their structures (e.g. by split 
merger) over time to cope with new situations coming up in 
the financial markets (e.g. the merger of Vontov) and
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possibly to gain competitive advantage. A change in the 
structure of an agent would mean a change in the methods 
of investments to cope with the new market situations 
(e.g. the case of Vontov).
It might be interesting to inform the reader that 
after this chapter was written, the Controller received 
news that one of Mosnic's major agents, which was not 
studied in this research, has merged with another 
investment bank to be more competitive. The Controller is 
currently involved in studying the implications of this 
merger to Mosnic1s strategy, structure and control system.
The Impact of Technology on Agents1 Strategy. Structure 
and processes (Working Hypothesis 2.2.a).
The pre-investment case studies show that communica­
tion technology intervened through the corporate informa­
tion system of the principals to impact agents* strategy 
and processes. This was clear in the case studies where 
the Corporate Controller and the Director used the 
information and the communication facilities made 
available to them to negotiate with the agents and to 
amend the latter*s strategies. In Level II, it will be 
argued how the use of technology by different agents led 
to the emergence of a number of corporate control sub­
systems (working hypothesis 2.2.b).
The ability of the Controller to negotiate investment 
proposals with the agents was dependent on his success in 
utilizing the communication technology to appraise 
critically the means and methods of the agents. The case
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studies signify that it was highly unlikely that the 
Controller would be able to negotiate with the agents the 
amendment of their proposed investment strategies without 
the communication technological support availed by the 
company for his use.
The Impact of Stakeholders' Religious Beliefs on Agents1 
Strategy and Processes (Working Hypotheses 2.3.a and
2.3.bK
In Section 7.1. it was argued that the religious 
ideology of the stakeholders influenced the formulation of 
their investment strategy and goals. On the other hand, 
the agents' case studies supported the argument that the 
religious ideology of the principals led to an amendment 
of the agents' strategy, structure and processes. This 
suggests that the corporate strategy in Mosnic intervenes 
as a variable to impact the investment models of the 
agents. Indeed, none of the three agents really submitted 
investment proposals which Mosnic accepted without 
negotiation. In addition, the impact of the religious 
beliefs of the stakeholders intervened through the 
corporate investment goals to influence the investment 
strategy and approach of the agents.
The three case studies indicate that the pre­
selection analysis of MIP and BJ-S gave high consideration 
to the religious restrictions imposed by the principals. 
To repeat, in the investment process, the two agents were 
not allowed to invest in interest bearing securities. In 
this process1 the Controller contributed to the agents' 
understanding of this requirement. For example, see
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Chapter (6) section 6-A, the case of MIP 'Islamization of 
the investment process through MIP1, page 284.
Concluding Remarks on Working Hypothesis # 2
The analysis of the three pre-investment case studies 
has enhanced our understanding of the working hypothesis 2 
in the following aspects. It highlighted how agents1
strategy, structure and processes were modified to take on 
board the stakeholders' perception of the nature of
financial markets' uncertainties. In addition, it became 
clear that the agents' structure was influenced by both 
the type of the investment markets in which they operated 
and the potential changes in structure of the industry 
(e.g. the merger of Vontov).
Further, the recruitment of the Controller and his 
use of modern communication and information technology 
facilitated the interaction of Mosnic's owners with the
agents. This threw light on how communication technology 
intervened through the corporate information system to 
influence agents' strategy and processes.
The analysis of the case studies also revealed how 
the religious beliefs of the stakeholders influenced the 
agents' strategy, structure and processes through the
corporate strategy and goals.
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ANALYSIS LEVEL II
In the Level II analysis, I will discuss working 
hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. I will also shed more light on 
the remaining parts of working hypothesis 2.
7.3. The Inter-Relationship Between Agents' Strategy, 
Structure and Processes with Mosnic's Control 
System of maintaining an appropriate Portfolio 
of Agents (Working Hypothesis # 3)
In this section, I will analyze the three pre­
investment cases on specific agents to highlight the 
relationships between the attributes, which were developed 
by the Controller for the selection of agents, and the 
strategy formulation and pre-investment control processes. 
For detailed attributes to establishing a fiduciary rela­
tionship with the asset managers the reader is referred to 
the ASSPQ (Appendix 5.1 in Chapter (5), page 169).
The five attributes, which were described in Chapter 
(5) and which will be discussed in this working hypo­
thesis, are:
1. Agents1 investment approach; e.g. risk-taking 
attitude.
2. Agents' ability in scanning the markets, readiness 
to supply information to Mosnic, and agents' use 
of technology;
3. Agents' personnel rewarding system, turnover and 
portfolio management efficiency;
4. Effectiveness of agents' internal control system; 
and
5. Agent's structure.
1. Agents' Investment Approach.
The Controller felt that it was important to study the 
investment approach (the risk-taking attitude, the asset 
allocation models, etc) proposed by MIP, BJ-S and Vontov
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Banks to ensure that the intended agents would 
successfully manage the principals* investment risk. In 
addition, the process of negotiating the risk-taking 
attitude with the intended agents and their investment 
approach [e.g. their rational financial economic analysis, 
market outlook, strategy and asset allocation, different 
currencies investment models* etc. for more details refer 
to the three pre-investment cases in Chapter (5)] was an 
opportunity to introduce to the agents their principals* 
perception of risk. This made it possible to manage the 
corporate portfolio within the risk parameters generally 
acceptable to the stakeholders. Indeed most of chapter 
(5) describes processes through which the financial 
strategies with different agents emerged from the 
interaction between the agents' sophisticated models and 
the principals' perception of the markets' uncertainties 
as interpreted by the Controller.
The Controller also believed that differences between 
MIP, Vontov, and BJ-S in terms of their investment appro­
ach and their risk-taking attitude were important for the 
Corporate strategy process and hence, for strategic cont­
rol procedures. To understand the detailed features of the 
strategic control processes designed to monitor the invest­
ment decision processes of each agent, the Controller had 
to be clear about the details of their investment approach. 
Detailed aspects of differences in the investment approach 
of the three agents are presented in Fig. 7.3, (page 343). 
This figure shows the major sub-attributes used for 
analyzing the three agents investment approach.
-342-
For example, in evaluating the agents by the types of 
assets, (sub-attribute (1) in Fig. 7.3), the Controller 
arrived at the conclusion that Vontov and MIP had more 
talents in global shares portfolio management and other 
equity related investment while BJ-S had better abilities 
in bond management. The identification of these 
differences by the Controller enabled the principals to 
reduce their risk by assigning to the right agent the
suitable type of securities. Later on the Controller came 
to know that MIP having realized the large size of the
U.S. economy and its domination over the world financial
markets, decided to employ more of the American mathemati­
cal economists to prepare them for being U.S. shares 
specialized portfolio managers. Knowing this, the 
principals requested from the Controller to bear in mind 
that the Americans by nature are more aggressive in risk- 
taking than the Swiss managers. Thus, the Controller went 
for more interaction with MIP.
This is not to say that there were no problems
confronting the Controller in getting all the necessary 
information about agents' strengths and weaknesses in 
terms of who had better abilities in managing certain 
types of securities. Nevertheless, examining the agents' 
investment management style [Fig 7.3, sub-attribute (2)] 
revealed to Mosnic a number of important aspects for 
evaluating the strategy and investment processes of 
intended agents. For example, the outstanding experience 
of BJ-S in the choice of bonds convinced Mosnic's 
Investment Policies Committee that it would be more safe
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Fig. 7.3
Attributes to Agents' Investment Approach
1. Types of Assets:






a) Importance of market timing. 
(Frequency of Asset Allocation)




o large companies 
o small companies 
o low P/E
c) Bond Choice.





to assign bond portfolio management mainly to BJ-S. How­
ever, as shown in the control procedures designed by the 
Controller specially for BJ-S (see Chapter (6) pages 292 
to 297 BJ-S post-investment case), the processes necessary 
for monitoring bond portfolios were different from those 
designed for monitoring purely shares portfolios. Thus,the 
difference in the types of assets and in the management 
styles of different agents led to different control 
procedures. Most important for the Controller were:(1) 
ensuring that certain degree of risk-taking compatibility
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existed between the principals and the agents. (2) Agents 
had flexibility to adjust their rational (quantitative) 
models to the principals' perception of the financial 
markets' uncertainties.
2. Agents' Ability in Scanning the Markets. Readiness to 
Supply information to Principal, and the Agents' use of 
Technology.
The Corporate Controller found it necessary to 
formalize the process of studying the three agents' market 
scanning abilities, their readiness to provide market 
information to the principals, and their communication and 
information means (technology) in order to reduce the risk 
taken by the principals on their agents. This was also 
important to ensure that the intended agents' strategy and 
processes were based on reliable information i.e. the 
quality of data.
The Controller identified the differences in the 
above attributes between the three agents by using the 
following sub-attributes which emanated from the sources 
of investment input (information) used by the agent:
Information Sources Available for the Agent to Formulate 
the Investment Decision.
1. Analysis of economic factors.
( i) U.S.A., Japan, Germany, U.K., France, etc.,
monetary economics (interest rates outlook).
(a) Information from outside.
(b) External information.
(c) Reference/names of institutions/organizations 
used.
(ii) Other economics - as in (a), (b), (c) above.
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2. Sources of portfolio models.
(a) Developed internally.
(b) Borrowed from external sources.
(Names of institutions or individuals)
3. Stock market information.
(a) Internally processed.
(b) Acquired from outside sources.
4. Bond market information. 
Same as in 3 (a) & 3 (b).
5. Trends of global industry. 
Same as in 3 (a) and 3 (b).
6. Bond selection information. 
Same as in 3(a) and 3(b).
7. Common equities selection. 
Same as in 3(a) and 3(b).
MIP, BJ-S and Vontov were different in these sub­
attributes as explained in Chapter 5 in the following 
processes:
* asset allocation (different emphasis in the 
construction of the portfolio in terms of exposure 
to shares, bonds, currencies, geographical 
allocation, and industries);
* market outlook (different evaluation of future 
trends of financial markets);
* interest rate forecast (different forecast for 
global interest rates fluctuations);
* economic analysis (different evaluation of the 
economies of the countries which affect the major 
financial markets);
* security selection (different views on the types 
and number of securities to be selected for the 
proposed portfolios).
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Based on these differences, the corporate control 
procedures, which ensured the implementation of strategy, 
were differently designed for each specific agent. For 
example, unlike BJ-S, Vontov proposed to invest mainly in 
shares; however, since the stakeholders considered too 
much exposure in shares as a sign of aggressive 
investment, the Controller had to design control 
procedures which would ensure that shares are not 
cyclical, maintaining growth, and reasonably diversified. 
The indication of this relationship can be generalized to 
suggest that agent capabilities of financial markets* 
scanning, agent efficiency in providing timely market 
information to the principal, and the communication 
technology expended by the intended agent's strategy, 
structure and processes are important indicators to decide 
whether to select or to deselect a particular agent.
Hence, the strategic decisions taken by the agents of 
high market scanning abilities and by those who applied 
sophisticated communication technology in analyzing market 
information were likely to require from the Controller 
less strategic control procedures. For example, unlike 
BJ-S, MIP was considered by the Controller to be very 
competent in market scanning and had a reliable 
information system which means also the concern of the 
Controller about. Thus, if these attributes changed 
within the current agents, or as a result of hiring a new 
agent, the control procedures were likely to change 
accordingly. The concern of the Controller about the 
market scanning capabilities of the agent and the degree
347-
of reliability of information provided by them also meant 
that the Controller wanted to be sure of the quality of 
the data used by the agents in their rational financial 
and economic analysis.
3) Agents1 Personnel Rewarding Systems. Turnover and 
Portfolio Management Efficiency.
The Controller introduced the evaluation of agents1 
personnel as a further attribute to improve agents* 
selection. This was prompted by the case of Vontov where 
due to the split in the firm, the change in the investment 
approach exposed the interest of Mosnic to higher risk. 
Indeed, one of the reasons why Vontov was de-selected was 
because of the expensive restructuring of the portfolio 
(high transaction costs) by a new portfolio manager who 
allocated considerable part of the portfolio to a number 
of airlines and transportation stocks just before the Gulf 
crisis which led to rocketing energy cost. His approach 
did not properly account for market uncertainties as seen 
by the stakeholders. Moreover, to re-construct the port­
folio for making it compatible with his approach this new 
portfolio manager had to sell securities. As a result, 
Mosnic incurred further transaction costs.
Sometimes, this attribute to the selection of agents 
is difficult to test. The principals may not be able to 
discover how in the future an agent's organization will be 
restructured. Hence, this type of risk cannot be known 
before signing the agreement, but can be monitored loosely 
afterwards. I have just told the recent story of agents 
merger in section 7.2 of this chapter. This merger was not
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predictable. In any case, the Controller had no option but 
to deal with the risk taken on the personnel of the new 
agent particularly if the investment approach would 
change.
The takeover or merger of investment management firms 
by other organizations also placed a new burden on the 
principals who would be interested to assess whether the 
new ownership would provide the appropriate incentives to 
the key individuals in their organizations to motivate 
them to produce as they did before. One of the problems 
of mergers is that key personnel may not have the autonomy 
they had before. Indeed, this was another reason why the 
Controller advised the termination of the relationship 
with Vontov in order to eliminate any further risk the 
stakeholders might face due to merger or split.
The problem the Controller had with these attributes 
when examining the MIP, BJ-S and Vontov personnel 
situations was the inadequacy and the one-sidedness of 
the information available to analyze the differences in 
these attributes. The current compensation package of the 
agents1 personnel, their track record, turnover, and 
internal mobility over time, were important attributes for 
deciding whether to select or not to select an agent. 
This was because dealing with a more stable agent meant 
less risk taken by the principals on their agents. 
However, these attributes were difficult to examine due to 
lack of information and the inconveniences met by the 
Controller in asking for external organizations* personnel
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private matters.
It can therefore, be concluded that an agent's personnel 
reward system,agent*s internal stability in terms of port­
folio managers turnover, and the track record of agent*s 
personnel in the efficient management of investment, and 
performance are all attributes of considerable value in 
determining whether to establish a fiduciary relationship 
with the intended agent or not. From a strategic control 
point of view,the above argument suggests that an intended 
agent with stable structure and with a sound track record 
in efficient portfolio management was likely to require 
less monitoring effort from the Corporate Controller (e.g. 
the case of Vontov). Hence, the specific control needs of 
such an agent would be different from an agent who had 
high staff turnover. After the merger of Vontov, the 
strategy and portfolio management personnel changed which 
meant that the Controller had to monitor how the new 
personnel would approach Mosnic's portfolio. (See chapter 
5, the story of Vontov's de-selection).
Accordingly, the necessary control procedures changed 
as Mosnic changed the structure of its agents' portfolio. 
In fact, the case studies and particularly the case of 
Vontov showed that the portfolio of agents could be 
amended through the complicated processes of selecting or 
deselecting the agents.
(4) Effectiveness of intended Agent's Internal Control 
System.
An important attribute guiding whether to select or
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not to select a discretionary portfolio manager is to 
examine the effectiveness of his internal accounting
control systems. The differences between agent’s internal 
control systems were critical to Mosnicfs corporate 
control system. The case studies of MIP and BJ-S banks
showed that in order for the Corporate Controller to 
determine control needs of these agents, he had to judge 
the extent to which he would rely on these agents* 
internal accounting Control systems. (See chapter 5 - The
internal control systems review in MIP and BJ-S case
studies). However, due to significant differences which 
were observed, the corporate control system in Mosnic 
included a number of sub-systems to control the different 
agents. Indeed, if the sub-systems were not appropriately 
tailored to suit the need to each specific agent, the 
whole corporate control system could have been vulnerable 
to collapse or to be more ineffective. In fact, determining 
the suitable control procedures for the intended agents 
goes in line with evaluating the investment strategy and 
the structure of the agent.
Although in selecting or de-selecting an agent, it was 
necessary to look into the internal accounting control 
system of the agent, Mosnic did not necessarily drop BJ-S 
from its portfolio of agents because of its ineffective 
internal accounting control system. This is because BJ-S 
was found good in other aspects. Instead of de-selecting 
BJ-S, the Corporate Controller designed a more rigorous 
control system to overcome the specific weaknesses (as 
described in Chapter 6, pages 292-297). This special
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monitoring system designed for BJ-S also depicts that 
having determined the control requirements in the pre­
investment stage, the first post-investment procedure to 
be carried out by the Controller is to design (describe) 
the detailed system for monitoring the selected 
discretionary agent.
Thus, investment houses can deal with agents who have 
different levels of effectiveness in their internal 
control systems provided that (1) other attributes for the 
selection of the agents compensate for their control 
weaknesses; and (2) the corporate control system can be 
designed to accommodate the differences between agents in 
terms of the effectiveness of their internal control 
procedures.
These arguments further suggest that agents who have 
effective control procedures can be better positioned for 
vesting trust in them i.e., the level of monitoring the 
financial strategy assigned to them by their principals 
may be a bit loose. Consequently, the principal may 
require less tight monitoring procedures of some agents 
than they would for others. Hence, the principals' 
control processes for each agent may be different.
(5) An Agent's Structure.
The three pre-investment case studies show that an 
agent's structure is also an important attribute both in 
selecting an agent and in designing the necessary control 
sub-system for that agent. From the case studies it was
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possible to identify the following six components of 
agents1 structure which Mosnic had to examine in order to 
see how much security was found in the agents1 strategy 
and processes;
1. organizational set-up;
2. diversified market specialism;
3. branches and associates;
4. custodians and correspondents;
5. number and type of clients; and
6. number of clients assigned to each portfolio 
manager.
For example, if the agent*s organizational set-up for 
decision making was found to be satisfactory then the 
intended agent*s proposed investment approach (process) 
would be worthy of more credibility (see the conclusion 
sections on evaluation of agents * means and methods in the 
three pre-investment case studies). Accordingly, Mosnic 
would tend to vest more trust in the agent*s investment 
model when formulating its strategy.
Another example is that if Mosnic found that the
*
agent's custodians were highly rated then this would 
signify to it that the physical custody of its securities 
would be safeguarded and these assets would be free from 
charges and encumbrances. This would mean to the 
Controller that agent required loose monitoring procedures 
to verify the financial assets of Mosnic.
* The reader is to be reminded that Mosnic does not depend 
on the approved lists provided by rating agencies. 
Because, for example, some central banks use the audited 
financial statements of a bank to rate it as a reliable 
institution and custodian. The Controller believes the 
quality of data used in financial statements requires 
further scanning by appraising agents' strategy, 
structure and processes.
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The above suggests that agents' structure tend to in­
fluence their strategies and processes which in turn would 
affect the corporate strategy formulation and the determi­
nation of the different agent's control requirements.
Concluding Remarks on Working Hypothesis 3.
Fig 7.4. illustrates how the analysis of the three 
pre-investment case studies have advanced our
understanding of working hypothesis 3. It shows how the 
attributes of the agents' strategy, structure and 
processes affect Mosnic's strategy formulation and the 
determination of the control procedures required to 
monitor the different agents. Further, it demonstrates 
the components of agents' structure and how they influence 
Mosnic's strategy formulation and pre-investment control 
procedures through the agents' processes.
In addition, the discussion in this section has 
enhanced our understanding of the remaining parts of 
working hypothesis 2 (2.1.b, 2.1.c and 2.1.d) which deal
with the impact of portfolio agents linked to Mosnic with 
fiduciary relationships on the corporate strategy and 
control processes and role of the Controller.
7.4. The Relationship Between Maintaining A Portfolio 
of Agents and Agents' Monitoring Processes 
(Working Hypothesis # 4)
The pre-investment case studies show that the 
agents' selection processes involved the following 
investment planning processes. First, the financial
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FIG. 7.4
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strategy to be pursued by each agent had to be determined. 
This was important aspect in the negotiations with MIP, 
BJ-S and Vontov about their rational economic and finan­
cial analysis. Second, the Controller set the general out­
lines and the features of suitable control procedure to be 
tailored for monitoring each specific agent. These two 
planning processes had a direct relationship with the
post-investment strategic control processes. This is
because, based on the control features developed in the 
pre-investment stage, the first step taken by the
Controller in the post-investment stage after the
selection of the agent (as mentioned in section 7.3), is 
to design the control procedures to be implemented in 
monitoring the agent.
For example, in the selection of BJ-S, the Controller 
had to make sure when designing the monitoring procedures 
in the post-investment stage that it (BJ-S) catered for 
some of the weaknesses in its reporting system observed in 
the pre-selection stage. These included the inadequacy of 
providing data on (1) the realized and the unrealized 
losses and gains of the portfolio; (2) details of bonds 
liquidated before maturity to avoid interest; (3) details 
of securities sale and purchase transactions; (4)
information on different levels of asset allocation e.g.
- By sector of industry
- By country
- By currency
- By bond maturities
- Growth or income shares
- Bonds and convertible bond (warranties), etc.
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Hence, given the differences observed between agents 
in the pre-investment stage, this meant that the control 
systems designed to monitor each agent would also be 
different. This equally applied to the strategy 
formulation process. While formulating the strategy, the 
Controller also had to design strategic control procedures 
of each agent to monitor the implementation of the 
financial strategy negotiated with the agent.
On the other hand, having designed the control 
procedures to cater for the specific requirements of each 
agent, the Controller also had to deal with the 
performance evaluation of the discretionary portfolios 
constructed by the agents. The latter process involved 
the following:
(1) measurement of ROI;
(2) comparison with benchmarks and with other agents;
(3) bottom line assessment of ROI;
(4) identifying reasons for unsatisfactory performance;
(5) re-allocation of assets; and
(6) tightening the controls.
In the remaining part of this section, I will discuss the 
most important three of components of this multi-system of 
portfolio evaluation, namely (1) the measurement of ROI 
produced by the portfolios; (2) the comparison of agents* 
performance with each other and with market indices* and 
(3) bottom line assessment of ROI.
Measurement of ROI.
The two post-investment case studies and the 
deselection of Vontov, indicated that some of the agents
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(e.g. MIP and Vontov) used return on investment as a 
measure of their portfolio performance and compared it 
with the market indices. However, to Mosnic, that was 
only a general short-term indicator of how the agent 
strategy was proceeding. Agents were allowed a longer 
time horizon to adjust to the changes in the financial 
markets and to be able to accommodate the shifting 
objectives of the stakeholders in response to market 
uncertainties. Even Vontov (see the end of the fiduciary 
relationship in chapter 5) was not deselected for the 
unsatisfactory portfolio performance which was mainly 
ascribed to the panic of the financial markets caused by 
the Gulf turmoil. Rather, the relationship was terminated 
when the principals became convinced that Vontov had 
changed its structure, processes and strategy to the 
extent they were no longer compatible with Mosnic strategy 
and goals - although these changes in approach may 
themselves have contributed to the imprudent stance taken 
by Vontov. Hence, Mosnic used the above multi-system of 
evaluating agents' performance. This concept will be 
discussed in more depth later on in Chapter (9) where the 
finance literature is reviewed.
However, it is important to emphasize that most of 
the agents (as illustrated by the post-investment cases in 
chapter 6) do try to analyze performance based on risk and 
return. The experience of Mosnic also shows that even 
after using the best computing technology the asset 
managers have hardly been accurate in assessing the real
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market uncertainties as seen by the stakeholders. 
Moreover, the Controller has actually observed that the 
portfolio mangers take risk as diversifiable and un- 
diversifiable. They tell Mosnic that if it accepts taking 
the second type of risk, then markets would automatically 
yield an ROI equal to the money market rate less the 
transaction cost (1/4% on return on the fiduciary place­
ments) and the asset management fee. Though Mosnic wanted 
to be very conservative, fixed interest earning (i.e. 
money market instruments) are not permanently allowed 
forms of investments due to religious restrictions. Thus, 
Mosnic*s model for managing the religious risk (e.g. by 
selling before maturity and temporarily parking funds in 
fiduciary placement, i.e money market accounts etc.) meant 
that the asset managers had to re-consider their classifi­
cation of risk into two main measurable types. Hence, the 
whole concept of ROI based on the rational portfolio 
models adopted by the agents needed additional information 
to be given by the Controller, further negotiations, and 
modifications in a continuous process of interaction.
Moreover, had Mosnic operated a policy of switching 
between agents where unsatisfactory ROI's were achieved, 
it could have incurred huge transaction costs. Such 
transaction costs would include: 1) The lead time required 
by the newly hired agent to reconstruct the portfolio of 
the old agent to make it compatible with his firm*s 
investment strategy. 2) Brokerage fees in selling and 
buyinbg securities. 3) Possible loss of higher return
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while money was “parked" in cash or short-term securities 
while the portfolio was being reconstructed (especially 
bearing in mind the prohibition of interest). 4) The
considerable effort involved in the selection of a new 
agent.
Comparison of Agents1 Performance for Evaluation of 
Results Achieved.
The comparison of the performance of MIP, BJ-S and 
Vontov emerged as one of the problematic issues for Mosnic 
because of their different structures, strategy and 
processes. The standards of comparison available for the 
Controller to deal with the three agents were as follows:
(1) Comparison with an absolute goal (i.e. long-term 
pre-determined goal).
(2) Comparison with market indices.
(3) Comparison with other portfolios.
The main problem was that, to compare one had to make 
accurate measurement first.
Furthermore, the agents differed in their choice of 
the method by which their portfolio performance should be 
evaluated. The Controller did not agree with Vontov about 
the idea of comparison with an absolute goal because this 
contradicted with the stakeholders* strategy of managing 
investment risk through close interaction with the markets 
and then with the agents.
Another problem with the absolute goal method of 
performance measurement was that, practically speaking,
all portfolios would fail to meet the different objectives 
negotiated with the agents in a troubled year and would 
perform better in a good time. On the other hand, Vontov, 
which was one of the best managers in strong bull markets, 
showed the poorest performance in bear markets. BJ-S, the 
conservative manager, showed the poorest performance in 
the most difficult markets. Thus, the decisions to be 
taken subsequent to measuring performance using absolute 
goals achievement system were critical and required 
careful considerations of the differences between agents 
in terms of their investment strategy, approach, and 
philosophy of investment before any final judgment was to 
be made. The case studies (e.g. MIP in Chapter (5)) showed 
that it could be simplistic to impose on any agent a 
standard ROI to be produced.
Another problem of the absolute goal system of 
portfolio performance measurement was that the
stakeholders and the Controller needed to agree with the 
agents on the provision of additional benchmarks in order 
to understand the activities of the portfolio and to 
assess whether the manager was doing a good or a bad job 
in the light of the specific market environment in which 
the concerned agent was operating.
After the investment mechanism starts, one can hardly 
find typical portfolios constructed by different agents 
even if the ’guidelines are the same. Depending on each 
agent approach and the portfolio managers' philosophy the
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selection of securities can be largely different. But 
each agent have his rational analysis for justifying the 
selection of securities. Thus, one cannot compare the 
agents even if the investment guidelines given to them are 
the same and the ROI produced by them is not the same.
Indeed, the three agents agreed to provide the bench­
mark information required by the principals and the Cont­
roller. The problem of dealing with different agents in 
terms of performance measurement by the benchmarks (market 
index) approach was to look beyond the problems inherent in 
the absolute goals. This was obvious because the pattern of 
each agent's interaction with the financial markets was 
different and dominated his investment returns. In fact, 
the agents case Studies show that they differed in terms of 
guidelines issued to them. (See (1) in chapter 5 section 
5-A (The case of MIP selection) asset allocation discuss­
ion, and (2) in section 5-B (BJ-S selection) see 'specific 
requirements' page 184). Hence, the benchmark system 
(which depends on standard ROI) alone was not enough.
In practical terms, the Controller had to look into 
the objectives negotiated with each agent to appraise the 
way in which that particular agent coped with the 
financial markets. These objectives were not absolutely 
financial. Sometimes they were even religious. Some 
agents were told to invest purely in shares, e.g. Vontov. 
Others were holding portfolios composed of bonds, treasury 
bills and shares. Hence, each agent required a specific
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measurement system and special consideration for the 
emerging structure of each portfolio. Insisting on 
comparison of agents who are not alike, means setting one 
standard for the structure of all the discretionary 
portfolios. This would actually contradict with the 
policy of diversification over agents to benefit from 
their different types of specialism. This policy is one 
of Mosnicfs models to cope with investment uncertainties 
but without necessarily using sophisticated measurement 
techniques.
Comparison of Different Agents1 Performance with Market 
Portfolios (Benchmark comparison)
This is an important process because its indications 
draw attention to the problems of the financial strategy 
adopted by each agent.
The fact that agents used to compare their performance 
with market indices led to problems of a different nature. 
For example, the representative of MIP failed to explain 
to the Controller why in evaluating its performance MIP 
compared Mosnic portfolio with the market portfolio. The 
MIP representatives reply was that the system was set by 
the bank and applied as it was. MIP representative also 
could not explain to the Controller whether the market 
indices had the same transaction costs incurred by Mosnic. 
These costs differed from one agent to the other. The 
problem of Mosnic was more complex because the three 
agents serving Mosnic had different portfolio transaction
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costs. Hence, the comparison of different agents 
performance with market indices would usually lead to 
different results. Above all that, as argued earlier, the 
stakeholders* could hardly believe that beta can measure 
accurately the relative risk of stocks.
Bottom line Assessment of ROI.
The case studies also indicated that the principal's 
post-investment pattern of dealing with the three agents 
differed from one agent to the other. This meant that 
Mosnic applied different bottom line judgements on the 
different performance of agents taking into consideration 
the different market situation in which each agent 
operated and the investment strategy negotiated with each 
agent. Indeed, the asset allocation style which Mosnic 
negotiated with MIP, BJ-S and Vontov was not the same. 
Because once the investment process started and the 
performance was reported, attention moved to the current 
specific problem of the portfolio rather than arguing 
about what had been agreed. Even if the same objective 
was agreed with each agent when the investment process 
started, the three agents came upon dissimilar problems. 
Hence, the tactical re-allocation of the portfolio 
securities (a process in the bottom line approach) with 
each of the three agents turned to be the most significant 
post-investment control procedure. It was different from 
agent to the other depending on the nature of the found 
post-investment situation.
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This also indicates that debating the re-allocation 
of assets by investment houses (as appropriate in each 
portfolio) in reaction to the financial markets is at the 
core of the control procedures stakeholders use to manage 
their risk while hoping in a more general way for a bottom 
line satisfactory performance. Indeed, to avoid the risks 
involved in over-reacting to the short-term depression of 
the performance, and shifting from one agent to the other, 
Mosnic tried to make sure that the agents were 
appropriately re-constructing their portfolio. This meant 
improving the decision processes of each agent as 
appropriate while satisfying the requirements of the 
stakeholders.
Hence, it can be argued that the bottom line approach 
is a process by which the principals rectify the agent 
strategy and processes to improve the portfolio 
performance. However, the bottom line approach does not 
replace the rational measurement of the ROI. Rather, it 
treats ROI as one of the factors which is considered 
together with other processes. Moreover, the bottom line 
appraisal processes are complicated, unpredictable, depend 
on the specific nature of the portfolio problem and they 
fundamentally differ from one agent situation to the 
other. This is because the different agents organizational 
processes lead to different types of portfolio management 
problems. The Controller had to understand each problem 
specifically. There is no hard target for ROI in either 
absolute or relative terms. The ROI calculations serve as
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a basis for summarizing views on different securities in 
different situations. They therefore facilitate debate in 
the process of interaction between agent and stakeholders 
rather than provide definite calculations of how resources 
should be allocated.
Concluding Remarks on Working Hypothesis 4
Fig. 7.5 summarizes the insights gained from the 
analysis of the post-investment case studies concerning 
working hypothesis 4. It shows how the pre-investment 
processes for maintaining the portfolio of agents tend to 
determine the features of the post-investment control 
processes. Further, it signifies that the corporate 
control system comprises a number of sub-systems to cater 
for the requirement of monitoring the different strategy, 
structure and processes of agents.
The figure also depicts that, in evaluating the 
performance of portfolios, Mosnic used a multi-system to 
take on board several parameters (e.g. stakeholders* 
shifting objectives, transaction costs of terminating and 
hiring agents) which could not be reflected by ROI alone. 
Having dealt with one direction of the arrows in Fig. 
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7.5. The Feedback of Agents' Performance Evaluation 
System to the Process of Maintaining An 
Appropriate Portfolio of Agents 
(Working Hypothesis 5)
The post-investment case studies show that based on 
the results provided by the multi-system used by Mosnic to 
evaluate the performance of agents, it had two 
alternatives to pursue, namely (1) to modify the financial 
strategy of the agent; or (2) to deselect the agent. If 
it opted for the latter option, (e.g. the case of Vontov) 
this would mean a change in the pre-investment strategic 
process, for example the re-allocation of assets either 
among the existing agents or to a new agent. The re­
allocation of assets among the existing agents would mean 
that their current financial strategies would be modified. 
Accordingly, the control processes would need to be 
adjusted to cater for the new features of the agents' 
portfolio.
On the other hand, if Mosnic decided to modify the 
financial strategy of the agent due to the results of 
their performance evaluation, this meant a reconstruction 
of the agent's portfolio (provided the latter was prepared 
to amend his strategy). Accordingly, the Controller had 
to determine the control requirements of the modified 
portfolio which, as argued in working hypothesis 4, would 
impact the post-investment control processes. Hence, the 
dynamic and overlapping nature of the strategy formulation 
and implementation and control processes of investment 
houses operating through a portfolio of agents.
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Concluding Remarks on Working Hypothesis 5 
Fig. 7.5. also shows how the multi-system of 
portfolios' performance evaluation feeds back to the 
process of maintaining the portfolio of agents. The 
figure also reflects the feedback loop process by which 
the changes in the process of maintaining the portfolio of 
agents affects the post-investment processes.
7.6. The Detailed Conceptual Framework
In the light of the analysis of the specific agents
case studies, the general conceptual framework developed
in Chapter 4 (Fig. 4.1.) can now be elaborated into a
detailed conceptual framework. This is illustrated in 
*
Fig. 7.6. which is a product of Figs. 7.1, 7.2, 7.4 and
7.5.
In comparison with Fig. 4.1 (The General Conceptual 
Framework) Fig. 7.6 shows the following additional 
features. The strategy formulation in Mosnic (box B) 
emerged from a stream of financial strategies negotiated 
in an interactive process with a portfolio of agents (box 
G) . It can also be realized that agents' strategy, 
structure and processes have a number of attributes (box 
C) which impact Mosnic's strategy formulation and control 
processes required to monitor the different agents (boxes 
G and H).
* The reader will appreciate that to make the detailed 
conceptual framework simple, I have not shown in fig. 
7.6 the sub-attributes of factors inside box (C). For 
example, agent investment approach alone would need a 
box as big as Fig. 7.3 on page 343.
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In addition, the figure demonstrates that in the 
post-investment process (box E) 1) there are a number of 
sub-systems designed to monitor the different agents; and 
2) the evaluation of the different portfolios is based on 
a number of components (multi-system). It also reflects 
how these post-investment processes affect and are 
affected by the pre-investment processes (box F).
However, the reader must appreciate that even this 
detailed conceptual framework does not embrace all the 
subtle intricacies of the resource allocation processes as 
highlighted in this and the previous chapters.
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CHAPTER-8 
PRIMARY CONCLUSION ON STRATEGY 
AND CQNTRQLLERSHIP IN INVESTMENT HOUSES
MANAGEMENT ACADEMIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
Introduction
Academics in the field of management are used to 
being informed by the literature at an early stage of the 
research. However, this research built its grounded 
theory first in order to contrast it afterwards with the 
different bodies of knowledge in the literature. Glaser 
and Strauss (1979) argue that:
"substantive theory faithful to the empirical situation 
can not, we believe, be formulated merely by applying a 
few ideas from an established formal theory to the 
substantive area. To be sure one goes out and studies an 
area with a particular sociological perspective, and with 
a focus, a general question, or a problem in mind. But he 
can (and we believe should) also study an area without any 
preconceived theory that dictates prior to the research, 
"relevancies1' in concepts and hypotheses." (P33)
Thus, by inducing the grounded theory of this 
research from the detailed case studies, the researcher 
aimed at studying his problems without being over­
influenced too much by pre-conceived theory which would 
dictate prior to the research relevancies and concepts. 
As explained in Chapter (1) figure 1.1, I started with 
some general ideas from literature.
Adopting the inductive approach to theory generation 
came naturally to me, a practitioner. My prior knowledge 
was largely that acquired from the field and I attempted 
to capture that with my initial case study. However, that
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initial knowledge perception was not enough. I needed to 
do more field work. The initial case needed to be 
supported by the case studies of different agents in order 
to check for consistency. In fact, this process revealed 
far more complexity than initially realized. Only towards 
the end of the research did I, as a practitioner (and a 
researcher), consult the literature to examine what 
theories were there compared with the theory developed 
from Mosnic. This identified the similarities and 
differences between the literature and the theory 
advocated in this study in addition to what the latter can 
contribute to the former.
The above arguments are not meant to suggest that the 
practitioner conducting this research was not informed at 
all by the literature before starting this research 
process. In fact, the Controller (the researcher) used to 
consult the relevant literature very often to seek 
solutions for some of the managerial problems which 
confronted him. However, the Controller did not have a 
clear framework which would draw the boundaries of the 
control problems and hence be able to consult the relevant 
literature. Indeed, he needed to analyze his problem in 
depth through examing relations with different agents and 
then analyze it to identify the relationships which affect 
the control system and controllership functions in Mosnic.
In order to refresh the memory of the reader, I 
present next the distinctive features of Mosnic and the 
major findings emerging from the analysis of the agents'
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cases.
THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF MOSNIC AND THE 
MAJOR ISSUES EMERGING FROM THE RESEARCH
To determine which areas of the existing theory are 
to be consulted, it is useful to summarize the distinctive 
characteristics of Mosnic and the major issues emerging 
from the research.
STRATEGY FORMATION IN MOSNIC
In Mosnic, strategy emerged in a stream of decisions 
taken by the principals and the agents. Therefore, the 
sub-systems (models) of the agents were relevant to the 
formation of the overall corporate strategy. These models 
were presented by the agents as proposals subject to be 
amended to match with the stakeholders' perception of the 
markets' uncertainty. However, given the volatility of 
the financial markets, Mosnic could not confine itself to 
rational economic and financial analysis (carried out by 
the portfolio managers) alone to formulate investment 
strategy. Rather, Mosnic had to get into open negotiation 
with the discretionary portfolio managers' to ensure the 
compatibility of their sub-strategies with what the 
stakeholders' expect as an overall investment strategy. 
Hence, I will need to review the literature on strategy 
formulation to ascertain what insights can be gained to 
explain the situation in Mosnic.
CONTROLLERSHIP RELATED ISSUES
Mosnic decentralized its portfolio operations to a 
number of external discretionary agents. Thus, the agents
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represent the accountable responsibility centres for 
Mosnic. The agents operated under the hierarchical 
structure of their own organizations but remained 
accountable to Mosnic for their performance. Hence, it is 
necessary to try to draw parallels with the literature on 
the control of responsibility centres in large multi- 
nationally divisionalized companies.
In Mosnic, control and strategy were intimately 
connected and hardly separable. The theory produced in 
chapter (7) indicates that interactive involvement of the 
control function was essential for the formulation and the 
implementation of the investment strategy. Indeed, some 
strategy processes (e.g, the tactical re-allocation of the 
assets, shifting the financial strategy, maintaining an 
appropriate portfolio of agents etc.) emerged as 
significant control aspects for Mosnic. Hence, it is 
necessary to find out what the strategic control 
literature can offer this thesis about the relationship 
between strategy and control and how that is influenced by 
the environment.
In Mosnic, the perception of risk by the stakeholders 
was not clear. As a result, management could not forecast 
the expected return on investment to set clear performance 
targets for the discretionary agents. This led to the 
problem of how to evaluate the discretionary portfolios 
performance based on ROI projections. Indeed, the 
portfolio management processes were too complicated to be 
understood by simple ROI calculations provided by the
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agents themselves. Hence, discretionary agents accountab­
ility based on risk-adjusted future returns emerged as a 
critical issue facing Mosnic. Thus, it is in this context, 
that the thesis needs to consult both the portfolio model 
itself and approaches to portfolio performance evaluation 
provided by the finance literature.
In Mosnic, the role of controllership in strategic 
decision process was wide. The Controller was needed to 
help in attending to complicated portfolio management 
processes. His involvement in such processes raised the 
questions of his own independence and performance 
measurement. The interactive role of the Controller proved 
to be fundamental in facilitating the principal-agent 
interaction processes. The interactive management approach 
also triggers the discretionary agents accountability 
issue. These problems are examined in the controllership 
theory from the perspectives of interactive learning loop 
processes and management of strategic uncertainties.
In Mosnic, the selection of the agents was the most 
significant decision to be taken. This involved 
complicated processes and allocation of resources. Mosnic 
actually strived to select the best agents who were 
prepared to expend the maximum resources to take the best 
investment decisions while mitigating the divergence 
between the principals' risk taking attitude and their 
(the agents') attitude towards investment risks. Both the 
finance theory approach to investment decision and 
agency theory will be reviewed in Chapter (9) with a view
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of advising on these problems.
Having described and analyzed the cases of the agents, 
the professional literature contributed by portfolio 
managers will also be examined to find out the differences 
and the similarities between what is advocated and the 
theory of Mosnic.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Based on the problems and the distinctive 
characteristics of Mosnic enumerated in the previous para­
graphs, the following structure was followed in reviewing 
the relevant academic literature. In this chapter, under 
Management Literature the following will be reviewed:
(1) Strategy formulation
(2) Control literature
In Chapter (9) , the Finance Theory will be reviewed, 
and in particular the following relevant areas will be 
covered:
(1) The Modern Portfolio Theory and the risk-adjusted 
return methods for evaluation of portfolio 
performance.
(2) The Professional Literature contributed by the 
professional portfolio managers will also be 
surveyed in Chapter (9).
(3) The Agency Theory will be reviewed in the last 




The distinctive features of Mosnic have indicated that 
strategy emerges in a stream of complicated decisions 
taken at different levels by the principal and the 
discretionary agents in an endless interaction process. 
The controllership role is a key to the strategy change. 
The powerful clues and logics for setting directions for 
the discretionary agents to search for the acceptable 
investment strategy are represented by a series of 
organizational processes. These processes involve the 
interaction of the Controller with both the discretionary 
agents and the stakeholders in making changes in the 
strategic goals manageable. Now, I take this strategy 
problem to some relevant theory in the field of corporate 
strategy to find out similarities and differences and to 
come-up with implications for strategy theory.
Quinn's (1978 and 1980) approach to the question of 
strategic decision calls for viewing strategy formulation 
within the framework of organization behaviour. Emphasiz­
ing the need for his study Quinn argues that many 
behavioural studies have been conducted in settings far 
removed from the realities of strategy formulation. He 
has also emphasized that other studies have concentrated 
solely on human dynamics, power relationships, and 
organizational processes, but have ignored the ways in 
which systematic data analysis shapes and often dominates 
crucial aspects of strategic decisions. Quinn concludes
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that few of these studies have offered much normative 
guidance for strategists. Recognizing the contributions 
and the limitations of both approaches, Quinn has 
attempted to document the dynamics of actual strategic 
change processes in some ten major companies as perceived 
by those most knowledgeably and intimately involved in 
them.
Several important findings have emerged from Quinn's 
investigations. In fact he has concluded that neither 
"the power-behavioural" nor the "formal systems planning" 
paradigms completely characterize the way successful 
strategic processes operate.
Quinn (1988) further argues that effective strategies 
tend to emerge from a series of "strategic sub-systems", 
each of which attacks a specific class of strategic issues 
(e.g., acquisitions, divestiture or major reorganizations) 
in a disciplined way, but which is blended incrementally 
and opportunistically into a cohesive pattern that becomes 
the company's strategy. He further argues that the logic 
behind each "subsystem" is so powerful that, to some 
extent, it may serve as a normative approach for 
formulating the key elements of strategy in large 
companies. He proposes that because of cognitive and 
process limits, almost all of these subsystems and the 
formal planning itself must be managed and linked together 
by an approach best described as "logical incrementalism".
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Quinn concludes his arguments by stating:
"such incrementalisn is not 'muddling'. It is a 
purposeful, effective pro-active management technique 
for improving and integrating both the analytical and 
behavioural aspects of strategy formulation." (P.95)
Quinn's stance on incrementalism is supported by 
Pascale (1984) whose work describes Honda's success in 
achieving competitive advantage in Western Motorcycle 
markets. Pascale argues that the Japanese do not use the 
term "strategy" to refer to one competitive master plan of 
business. Rather, they think more in terms of "strategic 
accommodation" or "adaptive persistence", under-scoring 
their belief that corporate direction evolves from an 
incremental adjustment to unfolding events. Pascale
further states that rarely in the view of the Japanese 
does one leader (or a strategic planning group) produce a 
bold strategy that guides a firm unerringly. Instead, he 
believes, what the Japanese value above all things is the 
ability of an organization to raise ideas from bottom to 
top and back again in continuous dialogue. He concludes 
that:
"As this dialogue is pursued, what in hindsight may be 
"strategy" evolves. In sum, "strategy" is defined as 
"all the things necessary for the successful 
functioning of organization as an adoptive mechanism." 
(Quoted from Quinn, et. al 1988, P113)
Tomkins (1991), referring to Pascale's work,
describes the story told by Pascale on how the Honda
executives planned their entry to the American markets as 
a fascinating description of relatively uninformed risk 
and opportunism coupled with technological advantage which
was only seen as market worthy in the U.S.A. after the 
initial products offered in the U.S. market had failed. 
The story told by Pascale demonstrates learning and 
experimentation derived from incrementalism. The
difference is that the Honda experiments were from real 
life and not from the pre-decision perceptions of the 
executives. Tomkins says the process described by Pascale 
did not seem all that logical. However, as Tomkins argues, 
it succeeded largely through a process of persistence and 
perception of opportunity as it unfolded. The conclusion 
drawn by Pascale is that the Japanese distrust single 
strategic plans as they believe that they limit peripheral 
vision which is fundamental for recording and reacting to 
environmental changes. Tomkins (1991) argues that this 
conclusion of Pascale at the very least supports Quinn's 
stance on incrementalism.
Now, we return back to look deeper into the version 
of incrementalism advocated by Quinn to compare this with 
the theory indicated by the case of Mosnic on the strategy 
formation issue to draw similarities and to find out 
differences and implications.
In general, one can draw parallels with Quinn to 
conclude that Mosnic has the extreme form of an 
incrementalism since the agents sub-strategies form the 
corporate strategy. Furthermore, Quinn argues that 
rational planning systems over-emphasize the prediction 
and the measurability of the organizational goals.
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Similarly, Mosnic could not adopt a purely financial 
(rational) planning and measurement approach, because 
nature of the financial markets' turbulence and the 
unpredictability of the stakeholders' pattern of interac­
tion with future market circumstances. The difference 
between Quinn's argument about over-emphasizing the 
measurability of organizational goals in planning systems 
and Mosnic's use of rational analysis is that in the 
latter's situation agents present their financial and 
economic analysis assuming applicability of the quantitive 
methods in predicting the future. But Mosnic does not 
take this as a good reflection of what would happen in the 
future markets. Thus, the Controller intervenes to help 
the agents understand how the stakeholders interact with 
the markets' uncertainties which means the process of 
amending (changing) the rational analysis is more frequent 
in investment houses. In other words, the rational 
economic and financial analysis are used by the investment 
house, but any one analysis can hardly remain valid for 
long as the financial markets change perhaps everyday.
The implication of the above is that in the 
investment houses pursuing their activity through 
discretionary agents, rational portfolio models/analysis 
are used to give the decision-maker the insight (which the 
principal's lack) but the organizational behaviour (the 
variable way the investors perceive risk, their market 
psychology, what others tell them, what they need, etc.) 
influence the formulation of strategy which means the
perception of risk by the principal and what they need
supersedes the power of the agents' logic in formulating
strategy. The reason why the stakeholders do not want to
depend on the agents' quantitive methods is ascribed to
their experience with the nature of the financial market 
uncertainty. This will be further elucidated in Chapter 
(9) with the review of the finance theory.
Thus, a further implication of this study for the 
arguments of Quinn is that rational analysis for the 
formulation of the strategic investment decision is not 
trivial in the investment process, but it gets revised and 
adjusted as the organization behaviour influences the 
post-investment complicated processes. The reader is to 
be cautioned, however, that the rational quantitative 
analysis carried out by the portfolio managers are vital 
for Mosnic to remain informed about the different views of 
these agents. This will also be discussed further in the 
finance theory version on the modern portfolio theory.
Quinn (1980) has described the process by which the 
strategic decisions emerge in large companies using the 
analogy of large rivers slowly moving in specific 
directions, contain within them various ebbs, flows and 
eddies which do not necessarily contribute in any direct 
analytical way to the general direction yet nevertheless, 
in aggregate, help to determine it. It is argued by Quinn 
that the flow of these rivers has direction, but no 
obvious beginning nor end. Tomkins (1991) comments on 
this analogy and says that in a company this could be
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interpreted as the absence of a clear separation between 
strategy and implementation. Given the situation of 
Mosnic, one can draw another parallel with Quinn's 
conclusion about the overlap between strategy and 
implementation. On the other hand, this study implies 
further that the process by which the strategic decisions 
emerge and get implemented in the investment houses may be 
different due to the nature of the environment, the 
product, the role of external organizations' means, 
methods and people. In fact, there is no single point in 
time that the investment houses can assume their resources 
are optimally allocated. Resource allocation in investment 
houses depends on maintaining the appropriate portfolio of 
agents which are different in their strategy, structure 
and processes. This in itself is a complicated process. 
It involves discussing with different agents in different 
times and in different processes different investment 
goals which can hardly remain static. Thus, the 
formulation of any tight, analytical and holistic master 
plan to be assigned to the different agents for 
implementation is far too difficult (if not completely 
impossible) for organizations operating in the financial 
markets through a portfolio of different agents. In fact, 
investment strategy emerges from a fluid interaction 
between the principal and each agent. This interaction 
requires the presence of a capable controller to secure 
appropriate interpretation of the stakeholders' perception 
of the financial markets' uncertainty. Perhaps these 
markets' uncertainty are more difficult to forecast than
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the other businesses risk.
Also, the implication of this argument to the 
strategy literature is that, in investment houses, it is 
difficult to set a limit for the time needed to create 
awareness of threats and opportunities, build consensus, 
select and train people for change and marshall resources. 
This is because in a discretionary investment process, due 
to the volatility of the financial markets, the strategy 
formulation and implementation happen all at a time in a 
continuous process. A key factor for the success of these 
processes is the intimate interaction of the owners with 
the discretionary agents and the Controller. Hence, a 
major message of this thesis to the strategy literature is 
that strategic decision in the investment houses operating 
through a portfolio of agents emerge and flow similar to 
different rivers which do not have confluences. These 
processes involve monitoring amending and even formulating 
the investment decisions demonstrated by the different 
discretionary agents. This can be viewed as incremental 
logic but in a different process from that of Quinn.
As one goes deeper to the discretionary investment 
decision levels in the investment houses, life becomes 
even more complicated than the picture given by Quinn. 
For example, as argued previously, the behaviour of the 
stakeholders which changes with the unpredictable 
uncertainty of the markets, supersedes the rational 
investment models presented by the discretionary agents.
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This is even though the sophisticated risk-return analysis 
models are taken by the principals as an indicator to 
understand the methods and the means of the agents under 
the different market circumstances. This means Quinn's 
incrementalism is found in the discretionary investment 
decision formulation processes, but the process of
strategic change does not embrace (adopt) agents-wide 
rational analysis as argued by Quinn. Rather, the agents 
embrace (each one in his strategy) the new objectives of 
the stakeholders.
Quinn portrays the top executive as if he develops 
his ideas about strategy and tests them through 
experiments in separable parts of the company. The 
process by which strategic ideas emerge is different in 
investment houses operating through the use of discretion­
ary agents. This is because the externalization of 
portfolio management means that the strategic decision 
makers want to seek ideas of the external professional 
organizations (the agents). Thus, the principals do not 
have preset ideas to be tested. Indeed, the discretionary 
portfolio management process starts by the corporate
executives of the principals (the Controller) asking for 
new ideas from the different parts (the agents) of the
company. The principals may not have the expertise to set
the broad strategic directions (as argued by Quinn) to be 
viewed by the agents. In fact, the agents advise the 
principal about the investment directions then the latter 
feeds in his reguirement by the Controller. Hence, one can
conclude that the agents strategy and processes (the 
method and the means) influence the strategic investment 
directions.
Quinn argues that the direction is set by powerful 
clues or "logics" gradually established in the 
organization which enables sub-systems to bound their 
search for strategies. Then he gives a picture that when 
enough testing of each main idea has been achieved and 
sufficient knowledge gained, the chief executive goes 
public and announces the decision. Tomkins (1991) 
summarizes this process which is described by Quinn as 
that the chief executive declares the decision publicly 
after securing the knowledge that there will be support 
for it because the decision merely 'crystalizes' the views 
already put to him whether he subtley induced them or not. 
Tomkins further emphasizes that it is important not to 
read Quinn in terms of calling for a destruction of formal 
corporate planning or rational analysis. He adds that 
Quinn's fundamental point is simply that it is foolish to 
try to produce a total group wide analysis at one point of 
time and then to go ahead rapidly implementing that, 
ignoring changing external and internal environments. 
Thus, in Quinn's approach, rational economic and financial 
analysis will be vital in presenting proposals, examining 
relationships between strategic different decisions. 
Thus, Quinn does not dismiss rational analysis. On the 
other hand, in Mosnic there are numerous situations where 
decisions are made without much rational analysis. For
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example, the decision of the stakeholders that bonds 
should represent the major assets in the portfolio. This 
in fact depended purely on the stakeholders' naive (not 
rational) perception of the nature of financial markets' 
uncertainty. They did not conduct rational analysis. 
They just depended on their experience with the stock 
markets and the bond markets. Sometimes the notion of 
risk as presented by the portfolio managers might not be a 
good reflection of uncertainty to the stakeholders. This 
will be further discussed in Chapter (9) which is about 
the Modern Portfolio Theory.
A major similarity between the strategic decision 
process described by Quinn and the discretionary 
investment process (the case of Mosnic) is that, in both 
situations, economic models are vital in presenting the 
proposals. However, as one goes deeper levels to the 
nature of the discretionary investment decision processes, 
Quinns' approach does not explain the process by which the 
clues and logics' are used to set the direction in the 
investment house to enable the subsystems (the 
discretionary agents) to bound their search for 
strategies. The major difference is ascribeable to two 
factors: first, the organizational complications in the
discretionary investment decision processes and the 
multiple levels at which these decisions unfold; second, 
the involvement of the controllership function in the 
strategic investment decision processes. For example, the 
decision levels and processes in the discretionary
investment situation under this study involves the broad 
corporate investment decisions, the resources allocation 
processes to the main categories of the financial assets 
through the principal-controller-agents interaction. At 
further deeper levels (in the individual securities 
selection processes), the discretionary agents play a 
significant role. In the situation of Mosnic, the 
corporate logic or clue used to set the direction is the 
Controller's interpretation of the stakeholders' variable 
perceptions of risk. Unlike, the clues in the argument of 
Quinn, in Mosnic, the powerful logics and clues are not 
gradually established inside the organization to enable 
the subsystem (the discretionary agents) to bound their 
search for investment strategy. In fact, the powerful 
logics and clues are first to be established in external 
organizations, and second these logics change so 
frequently over time that most of them are actually 
established within the strategy implementation process. 
Indeed, because of the nature of: (1) the uncertainties in 
the fast-moving financial markets, (2) the role of the 
interactive controllership, and (3) the clear-cut 
independent tasks of the discretionary agents (each one is 
separately flowing river), the process by which the 
strategic decision unfold in the investment houses differ. 
Perhaps due to the revocability of the investment decision 
(i.e. due to the swift marketability of the held 
securities) and because there is often no time for the 
gradual establishment of the powerful logics and clues the 
process is different in investment houses. In fact,
Mosnic's problems in terms of gradual establishment of
rational goals is more complex. The trouble the Controller 
had to deal with was how rationality could be used while 
events were coming along so fast that the stakeholders 
could not get time to think deeply and rationally about 
things.
Hence, a further implication of this argument for the 
strategy theory is that the establishment of powerful 
clues and logics for setting directions in the investment 
organizations to enable the subsystems to bound their 
search for strategies are contingent on the post­
investment role of the Controller, the principals' 
environment and the means and the methods (strategy,
structure and the processes) of the discretionary agents 
i.e. the subsystems themselves.
Quinn gives a picture of effective strategy as 
emerging from a series of strategic subsystems each of 
which attacks a specific class of strategic issue in a 
disciplined way, but which is blended incrementally and
opportunistically into a cohesive pattern that becomes the 
company's strategy. This is exactly what happens in Mosnic 
except that each agent runs his own subsystem.
Quinn also argues that formal practices usually 
institutionalize incrementalism. If one takes the short­
term financial strategies Mosnic used to negotiate with 
each agent as formal plans and compare it to Quinn's 
statement, many similarities can be observed between his
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increment a 1 logic and the issue of strategy formulation in 
investment houses.
According to Quinn the first reason for the 
institutionalization of incrementalism by formal practices 
is to utilize specialized expertise and to obtain
executive involvement and commitment. Hence, most plan­
ning occurs "from the bottom up" in response to broadly
defined assumptions or goals, many of which are long­
standing or negotiated well in advance. The second
reason, is that most managements purposely design their
plans to be "living" or "ever green". He argues that 
these plans are intended only as "frameworks" to guide and 
provide consistency for future decisions made increment­
ally. He further supports his argument by asserting that:
"To act otherwise would be to deny that further 
information could have a value. Thus, properly 
formulated formal plans are also part of an 
incremental logic." (P.102 The Strategy Process: J. 
Quinn, et.al)
In Mosnic, the planning system was not exactly 
occurring from "the bottom Up" in response to broadly 
defined assumptions or goals many of which were long 
standing or negotiated well in advance. Perhaps it is 
coming bottom-up except the difference was that Mosnic was 
a big organization which included a number of agents. In 
this sense, it was coming bottom up from outside. 
Therefore, this had implications for controllership which 
had to consider monitoring strategy implementation by 
external organizations. In fact, the strategy process in
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Mosnic started by the discretionary portfolio managers 
taking the initiative of submitting their investment 
model/strategy. Some agents prefer sticking to their risk 
taking policies if they would be held accountable for 
implementing their models (strategies). Other agents 
offered their models to Mosnic for triggering principal's 
risk taking factors as basis for negotiation. As argued 
previously, this can be viewed as an incremental logic 
which takes place in a process different from the one 
described by Quinn. However, in Mosnic, the logic of 
incrementalism did not wait for periodic (quarterly, semi­
annual or annual) planning meetings. The strategy process 
(which involved the principals, the Controller and the 
agent) emerged in a stream of tactical decisions triggered 
by the following: (1) The situation in the financial
markets which affected both strategic decision partners
(the principals and the agents) ; (2) the shift in the
stakeholders perception of risk; and (3) the shift in the 
discretionary portfolio manager's approach to investment 
strategy.
Quinn's logic of incrementalism has similarities with 
the situation of Mosnic in that the strategic decisions
emerged from the on-going processes and were not
formulated by corporate master plans, corporate master 
matrices or long run fixed portfolio mixes. However,
these on-going processes were different in Mosnic because 
the formation of the strategic decision depended on the 
specialized expertise of the discretionary portfolio
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managers which would then be meshed in the 
process by taking from the controller in a fluid 
interaction the stakeholders perception of the 
markets' uncertainty.
(2) CONTROLLERSHIP LITERATURE REVIEW
Strategic Control Theory Review
Having said that shifting goals caused agents' 
monitoring problems in Mosnic, we turn to consult some 
strategic control literature on this problem.
Perhaps, the commonality between Mosnic's situation 
and the existing theory on strategic control is that in 
the former's case it is debated in Chapter (7) that a 
meaningful ROI measurement is problematic. Indeed, the 
pre-investment case studies (e.g. MIP) in Chapter (5) have 
shown that the portfolio managers even though they use the 
most sophisticated techniques for rational economic and 
financial analysis, are still reluctant to set a standard 
ROI to be achieved. Their main problems are: (1) the
volatility of financial markets; (2) understanding how the 
stakeholders perceive the markets' uncertainty.
Some authors e.g. Goold and Quinn (1990) argue that 
the practice of strategic control is problematic for a 
number of reasons. First, strategic control is devised in 
order to accommodate uncertainty and flexibility in the 
implementation of strategy. Second, there is difficulty 





mo tiva ting managers. Third, there is risk of discouraging 
management judgement if strategic control systems are 
viewed as alternatives to ongoing management and not a 
support to it. Fourth, designing a strategic control 
system must enhance rather than destroy mutual confidence 
between management levels.
Goold and Quinn develop the following contingency 
model of strategic control (Fig. 8.1). They argue that 
the ideal circumstances for strategic controls should be 
in businesses with low environmental turbulence in which 
it is relatively easy to specify and measure precise 
strategic objectives. They argue that in such businesses 
a formal strategic control system could be set up and 
linked to personal rewards and should help to ensure that 
business remains 'on tract' strategically. However, where 
strategic goals can be set, but environment is highly 
volatile, a strategic control system may still be 
valuable. In such a situation, Goold and Quinn propose 
that management should be more ready to modify their 
strategic objectives as circumstances change. Also the 
link between achievement of strategic objectives and 
personal rewards should therefore be less mechanistic and 










Ability to specify and measure 
precise strategic objectives
On the other hand, if the environment is less 
volatile while setting and measuring strategic goals is 
difficult, the value of a strategic control process would 
be more related to monitoring business progress than to 
motivating management.
In situations where environmental turbulence is high 
and where it is hard to specify measurable strategic 
goals, the value of a strategic control system would be 
problematic. Under such circumstances, they propose that 
a constantly updated view of progress based on a more 
holistic view of the business would be needed and a 
'tightly' administered formal strategic control would be 
more of a hindrance than a help. Hence, they suggest a 
looser, more informal relationship between senior 
management and the business that stresses directional, 
long-term goals, rather than precise targets may be 
preferable.
Strategic control sys­
tem valuable,but should 












Thus, Goold and Quinn suggest that the ideal 
circumstances for strategic controls should be in 
businesses with low environmental turbulence in which it 
is relatively easy to specify and measure precise 
strategic objectives. In Mosnic, the interactive 
involvement of the control function has proved to be a 
tool that enabled the stakeholders to manage the strategic 
uncertainties in a manner that was compatible to their 
perception of the investment risks. Indeed, one of the 
problems faced by the Controller was that he could not 
clearly distinguish between strategic planning and 
control. The two were merging together. Sometimes he 
would look into a control problem and would get ideas 
about strategic changes. Sometimes also while considering 
strategic issues suddenly he would be concerned about 
controller ship. A good example of this could be the 
financial strategy change processes with the three agents 
studied in Chapters (5) and (6) of this research. Hence, 
in investment houses the whole processes could be meshed 
together.
In addition the interactive risk management system 
in Mosnic seems to have made it indispensable to depend on 
strategic controls to cope with the high turbulence of the 
financial markets. This is contrary to the argument of 
Goold and Quinn who suggest that if the environment is 
turbulent and goals can not be rationally set, then 
strategic control is problematic. Indeed, the
uncertainties of the financial markets which hindered the
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formulation of strategy were made manageable and 
sustainable day-by-day through the Controller whose active 
involvement in the strategy process on a daily basis made 
it possible to run strategy, operation and strategic 
control in a continuous stream. This system in fact gave 
the stakeholders the comfort that the complexities 
involved in the discretionary portfolio management process 
were greatly moderated by accepting the interactive role 
of the Controller in the strategy process.
A possible explanation of the difference between the 
argument of Goold and Quinn and the situation in Mosnic is 
that Mosnic has managed to develop the supporting systems 
in its processes that would enable it to change its goals 
(even on daily basis) in response to the turbulent 
environment in the financial markets and the performance 
of its portfolio agents. This was made possible by the 
characteristics of its control system and controllership 
function.
The implication of Mosnic's case to Goold and Quinn 
model is that, if the product is promptly marketable and 
if the control system is accessible by the controller in 
every moment and has the ability and flexibility to adapt 
to environmental changes, then, even if the environment is 
turbulent and the rational setting of strategic goals is 
difficult, organizations can still exercise strategic 
control on a day-by-day basis. Also day-by-day strategic 
control can be more effective if the business owners are 
effectively involved in the interactive management
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processes with the Controller.
Another implication for the work of Goold Quinn is 
that the means and the methods (strategy, structure and 
processes) of the accountable unit (the agents) represent 
an influencing variable that makes strategic control even 
more problematic, e.g., (the Case of BJ-S Bank monitoring 
problems). In fact, the discretionary portfolio managers 
are not owned by investment houses. Thus, the Controller 
may not be able to intervene with them too formally to 
influence their strategy, structure and processes. Hence, 
strategic control could be ineffective without a fluid 
stream of interaction between the principals and the
agents. Indeed, the controllership element has emerged (in 
the situation of Mosnic) as a factor which makes the
interactive monitoring of the agents effective. This does 
not mean that the controller has the total power to compel 
the agents to re-shape their systems in a way consistent 
with the style the controller would like to exercise
strategic control. The whole process depends on
cooperative exchange of opinions, learning from each other 
and understanding the requirements of the fund owners.
This study also has implications for the strategic 
control literature in that the link between achievement of 
strategic objectives and personal rewards (either 
mechanistic or less compelling) may not be an effective or 
even relevant tool to secure the achievement of the 
strategic objective by the accountable unit. It is implied 
by this research that the function of controllership is a
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key factor to keep the accountable unit satisfied on a 
daily basis with the strategic objective to be pursued. 
Perhaps, the role and the uses of control in investment 
houses is wider than its application in other businesses' 
strategy process.
In fact, other authors, e.g. Simons (1990), argue that 
management control systems are used by top managers (1) to 
set agendas for the discussion of uncertainties that arise 
as the firm attempts to create competitive advantage; and
(2) not only to monitor that outcomes are in accordance 
with plans but also to motivate the organization to be 
fully informed concerning the current and expected state 
of strategic uncertainties. Compared to this argument, in 
Mosnic there is no direct and visible relationship between 
the design of the management control system and gaining 
competitive advantage over other investment houses. This 
difference may be ascribed to the fact that the nature of 
Mosnic's operation does not put it in direct competition 
with other investment houses. Rather, it depends on the 
abilities of the external portfolio managers to achieve 
its goals within the qualitative parameters set for them 
and the strategic control system to monitor strategy 
implementation and goals achievement.
Simons uses four concepts in his model. These are: (1) 
limited attention of managers; (2) strategic uncertainties;
(3) interactive management control; and (4) organizational 
learning. The recursive model (Fig. 8.2) developed by
Simon illustrates why management control systems should be 
considered as an important input to strategy formation. 
Recognizing that strategies can be both intended and 
emergent, he suggests his model to illustrate that emerging 
strategies can be influenced and managed - serendipility 
can be guided by top management who use formal processes 
to focus or gain rational attention and thereby generate 
new ideas, tactics, and strategies. Simon's model further 
indicates that management control processes, which are 
characterized as tools for implementing goals, can be 
instrumental in allowing the organization to learn and 
adapt overtime.
Compared to Simon's model, in Mosnic the processes by 
which the control system and the controllership input to 
the strategy formulation are different. Of course, there 
are also some similar features between the two processes, 
e.g. the organizational learning concept is important for 
strategy formulation in Mosnic also. A further situation 
of similarity is that the concept of limited attention can 
be applied to the relationship between the discretionary 
asset managers and the stakeholders (the principals). Most 
of the strategy and control processes in Mosnic were 
shared with the asset managers while other areas were 
delegated to the agents by necessity. The argument in 
Chapter (7) has established the fact that the allocation 
of the principals' resources to the individual securities,
Fig. 8.2
Source: Simons*s process model of relationship







-CHOICE OF INCENTIVES 
-MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
SYSTEMS BY TOP MAN­
AGEMENT
and the selection of the industry and the companies to 
construct the principal's portfolio are significant 
processes predominantly executed by the discretionary 
agents while responding to the Controller's input about 
the variable (shifting) objectives of the stakeholders. 
The latter has limited information about the markets and 
about the individual securities. Nevertheless, those 
discretionary agents were not subordinates who could be 
formally controlled through a line authority relationship. 
Thus, the controllership processes were key factor for 
Mosnic to maintain strategic control of the agents. 
Hence, the concept of limited attention is relevant for 
management control in investment houses, but in different 
ways. For example, the activities of a number of external 
agents demanded attention, but this was more important 
than paying attention to the organization's (Mosnic*s) 
internal activities. In contrast, Simon's has emphasized 
the intra-organizational activities.
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This study suggests that inter-organizational 
activities of the external firms is also important for the 
strategy process. Actually, the case of Mosnic suggests 
that the strategy of the firm is not the only factor which 
determines whether uncertainties should be considered 
critical to the achievement of chosen objectives. Rather, 
the strategy, structure and processes of the agents also 
impacted the objectives to be achieved by the investment 
organization (Mosnic) .
Simons also argues that some aspects of the management 
control system are classifiable into interactive and pro­
grammed. He says: "Interactive management controls allow
top managers to be fully informed about such decisions 
throughout the organization." Interactive control in 
Mosnic was operated in a different process because it was 
designed to allow the principals to be informed about 
decisions processes in external organizations (the 
agents).
A further comparison between Mosnic*s interactive 
Mosnic*s control system and Simons's interactive 
management control crystalizes more differences. Simons 
asserts that top management must decide which aspects of 
management control systems to use interactively and which 
aspects to programme. On the other hand, in the situation 
of Mosnic, the Corporate Controller interacts so 
intimately with the agents to exercise control and to 
resolve significant strategy matters at levels where the 
stakeholders (top managers) may not be interested to
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describe or they may not have the technical capability to 
tell the Controller those detailed aspects of control to 
be interactive or programmed. Actually, these details are 
determined by the Controller. Hence, the role of the 
Controller, though important is not emphasized by Simon as 
key factor determining the features of control i.e. 
either interactive or programmed. The implication of this 
argument is that controllership is a key influencing 
factor that determines the nature of the strategic 
controls whether programmed or interactive.
Another implication for the work of Simons is that 
the means and the methods of the strategic unit to be 
controlled (the discretionary agents) influence and 
determine the nature of control either to be interactive 
or programmed and not only top management determines this.
Simons further argues that management control becomes 
active when business managers use planning and control 
processes to actively monitor and intervene in on-going 
processes. In the situation of Mosnic, the stakeholders 
use the control function for overcoming the difficulty of 
formal long range planning. Therefore, control is made 
interactive in the pre-investment stage i.e. before 
strategy formulation. Simons was not considering invest­
ment houses and did not, therefore, perceive the import­
ance of the pre-decision role of the strategic controller­
ship function in such organizations. In Mosnic, this role 
is difficult to separate from the top management role.
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According to Simons, organizational learning is the way 
that an organization adjusts defensively to reality and 
uses knowledge to improve the fit between the organization 
and its environment. Hence, both the personal involvement 
of top managers and the defining characteristics of 
interactive control strongly influence the incentives to 
produce and share information. He further argues that the 
focusing of organizational attention and the interactive 
exchange of information stimulates learning throughout the 
organization about the strategic uncertainties that are 
perceived by top management. Hence, by focusing attention 
throughout the organization, top managers use interactive 
management control to influence and guide the learning 
process. This is actually what happens in Mosnic. The 
organizational learning processes in Mosnic demonstrated 
the relationship between the management of strategic 
uncertainties and the learning loop which extended outside 
the organization to the external responsibility centre 
managers (the external agents). Thus, there is some 
similarity.
The main message of these arguments to the 
contribution of Simons and the rest is that their models 
can be enhanced by further studying the relationship 
between the involved controllership function, strategy 
formulation and the interactive management control 
processes. In addition, the means and methods (i.e. the 
strategy, structure and the control processes) of the 
external accountable unit must not be ignored as they may
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influence the corporate strategic control processes. This 
may seem to be specific to investment houses, but 
increasingly manufacturing companies operate through close 
relationships with suppliers and purchasers and so these 
'agency-like' relationships may have similarities to 
Mosnic.
Moreover, the process by which the business managers 
interact with the external discretionary portfolio 
managers is far more complicated (due to the influence of 
the financial markets) than the straightforward recursive 
process pictured by the model suggested by Simons.
DECENTRALIZATION, PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT,
RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING, AUTHORITY AND CONTROL.
A number of writers [Anthony, Bedford and Dearden 
(1984), Maciariello (1984), Vancil (1979), Wilson and Chua 
(1988) etc...] argue that measures of performance need to 
be established for organizational subunits that "link" 
each subunit to the whole. These organizational subunits 
are called "centres of responsibility" or "responsibility 
centres".
Similar to large multinational companies Mosnic 
strives to find ways of coordinating and controlling its 
diverse discretionary agents. However, the discretionary 
agents in Mosnic, as responsibility centres, seem to have 
different characteristics from those of the divisions in 
the large companies. Moreover, reasons for decentraliza­
tion in the large companies may not be similar to Mosnic's
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motives behind decentralization.
In existing management theory (Maciariello 1984) it 
is assumed that decentralization allows closer control and 
supervision of activities within the division than does 
centralization. In the situation of Mosnic, control 
within the external discretionary agent is only one of the 
many attributes to consider before selecting the agent. 
Even if control within the discretionary agents is not 
effective Mosnic may decentralize for many other reasons 
while compensating for the control weaknesses by other 
qualities in the discretionary agent. This is clearly 
argued in chapter (7) particularly the analysis of the 
agent selection cases.
In large companies, decentralization leads to better 
managerial motivation as the divisional managers run their 
own business, within broadly given constraints concerning 
the corporate strategies, goals, objectives and policies. 
This aspect seems to have similarities to the relationship 
between Mosnic and its external discretionary agents. 
Actually, there are differences as well. The discretionary 
agents have their own investment strategies and policies. 
The quality of their strategies and policies (means and 
methods) motivates Mosnic to select the agents to benefit 
from them. These strategies may constrain the principals' 
corporate strategy. On the other hand, the agents (if 
viewed as divisional managers) are reluctant to depend on 
the discretionary powers vested on them to run their 
business remote from the principals. Indeed, the agents
406-
have always welcomed the involvement of the principals to 
share the accountability with them. We know from our 
grounded theory in this research that best performing 
agents do not get a direct reward. The rewarding process 
in Mosnic is different as discussed in the conclusion of 
chapter (6).
In large companies, decentralization facilitates 
better overall performance evaluation of various 
accountable units of the organization. In the situation of 
Mosnic there is no inter-dependence problems between the 
portfolios of the discretionary agents employed. Even 
comparison between the agents in terms of performance has 
been found problematic in Mosnic [see the analysis chapter 
(7)]. It is problematic because of the agents' differences 
in terms of means and methods (approach, culture, 
philosophy, etc..... ).
The most obvious similarity between Mosnic and large 
companies is that decentralization reduces the
dysfunctionalities resulting from centralization. In large 
companies, and in Mosnic as well, centralization is 
avoided because of the potential dysfunctionalities which 
have to do with information processing constraints and the 
lack of expertise (particularly in Mosnic) in the 
corporate management relating to specific markets and the 
relevant investment activities. Bounded rationality is 
one of the reasons why large companies decentralize their 
decision making. Wilson and Chua (1988) offered bounded 
rationality as a reason for decentralization of decision­
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making by stating that because human-beings are intrinsi­
cally bounded in their ability to process information, it 
is necessary to decentralize decision making. They add 
that at a point of development organizational activity 
will become too difficult and complex for the managerial 
capacities of one individual or small group of individuals 
located in one place. In all those reasons for decentrali­
zation due to the bounded rationality, the situation of 
Mosnic is similar to the large organizations.
However, Mosnic is somehow different from the large 
companies which decentralize decision-making to enable 
senior management to concentrate on longer-term strategic 
decision-making to local managers. In fact, the two 
decision levels, (level-I and level-II) discussed elabora­
tely in chapter (3) integrate into one activity i.e., one 
decision process. Thus, in investment houses decision 
making is decentralized but again integrated in one 
process.
This argument suggests the need to conduct further 
research on decentralized decision-making in investment 
houses to understand the processes through which and why 
the decentralization (externalization) happens.
The existing management theory has emphasized the 
motivational implications of decentralization. This is in 
the sense that delegating decision-making authority to 
local managers in the large companies is intended to lead 
to higher levels of motivation. That is to say, if the
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local managers of the large companies are only allowed to 
act on instructions from their senior managers they may be 
demotivated and feel frustrated at not being able to 
exercise any authority. In the situation of Mosnic, 
despite the discretionary autonomy given, the agents feel 
comfortable to work according to the principals' 
guidelines to avoid being accountable for unsatisfactory 
performance.
The implication of this argument is that the 
motivational impact of decentralization in the investment 
houses is less than its impact in the large multinational 
companies because, in the former case, local managers (the 
agents), and corporate managers (the principals) have the 
tendency to be cosy about sharing of responsibility. This 
is probably due to the higher turbulence in the environ­
ment and the fixed fee asset management contracts.
An overall implication of the preceding arguments is 
that academic literature on the issue of decision and 
control decentralization in large organizations provides 
first level parallels to the theory generated from Mosnic. 
However, at the deeper level of comparison, differences 
occur. This calls for further but deeper research of the 
issue of decentralization by practitioners in the large 
investment houses which are actually operating multi- 
nationally.
RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING
Mosnic had difficulties in identifying financial 
targets for the investment activity assigned to the 
external discretionary agents. Thus, responsibility 
accounting has remained as a problem in Mosnic due to the 
potential unrealism in financial approach to the agents 
performance evaluation.
Wilson and Chua (1988) argue that responsibility 
accounting requires the identification of particular costs 
or revenues as the responsibility of certain individuals 
or group in an organization. To them, that means 
managerial accounting information is classified and 
reported by area of responsibility.
A long established fact in management theory with 
regard to responsibility accounting is that people should 
be made responsible for financial elements which they can 
control. On the other hand, people should not be made 
responsible for items of cost which they cannot control; 
neither should they be rewarded for revenues which are not 
a result of their efforts. Thus, based on the existing 
management theory [Wilson and Chua (1988), Anthony, 
Bedford and Dearden (1984) etc], a responsibility centre 
may be defined as one area of responsibility which is 
controlled by an individual.
If one compares how a discretionary portfolio manager 
operates (as an accountable unit) with the responsibility 
centre manager as defined in the academic literature, it
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becomes clear that there are differences. First, a 
discretionary agent receives a fixed amount of fee 
calculated on the remaining market value of the securities 
in the portfolio regardless of the performance achieved. 
Thus, the principal does not possess a direct motivational 
tool to reward and penalize the agent. The agents case 
studies and analysis in chapter (7) shows that while port­
folio performance differential can be materially high and 
significant (4%, 6%, 10%, 20% or even more), the impact of 
the performance differential on the fixed fee charged (on 
the current value of the securities) by the portfolio 
manager may be insignificant, negligible and immaterial 
compared to the portfolio differential loss or gain. Thus, 
the management fee element can not be used in the short­
term as a flexible tool to influence the behaviour of the 
discretionary agent.
The other implication of this research to 
responsibility accounting theory is that the interactive 
portfolio management approach allowed the discretionary 
agent to liaise with the principals so frequently and 
closely, that the former was released from the short-term 
accountability of the investment decisions taken on behalf 
of the principals. Hence, the involvement of Mosnic's 
management with the portfolio managers in an iterative 
process of interaction was helpful for the effective 
management of risk but it made responsibility accounting 
difficult. Moreover, environment controllability impacts 
the level of accountability.
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Another implication of this study is that the 
discretionary agents, as participants in setting the 
investment objectives of the principals, normally came up 
with their investment models indicating that acceptance of 
these models by the principals would make them (the 
agents) satisfied with the objective they would pursue. 
However, the principals' perception of the investment 
risks was so fluctuating that they often intervened to 
change the models proposed by the agents. This might make 
the agents dissatisfied with the amended strategy/models 
unless the Controller managed the process of intervention. 
Hence, an important factor that influences the 
effectiveness of responsibility accounting is the role of 
controllership.
CONTINGENCY APPROACHES TO ACCOUNTING 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
One of the major problems confronting Mosnic 
management is agents controllability through a reliable 
information system. This is mainly because of the 
decentralization of information processing. An additional 
problem is the use of heterogeneous data sources to set up 
an information system to measure the corporate portfolio 
performance. The heterogeneity of information sources is a 
natural result of decentralization to different agents. 
Pursuant to the above problem, the Controller examined 
some of the major contributions in the information system 
contingency literature. Otley (1980) has reviewed and 
assessed contingency approaches to management accounting
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by reference to what he considered to be a minimally 
necessary framework for the construction of a true 
contingency theory. Otley argues that the contingency 
approach to management accounting is an important 
theoretical development. However, he sees some lack of 
conceptual clarity in the current state of the art. 
Moreover, he suggests using different research 
methodologies to improve those commonly reported. Otley 
argues that a contingency theory of management accounting 
has a great deal of appeal and can offer a logical 
explanation for the bewildering variety of management 
accounting systems actually observed in practice. But, he 
points out that a number of reservations need to be 
expressed. He summarizes these reservations as follows. 
First, the nature of appropriate contingent variable 
requires further theoretical and empirical elucidation. He 
suggests taking a control based theoretical framework to 
ensure focus on the unpredictability of contingent 
variables that influence organization success. Secondly, 
he calls for the need to enhance research by taking 
organizational effectiveness as an important aspect of a 
true contingency theory of control system design. Thirdly, 
the 'tentative* link of the contingency theory of 
organizational design with organizational effectiveness 
renders it weak. Hence, Otley argues not to use 
'structure' as 'the sole intervening variable' between 
contingent variables and the choice of the accounting 
information system. Finally, he suggests to study 
management accounting/ information systems in conjuction
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with the inter-connected components that make-up an orga­
nizational control package and not in isolation from its 
wider context. Otley suggests that the above short-comings 
can be overcome by adopting an explanatory mode of 
research involving the careful observation of the 
operation of organization control systems over a period of 
time with the objective of including the major 
contingencies and mapping their inter-connections with all 
parts of the organizational control package.
An important research agenda proposed by Otley is the 
development of a theory of management accounting that 
explains how it is affected by various contingencies and 
how it is integrated into its wider context of organiza­
tional control mechanism.
Otley proposes that accounting information system is 
only one aspect of the over all control situation. Hence, 
hypothesized variables to effect accounting information 
system design are the same as those which are assumed to 
explain differences in organizational structure. If that 
is the case, he argues that it is unrealistic to expect 
purely statistical methods of analysis to unravel a 
complex pattern of interaction. The researcher must have 
a closer involvement and develop hypotheses as to likely 
relationships as he explores the organization he is 
investigating.
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Marciariello (1984) points out the connections and 
differences between Management Control System (MCS) and 
information systems and argues that:
"information flows and management systems must be 
designed to support this management control process.
..........  They are therefore more like structural
elements of the MCS, where as the process is 
repetitive and goes on continuously with the 
organization. Another way to think about these 
connections is to envision the information flows as 
links between the control structure and the control 
process." (Maciariello 1984 P. 212-213)
Cooper's (1981) work reflects on contingency theory 
of management accounting and emphasizes that it tends to 
be focusing on the choice of means to achieve given ends. 
His criticism of contingency approach to management
accounting is reflected in his concern about issues of 
ends as well as means. His concern for 'ends' involves 
consideration of the alternative possible roles of 
accounting in different economic and social systems. He 
prefers to consider management accounting as means for 
ends wider than organizational accounting control which 
rests on specific economic objectives. Cooper further
argues that the concern for means might involve
consideration of alternative strategies of control. His 
critique of contingency theory suggests that environmental 
management, the creation of cultures and the encouragement 
of intelligent rather than consistent experimentation 
might be neglected forms of control. Thus, Cooper suggests 
that it is time to distinguish between good and bad 
controls based on the concern about means in the light of 
the ends.
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Elaborating on the potential of contingency theory 
approach to management accounting, Hopwood (1989) argues 
that the patterns through which responsibilities and 
accountabilities are allocated, modes of organizational 
integration and coordination and procedures for employee 
evaluation and rewards are, nevertheless, now seen as 
having the potential to moderate either the forms that 
accounting takes or the ways in which it is deployed in an 
organizational arena.
The focal point in Hopwood's argument is that deeper 
researches of the emergence and change of accounting 
systems need to be conducted to advance our knowledge of 
the means by which accounting both change over time, and 
itself provides a basis for wider organizational changes.
Hopwood points to the current consideration being 
given to the roles which task technologies, corporate 
strategies and competitive postures, and even corporate 
cultures, can play in changing what is seen to be a 
desirable state for the accounting practice. He 
emphasizes that those factors have started to be 
viewed as having a relevance for the accounting condition.
In his study, Hopwood identifies two accounting 
research problems. First, a vast majority of accounting 
researchers focus on accounting on ways that either 
isolated it from its organization contexts, or were 
content to rely on the most abstract and generalized 
characterization of those contexts. Second, much of the
-416-
focus of accounting research was on increasing the 
technical rationality of the accounting practices and 
measurement methods. Hopwood criticizes both of the 
research approaches for 'partiality.'
Hopwood reminds those who criticized the contingency 
theory approaches to management accounting (e.g. Otley 
1980, Dent & Ezzamel 1982, Coopers 1981, Robson and Cooper 
1989 etc) that their earlier concerns were focused on the 
problems of particular notions of contingency embodied in 
prevailing contingency theories rather than the idea of 
contingency per se i.e. contingency of the nature of 
accounting itself.
He further believes that the works of these critics 
have not touched the essential notions of accounting and 
have taken for granted the technical and economical 
(rational) general roles that accounting is capable of 
serving.
The problem triggered by this research is how to study 
the complicated interaction between a number of contingent 
variables (not yet identified by academics or practition­
ers) and the AIS. Examples of these relationships are: (1) 
principals' strategy and goals with agents' strategy 
structures and processes to the extent these relationships 
pertain to AIS features; and (2) agents' strategy 
structure and processes relationship with principals' AIS.
Even those who criticize contingency approaches to 
accounting either for their instrumental rationality views
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or for failure to understand accounting within a wider 
organizational and social functioning framework, have not 
yet realized the need for understanding accounting, 
social, and organizational functions in complex situations 
where structure is complicated by decentralization to 
agents.
Also, the contingency theory has not addressed the 
required limit of organizational control, i.e., what level 
of control is required. The case of Mosnic shows that in 
the initial stages the stakeholders were satisfied with 
selecting brand name agents and leaving them to operate on 
trust basis without the need for a formal information link. 
Then an investment Advisor was inserted to monitor the 
work of the agents more closely. At a later stage they 
decided to hire the Corporate Controller who was also 
expected to operate as a corporate information manager. 
The Corporate Controller was assigned wide powers to 
interact with all the agents as a gate-keeper between the 
principals and the agents. The level of organizational 
control became a function of what the Controller and the 
agents agreed and furthermore, investment houses are beset 
with the difficulty of defining what should be organizat­
ional control because the optimization of goal achievement 
is a process dominated by agents existing in different 
continents. Goal achievement has to be sought in markets 
beyond the scanning capacities of individual investment 
houses. Contingency approaches have not yet addressed 
these different organizational and social contexts.
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The 'rational' approach to investment in Mosnic is 
mixed with the holistic approach of risk management. 
Investment strategies are extremely dynamic. For effective 
functioning, Mosnic management has no option but to use 
shifting frames and a variety of systems. Perhaps, the 
rate of contingencies between variables in designing 
systems for investment houses is higher than distribution 
and manufacturing firms for two reasons: (1) The
influence of the agents' systems (2) The increased 
turbulence of the financial markets which lead to 
continuous shift in strategy.
The problems of the dynamic change of investment 
objectives which hinders complete dependence on rational 
management system in Mosnic, triggers further the need for 
questioning the existing management contingency
approaches. As elaborately discussed earlier, in Mosnic 
organizational effectiveness is measured by controlling 
risk (uncertainty). Indeed, risk management in Mosnic has 
been carried out in an endless flow of interaction with 
the markets and with different portfolio managers. Thus, 
it was not that simple to set a quantified limit for 
Mosnic's objective. ROI measurement is a problem. This 
meant shifting standards for determining effectiveness. 
Given the nature of the markets' uncertainty, the 
principals have to revise the required ROI as time passes. 
This also means difficulty in appraising the agents short­
term performance. Hence, perhaps the criteria for 
rewarding is not similar to the ones assumed by
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contingency theorists. As far as punishment is concerned, 
it is not directly applicable to investment houses which 
adopt fixed fee asset management contracts. In other 
words, agents may not be rewarded for high performance nor 
they are penalized for unsatisfactory short-term
performance. Punishing the discretionary portfolio 
managers is done through dismissing the ones who do not 
remain compatible in terms of strategy, structure and 
processes with the criteria set by Mosnic. Termination of 
the agent services in response to the short-term ROI means 
continuous incurrence of transaction costs resulting from 
shifting from one agent to the other, losing time, 
incurring cost of selecting and understanding the style 
and methods of new agents. This problem will be 
elaborately discussed in Chapter 9 which is about the 
finance theory. As far as contingency theory is concerned 
the above argument shows that the required level of 
control, the period over which to assess the effectiveness 
of control and the types of control may be different in 
investment houses from what has been addressed in the 
current contingency theory. Therefore, at a broad level 
the contingency theory is right. However, it does not 
help me very much. Perhaps the situation is different in 
investment houses than in running other types of 
organizations. It does not help me very much because what 
I actually need to understand in designing the process is 
not some broad contingencies but the detailed process. I 
have actually mentioned this point while discussing the 
work of Hopwood in the previous two pages.
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In fact, I am not dismissing contingency theory. 
Rather, one would expect differences in an investment 
houses from the standard stuff on control system in the 
basic text books based on manufacturing and distribution 
organizations.
As hinted earlier, one of these differences is that 
Mosnic agents have fixed fee contracts. Viewing this, one 
can argue that the current contingency theory of 
management system would not take on broad the impact of 
agegt personnel controls on the principal's organization 
effectiveness. Hence, this theory can be enhanced by 
studying how to exercise tight or even loose control on 
external agents to achieve organizational effectiveness.
Perhaps, unlike other types of organizations, 
effectiveness of organizational control in Mosnic is 
influenced by: (1) the financial markets (2) shifting
goals and strategy process (3) agents -strategy, structure 
and processes (4) stakeholders' religious beliefs and (5) 
technology. In addition the changing nature of the 
financial markets' uncertainty emerged as one of the major 
challenges for Mosnic's strategic control system. Thus, 
the role of the Controller is crucial in changing the 
control system.
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THE ROLE, INVOLVEMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF CONTROLLER AND THE IMPLICATION 
FOR CONTROLLERSHIP RESEARCH
Some of the problems faced by Mosnic in implementing 
its discretionary investments were how to specify the role 
of the Controller in interacting with the agents, how to 
secure the independence of the Controller in views of his 
involvement with both the principals and the agents and 
how to measure the performance of the Controller without 
releasing the agents from accountability as a result of 
his liaison with them.
Sathe (1982) argues that unlike operating executives, 
controllers are staff managers not measured on operating 
profit and loss (the "bottom line"). He suggests that:
"According to conventional thinking an appropriate 
criterion of effectiveness is the quality of 
information and analysis presented to aid operating 
executives in business decision m a k i n g (P - xv)
Sathe has criticized this manner of controllers' 
performance measurement by arguing that it is too 
simplistic a view in today's business environment. He 
added that because of increasing organizational size and 
business complexity the operating executives, however 
bright and capable, simply do not have the depth of 
knowledge in the variety of disciplines needed to achieve 
maximum effectiveness. Hence, according to Sathe, staff 
executives such as the controller must become actively 
involved in the business decision making process - by 
recommending'courses of action and by challenging the 
plans and actions of operating executives to ensure that
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specialist knowledge and expertise get proper considera 
tion when business decisions and actions are taken.
However, he believes there is a dilemma for involved 
controllers and others. He ascribes the dilemma to the 
fact that the controller has two seemingly contradictory 
responsibilities, both of which appear to be increasing in 
importance. His argument is that:
"On the one hand, the controller is responsible for 
providing assistance in the business decision making 
process.... On the other hand, the Controller is 
also responsible for the integrity of the financial 
information provided to external agencies and for 
ensuring that control practices conform to corporate 
policy and procedures. To discharge these 
responsibilities effectively, the controller must 
retain a sense of objectivity and independence from 
management." (P-l)
The study also concludes that management seeking to 
increase the general level of controller involvement in 
the company could search for levers available to produce 
change. Moreover, Sathe has also discussed the consequen­
ces of controller involvement for company performance. To 
investigate this he has raised the following inquiries.
"Does active controller involvement help improve the 
company's financial performance? Does active 
controller involvement compromise controller 
independence? Does involvement stifle management 
creativity and initiative?" (P.2)
Sathe believes that these questions are difficult to 
investigate because of a number of factors which affect a 
company's performance.
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Sathe's argument on the paradox of controllers' 
involvement and compromise of their independence has 
touched on significant issues. However, the Controller's 
role in Mosnic involves the following: (1) independence,
(2) performance evaluation, (3) stakeholders' risk
management, (4) facilitating inter-organizational
relationships, (5) influence on the organizational
structure, (6) operating most dynamic investment 
strategies i.e. his task of making possible coping with 
the financial markets turbulences, and (7) interpreting 
the principals' requirement to the global portfolio 
managers.
The independence problem emerging from the Controll­
ers' involvement was different in Mosnic. This study shows 
that the principals got involved through the Controller 
with the agents. This creates problems that are different 
from those in Sathe's arguments. For example, the princi­
pals involvement in portfolio management issues was likely 
to release the discretionary agents from accountability. 
It was the role of the Controller to lead Mosnic out of 
this problem which required from him careful orchestration 
of the principal-agent interactive processes. However, the 
dilemma which this triggered for Mosnic was how did this 
role impact the Controller's independence? The information 
of the case studies presented in the thesis was not enough 
to address this question. In addition, for the purpose 
objectivity, it may be more appropriate if this issue is 
researched by someone other than the author.
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The above problem also complicated the Controller's 
performance measurement in Mosnic because of his 
involvement (1) in the agents' accountability; and (2) 
with both the principals and different agents at different 
levels of interaction.
CONCLUSION
The whole thrust of this research has been to 
understand how investment houses actually operate in 
working with external portfolio managers and exercising 
control on them. In following through the developing 
themes in this grounded research, the grounded theory that 
emerges from this process of research had ended up giving 
us a number of important insights into the nature of 
strategy and the nature of controllership in this type of 
organization.
Nevertheless, as this research developed I became 
more and more aware of apparent inconsistencies between 
techniques and tools (e.g. the modern portfolio theory) 
suggested by finance literature and what actually happens 
in investment houses. Now I will review specific areas in 




SECONDARY CONCLUSION : REVIEW OF THE FINANCE ACADEMIC
AND PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE
Objectives
This chapter attempts briefly to examine why the 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) is not adequate for the 
portfolio management in Mosnic. The reader is reminded 
that although Mosnic has not prohibited the use of MPT by 
the asset managers, these agents were not left free to do 
everything they want based on MPT. In addition, the 
chapter discusses the relevance of the well developed 
portfolio performance evaluation techniques to the nature 
of this type of organizations.
However, this chapter does not examine the literature 
on capital budgeting because this research does not deal 
with direct investments. Rather, it is concerned with 
marketable securities portfolio invested through discret­
ionary agents. Emphasis is also placed on the contribu­
tions made by the professional portfolio managers to find 
out their views about risk assessment.
THE MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY:
Does it Help Mosnic?
The dictionary of finance and investment terms 
compiled by Downes and Goodman (1987) defines portfolio 
theory as follows:
"Sophisticated investment decision approach that
permits an investor to classify, estimate, and
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control both kind and amount of expected risk and 
return; also called portfolio management theory 
or modern portfolio management. Basic to portfo­
lio theory are its quantification of the 
relationship between risk and return and the 
assumption that investors must be compensated for 
assuming risk. Portfolio theory departs from 
traditional security analysis in shifting 
emphasis from analyzing the characteristics of 
individual investments to determining the 
statistical relationships among the individual 
securities that comprise the overall portfolio 
(P.296)
Markowitz (1952) argues that portfolios can behave 
quite differently from the securities of which they are 
composed and that rational investors should be primarily 
concerned with their portfolios rather than with the 
securities they hold in the portfolio. Markowitz claims 
that the impact of a security on a portfolio is dependent 
on three factors:
1. The return on the security.
2. The uncertainty (risk) of return on the security.
3. The movement (covariance) of the security in 
relation to the movement of every other security 
in the portfolio.
It is also assumed that using the above information, 
an investor can put together a group of portfolios, each 
of which gives the highest level of return for its level 
of risk or the lowest level of risk for a given level of 
return. The investor can then select from these 
1 efficient portfolio's the one which best balances his 
desire for return with his tolerance for risk.
Portfolio theory is also built on the assumption that 
the organizational processes through which the investment
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decisions emerge are simple and straightforward. However, 
unlike what is advocated by the MPT, the initial case 
study and the other five case studies demonstrated that 
Mosnic did not depend on the mean-variance analysis as a 
measure of risk. Rather, Mosnic felt the need for a more
holistic approach to assess the risk of investing its
discretionary funds through portfolio managers.
Apparently, the need for such an approach was
dictated by the fact that the principals had to adjust
their objectives in order to accommodate the changes that 
took place in the fast moving financial markets. This 
required a continuous process of interaction, which was 
carried out by the Corporate Controller between Mosnic and 
its portfolio agents, in which the latter were made aware 
of the stakeholders1 perception of the nature of 
uncertainty in the financial markets to that they (agents) 
can reflect it in their investment strategy.
This process, which comprised the formulation of the 
corporate strategy and the pre - and post-investment 
controls, tended to be perceived by the stakeholders to be 
more comprehensive and useful in dealing with the nature 
of uncertainty in the financial markets than the simple 
mean-variance measure of risk. Indeed, such a process 
tended to help Mosnic to cater not only for the risk of 
investing its discretionary funds through portfolio 
managers but also the risk of managing the agents.
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Cohen, Zinbarg and Zeikel (1987) also question the 
measure of risk advocated by the MPT. They state:
"A closely related question, and one that should 
be kept in mind as we further trace the 
development of modern portfolio theory, is 
whether standard deviation (or variance) is the 
most appropriate measure of risk. Most of the 
work stimulated by Markowitz uses historical 
price volatility as a guideline to the probable 
future variability of a security's rate of return 
about the mean. But if an investor is not in need 
of high liquidity and is truly a long-term 
holder, the price volatility per se does not 
really pose a risk. Rather, in this case, the 
question of concern is one of ultimate price 
realization risk of bankruptcy, for example - and 
not interim price volatility." (P.135)
They argue that:
"There were (and still are) some very practical 
obstacles that restrict the use of the Markowitz 
model. An obvious drawback is that practicing 
investment managers have difficulty understanding 
the mathematics involved. Second, while security 
analysts and portfolio managers are accustomed to 
thinking about expected rates of return, they are 
much less comfortable in assessing the possible 
ranges of error in their expectations and are 
even less accustomed to estimating covariances 
among securities.
Still another limitation in the use of Markowitz 
model is that each time a change in the existing 
portfolio comes under consideration, the entire 
population of possible securities must be 
re-evaluated in order to preserve the desired 
risk/return balance. This reevaluation, in turn, 
requires a large number of mathematical 
calculations. Markowitz himself pointed this out 
by observing that "an analysis of 100 securities 
requires 100 expected returns, 100 variance's, and 
almost 5000 covariances." (P.135-136)
They also comment that due to the complexities and 
the unworkability of these calculation problems, Markowitz 
suggested a simpler procedure - relating the returns on 
each security to the returns on an overall index of market
-429-
prices and thereby implicitly relating the returns on each 
security to each other security. Despite this simplifica­
tion, this research indicated that even after relating the 
ROI of each security to the returns on an overall index of 
market prices, the MPT does not explain what processes 
should follow the determination of the ROI.
In addition to the above problems, Cohen, Zinbarg and 
Zeikel also give the following support to some of the 
economic consequences which Mosnic would bear if it were 
to change its agents every now and then and thereby 
restructure its portfolio.
"Even more significant than the sheer volume of 
computations required to apply the Markowitz 
technique is the fact that the portfolio 
alterations required to achieve constant 
portfolio efficiency may be so numerous that they 
can give rise to large, uneconomic transaction 
costs. This cost should be true even if portfolio 
managers reviewed their holdings as frequently as 
quarterly." (P.136)
On the other hand, even portfolio managers have 
voiced their reservation concerning the use of MPT in the 
investment decision related to marketable securities. For
example, Rosenberg (1986) argues that:
"some of the world's most formidable investors....
..... and heralded investment experts...........
argued that beta constituted a poor substitute 
for risk analysis. Their criticism emanated from 
the belief, even if beta were a good measure of 
past relative volatility, it was not necessarily 
a good predictor of future volatility. Most 
important, (such investors were) concerned with 
short-term market fluctuations. Their definition 
of risk centered on the probability of any 
company's being unable to meet investor expecta­
tions for growth in earnings, dividends, or book 
value over time -fundamentals not considered in 
beta calculations." (P.125)
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He further adds that:
"Time has healed much of the fundamentals versus 
beta controversy. Many of the original advocates 
of beta became disenchanted with its use. Others, 
such as Dr. William Sharpe of Stanford's 
Graduate School of Business and Dr. Barr 
Rosenberg of the University of California 
(Berkeley) School, presented provocative 
adjustments to historic betas -adjustments that 
combined numerous fundamental considerations to 
accomplish what all investors strive for: 
predicting future risk. Value Line, one of the 
better investment statistical services, now 
combines elements of MPT with past and projected 
fundamental factors to arrive at its risk 
proxies." (P.12 6)
Chapman and Ward (1991), who use Markowitz's model as 
a theoretical framework argue that there are two basic 
reasons that justify the call for a wider perspective in 
terms of the objectives of a decision support system for 
portfolio management. First, a number of people are 
involved in the decision process, with different skills 
and responsibilities. Second, decisions need to be made 
on a real-time basis, most by those with the least 
seniority or authority, "the traders", with appropriate 
guidance from various levels of "management". They also 
realize that the financial control situation involves 
important information generation, evaluation and communi­
cation of appropriate information.
Although, the Chapman and Ward study is a move in the 
right direction, they only recognize a small part of the 
complications involved in the investment decision 
processes. Indeed, the findings which emerged from this 
study cast light on the detailed organizational strategy
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and control processes which impact the way the brokerage 
firms formulate investment decisions.
Another problem, which was revealed by the agents 
case studies and which highlights a practical difficulty 
in the applications of the MPT in this type of investment, 
is the quality of data.
Mosnic had to make sure that the quality of 
information provided by the agents was reliable. This 
seemed to be more important than just emphasizing the 
technical analysis of the information by the portfolio 
managers who carried out estimation of the relevant data 
for selecting the securities. It was argued in chapter 
(7} that in selecting its portfolio managers Mosnic 
preferred those who had better capabilities of scanning 
the financial markets.
The quality of information problems has hardly been 
voiced in the finance literature. Indeed, rather than 
giving it adequate consideration and emphasizing its 
significance as a pre-requisite for good measurement and 
estimation, the finance (and accounting) literature 
implicitly assume that this problem has been taken care 
of.
Cohen, Zinbarg and Zeikel (1987) also draw attention 
to this problem by quoting from The Wall Street Journal 
the following:
"Which of many, many sources of information can
you rely on? Where can you go for unbiased,
accurate information? The vast, and outpouring
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of investment information, advice, alleged facts, 
and recommendations can be bewildering and 
c o n f u s i n g (P.82)
FINANCE THEORY TECHNIQUES OF MEASURING 
PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
The analysis of the case studies in chapter (7) has 
led to the development of the detailed conceptual 
framework. A grounded theory produced in chapter (7) 
indicates that evaluating the discretionary portfolio is a 
complicated system which involves the use of a multi­
system (See Fig. 7.6 The Detailed Conceptual Framework). 
Now, I want to consult the finance theory on this problem. 
Indeed my review of the MPT indicates that measurement of 
the portfolio performance is the final step in the MPT. 
To refresh the memory of the reader, the basic four steps 
argued by the Modern Portfolio Theorists can be summarized 
as follows:
1. Security valuation i.e. describing a universe of 
assets in terms of expected return and expected 
risk.
2. Asset allocation decision i.e. determining how 
assets are to be distributed among classes of 
investment, e.g. bonds, shares, precious metals 
etc.
3. Optimization of the portfolio i.e. reconciling
risk and return in selecting the securities to be 
included, e.g. determining which portfolio of 
stocks offers the best return for a given level 
of expected risk.
4. Performance measurement i.e. classifying each
security's performance (risk) into market -
related (systematic) and industry security 
related (residual) classifications.
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The purpose of this section is briefly to review the 
MPT's performance measurement techniques (step # 4 above) 
with a view of finding out whether these techniques (1) 
can be applied to investment houses like Mosnic; or (2) 
match with the performance measurement system described in 
chapters (6) and (7).
Finance theorists (e.g Sharpe 1985) argue that the 
most widely publicized type of portfolio performance 
measurement is that used for external reporting to 
clients. Such bottom-line measurement is concerned 
primarily with the results obtained by the organization as 
a whole, with little concern for the manner in which the 
results were produced. Some investment managers routinely 
measure their own performance in this way; some 
sophisticated investors (e.g., corporate pension fund 
officials) measure their fund's performance; and a number 
of third parties provide measurement services for both 
investors and investment managers.
This study has shown that bottom-line measurement 
should go beyond the result as a whole to explain the 
manner (the methods) and the means expended by the asset 
manager to achieve the result even if it was negative. 
Without this wider understanding of the bottom-line 
approach the investment houses can hardly avoid switching 
from one agent to other and consequently facing the 
incurence of transaction costs which may put the 
invested capital into a real jeopardy.
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Farrel (1983) argues that portfolio performance 
evaluation aims not only at assessing the success of the 
investment process in achieving the overall investment 
goals, but also at diagnosing the contribution of the 
individual elements that have made possible the 
achievement of the overall goal.
He further argues that performance evaluation should 
provide a feedback mechanism enabling the organization to 
emphasize those aspects of the process which are 
productive, and down play or reconstitute those which have 
failed to contribute to the investment goal.
Farrel demonstrates his arguments by describing the 
investment needs of a hypothetical pension fund to 
illustrate the sort of investment goals that the fund 
might establish. Based on that, he indicates three major 
aspects of the investment process that should be 
evaluated. These are: (1) asset allocation; (2) weighting 
shifts across asset classes; and (3) security selection 
within asset classes.
With respect to evaluating security selection, Farrel 
discusses two general methods of evaluation. These are:
(1) comparison against asset-class indexes as well as 
against comparable managers within the asset class; and
(2) risk-adjusted performance comparisons that derive from 
the portfolio theory and capital market theory.
Farrel concludes his argument on performance 
evaluation by consolidating the three aspects of perform-
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ance asset allocation, weighting shifts across asset
classes, and security selection within asset classes into 
an overall performance evaluation for his hypothetical
pension fund.
Levy and Sarnat (1972) use the portfolio model to
assess the performance of mutual funds and to test the 
degree to which efficiency criteria, based on realized 
return, can be used to facilitate current investment 
decisions. Taking mutual funds as a proxy for portfolios 
in general, they try to explain the risk-return pattern of 
mutual funds returns. Their theory is based on expected 
variables, and therefore, relates to the future. They
attempt to test the ability of the various efficiency 
criteria applied in their book to predict the future on 
the basis of past data on risk and return.
In discussing measurement of mutual funds performance 
they argue that,
"mutual funds often have varying objectives, and 
as a result, the funds investment policies also 
tend to differ. Funds which emphasize capital 
gains attempt to invest mainly in growth stocks, 
while funds which emphasize current income, tend 
to build more balanced portfolios." (P. 477)
They further argue that despite these differences, 
some investment objectives and policies are common to all 
(or almost all) of the funds. They give the following 
examples on the common policies: (1) to increase return
through professional investment analysis, and by taking 
full advantage of scale economies in the management of the
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portfolio; (2) to decrease investment risk by diversifying 
the portfolio.
With regard to investment decision Levy & Sarnat say:
" When deciding between the alternatives of 
investing in mutual fund shares, or directly in 
common stocks, investors must weigh the degree 
to which the funds have succeeded in achieving 
these two common objectives against the expenses 
incurred in providing the professional 
management. "(P.478)
Accordingly, they argue that if a fund's mean rate of 
return is higher than the rate of return earned by an 
investor who randomly diversifies his stock market 
investments, one might conclude that the mutual fund has 
succeeded in achieving the first of its main objective
i.e., increasing the average rate of return to investors.
They further argue that decreasing risk is not 
reflected in the average rate of return earned by mutual 
fund investors, but rather in the variability of the 
annual rates of return. Hence, they conclude that the 
smaller the standard deviation, the more stable the series 
of return, and consequently the lower the risk associated 
with such investments. Finally they argue that,
"to evaluate the investment performance of mutual 
funds, we require two variables; the mean rate of 
return and the standard deviation associated with 
these returns. "P. 478)
As such, to evaluate a particular mutual fund's 
performance, they recommend to compare the funds' average 
rate of return and risk with the average rate of return 
and risk of investments randomly chosen from the stock
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market, i.e. with an unmanaged portfolio. In emphasizing 
the benchmarks measurement of performance they suggest 
that:
"The accepted way to carry out such an evaluation 
is to compare the fund1s average return and 
variability of a general index such as Dow Jones 
or Standard and Poor (S & P) ." (P. 478)
Levy and Sarnat extend their discussion to 
alternative measures of investment performance such as the 
reward-to-variability ratio. In their view, this method is 
based on the following formula which measures the price of 
unit of risk for all investors in a perfect market.
°xm
Where Exm= the expected return of market portfolio
r = the riskless rate of interest.
crXm = the standard deviation of return of the 
market portfolio.
Based on this formula, they suggest that a similar
relationship can be defined for any portfolio say (i) as
follows:
Ex.^ - r 
°x±
Levy and Sarnat mention that Sharpe and others have 
pointed out that:
"The R/V ratio constitutes an appropriate measure 
of performance for efficiently diversified 
portfolios but should not be applied to single 
securities or small portfolios.
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They explain the concept of volatility by introducing 
the notion of a characteristic line which is explained in 
f igure 9.1.
Fig.9.l
Three examples of possible characteristic lines





The characteristic line of a particular security i (or 
mutual fund i) is defined as the regression line between 
x^and xm , where xi and xm denote the returns of ith
security (mutual fund) and of the market portfolio,
respectively. Three examples of possible characteristic 
lines are drawn in figure 9.1.
The slope of the regression line, is a measure of
the relationship between the change in xi following a
change in xm . Levy and Sarnat call this relationship
volatility.
Accordingly, if 6i = 1 (line 'a' of Fig 9.1, a 1 %
increase (decline) in the return of the market portfolio 
is accompanied by 1 % increase (decline) in the return of 
security (mutual fund) ±. If Bi is greater than 1 (line
'b* of fig 9.1) i is more volatile than the market port­
folio, that is to say it is an "aggressive" security which
439-
rises faster than the average during a bull market, but 
also falls more than the average during a bear market. 
Using the same type of reasoning, a security (portfolio) 
haying a characteristic line with a slope of less than 1 
(line "c' of Fig 9.1) represents a "defensive” security 
(portfolio), i.e., one which rises more slowly than the 
average during a rising market, but also falls less than 
the average in a declining market. It is therefore, 
assumed that using beta analysis investors can come by a 
"super" defensive stock, that is one which has negative 
correlation with the market portfolio i.e., would have a 
characteristic line with a negative slope.
Indeed, Levy and Sarnat argue that whereas Sharpe 
takes the reward-to-variability as his performance 
indicator, Treynor replaces the standard deviation of the 
R/V ratio with volatility. This is expressed as follows:
Exi “ r
Accordingly, they derive a performance measure which 
is appropriate for single securities and partially 
diversified portfolios, as well as for fully diversified 
portfolios.
Using the above measures, the performance of a 
security is judged by its deviation from the equilibrium 
relationship (characteristic line) implied by its 
volatility or systematic risk. Thus, the Treynor index is 
set out in terms of the different return (Ex^) per unit of 
systematic risk.
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According to Sharpe (1985):
"Unfortunately, it is very difficult to separate 
performance due to skill form that due to luck... 
A change should be made only when there is 
adequate reason to expect the advantages to 
outweigh the costs. Switching from one manager 
to another on the basis of minor differences in 
short-term performance will certainly incur 
transaction costs (as the new manager replaces 
old holdings with new ones that conform to his or 
her "style") but there may or may not be any 
improvement in future performance." (P. 681)
Recommending moderate rationality in comparative 
evaluation of portfolio managers' performance, Sharpe 
suggests that differences in agents' past performance 
should be treated as interesting data. However, he argues 
that such data should be utilized only in exploring areas 
which may require detailed examination and discussion.
Sharpe concludes his arguments about rational methods 
of performance measurement by stating that:
"much more could be said about performance measur­
ement. It suffices to indicate that, although 
some investment managers may not like it, perfor­
mance measurement appears to be here to stay".
LIMITATIONS OF RISK/RETURN TECHNICAL METHODS 
IN EVALUATING PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
In the following paragraphs an attempt will be made 
to find out if the works of Farrel (1983) and Levy and 
Sarnat (1972), in the evaluation of portfolio performance 
can help in furthering our understanding on how portfolio 
performance evaluation is tackled in Mosnic.
The study of Farrel builds on a hypothetical pension 
fund to describe the sort of investment goals that the 
fund might establish. As mentioned earlier, it emphasizes
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three major aspects of the investment process that should 
be evaluated. However, Farrel does not consider the 
processes involved in allocating the assets through a 
portfolio of agents maintained by the investor.
Furthermore, his study does not describe the 
different levels of asset allocation which, in this study, 
involve the following: (1) corporate policy or strategic 
allocation of the resources, (2) tactical asset allocation 
by the agents. Each of these processes involve a number 
of processes.
The asset allocation processes identified by Farrel 
does not show the significance of the following processes 
(1) geographical allocation of the assets; (2) allocation 
of the securities in the portfolio by industry and 
company; and (3) allocation of the assets by currencies.
Diversification of agents or maintaining the 
portfolio of agents is a significant factor for investment 
decisions and asset allocation. Farrel argues that the 
prime determinant of whether the plan will meet the real- 
return target at minimum risk over an intermediate to 
longer period of time is the effectiveness of asset 
allocation.
The above argument can be relevant to many of the 
plan sponsors who have to state their long-term goals in 
terms of a real return on investment i.e. nominal return 
less inflation rate.
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Farrel argues that the objective of an asset 
allocation is to blend assets together so as to hedge 
against adverse economic changes (reduce risk), and, at 
the same time, provide greatest opportunity for achieving 
a required long-term rate of return.
But, Farrel's work does not explain how to formulate 
a corporate risk management policy utilizing a number of 
risk management approaches obtained from a portfolio of 
discretionary asset managers. In Mosnic I am not talking 
about one portfolio and one decision maker. His debate of 
analyzing the performance of a fund by assessing the 
effectiveness of the asset allocation needs to be enhanced 
by looking into how financial institutions work. Moreover, 
this study suggests that the effectiveness of assets 
allocation to achieve satisfactory performance and to 
preserve the invested capital equally depends on the 
quality of the data and its analysis. The model developed 
in this thesis at the end of chapter (7) (fig 7.6) shows 
that the quality of data, and hence, the effectiveness of 
the financial strategy (asset allocation) depends on the 
means and methods (strategy, structure and processes) of 
the investment decision maker.
The second dimension suggested by Farrel in 
appraising the performance of a fund is to test the 
productivity of any changes in the weighting of the assets 
from the long-run-target asset allocation. According to 
this dimension, if the fund is over-weighted in 
international equities and under-weighted, for example, in
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domestic equities over the period, one can measure the 
extent to which this would impact performance relative to 
the maintenance of a position in line with the long-term 
target. This argument means that for its implementation, 
one must first compare the return earned on the asset 
class to the return earned on the portfolio. This 
naturally leads to problems of measurement and comparison 
as highlighted earlier in this chapter.
From a technical and a rational point of view that 
can be lived with. On the other hand, this has not taken 
us forward to see what should happen after the measurement 
of ROI. In chapters (5) and (6) it was reported how MIP 
and Vontov Banks explained in detail in their performance 
report the impact on ROI created by over-weighting or 
under-weighting in certain securities. However, that was 
not more than a general indication and not a final 
appraisal. The case of Mosnic shows that under-weighting 
or over-weighting in certain types of securities maybe the 
result of the agent's specialization. If this is the case 
even if the ROI is negative the investor will not take it 
as a sign of non-productivity.
In fact, Farrel's dimension for assessing the perfor­
mance of portfolios in terms of asset mix changes does not 
explain the processes involved in portfolio performance 
appraisal. The problem which has not been explained is the 
extent to which investors in the financial markets can be 
sure about the nature of uncertainty to set a long-term 
ROI target ? This study shows that this can hardly be
achieved. Thus, the debate made by Farrel does not explain 
how asset mix is changed and it does not show the process 
by which the investment decision makers (either agents or 
principals) agree on their perception of risk 
(uncertainty) . This perception can change so frequently in 
investment houses. Perhaps in the case of pension funds 
because the ultimate objective of the investment is to 
meet certain liability and because the fund beneficiaries 
(the owners) are not active participants in the decision 
process, the setting of long-term target may be acceptable. 
However, this is not the case in investment houses where 
the fund beneficiaries would like to preserve their capi­
tal while behaving in a reasonably opportunistic manner.
Another dimension proposed (by finance theorists) to 
be used in portfolio performance evaluation is the techni­
que of assessing the success of managers within individual 
asset classes e.g., domestic equities, international 
equities, and fixed income securities. This method is used 
by almost all the portfolio managers who report their 
performance to Mosnic. For example in their commentary on 
U.S domestic equity performance, MIP makes comparison with 
market indexes such as the S & P 500.
Some writers (Farrel, Levy and Sarnat, Sharpe) have 
also proposed evaluating portfolio performance based on 
measurement of risk-adjusted return derived from the risk- 
return theoretical frameworks. They argue that comparison 
can also be with performance of others specializing in the 
management of securities within the asset class.
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However, comparison of performance without describing 
how to articulate the appropriate portfolio strategy could 
not help Mosnic. To understand the processes which should 
follow the comparisons, Mosnic needed an active role to be 
played by the Corporate Controller. That role involved 
attending to strategic change by learning from agents.
Treynor performance indicator (discussed by Levy and 
Sarnat), which is based on volatility rather than on 
variability, would not advise Mosnic in its portfolio 
performance planning and evaluation problems because it 
does not consider the processes and problems inherent in 
evaluating divisionalized portfolios.
Comparison of the return of a discretionary portfolio 
with the return of the market portfolio and consequently 
determining the aggressiveness of a security in terms of
its volatility would hardly be of help to Mosnic as to how
to manage the post-investment relationship with a 
portfolio of discretionary managers. Once again the 
problem is the use of ROI. Is it an indicator or is it
for final appraisal? The debate in Chapter (7) on ROI
shows that the essential idea behind measuring ROI is to 
use it as an indicator to compare returns obtained with 
those of one or more appropriate alternatives e.g other 
managers, benchmarks. Sharpe (1985) explains making 
relevant comparisons as follows:
"In some cases the focus is on the returns from 
"similar" actively managed funds, in other, 
"similar" naive or passive strategies are 
considered(P.682)
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Thus, according to the finance theory it is important with 
either approach to choose relevant alternatives. In real 
life this is difficult because investors may not have the 
required quality of information to assert that specific 
benchmark portfolio can be feasible and can represent 
alternatives that might be employed if the portfolio being 
measured had not been held.
Indeed, Sharpe has strived to simplify comparison 
based on a single measure. He says:
"A single measure that takes both elements into 
account may be used. Alternatively, the 
comparison may be restricted to funds with 
similar exposure to risk, and their returns 
compared directly11. (P. 682-683)
The debate in chapters (6) and (7) indicates that 
although the objective of the stakeholders conveyed to the 
agents can be the same, it is very often that the latter 
ends up constructing different forms of portfolio. ROI 
produced by each agent can also be different. There is 
nothing wrong with this. However, what is important is 
that agents who have different approaches to investment 
should not be compared with each other. Rather, the 
performance evaluation of each agent should be viewed in 
the context of his structure, strategy and processes. 
This means that if the quality of the decisions taken by 
the agents are sound and compatible with the conveyed 
guidelines, the principals should not respond negatively 
to the unsatisfactory short-term ROI.
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Some practitioners in the field of portfolio
management support the above view. For example, Williams
(1986), argues that similar objectives are difficult to
calculate. He says about this problem:-
"The idea of comparing one’s fund with other funds 
that have similar objectives is very appealing. 
This is especially true since many fund sponsors 
are hiring managers with specific styles which 
cannot easily be compared with more diversified 
portfolios or with specialized portfolios with 
different structures or objectives. Unfortunately, 
developing a workable definition for "similar 
objectives" and finding a sufficiently large 
sample of funds which fit the objectives are two 
formidable problems. All funds have as their 
general objective making money without losing 
money. More eloquent statements suggest as 
objectives maximizing return without undue risk of 
loss of principal. These definitions of objectives 
are of little help since they include all funds 
rather than just "similar" funds.
In theory it is possible to compare funds based on 
their level of risk, such as the percentage in 
equities. In practice it is not possible to find a 
sample of funds with exactly the same asset allo­
cation as the sponsor' s fund, so typically a range 
of allocations is considered. In other words, a 
fund with 63 percent in equities would be compared 
with funds having between 60 percent and 70 
percent in equities. However, in a volatile period 
there can be substantial differences between funds 
having 60 percent in equities and funds having 70 
percent in equities. Also, if the fund being 
measured has a very high or a very low percentage 
in stocks, there will probably not be many similar 
funds in the same category." (P.199)
At the corporate level in Mosnic, aggressiveness of a 
portfolio may not be measured in terms of volatility as 
explained by Levy and Sarnat. For example, in Mosnic 
shares were categorically viewed as aggressive investments 
while fixed income securities are viewed as defensive. 
This opinion remained unchanged despite the arguments of 
the agents that in the long run shares would out-perform
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bonds. The whole process depended on how each investor 
perceived risk. The Controller could not calculate in 
advance how the stakeholders would perceive markets1 
uncertainty. Hence, it seems that the volatility and 
characteristic line indicators of portfolio performance 
assume that risk is clearly conceived and stated by the 
investors, which is hardly the case in real world.
Both measures further assume investors1 clarity about 
market risk and security risk. The Controller had to go 
through lengthy processes to clarify to the agents the 
stakeholders' perception of risk. Market risk has been a 
difficult concept for the stakeholders to understand. The 
stakeholders of a portfolio may have differences in perce­
iving risk. Moreover, the situation of Mosnic has shown 
that agents assigned the same objectives by their princi­
pals can be different in their style of investment risk 
management.
The conceptual background of the performance indicators 
discussed by Levy and Sarnat is the portfolio theory, which 
is set out in terms of "expected" variables. These variab­
les pertain to forms of the probability distributions of 
future returns on securities, to their expected values, to 
their variances, and to the potential interaction among 
security return i.e., to their covariances. In Mosnic's 
situation, it is difficult to make it operational this way 
because it is not easy to pre-set for agents the stakehol­
ders probability beliefs and their expectations regarding 
long-term future returns. The principal's probability
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beliefs can be substantially influenced by the situation 
in the financial markets, which make them difficult to 
predict.
SUMMARY OF THE MPT APPROACH 
TO STRATEGIC INVESTMENT DECISIONS
The reader is to be cautioned that I am not arguing 
that because of the financial markets' uncertainty, the 
finance theory has no application in understanding probl­
ems. My major argument is that the nature of the financial 
markets' uncertainties and the way they are perceived by 
different investors is not adequately captured by the fin­
ance theory and its well developed instruments. In Mosnic, 
management could not act in the way the finance theory 
suggests to measure risk. Indeed, the way uncertainty is 
captured in finance theory is not convincing to the 
stakeholders.
Risk is more complicated than the way it is captured in 
the finance theory. The financial markets move so fast and 
the stakeholders carry on changing their perception of the 
markets' uncertainty. Therefore, Mosnic was not able to 
accurately measure the risk to adjust the required return. 
Even the portfolio managers who presumably have adequate 
sources of information could not agree on assessment of 
risk. At the end of the day risk assessment is also affec­
ted by the beliefs of the portfolio managers and what each 
agent considers certain or uncertain for Mosnic depending 
on a fluid stream of interaction with the principals 
through the Controller. Hence, measurement of risk is not 
the final solution for determining the ROI required by the
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stakeholders. As argued before, the well developed tech­
niques which measures the expected ROI do not explain how 
to assess risk taken on hiring an investment management 
organization rather than any other agent.
Agents could not operate without interacting with
Mosnic. Why? Because MPT which is a well-developed techni­
que adopts a simplistic notion of risk which emphasizes 
mean and variance. Because the stakeholders in Mosnic do 
not like dependency of some simplistic techniques or risk 
assessment which do not reflect the nature of uncertainty 
in the financial market, a holistic approach to risk was 
inevitable to manage the investment. In this holistic 
approach the agents needed to modify their MPT - based 
proposals by using the controllership model in Mosnic to 
obtain information about how the stakeholders perceive 
risk. The agents came to believe that information might 
not be specific. Hence, they needed to maintain fluid 
streams of interaction with Mosnic. Which meant the notion 
of risk is not adequately captured by the finance theory.
The main message of this study is that MPT is fine. 
But it assumes that by knowing a series of data the
investment decision maker, even without examining the
quality and the relevance of the data can modify the 
portfolio in the short-term taking any transaction cost 
which may come up. Based on the grounded theory in 
chapter (7) of this thesis, MPT is not workable as it is. 
However, I am not arguing that agents should not use the 
MPT to present data for their principals. Indeed, this is
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a fundamental step in a long holistic process towards the 
formulation of the investment strategy. (The reader is 
reminded to refer to my debate on Quinns stance in chapter 
(8) to refresh his memory about my model of dealing with 
the strategic decisions in a holistic manner). My argument 
is that MPT assumes that information about the stakehol­
ders' perception of uncertainty is specific. This is not 
the case in real life. I argue that discretionary portfolio 
managers cannot use the MPT technique which rests only on 
mean and variance analysis to manage the portfolios in a 
manner compatible with the stakeholders' perception of 
risk. The discretionary asset managers need to be informed 
by the Controller before they can claim accurate 
assessment of risk attached to projected ROI's.
The fact that the stakeholders' changed the structure 
of Mosnic by inserting an involved Controller (see chapter 
3) and their interaction with the agents in the pre-invest­
ment and post-investment phase [Chapters (5) and (6)], 
reflects their discontent with the notion of risk (mean - 
variance approach) as captured by the finance literature. 
The arguments made by the chairman and the director in 
chapters (3) and (5) indicated that the type of the uncer­
tainties they had experienced with the fianancial markets 
could not be managed through the MPT approach. The stake­
holders wanted to have that fluid type of interactions 
described in chapter (6) to exist so that the asset 
managers could understand the formers' perception of 
uncertainty. One time measurement or risk and hence the ROI
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the ROI was not workable. The holistic approach referred 
to in the preceding paragraph proved to be workable 
because it has reflected, through attending to unspecific 
information and processes, the risk which is critical to 
the view of the stakeholders.
EXTERNALIZATION OR INTERNALIZATION
Crowel and Mainer (1980) argue that in the more 
conventional approach a pension fund administrator
selects, orchestrates and monitors asset management 
services supplied by banks, investment counselors, and 
insurance companies. A typical large sponsor employs six 
or more equity management firms, two to three bond 
managers, and perhaps a consultant to monitor investment 
performance and advise on manager selection.
They argue that externalization of portfolio is
mainly due to lack of credibility when no in-house 
investment expertise presently exists. In such situation, 
on-the job learning seems foolhardy and hiring from the 
outside carries all the risks of recruiting. They further 
suggest the following reasons to stay in with the
traditional pattern: (1) The use of outside services 
facilitates diversification of the styles or philosophies 
applied to fund management. (2) There is less risk of 
conceptual stagnation. (3) The survival of outside 
managers requires what motivate them continually toward 
excellence. (4) The use of multiple external managers 
avoids dependence on a few key people. (5) Investment
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professionals have only limited career opportunities in a 
corporate environment.
However, in Mosnic beside these five reasons the 
issue of whether to externalize or internalize portfolio 
management was resolved long ago. These are some 
additional reasons given in chapter (3) under the need to 
operate through agents.
1. Funds were not large enough to justify the cost of 
establishing a huge in-house portfolio management 
team.
2. Investing abroad was considered the appropriate
strategy for situation in the Middle East.
3. The high cost of internal management, imported
technology, etc outweighed the other factors in
favour of internalization.
AGENCY THEORY
A number of authors (e.g. Baiman 1982, 1990; Hart and 
Holmstram 1987; Eisenhardt 1989) have attempted to review 
the literature on agency theory. This section draws
heavily from these reviews briefly to examine the
implications of the detailed conceptual framework
developed in Chapter (7) on the assumptions of agency
theory.
According to Baiman (1990),
"An agency relationship exists when one or more 
individuals (called principals) hire others 
(called agents) in order to delegate 
responsibilities to them. The rights and 
responsibilities of the principals and agents are 
specified in their mutually agreed upon
employment relationship." (P.342)
In Mosnic such an agency relationship does exist with 
the portfolio managers. The principals delegate to the
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latter the responsibility of investing their discretionary 
funds on their behalf. However, this thesis argues that 
some of the underlying assumptions of the available agency 
literature can hardly explain the nature of the agency 
relationship in investment houses.
In all agency models, individuals are assumed to be 
motivated solely by self-interest. An agency problem arises 
if the first-best (the cooperative) behaviour, which 
maximize the groupfs welfare, is not consistent with each 
individuals self-interest. This happens if the employment 
relationships are such that, given that everyone else is 
acting cooperatively, one or more individuals could make 
themselves better off by deviating from their cooperative 
behaviour. In this respect Baiman (1990) argues that defi­
nitely if one or more individuals are expected to deviate 
from their cooperative behaviour, others may find it in 
their best interest to deviate. Baiman concludes that the 
end result is that when cooperative behaviour is not 
consistent with self-interest behaviour (i.e. it is not 
self enforcing), the group suffers a loss of efficiency 
and all individuals are potentially made worse off.
However, because the unit of analysis is the contract 
governing the relationship between the principal and the 
agent, the focus of the agency models is on determining 
the most efficient contract governing this relationship.
However, the problem here is to what extent can we 
measure the loss of efficiency created by the divergence
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between cooperative and self-interested behaviour i.e., 
the loss from agency problems? The experience of Mosnic 
shows that given the fluid interaction between the princi­
pal and the agent in the investment process, it was 
neither practical nor easy to quantify the loss of 
efficiency. This becomes even more complicated if the loss 
of efficiency resulted in a decline in the ROI which as 
argued in the previous chapters can hardly be used as the 
main measure for performance evaluation in Investment 
Houses.
Even if we accept that the loss of efficiency can be 
measured by the decline in the ROI, does that mean Mosnic 
should modify the asset management contract? The holistic 
approach developed by Mosnic to control the performance of 
its portfolio agents is far more comprehensive than the 
simple contractual monetary adjustment advocated by agency 
theory as a mechanism to reduce the risk of a 
dysfunctional behaviour by the agent. Indeed, the case of 
Vontov Bank in chapter (5) shows that what mattered was 
the adequacy and the compatibility of the agent strategy, 
structure and processes with the principals' requirements.
Agency theory also assumes that contracts are 
costlessly and accurately enforced by the courts. As a 
result, the contracts studied are comprehensive and 
complete in the sense that for each verifiable events, 
they specify the actions to be taken by the contracting 
parties. However, in investment houses asset management 
agreements do not usually specify the actions and processes
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which will take place between the principal and the agent 
in the post-investment phase. Rather, the principal-agent 
relationship was characterized by a continuous process of 
interaction to help the agent understand what would maxi­
mize the welfare of the principals. Furthermore, even if 
the agent failed for reasons beyond his control to achieve 
the objectives agreed upon, suing the agent to enforce the 
asset management agreement was never envisaged by the 
principal. Indeed, the best option was to understand the 
problem of the agent through informal liaison rather than 
to modify the contract to set new financial terms.
On the other hand, Mosnic was very sensitive to the 
option of modifying the fixed asset management agreements 
or entering into new contracts with new portfolio managers 
because of the huge transaction costs which it would incur 
in such a process and the costly consequences of the lead 
time which the new agent would require to re-construct the 
portfolio according to the principals' attitude towards 
risk. The modification of the asset management contract 
was also costly due to the resources the principals would 
require to identify a new agent from a market where 
obtaining information about portfolio managers was very 
difficult.
Starks (1987) employs recent developments in agency 
theory to study the impact of compensation contracts on 
portfolio management in a restricted mean variance world. 
He argues that the agency problems in the fiduciary 
relationships could be caused by the following. (1) The
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principal cannot costlessly observe the resources that the 
agent expends in managing the portfolio. (2) The 
principal cannot costlessly observe the agents choice of 
risk level. Accordingly, Starks assumes that agents may 
choose a risk level that is not compatible with the 
principals. However, the case studies in this thesis 
demonstrate that investment organizations can know a lot 
about the potential resources an agent would expend 
through rigorously analyzing the agent in the pre­
investment phase. Stark's work would not help in 
unraveling the inter-connections of the factors that 
determine the features of the pre-investment procedures 
conducted by a principal to know (before contracting) the 
potential agent's resources, structures and processes. As 
such, Stark's study does not appreciate the role of the 
controller in understanding the pre-decision processes 
which take place between the principal and the agents.
The assumption of Starks that the principal cannot 
costlessly observe the agent's choice or risk level seems 
general. Indeed, the principal can describe to the agents 
their tolerable levels of risk even before entering into 
the asset management agreement. In addition the informal 
fiduciary relationships can be utilized as a process 
whereby risk can efficiently be managed.
This research shows that agents were motivated when 
the principals gave them more business, recommended other 
clients to them or at least did not withdraw the funds 
already entrusted with them. Indeed, the agents were most
458-
motivated to preserve the interest of Mosnic whenever they 
felt that there was a mutual understanding and that there 
was a sound working relationship.
On the other hand, although the asset management fee 
issue was very important for the agent, it was a minor 
step in the agent appraisal stages. In the post-investment 
phase, the fixed fee was not used as a tool to control the 
behaviour of the fiduciary manager. Without necessarily 
motivating the agent by a fee increase, the principals 
aimed at maximizing the utilization of the agents 
resources through interaction and close working 
relationship. In addition, instead of monitoring the 
behaviour of the agent from the expended resources angle, 
the principals and the Controller sought the agents 
support in formulating the dynamic portfolio strategies to 
reduce exposure to risk and to maximize their portfolio 
ROI. Ironically, Mosnic experienced better ROI and better 
services with some agents who had little resources than 
some of those who were highly reputed. This throws 
doubt on the expended resource issue raised by Starks.
REMARKS ON THE AGENCY THEORY
It seems that all agency models seem to be trying to 
create coordination between a superior and a subordinate 
through a monetary adjustment. It is all to do with a 
monetary contract. It implies that the principal will pay 
the subordinate certain amount of money and then this will 
be modified to try and make the agent take into account 
the principals attitude towards risk. That is almost all
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what agency theory is about. The existing range of the 
agency theory is varying around this theme. As it has 
been debated in the previous pages, due to the assumptions 
of rationality and accurate assessment of risk (mean- 
variance) the mechanism involved in the agency models does 
not provide a holistic approach needed to make the 
principal-agent level of risk taking compatible.
Perhaps it may well be that additional attention in 
the area of discretionary investment management is 
required to enhance the agency theory. Then one could 
vary the way of dealing with agents. This has not yet 
been adequately researched.
As said previously, all agency theory is getting co­
ordination between superiors and subordinates just by 
financial contracts. This thesis argues that one cannot 
control at a distance by measuring agents' financial 
performance based on ROI and adjusting it to uncertainty. 
This suggests that the whole basis (the bedrock) of the 
agency theory is undermined in this type of organization. 
This is because the agency theory assumes that you are 
detached and you can through a very simple monitoring 
mechanism make sure that interest of principal and agent 
is aligned in terms of risk and return. But, if you cannot 
actually get a clear relation of risk and return in the 
first place (a finance theory problem), you cannot 
possibly construct a contract. Hence, I argue that an 
adequate measurement of uncertainty is a pre-requisite to 
design an agency contract. Even after satisfying this
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condition, the rationality involved in all the agency 
paradigms contradicts with saving transaction costs in 
managing the principal-agent fiduciary relationships.
Indeed, the fundamental commonality between all the 
agency models is that they all build on a simple form of 
monetary contract in order to try to get a common notion 
of risk-return attitude between the subordinate and the 
superior. The thrust of this thesis is about that it is 
impossible to have a simple notion of uncertainty. It 
cannot be captured through the quantitative probability 
analysis alone. It requires a fluid type of interaction 
between the principals and the agents before contracting 
and after contracting. Until that time theorists agree on 
how to measure uncertainty the development of sensible 
agency theory may be delayed for Mosnic type of financial 
institutions.
CONCLUSION
An important message to be derived from this chapter 
is that the theory of finance and particularly the MPT and 
perhaps the agency theory has stemmed-out from economic - 
based literature. Controllership studies have emerged from 
organization - based and other literature. The situation 
of Mosnic further confirms the fact that controllership 
literature in its behavioural perspective has helped in 
understanding the complicated organizational and human 
processes by which the portfolio management practice takes 
place in real life. Thus, if we really want to understand 
the management of investment houses, the two bodies of 
literature have to be fused together.
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CHAPTER - 10
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE, SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH, AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
section (A): IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
Implications for Investment Houses
This research can be of value to investment houses 
in the following aspects:
(1) Strategy
Formal strategic planning is a problem for investors 
in volatile financial markets. Investment houses in the 
Middle East (and may be in other parts of the world) are 
better-off externalizing the management of their port­
folios to a well chosen portfolio of agents. Thus, agent's 
sub-systems can be a reliable support to formulate the 
investment strategy. Portfolio managers have different 
types of specialization and diversified input (information 
sources) to investment strategy. The best investment 
strategy can be formulated by negotiating with the 
discretionary portfolio managers taking into account their 
investment models. The negotiation process is important 
and requires open and continuous interaction between 
investors and their discretionary asset managers. This 
research suggests that the maximum benefit which could be 
derived from the principal-agent interaction process is by 
involving the controllership function to interpret on a 
timely basis the principal's perception of risk to the 
portfolio managers. Through this process, the investment 
houses can overcome the problem encountered in relying 
entirely on measurement-based assessment of risk.
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The case studies in this thesis suggest that the 
portfolio managers who have been dealing with Mosnic 
started to appreciate the limitation of the MPT. There is 
no way that they can solely depend on aggregation in a 
single massive decision matrix where all factors can be 
treated quantitatively. They were flexible to maintain 
fluid interactions with the investors to arrive at a 
holistic understanding of their principals' goals. This 
finding can be of a value to a number of investors who 
still believe that the professional portfolio managers are 
miracle creaters through their technically well-developed 
models.
Integrating Sub-Svstems:-
In fact, you do not need to nor can you integrate the 
systems of a number of external organizations. This has to 
do with different people, different approaches, different 
organizational culture, etc. It is advisable to benefit 
from their diversified experiences, means and methods. 
However, this should be on condition that there is 
compatibility to the investors' needs. Consensus creation 
between agents' strategy, specifity, tight control of 
agents can be very close to rigidity. Indeed, investment 
houses need effective controllership function to manage 
these problems. Even the most talented Controller cannot 
totally remove ambiguity. Some of it is inevitable in the 
strategy process. Seeking ultimate specifity in the total 
strategy can be very costly. The investors and the port­
folio managers have to be ready at each process of stra-
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tegy to attempt to visualize what new patterns might exist 
among the emerging models of the different portfolio 
managers. The most effective investment strategy to be 
developed with a group of agents tends to emerge gradually 
from an iterative process in which the principals learn 
through the Controller from the professional portfolio 
managers. In the financial markets investors can hardly 
end up with global formulations of total strategies.
(2) Strategic Control
This study suggests that investment strategy, tactical 
decisions,and operations emerge in one complicated process 
which includes monitoring the implementation of the invest­
ment strategy. Thus, the involvement of the controller can 
be an important ingredient for managing these complicated 
overlapping processes.
This study also informs the global investors that if 
they work with the controllership function on a day-by-day 
basis two problems inherent in discretionary investment 
control can be moderated: (1) The problem of shift in 
investors' goals due to environmental turbulences; and (2) 
The problem of operating a number of heterogeneous sub­
systems .
(3) Strategy and Religious Ideology (Value)
The case of Mosnic suggests that the personal religious 
values of the investors impact their investment strategy. 
This may not be different from the argument of Guth and
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Tagiuri (1965) who believe that the managers' choice of 
strategy can be objective if they include their personal 
values among the elements they take into account in their 
analyses and decisions. This is because, according to Guth 
and Tagiuri, personal values are important determinants in 
the choice of strategy. Personal values are classified as: 
theoretical, economic, social, political and religious. 
Indeed, the religious values of stakeholders in some 
Middle Eastern investment houses tend to have a profound 
influence on their strategic investment decisions. This 
implies that the role of the controllership function can 
be a key factor in ensuring that such values are catered 
for by Western portfolio managers in the various decision 
processes. Hence, investors who would like to make their 
discretionary agents aware of their religious and/or other 
values, which impact the strategy formulation and goal 
setting, should consider involving controllers who are 
capable of communicating the stakeholders' ideologies to 
the agents and who can ensure that the latter has complied 
with them.
Ahmed (1987) argues that Islamic banks address the 
ideological objective of propagating the beliefs of Islam 
and the social objectives of helping the needy and provi­
ding cheaper finance for poorer customers. Discussing the 
profit objective, he believes that the spirit of Islam 
calls for making reasonable rather than maximum profit. He 
states that:
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"Because the objectives of Islamic Banks were 
influenced by Islam, organization structure, the 
evaluation of performance and administrative 
controls were also affected(P.599)
Indeed, the case of Mosnic implies that there can be 
a contingent relationship between the Islamic ideology of 
the organization and the design of its control system.
(4) Control System and Structural Constraints
Designers of control systems for investment houses 
which have similar characteristics as Mosnic need to look 
into other contingent variables which have influence on 
the design of their control system. These variables would 
include the discretionary agents' strategy, structure and 
processes, the financial markets, use of technology in 
corporate portfolio management, and the stakeholders' 
perception of risk and investment objectives. In Mosnic, 
information and communication technology also have emerged 
as contingent variables which influence the design of 
control system in investment houses. Information and 
communication technology tend to relate to both the 
principal's and agent's information technology. Hence, 
accounting systems in investment houses would require 
further development by looking into the contingent 
relationships between the information and communication 
technology used in the global investment business and the 
design of their corporate control systems.
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(5) Style of Management
This study offers a different approach of management 
to investment houses. It advocates that rational analysis 
of securities, which is based on economics, should not be 
the sole source of formulating realistic strategic 
decisions. Within the interactive management style, the 
research suggests that corporate strategists, controllers, 
stakeholders together with discretionary agents need to 
work beyond the formal limits of the asset management 
agreement. The interactive management style provides a 
useful learning opportunity for investors to attend to 
maximum market information in achieving the best possible 
management of the strategic uncertainties.
Indeed, the interactive management style described in 
this study can be borrowed by investment houses particu­
larly in the following concerns. The formulation of 
investment guidelines is a problem for investors, 
particularly those whose management style is similar to 
that of Mosnic prior to the recruitment of the Controller. 
Depending on the trust vested by the principals on the 
agents, the former can enter through an interactive 
trustful fiduciary relationship to seek the advice of the 
latter (the agent) in formulating the realistic investment 
guidelines. This approach is useful and keeps the 
discretionary agent satisfied with the objective to be 
pursued.
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However, interactive portfolio management may trigger 
the problem of agent accountability due to the involvement 
of the principal in the portfolio management processes. 
Indeed, the model of Mosnic suggests that the role of the 
Controller was important in orchestrating the principal- 
agent relationship in a way that the interaction between 
the two parties did not hinder the accountability of 
discretionary agents for unsatisfactory performance. In 
fact, a complete approach of discretionary portfolio 
evaluation called 'the holistic or the multi-system' is 
offered by this study. [See chapter (7)].
(6) Staffing
Throughout this research the Controller's responsibi­
lities have emerged as an integral part of the corporate 
management responsibilities. He was involved in the 
following: (1) strategy formulation, (2) agents selection,
(3) interpreting to the agents the shifting risk perception 
of the stakeholders,(4) change of the investment strategy, 
and (5) change of the organizational structure through 
feed-backing to the principals about the portfolio of 
agents serving the investment houses. The implication of 
this for investment houses is that the Controller is 
important and should be viewed as a top management level 
executive who effectively participates in the formulation 
of the strategic investment decisions. Thus, the 
performance of the Controller has to be evaluated in the 
light of his contribution to strategy formulation and 
implementation and not on his skill of applying mechanis­
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tic accounting techniques. The grounded theory of this 
research implies that this can be done without trade-offs 
in the Controller's independence and integrity.
(7) Skill
The case of Mosnic has highlighted the important role 
of the controllership function in the complicated strategy 
formulation processes, in undertaking strategic control 
responsibilities, and in maintaining the portfolio of 
agents. This required both special skills and specific job 
description for the Controller. Over and above these, the 
Controller's academic knowledge process proved to be 
important for refining the skills acquired from practice 
in field.
Implications for Investment Banks 
(THE PORTFOLIO MANAGERS)
1. Better understanding of clients' needs
Professional portfolio management firms are currently 
facing heated competition in winning the businesses of 
global investors who themselves know a great deal about 
the international asset management markets. Given the 
difficulty of obtaining information about portfolio 
managers, which is not in favour of investors, investment 
banks are beset with the problem of gaining competitive 
advantage over the numerous financial institutions 
competing for the funds of global clients to manage them 
on a discretionary basis.
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However, like Mosnic, these potential clients are 
likely to have reservations towards the sophisticated 
(quantitative) investment models which intended portfolio 
managers claim they can apply to achieve the highest ROI 
for the portfolio. In fact, intended agents also try to 
impress potential investors with their attractive 
historical performance data. Today's clients (e.g.
Mosnic) are not likely to take for granted all the 
literature presented by the agents about their financial 
institutions.
Global portfolio management institutions also should 
be more receptive to the specific requirements of invest­
ment houses, particularly if the requirements are consi­
dered by the latter to be important (e.g religious 
beliefs) and/or are given more weight when choosing a 
portfolio of external discretionary agents. For example, if 
the agent is likely to stick to purely security analysis- 
based portfolio models without getting involved in a 
process of interaction with the principals to understand 
the processes involved in the latters' perception of risk, 
the investment house might be better-off not to select 
such an agent.
Furthermore, if the agent's internal control system 
is not reliable enough to safeguard the discretionary 
assets, the investment houses has to decide between (1) 
not selecting the agent or (2) catering for alternative 
control processes to compensate for the agent's internal 
control weaknesses.
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2. Implication for Portfolio Managers 
Training Centres
The global investment world is dominated by measure- 
based training programmes to promote the skills of the 
portfolio managers. The newly hired portfolio managers' 
training workshops and even the training sessions designed 
for the experienced portfolio managers emphasize the 
sophisticated computerized MPT models for the selection of 
the securities. However, these training centres, which aim 
for promoting the competence of the professional portfolio 
managers, should also consider giving sessions on organi­
zational behaviour and corporate strategy which are also 
vital for the newly hired and even for the experienced 
staff. This would qualify the professionals to perceive 
beyond the sophisticated mechanistic models. It would 
actually help them to deal with the portfolio management 
trade in its wider human and social contexts. Indeed, it 
is only through such a wide vista of knowledge that 
investment management banks can approach portfolio manage­
ment with a holistic perspective that enables them to 
better appreciate the needs of their clients.
3. Implications for Religious Investment 
Organizations
This study develops practical ways and means of dealing 
in the Western investment markets for organizations which 
have Islamic religious ideologies which are different from 
those prevailing in the West and in the Pacific market 
block.
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The research implies that the problem of interest and 
usury, which worries Muslim investors because it dominates 
the world financial markets, can substantially be overcome 
by involving a corporate controller as a buffer between 
the investors and Western investment banks. This should 
help in educating investment banks about Muslim investor's 
requirements and at the same time to interpret the stake­
holders' ideological perception of investment risk to the 
Western portfolio managers. This risk is not only market 
or non-market risk. Rather, it is the risk of violating 
the religious percepts of the investors. In addition, an 
efficient controller would develop the necessary control 




SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
AGENDA FOR FURTHER CONTROLLERSHIP RESEARCH
This is not the end of the job of the researcher. The 
Controller of Mosnic has other responsibilities to perform 
in the company. He is involved in the pre-decision 
analysis in areas other than the discretionary management 
of marketable securities. The corporate portfolio of 
Mosnic includes beside the marketable securities the 
following other forms of investme.
1. Real estate companies in North America and Europe.
2. Domestic real estate investments.
3. Direct participation in the mutual fund investments.
4. Direct participation in the leverage-buy-out deals 
privately placed by the specialized investment banks.
5. Venture capital (seed money) investments.
6. Direct investment in projects.
7. Acquisition of stakes in the equities of local 
companies.
In these types of investments, having made the invest­
ment decision through direct analysis of the deals, the 
Controller monitors the performance of the concerned 
external managing partners and investment banks. He is 
also involved in the direct investments strategy 
processes. All these areas need comprehensive researching 
from different academic perspectives. Indeed, accounting
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and finance academic researchers have hardly tried to 
understand how the different types of business of 
investment houses work.
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT IN MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 
PRACTICE AND IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
This study has strived to explain the role of the 
controllership function in investment houses. It 
questioned the adequacy of the MPT approach for resource 
allocation in investment houses dealing in marketable 
securities through a portfolio of investment banks. It 
became clear that, even with all the development in the 
MPT, the making of investment decisions can be extremely 
complex. It became clearer that it was not enough to 
perform sophisticated calculations to structure a portfolio 
of marketable securities to yield a standard ROI. Rather, 
professional asset managers and controllers in the global 
investment houses should extend their practices of 
portfolio management beyond the techniques provided by the 
finance theory and approach this type of decisions with a 
more comprehensive perspective which takes on board the 
corporate strategy, controllership and financial
functions.
However, while I am not debating the capital 
budgeting techniques in this research which is concerned 
with marketable securities portfolios invested through 
discretionary asset managers, I would still add my voice 
to Tomkins (1991) who calls for distinguishing between the 
theory of finance and financial management as practiced.
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He says about finance theory that it:
"......... is a set of analyses all based upon the
world, and is not necessarily coincident with the 
view point of all practicing financial directors 
and managers. The theory of finance stems from 
the work of financially oriented economists and 
their efforts to understanding behaviour in 
financial markets." (P.73)
As comprehensively debated by Tomkins (1991), it is 
evident from various empirical studies on firms* invest­
ment appraisal practices that net present value (NPV), or 
its derivative adjusted present value (APV), is not the 
universally accepted criterion by which to measure the 
worth of an investment project. Using the same logic, the 
expected ROI measured through mean-variance approach to 
risk is not the only criterion to construct marketable 
securities portfolios. Accounting students and finance 
theorists will need to understand the organizational 
processes which lead to the emergence of investment 
strategy in the financial institutions.
This research also calls for giving more 
consideration to the quality of information rather than 
just focussing on the sophistication of the quantitative 
analysis techniques as is currently the case in the 
finance theory.
PROPOSED INTEGRATION OF THE DIFFERENT DISCIPLINARY 
APPROACHES IN THE INVESTMENT DECISION
One of the main themes emerging from this research 
(conclusion to chapter 9) is the need for an inter-discip­
linary approach to understand the investment of discretio­
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nary funds in marketable securities through portfolio 
managers. Indeed, the heavy involvement of the controller­
ship function in the decision making process and the 
development of the supporting control systems tended to 
have greatly helped Mosnic in satisfactorily managing both 
its investments and portfolio managers. Hence, a multi­
disciplinary approach to the study of such problems would 
likely help in unraveling the complexities of resource 
allocation in investment houses.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CASE STUDY RESEARCH
Accounting research methodology theorists (e.g. 
Scapens 1990) argue about methods of case study research 
that in a programme of case study research multiple case 
studies can be used for two purposes - replication 
(repetition) and theory development. Thus, these
theorists argument is that a number of similar cases might 
be selected to replicate the theoretical explanations. 
They add that, alternatively, dissimilar cases may be 
selected to extend the theory to a wider set of 
circumstances. Thus, after Scapens, the differences 
between the individual cases will be determined by the 
direction in which theoretical extension is desired.
This practitioner research suggests that the case- 
within-a-case study method (e.g. the Controller's cases 
within the Mosnic case), beside extending the same case 
through further case studies (e.g. the five agents case 
studies on the discretionary agents of Mosnic), can
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develop a rich grounded theoretical framework, capable of 
explaining a wide range of circumstances in details which 
cannot be reversed by further data. Moreover, the 
practitioner who has the access to the information and the 
expertise to understand the details is best fitted to 
conduct such vertical case study research.
THE GENERALITY OF THE SITUATION
Chapters (1) and (2) argued why this research is 
important and whether the case of Mosnic is representative 
or not. The author as a practitioner is in regular 
contacts with other investment houses in his region and 
Western firms specialized in monitoring discretionary 
portfolios assigned to different groups of asset managers. 
Based on these contacts, it was evident to him that this 
problem of maintaining a portfolio of agents, monitoring 
them, formulating strategy and holistically dealing with 
risk and ROI, also seem, to be experienced by large 
multinational organizations,governmental monetary agencies 
and central banks, and wealthy private investors. It is 
not a problem limited to the Middle Eastern Islamic 
investment institutions.
THE PROBLEM OF HAVING THIS TYPE 
OF RESEARCH DONE
In chapters (1) and (2) , I have argued in favour of 
practitioner type of research and have emphasized that it 
has a legitimate place beside other types of research.
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But the problem is how to have this type of work done.
The problem is embodied in the following:
1. Research students may not be allowed free access 
to get this sort of confidential information.
2. Even if they are allowed access to information,
the controversy will be on the quality of 
information. As said before, this is a problem 
for the finance academics who are accustomed to 
over-emphasize the analysis of information 
without ensuring the quality of data being 
analyzed. I have already argued that the 
practitioner has a better position to examine the 
quality of his data.
3. Even if the student decides to act as a partici­
pant observer in the organization to be researc­
hed, this can be very costly and still reflect 
only a small part of what actually occurs.
Given the fact that global investment researching 
requires a lot of travel, costly interaction with sets of 
people scattered around the world, huge amount of data, 
efficient telecommunication facilities with the world and 
the collection of the relevant professional literature at
high costs, ordinary academic scholars who have limited
resources may not be successful in this type of research. 
Unless some interested organizations (financial institut­
ions) stand behind the scholars or the scholars spend some 
time actually working in these institutions.
-478-
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